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Technical Note 
  
Non-English words are italicised; the transliteration of Arabic words follows that used 
in the International Journal of Middle East Studies. The meanings of non-English 
words are given in parentheses following their first appearance, e.g. ribā (in Arabic: 
interest). 
 
All dates are cited according to the “Common Era” (c.e.), numerically equivalent to 
the Christian a.d. 
  
To protect the identity of my interview partners, I have decided not to add a detailed 
list of interviewees as well as the different locations of the interviews. If for academic 
reasons more details are necessary please contact the author directly. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa. According to the 2006 census more 
than 140 Million inhabitants live in this West African country. Nigeria is ethnically, 
linguistically and religiously heterogeneous. Approximately over 500 languages1 are 
spoken in the country. Hausa in the north, Ibo in the south east and Yoruba in the 
south west are considered to be among the most important languages and dominant 
ethnic groups. Nigeria borders Cameroon and Chad in the east, the Republic of Niger 
to the north, the Republic of Benin in the west and the Gulf of Guinea to the south.  
 
 
(Wikipedia 2010) 
Today, Nigeria is a federation of 36 states with Abuja, as the Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT). In 1999 the Fourth Republic was declared after a democratic 
                                                 
1 http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=NG speaks of 527 “individual languages” in 
Nigeria among which 512 are “living languages” and 11 have “no known speakers” (4/10/2010). 
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election. This was the fourth attempt by a civilian government in Nigeria after three 
failed attempts and a long experience with military dictatorship.2 
Nigerians are considered to be among the happiest people in the world. This is 
based on an outcome of a study from the year 2003 comparing more than 65 
countries.3 Another study entitled “What the World thinks about God” dating from 
2004 regards Nigerians as the most religious people worldwide.4 A Global Corruption 
Report from 2009 published by Transparency International places Nigeria 121 among 
180 countries.5  
In the media, Nigeria is often known for oil, ethnic, and religious crises. In the 
Niger Delta area where many international oil companies operate, explosions related 
to leaking pipelines as well as kidnappings of Nigerians and foreign residents and 
workers of oil companies happen intermittently.6 The situation in this area of Nigeria 
is a result of unequal distribution of oil income. Nigeria has been a member of the Oil 
                                                 
2 Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in Oktober 1960. The country was then ruled by the 
Military with attempts of a civilian government. The First Republic was between 1963 and 1966; The 
Second Republic was between 1979 and 1983; the Third Republic took place in 1993 when 
democratic elections were organized and annulled by the Military.  
3 According to the www.bbc.co.uk/news of 02/10/2003 the study was published by the New Scientist 
magazine in the UK. It is based on a survey conducted between 1999 and 2001. The study dealt with 
the level of happiness and satisfaction of people with their lives in the country they come from. 
(4/10/2010). 
4  www.bbc.co.uk/news (26/02/2004). 
5 Transparency International (2009): Global Corruption Report 2009. Corruption and Private Sector. 
Cambridge: University Press, pp. 200-203; In July 2010 the Nigerian Minister of Finances declares his 
dissatisfaction with the actual situation and stresses that one of the greatest concerns of the actual 
administration is fighting corruption, see www.allafrica.com (15/07/2010). 
6 During the 1st October independence celebrations in 2010, a car bomb explosion in Abuja killed eight 
people and injured three. Rebels from the Niger Delta area seemed to be behind this action; see 
http://english.aljazeera.net for more details (2/10/2010).  
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971 and yet it is considered by the 
World Bank as among the poorest countries in the world. The report of 1996 
summarizes the situation of the country in the following: “Nigeria presents a paradox. 
The country is rich but the people are poor.”7 Indeed this paradox is confirmed by 
many Nigerians who see themselves as excluded from the wealth of their own 
federation.8  
Muslims and Christians are the two major religious groups in the country. 
Adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR) are a minority. There are no reliable 
statistics at hand. Most Muslims live in the northern part of the country whereas the 
majority of Christians live in the south, however, in Nigeria, there are no clear cut 
religious borders. The three religions can be found everywhere in the country and 
they frequently coexist side by side. Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are often 
misunderstood in other countries and largely interpreted as purely religious ones. In 
fact, it is not easy to separate ethnicity from politics, religion, and economy in Nigeria. 
All these aspects are tied together in a complex way. Events documented by the 
media as “religious” conflicts between Muslims and Christians in many cases go 
deeper than this simplistic and often superficial explanation. The last events in Jos in 
2001, 2004, 2009, and 2010 were in many cases interpreted as a religious struggle 
                                                 
7 World Bank (1996): Report No. 14733-UNI Nigeria Poverty in the Midst of Plenty. The Challenge of 
Growth with Inclusion. A World Bank Poverty Assessment, May 31, p. 1. 
8 Informal communications with Nigerians during my field research 2006/2007 and 2008. 
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between Muslims and Christians. The issue is much more complex than it appears to 
be.9 Of course there are many other examples of religious coloured conflicts.10  
Nigeria has been a member of the British Commonwealth since 1960. In 1986, 
the then president of Nigeria, Ibrahim B. Babangida, registered his country with the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). These two examples show that Nigerian 
politics is oriented more towards economic benefits rather than according to religion. 
The postcolonial era in Nigeria is characterised by political, social and religious 
instability. Since its independence from Britain in 1960 the country has passed 
through a tumultuous political experience. The civil war between 1967 and 1970 
revealed that the country was far from being stable. This fact is confirmed by almost 
thirty years of military dictatorship and four attempts at democratic rule in the last fifty 
years of independent Nigeria.  
The first constitutional debate of 1979 was the first significant event in the 
country where religious division became more visible. This has to do with controversy 
related to the constituent assembly and the resulting sharīʿa debate. The discussions 
amongst Muslims and Christians to include Sharia Courts of Appeal in the Nigerian 
constitution led to a political turmoil. The same problem was raised again 1999 when 
Zamfara State’s Governor Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru declared full re-
                                                 
9 For a background on Jos-conflict, see for e.g. Higazi, Adam (2007): Violence urbaine et politique à 
Jos (Nigeria), de la période coloniale aux élections de 2007, In: Politique Africaine 106, pp. 69-91. 
Ostien, Philip (2009): Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria, in: Muslim-
Christian Relations in Africa, pp. 1-44. 
10 See the example of the Kaduna 2000 riots and the Muslim-Christian controversy related to Sharīʿa 
in: Danfulani, Umar H. D. (2005): The Sharīʿa issue and Christian-Muslim relations in contemporary 
Nigeria, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksel International. 
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implementation of sharīʿa law in his state. After him eleven other northern states 
introduced Islamic criminal law. During that time, many observers began to doubt the 
new democratization process in the country. Debates were not only held in the media 
and amongst politicians, but also in academia. Scholars and researchers from 
different countries and disciplines11 developed a keen interest in the sharīʿa issue. It 
became clear that this phenomenon was being debated in a broader African context, 
especially in multi-religious societies where religion and identity are adjunctive.  
                                                 
11 A few conferences that have dealt with the recent debate are: “The Sharīʿa Debate and the Shaping 
of Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria”, University of Bayreuth, Germany, July 11th – 
12th 2003; “Comparative Perspectives on Sharīʿa in Nigeria”, University of Jos, Nigeria, January 15th – 
17th 2004 both founded by the VW-Foundation. A publication came out of it: Ostien, P., Nasir, Jamila 
M., and F. Kogelmann (ed.) (2005): Comparative perspectives on Shari'ah in Nigeria. Ibadan: 
Spectrum Books. Also a Multidisciplinary research project: “Sharīʿa Debates and Their Perception by 
Christians and Muslims in Selected African Countries” between 2006-2009 founded by the same 
foundation and hosted by different universities in Germany, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Sudan was 
a forum for scholars from different disciplines to deal with the Sharīʿa issue in different countries and 
contexts; see all details under http://www.sharia-in-africa.net.  
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1 The Study 
In the year 200512 I undertook a pilot study in Nigeria where I built a network of 
contacts in Jos and in a few other states in the North.13 At that time I was developing 
ideas about my PhD project. Sharī‛a-re-implementation was a current topic at that 
time. Informal discussions with scholars at the University of Jos, with both Muslims 
and Christians about possibility of such a project as well as accessibility to Muslim 
communities in the North led my attention to my research-project. Previous studies of 
the Izala movement in Nigeria highlighted that this movement is one of the most 
successful reform movements in the West African country. According to my 
knowledge, since the studies of Umar, Loimeier and Kane no academic work has 
been published on new developments of the movement in Nigeria. My presence in 
Jos where Izala has its headquarters, some informal contacts first helped me to 
establish networks with members of the movement. The organization was founded is 
Jos and many of its leaders live in that city. My connection with the Department of 
Religious Studies of the University of Jos facilitated contacts with scholars of religion. 
Informal discussions (with experts of religion, students, and members of different 
religious groups like of Sufis and Izala) allowed collecting information about the field 
and the religious situation in general. It was also an occasion to collect names and 
                                                 
12 I accomplished my Magisterarbeit (MA-thesis) entitled “Die Entwicklung der Šarī‘a-Frage in Nigeria 
Ende der 1990er Jahre” in Religious Studies at the University of Bayreuth. The study deals with the 
historical development of the Sharīʿa Question in Nigeria before, during and after the colonial time with 
a focus on Islamic Law and recent debate in northern Nigeria.  
13 Through the VW-Project on Sharīʿa strong partnership were built between the Department of 
Religious Studies (Lehrstuhl für Religionswissenschaft) of the University of Bayreuth, Germany and 
the Department of Religious Studies of Jos University, Nigeria.  
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positions of future interview subjects. It became clear that Jos is the ideal place to 
conduct research on Izala. This first impression of Jos and Izala was complemented 
with a visit to other towns which are different to Jos and the Middle Belt region of 
Nigeria. I used the opportunity to conduct research in Lagos and to have informal 
discussions with Muslim scholars at Lagos State University (LASU) from the 
Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies. These discussions were more directed 
towards Islamic Law and the re-implementation of sharīʿa than to Izala. 
After this short visit to Nigeria, a proposal of the study was drafted. My plan 
was to look at Izala’s recent developments and add two major aspects: the division of 
the movement into two main factions (Jos and Kaduna) and the re-implementation of 
sharīʿa law that influenced (or is influenced by) Izala in one way or another. The 
sharīʿa-factor in relationship to Izala has not been studied before. The contribution of 
the movement to the so called sharīʿa project and especially its perception were not 
considered in academia. 
Back in Bayreuth I joined the Volkswagen Foundation (VW) project “Sharīʿa 
Debates and Their Perception by Christians and Muslims in Selected African 
Countries” (2006-2009). This project was an opportunity to deal with methodological 
skills and research tools (see methods below). Debates with colleagues and senior 
researchers from different disciplines (Religious Studies, Anthropology, Islamic 
Studies, Political Sciences, Sociology, Theology, etc.) and critical discussions of my 
research proposal challenged my project at different stages.  
15 
 
My first field work in Nigeria was conducted between December 2006 and 
March 2007. During this time I lived in Jos while regularly taking short trips to Kano, 
Kaduna, and Zaria. The strategy during this field research was to collect preliminary 
data, make contact with Izala leaders and Sufis without ignoring those who regard 
themselves as independent from both. The spectrum of interviewees included both 
insiders and outsiders of Izala in order to develop a clear and objective view on Izala 
and Sharīʿa.  
The interviews on Izala supplemented with literature research at different 
institutions in Jos, Kano, and Kaduna. At the University of Jos, I consulted and 
collected BA- and MA-Dissertations in Arabic, Islamic and Religious Studies. 
Relevant material from the library of Mambayya-House, Kano, and Arewa House, 
Kaduna, were copied and documented. These institutions provided me not only with 
written material and names of important personalities related to Izala and the re-
implementation of sharīʿa, but they also were starting points for extending my network 
of contacts and potential interview partners.  
The objective was to interview representatives of the two basic factions of 
Izala: Jos and Kaduna, but also to speak to ex-members and outsiders. At the same 
time representatives of the two dominant Sufi brotherhoods of the Qādiriyya and the 
Tijāniyya were interviewed. The major goal for the first stage of field work was to 
identify figures of the movement, to create an overview of developments of the 
organization, to analyse its relationships to Sufis past and present and finally to 
identify the Izala contribution to the sharīʿa project of 1999. The focus during this 
16 
 
initial field work was the  ʿulamā', experts and religious leaders with the aim of 
extending these interview subjects at a grassroots level during future field research. 
The ʿulamā' as well as many religious scholars are the ones who witnessed the 
establishment of Izala towards the end of the 1970s. They played a major role in the 
history of the movement. When it comes to doctrinal differences between Izala and 
groups outside of the movement, the leaders are the primary source of ideas and 
religious doctrines.  
In 2008 the spectrum of the study was enlarged to include other parts of 
northern Nigeria and more case studies derived from different contexts were added. I 
conducted my field research between February and April 2008. During this period of 
the research eleven out of twelve northern states were visited. The only exception 
was Niger State. This was a result of my contacts in the field and the availability of 
interview subjects and by no means an exclusion of specific actors. The leaders of 
Izala in Jos and Kaduna were interviewed in different areas. Places like Maiduguri, 
Sokoto, Zamfara, Gombe, and Katsina – among others – were covered.14 
Thematically three basic topics were explored. First, the establishment of Izala 
as an organization and its presence in different regions of the north, its division into 
two major groups and the attempts of reconciliation constitute the first part of the 
interviews. The issue of leadership, money, and structure were also part of these 
discussions. 
                                                 
14 I am thankful to Dr. Philip Ostien for assisting with travelling in northern Nigeria. He was conducting 
research on Sharīʿa Courts in the twelwe Sharīʿa States. Joining him in 2008 allowed me to move in 
many places and conduct interviews with several Izala and non-Izala people in different states of the 
north.  
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The second topic is the relationship between Izala and Sufi brotherhoods past 
and present. In order to analyse this relationship between the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1990s studies published by Roman Loimeier15, Sani Umar16 and 
Ousmane Kane17 were used. Through interviews with Sufi and Izala representatives 
and ordinary members this relationship is analysed from the perspective of today’s 
leaders. Important here is the discourse of both groups as well the change in that 
relationship.  
The third and last topic of the interviews was the re-implementation of sharīʿa 
law in northern Nigeria and its impact on Izala and the Sufis. On several occasions 
Izala leaders claimed that the movement was the initiator of sharīʿa in the north. The 
expectations from the sharīʿa project were high. The re-implementation started at the 
top (by single governor) and was accomplished by the masses (sharīʿa re-
implementation in other states was forced at the grassroots level). The re-
implementation itself presents for Muslims of the north a “success”. All Muslim groups 
in northern Nigeria with the exception of the Shiʿites (knowan among Nigerian 
Muslims as Yan Shia; calls itself Islamic Movement in Nigeria) under the leadership 
of Ibraheem Zakzaky18 accepted and appealed for the re-implementation. Through 
                                                 
15 Loimeier, Roman (1997): Islamic reform and political change in Nigeria. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press.  
16 Umar, M. Sani (1983): Islamic Revivalism Today. The Example of Jama‘tu Izaltul Bidʿah Wa Iqamitis 
Sunnah, BA-Thesis, Jos University; Umar, M. Sani (1988): Sufism and Anti-Sufism in Nigeria, MA-
Thesis, University of Kano.  
17 Kane, Ousmane (2003): Muslim Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for 
Removal of Innovation and reinstatement of Tradition. Leiden, Boston: Brill.  
18 For his biography and the Shiʿism question see Suleimann, Galadima I. (2005): Mallam Ibrahim El-
Zakzaky and the Question of Shiʿism; BA-dissertation in Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria.  
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this pressure to implement Islamic Law a new situation developed: a situation in 
which all Muslim groups needed unity. According to Ousmane Kane “Any outbreak of 
major conflict between Christians and Muslims caused Muslims factions to unite and 
forget, at least temporarily, their doctrinal divisions to fight the common enemy.”19 
The sharīʿa issue was a major contention between Muslims and Christians. Izala as 
well as Sufis had no option but to come together.  
There are some claims within the Izala that the movement was the initiator of 
sharīʿa and that Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru is a member of the movement. There is 
no definitive answer as to how he became a member and how he was influenced by 
Izala. Sufis also claim that they were behind the re-implementation of sharīʿa in 
northern Nigeria.  
If we take the re-implementation itself, then it can be considered as the 
realization of a “dream” of many Muslims to re-establish what has been removed 
during colonial times. It is a matter of identity related to the situation in the legal field 
that existed during the time of the Sokoto caliphate which was forbidden by the 
British colonial administration. Northern Nigerians are emotionally attached to the 
Sokoto Caliphate and its history. For them, Izala and sharīʿa go side by side. Izala 
doctrine feeds into the sharīʿa project and sharīʿa can be regarded as a realization of 
Izala doctrine: Islamization of the society (not to be confused with an Islamic State 
project) - as some scholars describe it.20  
                                                 
19 Kane, Ousmane (2003), p. 211. 
20 Informal discussion with Prof. Musa Gaiya from the University of Jos 2006; the scholar of religion 
sees the Izala project in no way as an attempt to Islamize the state. Furthermore, it is an Islamization 
19 
 
During the field research, ordinary members and ex-members of Izala were 
interviewed in order to gain grassroots perspective on the movement. Although many 
members (especially young people) could not tell much about the history of Izala 
through biographical sketches they provided insights of Izala from a different 
perspective. The environment in which they grew up is an additional source of 
information on Izala. The interviews were supplemented with visits to Izala institutions 
in Jos and other towns. Mainly mosques and schools of Izala were visited. In Gombe, 
I had a unique opportunity to visit an Izala hospital.  
The first chapter is an introductory one. After dealing with what has been 
published/written on the Izala movement in Nigeria so far and its development in and 
outside of the West African country, the methodology throughout the dissertation is 
clarified. Then the theoretical framework is introduced. The second chapter is a 
historical one. It serves as a historical background for the next chapters. The history 
of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria with an emphasis given to the Sokoto Caliphate 
period as well as an outline of other Islamic groups in the country will be given. The 
Sufi brotherhoods played an especially important role in spreading of Islam in the 
country. The British introduced so-called “indirect rule” in Nigeria. This strategy as 
well as the development of Islam during the British colonial and post-colonial periods 
will be analysed. The struggle between Sufis and reform-oriented Islamic groups in 
the 1970s are taken in consideration. This is shown through the struggle of Sheikh 
Gumi and Sufi Brotherhoods. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the society by insisting on several societal aspects such as Islamic education, dressing code, 
education of women, ban of alcohol, etc. 
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Izala has a reform project in Nigeria, but it is not the only Islamic group with 
such a plan. In chapter three this notion of “reform” is dicussed in the Nigerian 
context. The examples of the Shiʿite movement, the Jamāʿat Tajdīd al-Islām (JTI), 
Maitatsine, Boko Haram, or Salafiyya groups are different manifestations of the same 
phenomenon. Some of these groups were established at the same time of the Izala 
foundation, others, such as Boko Haram, are contemporary ones.  
Chapter four deals with the establishment of Izala. It gives an overview about 
the life and contribution of Sheikh Idris to the movement. It serves to clarify issues 
related to Izala like the discussion on innovation (Arabic: bidʿa), and the relationship 
between Izala and Wahhabism. In this chapter the development of Izala from the 
beginning of the 1990s is outlined. In particular, the division of the movement into two 
major groups is analysed. The division of Izala which was mostly unclear to non-
Muslims in northern Nigeria, was a big event within the movement. The doctrinal 
differences and attempts of reconciliation as well as the amendment of the Izala 
constitution are important parts of the movement’s history. Doctrinal controversies 
and internal debates are in many cases hidden to outsiders. This chapter is an 
attempt to clarify some aspects of internal differences within Izala. The discourse(s) 
within the movement and the rationale of leaders regarding the division is analysed 
and reflected through interviews and writings from within the Izala.  
One cannot deal with Izala without dealing with its relationship to Sufis. In 
chapter five this relationship is elucidated. Especially in the context of the re-
implementation of Islamic law, the Izala-Sufi struggle took another dimension. The 
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controversy surrounding the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria was 
huge. This event was perceived differently. Some speak of a project of Islamization of 
Nigeria and see in sharīʿa a danger to the democratization process for the federation 
during the Fourth Republic. For many Muslims, sharīʿa was constitutionally adapted. 
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the constitution of the West African country and 
what happened was an adaptation of an Islamic Law that existed in northern Nigeria 
for hundreds of years. In this chapter, the discussion goes beyond the Muslim 
community of Nigeria. The sharīʿa controversy in the country is a national dilemma. 
This chapter deals with the intra-Muslim discourse on sharīʿa especially Izala-Sufi 
debate(s). In addition, the discourse between Muslims and Christians is illustrated. 
The concluding chapter serves as a summary of the results and findings carried out 
in this study.  
 
The objective of this dissertation is to go beyond the studies of Roman 
Loimeier, Sani Umar, Ousmane Kane, and to some extent Andrea Brigaglia. Apart 
from dealing with the current Izala movement in Nigeria and its leadership and 
structure and updating the work of the previous scholars, a central objective will be to 
examine the Izala-Sufi relationship today within the sharīʿa project. Sharīʿa re-
implementation in Nigeria brought all Muslim groups irrespective of their doctrinal 
differences together. Apart from the Shiʿites under their leader Ibraheem Zakzaky all 
Muslim groups and individuals welcomed the re-implementation. How different 
Islamic groups dealt with their differences within the context of sharīʿa will be a 
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central question in this study. The study attempts to answer the following questions: 
How did Islamic groups (Izala or Sufis) legitimize their initiation of the sharīʿa project 
with the Umma (Muslim community) in northern Nigeria? What kind of discussions 
related to sharīʿa took place? What was the role of other Muslim groups within this 
project? 
2 Scope of literature  
In academia, the works of Sani Umar, Roman Loimeier, and Ousmane Kane 
are among the most well-known on Izala in Nigeria. There are also cases dealing 
with the situation in the Republic of Niger (Masquelier’s study on Muslim women in 
Dogondoutchi town, Grégoire on Maradi town; Alidou on Muslim Women). Literature 
on Izala in other contexts like Ghana, Chad and Cameroon is limited. These other 
contexts could be a subject of investigation in the future. The material collected in 
Nigeria at different universities shows that much research on Izala can be seen as 
case studies. They were dealing with local developments of the movement in a 
particular place or town. Some of them deal with one aspect related to Izala 
(education, mosques, etc.). The founder of Izala and current leaders of the 
movement were also often subject of studies. The studies listed below are in no way 
complete and they are only samples of academic research related to Izala done by 
Nigerian and other scholars.  
The Izala movement attracted the attention of a few scholars from both 
western and Islamic countries. Intensive work on Izala was done by a Nigerian 
Muslim from the north, Sani Umar, who looked at the relationship between Sufism 
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and anti-Sufism in his country. The author is a Nigerian and a native speaker of 
Hausa originally from Jos where he had access to the movement and conducted his 
field research during a very important period of the organization’s development. His 
BA-Dissertation was submitted at Jos University in 1983 and his MA at Kano 
University. Sani Umar is considered to be the first scholar who dealt with Izala in an 
academic way.21 Sani Umar traces the changes of Islamic identity from Sufism to 
anti-Sufism in the postcolonial period.22 Umar takes note of a “popularization” of 
Sufism in Nigeria during the 1940s. He relates the growth of anti-Sufism in the 1950s 
to anti-colonial tendencies in Kano, Sokoto and Katsina. The revival of Islam started 
according to Umar with Sa’ad Zungur (1915-1958) and Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992). 
This trend continued during the 1970s with the popularization of Sheikh Gumi’s views 
by the media. Through the establishment of Izala in 1978 as an organized entity, the 
struggle between the movement and Sufi brotherhoods became more visible. The 
author concludes that anti-Sufism is a form of “protest” and “reorientation” within the 
Islamic religious field in Nigeria.  
The studies of Roman Loimeier and Ousmane Kane are two different analyses 
of reform Islam in Nigeria. The former is a western scholar of Islam 
(Islamwissenschaftler) and the latter is a Senegalese political scientist coming from a 
Sufi background. Both researchers conducted field work at the end of the 1980s. 
Both took Kano as starting point for their studies. Loimeier looks at the development 
                                                 
21 Umar, M. Sani (1983), (1988). 
22 See Umar, M. Sani (1993): Changing Muslim identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: from 
Sufism to Anti-Sufism, in: Brenner, Louis (ed.): Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 154-178. 
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of the Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria (the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya) and their struggle for 
power and for followers. The doctrinal differences between both brotherhoods 
especially during the 1950s and 1960s are well documented. The advent of Sheikh 
Gumi as a pioneer of reform in Nigeria led to a shift of the religious landscape in the 
north. The struggle began between him and the “unified” Sufi Brotherhoods. The 
dispute between both exceeded the intellectual dispute. In the early 1970s Gumi and 
several Sufi leaders exchanged attacks via their writings. The doctrinal differences 
and disputes led to physical attacks. Loimeier’s work can be considered as 
fundamental background-study of the Nigerian religious and political landscape after 
independence. Sheikh Gumi played a central role during this period. Gumi and his 
reform program are analysed by Loimeier in other publications23 as well as in a 
general overview on Islamic reform in Nigeria in comparison to other African 
contexts24  
It was no surprise that an organization that shared Sheikh Gumi’s stance vis-
à-vis the Sufi-brotherhoods was founded. This idea of establishing an organization 
was realized by Ismaila Idris through the establishment of Izala. Kane regards the 
establishment of Izala as a project of modernity. The organization is an interesting 
                                                 
23 Die radikale islamische Opposition in Nordnigeria, In: Afrika Spectrum, 32, 1, 5-23; see also 
Loimeier’ publication of the same year: Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of 
Abubakar Gumi and the 'Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria, in: David Westerlund (ed.). African 
Islam and Islam in Africa. Encounters between Sufis and Islamists, London, 286-307; Loimeier, 
Roman (2003): Patterns and Peculiarities of Islamic Reform in Africa, In: Journal of Religion in Africa, 
33, 3, 237-62. 
24 Loimeier, Roman (2005): De la dynamique locale des réformismes musulmans. Études 
biographiques (Sénégal, Nigeria et Afrique de l´Est), in: M. Gomez-Perez (ed.). L'Islam politique au 
sud du Sahara. Identités, discours et enjeux. Karthala, Paris, 29-48. 
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phenomenon in the history of Islam in Nigeria. The movement calls people to Islam 
based on the Qur’ān and the sunna. Izala invited followers to the old tradition of al-
Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (pious predecessors; the first generations after the death of the 
Prophet), but at the same time Izala established schools and asked for women to be 
educated. The movement recruited ʿulamā' as well as young people at an early stage 
of its establishment. It then developed into an officially registered organization in 
Nigeria. Izala adapted itself to the needs of people and concentrated on several 
aspects of social life to propagate its doctrine. Islamic education played an important 
role in Izala. From Kane’s study, it is possible to identify several main figures of the 
movement and its development in Kano state. Although Kane’s book was published 
in 2003, it was based on the materials he collected for his PhD dissertation25 at 
Bordeaux University in 1993. This valuable study on Izala started with the rise of the 
movement and ended with its “domestication” – to use Kane’s concept. In other 
publications26 Kane analyzes the main figures and the social environment in which 
Izala came out and relates it to economic and political changes in and outside of 
Nigeria (Sheikh Gumi’s influence, the Saudi factor, etc). Kane27 sees in Izala a 
project of “modernization” of Islam and links up it with several other reform 
movements in West Africa, for instance, in Mali or Senegal. Studying abroad and 
                                                 
25 Kane, Ousmane (1993): Les mouvements islamiques et le champ politique au nord du Nigeria: le 
cas du mouvement Izala à Kano, thèse de doctorat, IEP, Paris. 
26 Kane, Ousmane (1994): Izala: The rise of Muslim reformism in Northern Nigeria, in:  Martin E. Marty 
and R. Scott Appleby (ed.), Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of movements, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 490-512. 
27 Kane, Ousmane (1999): La polémique contre le soufisme et les ordres soufis en Afrique de l'Ouest 
post-coloniale, in: Frederick de Jong & Bernd Radtke (ed.) Islamic mysticism contested: thirteen 
centuries of controversies and polemics.  Leiden: E.J. Brill. pp. 324-40. 
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establishing Islamic schools mainly sponsored by Islamic countries like Libya or 
Saudi Arabia led to questioning the old tradition of Sufism and the legitimacy of its 
doctrine. 
These three studies on Izala are considered to date to be a basic source of 
information on the movement and its development. The three mentioned scholars 
conducted field research on Izala during the 1980s. Sheikh Gumi played a central 
role in the three works. Apart from the PhD-dissertation of Andrea Brigaglia28 which 
was more on the ʿulamā' of Nigeria and only partially deals with Izala; there has been 
no work on the movement during the past few years. In other PhD-dissertations 
written by Nigerian scholars, Izala is presented among many other Muslim groups or 
in the context of Sufi and anti-Sufi opposition. 
Sheikh Abubakar Gumi29 with the help of Ismail Tsiga published his own 
autobiography in 1992. Surprisingly the prominent Islamic scholar did not say much 
about Izala. Apart from mentioning his agreement with the movement, its ideas, and 
supporting its ideology, the Sheikh clarifies that he never belonged to Izala. He 
indicates how his student and Izala founder, Sheikh Ismaila Idris, used his book to 
criticise Sufism. When discussing the movement, he qualifies members of Izala as 
enthusiastic young people who joined the movement and contributed to its spread. 
The book deals more with important events in the life of Sheikh Gumi himself such as 
                                                 
28 Brigaglia, Andrea (2004): Testo, tradizione e conflitto esegetico: gli `ulamâ' contemporanei e gli 
sviluppi dell'esegesi coranica nella società nord-nigeriana (Kano e Kaduna), 1960-2002, 2004, Ph.D-
dissertation, Università degli Studi di Napoli 'L'Orientale. 
29 Gumi, Abubakar and Ismail I. Tsiga (1992): where I stand, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.  
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his education, teaching, politics and visits abroad. The preaching and his 
confrontation with Sufi leaders are also mentioned in this book.  
The book by Tanimu Aliyu30 written in the Hausa language about Izala is 
considered by many Izala members in Jos to be a main source of information when it 
comes to the history of the movement and the biography of Sheikh Idris. It is a 
biographical sketch of the Izala founder’s life. It also documents the major events of 
the movement throughout its history. The book traces the early history of the 
movement when the founder started his preaching. Not only does it document the 
important events and meetings, but it also lists the main figures who joined or 
assisted Sheikh Idris. In addition to that, the formation of some Izala institutions is 
reflected. Part of the publication is concerned with problems within the Izala 
movement, as well as opposition to the leader, yet still illustrating the success of the 
group while following the path of the Sheikh. 
The PhD-thesis of Abdulfattah O. A. Olayiwola31 is a study on Islam and 
Muslims in Nigeria. Apart from dealing with the history of Islam in the West African 
country, the study focuses on the rivalries between Sufis and anti-Sufis (Izala). The 
author places both tendencies at the same period of time. Olayiwola sums up Izala’s 
criticism of Sufism in three main points: Sufism in general, the Qādiriyya Sufi-
brotherhood, and the Tijāniyya Sufi-brotherhood. The movement underwent a period 
                                                 
30 Aliyu, Tanimu (n.d.): Ignantaccen Tarihin Jamaʿatu Izalatil Bidʿah Wa’Ikamatis Sunnah, Jos: 
Abdulazeez Printing Co. 
31 Olayiwola, Abdulfattah O. A. (1997): The polytomy of Islam in Nigeria- Emanation, implication, and 
possible rectification, PhD-thesis at the School of Postgraduate Studies, Islamic Studies, Department 
of Religious Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria; especially pp. 109-160 deal with Sufi-Izala relationship. 
The author gives a good analysis of the doctrinal difference between the two groups. 
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of formation and propagation of its ideas which led to the consolidation by its founder, 
Sheikh Ismaila Idris. This period can be considered a time of success for the 
movement. Finally, Olayiwola concludes that Izala reached a stage of 
“disintegration”. He adds that internal problems such as the division of the Society, 
the style of leadership, and the approach to Islamic daʿwa all contributed to the 
movement’s disintegration.  
In Nigerian universities and especially in departments of Islamic and Arabic 
Studies, there are several dissertations dealing with Islam, Muslims and Islamic 
organizations. In a number of BA- and MA-dissertations it is not difficult to ascertain 
the affiliation of the author and wether he or she is an Izala or a Sufi. These projects 
are valuable to provide the reader with insight into the movement at the local level. It 
is also a source of information about names and key figures of Izala. 
The MA-dissertation of Isyaku Yandaki32 is a valuable documentation of the 
Izala development from a historical point of view. After dealing with revivalism in 
Hausaland that led to the establishment of Izala, the historian gives his point of view 
on the development of the movement. He identifies three basic periods in the history 
of Izala: formative (1978-82); consolidation (1983-1988); and Izala as a reality (1988-
1990). Yandaki operates with the notion of “Tajdeed” (revivalism) and considers the 
rise of Izala within this framework. In his analysis, he deals with Izala in relationship 
to Salafism and Wahhabism before he looks at the movement’s relationship with the 
                                                 
32 Yandaki, A. Isyaku (1990): A history of the Izalah movement in Northern Nigeria up to 1989, MA-
Dissertation, University of Sokoto. 
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state, and especially with the Muslim community in northern Nigeria. This study is 
based on elaborate field research and interviews with Izala leaders. 
Abdurrahman Lawal Adam33 was an Izala member before he left the 
movement in the mid-1980s. Today he acts as a murshid (advisor) in Jos, in the JNI 
(Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām, Arabic: Society for the Victory of Islam, established 1962 and 
largely considered an umbrella organization of all Muslim organizations in Nigeria). 
His dissertation was written in Arabic, in the Department of Arabic and Islamic 
Studies, at Jos University. It gives insight into Islamic organizations in the city of Jos 
like JNI, Sufi-groups, and of course Izala. The study clarifies understandings of 
concepts such as shirk (Arabic: polytheism), bidʿa (among others) within these 
groups. The study is comparative, and explains concepts and doctrines of Sufis and 
Izala from different perspectives before it ends with suggestions for solving these 
problems in the concluding chapter.  
The MA-dissertation of Muhammad Nuhu Gurama34 delves deeply into the 
Izala division and the reasons for the split in the movement, as well the attempts at 
reconciliation and the failure to bring the two major Izala groups together. This work 
goes beyond analysing the Izala-Sufi relationship, and discusses leadership 
struggles in an Islamic organization. The author appears to be a sympathiser of 
Sheikh Idris as well as the Kaduna faction of Izala although he tries to present issues 
                                                 
33 Lawal Adam, Abdurrahman (1992): the Conflict between the Jama’atu Izalatil Bidʿah Waiqamatis 
Sunnah (JIBWIS) and the Sufi Orders in Jos and the stand of Jama’atu Nasril Islam (J.N.I.), MA-
Dissertation, University of Jos. (in Arabic) 
34 Gurama, Muhammad Nuhu (2000): Leadership tussles in an Islamic organization: A case Study pf 
the Jama’at Izala Al-Bidʿah Wa Iqamat Al-Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S), MA-Dissertation in Islamic Studies, 
University of Jos, Nigeria. (in Arabic) 
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from different angles. He deals with the split between “Ismailism” and “Maiganduism” 
(concepts named after Sheikh Idris and Alhaji Mai Gandu). The author always relies 
on history to make comparisons between what happened within Izala and what 
happened during the time of the Prophet. He goes even further when he suggests an 
“ideal” structure for the organization; the ʿulamā' will be at the top, and all other 
departments will be under the Council of ʿulamā'. His solutions for bringing Izala 
factions together are summarized in three major points: mutual toleration, avoiding 
fanaticism, and learning lessons from the history of Islam.  
Ismaila Idris is the founder of Izala. Dealing with his biography is interesting 
not only for Izala members, but also for outsiders of the movement as well as 
scholars. The BA-dissertation of Muhammed Sadis Muhammed35 deals with this 
topic. It is not only a documentation of Sheikh Idris’ life in different places (Bauchi, 
Kano, Jos, etc.), but also a good source of information on the fatwās (in Arabic: legal 
opinions) issued by the Izala founder on different topics such as jinn (in Arabic: spirit), 
Ahl al-Kitāb (in Arabic: people of the book; Christians and Jews), polytheism, etc. 
Sheikh Idris is the main source of legal opinion for the Izala faction in Jos. This study 
clarifies the stance of the Sheikh on a number of theological issues such as his 
opposition to freeing individuals from jinn possession, and his attack on the 
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday as an innovation. The Sheikh also opposes 
                                                 
35 Muhammed Sadis Muhammed (2001): Late Sheikh Ismaila Idris Bin Zakariyya- His contribution to 
the development of Jama’atu Izalatil Bidʿa Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S.) in Nigeria, BA-
dissertation in Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria.  
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eating animals slaughtered by Sufis and Christians, and providing his argument for 
this through fatwās. 
Jamila Adam36 focuses on the Izala contribution to Islam and Arabic Studies in 
Jos. Part of her work is about the rise of Izala and its founder, but she also focuses 
on different types of schools belonging to Izala. This can be considered a 
comparative study on the contributions of schools to Islam and Arabic in Jos. She 
gives a short history of each school, its number of students, and their curriculum and 
contributions. In addition to that, few actual Izala Jos leaders were interviewed, which 
is common among many studies which deal with the movement.  
Muhammed Safiyyu Abdulkadir’s37 MA-dissertation on Bauchi state is a case 
study of another Nigerian state dealing with a specific topic related to Izala. The 
author gives an overview on the establishment of Izala in Bauchi indicating that the 
movement was initiated in 1979 by people who attended the general meeting in Jos 
in 1978. The initiative started by establishing a mosque belonging to the Izala and 
performing the Jumuʿa (Friday) prayer in it. The first Imam in this mosque was Umar 
Getato. As in many cases, this was interpreted as a provocation and a danger to the 
unity of the Umma. After the Imam was arrested several times, the court allowed him 
to perform Jumuʿa prayer in the mosque beginning in 1980. As in many other states, 
the Izala in Bauchi was affected by the division. This split happened in 1987. The 
reasons are summarized by the author in eight points, including money, leadership, 
                                                 
36 Adam, Jamila (2005): The role of J.I.B.W.I.S in the development of Arabic and Islamic culture in Jos; 
BA-dissertation in Arabic Studies, university of Jos, Nigeria. (in Arabic) 
37 Abdulkadir, Muhammed Safiyyu Abdulkadir (2006): A literary survey of Arabic Sermons of 
J.I.B.W.I.S. in Bauchi Metroplois. Bauchi State, MA-dissertation in Arabic, University of Jos. (in Arabic) 
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issues related to fiqh (in Arabic: jurisprudence) such as marriage, definition of Ahl al-
Kitāb, attachment to the Mālikī School of law, etc. Izala preaching in Bauchi is the 
main subject of this study. Preaching is central and khutba (the Arabic for “Friday 
sermon”) are under the supervision of the ʿulamā' Council of the movement. The first 
part is an introduction related to a definition of the concept of khutba and focusing on 
its meaning in a religious context. According to the author, preaching by Izala 
members in Bauchi goes beyond a religious context and extends to social and 
political aspects of the community. These three aspects sum up the content of Izala 
preaching. In addition to that, Abdulkadir adds what he calls “khutba tashjīʿiyya” 
(supportive preaching) through which Izala invites its followers to continue following 
the path of the movement. This kind of preaching is also directed at other people in 
order to inform them of the organization’s ideas. The Izala preaching is within the 
framework of the Mālikī School of Law as understood by the founder, Sheikh Idris. 
Abdulkadir stresses the weaknesses of Izala preaching in Bauchi criticising the 
competence of Imams in terms of language and experience. He comes to the 
conclusion that this situation will not change since the organization restricts itself to 
the teachings of Sheikh Idris.  
The work of Idris Abdullahi Alhassan38 deals with one of the important 
institutions of the Izala faction in Jos. Namely, the Higher Islamic School, Sarkin 
Mangu, where the headquarters of the organization are also situated. Like many 
                                                 
38 Alhassan, Idris A. (2003): The role of School of Higher Islamic Studies Sarkin Mangu Jos in 
advancing the spread of Islamic culture, and Arabic language for the year 1989 to the year 2001, BA-
dissertation in Arabic Studies, University of Jos. (in Arabic) 
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projects, the study starts by giving an overview on the city of Jos and Islamic 
education in the city before the author deals with the history of Izala and its main 
figures, both past and present. This institution was founded in 1985 in Sarkin Mangu, 
Jos. In 1985, it obtained approval from the Ministry of Education in Plateau State as 
well from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria in 1989. The curriculum of the School is 
divided into two phases: preparatory (3 years) and secondary (3 years) in order to 
achieve a Secondary Level Certificate. In addition to highlighting the structure of the 
school and its institutional framework, the author also concentrates on the 
contribution of three important figures in the improvement of education in this 
institution. Five major subjects are taught in this school, namely Islamic Education 
(Qur’ān, tafsīr, ḥadīth, etc.); education (methodology, psychology), as well as Arabic; 
English, and Hausa. In addition to that there are other three subjects; the History of 
Islam, General Knowledge, and Household Training. The author accentuates the 
objectives of the schools: mastering the Arabic language and Islamic education, and 
preparing students for university. The author gives a variety of statistics and tables in 
his study which illustrate the contributions of former school students in spreading 
Islamic education. A number of issues are seen by the author as obstacle, such as 
lack of books and finances, and low levels of Arabic and English competency.  
Bawa D. Muhammad Anka39 presents a case study from Zamfara State where 
Izala was established on 25th May 1978. Similar to other contexts, Izala attracted 
young people more than any other population. This resulted in social conflicts within 
                                                 
39 Bawa D. Muhammad Anka (2002): Izalah-Tariqah relationship in Zamfara: A Study in perspective, 
MA-Dissertation in Islamic Studies, Usman Dan Fodio University Sokoto.  
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families and between Izala and other Islamic groups. Izala in Zamfara State are 
generally more peaceful than those states of the north. Also the division of the 
movement into two groups happened in Zamfara State and as a result two main 
factions emerged. This division, Izala’s changing of methodology, political 
participation, and sharīʿa re-implementation are seen by Muhammad Anka as 
reasons for rapprochement between Izala and Sufi brotherhoods in Zamfara State. In 
addition, the author highlights the impact of Izala on education (Islamic knowledge, 
establishing schools, etc.) and on social life (the changing of existing practices) in 
Zamfara State. This research is different from other studies on Izala since it gives 
examples of cooperation between the movement and Sufi-Brotherhoods. The author 
sees the re-implementation of Islamic law behind this rapprochement. 
The studies mentioned above are samples of works written on Izala. The 
spectrum is wider and depends on the context and department in which the project 
was fulfilled. Personal observations of BA and MA projects in the department of 
Islamic Studies, at Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto, show that most projects are 
more closely related to Sufism and to the histoy of the Sokoto Caliphate. Only a few 
projects deal with the Izala movement. This can be explained by the fact that Sokoto 
has been a centre of Sufism since the 19th century. The development of Izala seems 
to be similar in many northern states of Nigeria. The relationship to Sufis and also the 
division of the organization into two major groups can be compared in different 
contexts. The headquarters in Jos and later in Kaduna played a role in guiding the 
doctrinal lines of the movement. 
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Izala is a transnational movement. It spread not only to most Nigerian states 
but also from Nigeria to neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and the 
Republic of Niger. The case study of Masquelier40 on the town of Dogondoutchi, in 
the Republic of Niger, is a documentation of Izala development outside of Nigeria. 
From an anthropological perspective she shows the social conflicts that emerged 
after the coming of Izala. The new “mode of life” introduced by Izala created social 
conflicts in the town. Izala emerged during a time of economic weakness and it 
especially attracted young people. According to the author, it offers a discourse of 
“morality” in a time of dissatisfaction. Izala are categorized by Masquelier as reformist 
and conservative in comparison to mainstream Islam or to traditional Muslim clerics. 
Izala’s advent created several problems in families and between Muslim groups. The 
discourse analyzed by the author reflected the type of on-going discussions and 
debates among reform oriented Muslims (Izala) and ṭarīqa (Sufis) on the meaning of 
Islam. Antagonism is depicted through attacks on one group by the other, and 
destroying each group’s social image. For instance, name-calling often occurs 
between the groups, using terms as “donkey, dogs,” which illustrates “the animalized 
other” – as shown by the author. 
                                                 
40 Masquelier, Adeline M. (1996): Identity, alterity and ambiguity in a Nigerien community: Competing 
definitions of 'true' Islam, in: Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (ed.), Postcolonial identities in 
Africa, London, Zed Books, pp. 222-244. 
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In another publication41 the struggle for mosque space was a starting point in 
the history of Izala in the Republic of Niger. After that the movement changed its 
strategy to insist on the issue of “knowledge” and necessity of education, and 
especially the education of women. The movement questioned the existing religious 
authorities (Malamai; Hausa: traditional Islamic scholars) in order to establish its own 
system of values and norms, such as the way of dressing, the type of education, etc. 
Masquelier’s in-depth study on the same town is reflected in her book on “Women 
and Islamic revival”.42 This publication focuses on one charismatic scholar of the 
town who represents a Sufi answer to reform Islam, and particularly to Izala. The well 
respected Islamic scholar, Malam Awal, came to Dogondoutchi with a program to 
“purify” the town from Izala and establish his vision of “being a Muslim”. In this 
program women play an essential role in such a way that they gain more and more 
social prestige. If the Izala puts restrictions on marriage (i.e. quick marriage, law 
costs, etc.), the new order gives women space for “self-determination” (bride wealth, 
material needs, fashion etc.). Masquelier highlights that “women’s strategic efforts to 
defend their interests and agendas (…) centered on the redefinition of Islamic 
orthodoxy”.43 
                                                 
41 Masquelier, Adeline M. (1999): Debating Muslims, disputed practices: Struggles for the realization of 
an alternative moral order in Niger, In: Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (ed.), Civil society and the 
political imagination in Africa: Critical perspectives, 1999, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 
219-250. 
42 Masquelier, Adeline M. (2009): Women and Islamic revival in a West African town, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; in the same direction see the study of Husseina D. Alidou: 
(2005): Engaging modernity: Muslim women and the politics of agency in postcolonial Niger, Madison: 
The University of Wisconsin Press. 
43 Masquelier (2009), p. 277. 
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The study of Emmanuel Grégoire 44 examines the relationship between trade 
and Islam in the town of Maradi in the Republic of Niger. To be merchant and using 
the title Alhaji (pilgrim) is a prestigious social position in that town. This prestige 
developed recently by joining Izala as a kind of identity marker. Being an Izala in this 
context is a kind of rebellion against the existing Sufi authorities of Qādiriyya and 
Tijāniyya as well a rebellion against social rules. These merchants wanted to 
establish new societal regulations. Instead of establishing mosques they tended to 
build schools for education. A new affiliation dictates new social behaviour towards 
others and towards the old, established tradition. Grégoire makes an interesting 
remark when he compares the Izala ideology of the Islamic Brotherhoods with the 
relationship between Protestantism and Catholicism in a Christian context.45 
Furthermore, the Izala movement seems to combine religion and business. 
Abdoulaye Sounaye’s46 study deals with Izala in the Republic of Niger, 
particularly in an urban centre (Niamey). The movement reached the country during 
the mid-1980s and developed into a socio-religious authority. The Izala movement 
often uses different strategies to propagate its doctrine. Through the wa‘zin casa (in 
Hausa: national preaching), the markaz (in Hausa and Arabic: centre of social 
interaction), and the mosque, the movement’s discourse changed from being 
“marginal and périphérique” to a “plutôt accepté” discourse – as Sounaye points out. 
                                                 
44 Grégoire, Emmanuel (1993): Islam and identity of merchants in Maradi (Niger), in: Louis Brenner 
(ed.), Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1993, London, Hurst, pp. 106-115. 
45 Ibid. p. 114. 
46 Sounaya, Abdoulaye (2009): Izala au Niger: une alternative de communauté religieuse, in: L. 
Fourchard, O. Goerg and M. Gomez-Perez (ed.), Les lieux de sociabilité urbaine dans la longue durée 
en Afrique, Paris, L'Harmattan, pp. 481-500. 
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The wa‘zin casa is an occasion for international preaching, wherein preachers from 
outside the Republic of Niger come to preach. During these few days topics related to 
the situation of the Umma are discussed. This event is also an occasion to collect 
money for the movement and mobilize people of different ages to join Izala and 
assist. This can be compared to the maulid celebration of Sufis but, with different 
objectives and organization. The markaz is the place of “sociability” and appears as a 
place of continuous education. With a library and a weekly sermon every Thursday, 
this place attracts merchants, young people and other categories of people. The 
markaz is a place for building social networks. It can be compared with the Zāwiya in 
the Sufi context. The third place is in the mosque. It is a place of building the 
“communauté Izala” and for “mediation” among its members. Sounaye sees the 
mosque as a place for building the sense of “collectivity” in Izala. The author 
indicates three institutions that are used by Izala as “tools” to propagate its doctrine. 
This strategy aims to bring religious, economic and social aspects together. It allows 
Izala to dominate the “religious field” in which it operates. Finally, the author raises an 
important question related to the institutionalization and normalization of Izala. To 
what extent is it possible to talk the dynamism of its reform project in the future?  
 Robert B. Charlick,47 a political scientist, thinks that Izala (as the defender of 
Islamic morals) is an “Islamist movement” which confronted the Nigerian state 
several times on different occasions since the 1990s. The author explains that the 
movement has been looking for an “autonomous identity” which opposes the existing 
                                                 
47 Charlick, Robert B. (2004): Islamism in West Africa: Niger, In: African Studies Review 47 (2), pp. 97-
107. 
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traditional Hausa social rules. He adds that Izala attracted youth, merchants, and 
“urban unemployed” and it offers a particular system of values. Charlick concludes 
that Izala is “used in part to permit a form of capitalist economic modernization (…) 
without an acceptance of the western Beliefs…” 
 Olivier Meunier,48 anthropologist and sociologist who has published 
extensively on Islam in the Republic Niger, describes a phenomenon of unification of 
Sufi brotherhoods against Izala in the town Maradi that seems to be similar to what 
Roman Loimeier described in northern Nigeria. Meunier documents that the founder 
of Izala in the Republic Niger, Malam Chaibou, studied in Katsina (Nigeria) and was a 
student of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi in Kaduna, Nigeria before he returned to Maradi 
and founded the movement in early 1980s. His preaching was even recorded and 
transmitted on the radio. Meunier views in Izala a Wahhābī movement that crossed 
the Nigerian border to the town of Maradi. He relates the development of Izala to 
external influences, especially Saudi Arabia. The rise of the movement took place 
during a time of economic crisis (1980). Izala attracted many unsatisfied people and 
established itself as a movement against Sufism and the syncretistic practices of 
Marabous. In his book49 on Islam in Niger, the author differentiates between three 
major groups in Maradi: traditionalists (Sufis), rationalists (those who call themselves 
Mālikīs without any affiliation to Sufism or to reform Islam), and reformists (Izala). 
                                                 
48 Meunier, Oliver (1998): Marabouts et courants religieux en pays hawsa: dynamique de l’islamisation 
de la ville de Maradi à la fin du XIX° siècle et durant le XX° siècle, In: Revue Canadienne d’Études 
Africaines 32 (3), pp.521-557.  
49 Meunier, Olivier (1998): Les voies de l'islam au Niger dans le Katsina independant du XIXe au XXe 
siècle, Paris: Publications Scientifiques du Museum. 
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3 Methodology 
The Study of Religion offers different approaches for dealing with the 
phenomenon of religion. The historical-philological and the empirical-sociological 
methods are well-established, scholarly methods which are often applied. Many other 
academic approaches are also accepted, i.e. the anthropological, philosophical, 
psychological and even feminist approaches.50 In this study, I am not defining the 
concept of “religion” either in substantial or in a functional ways as it is the case in 
many publications in Religious Studies. I am going far beyond the problem of 
definition of the concept of “religion”, and the debate behind it. I am aware of the 
importance of this debate to my project. I think instead of defining “religion” myself I 
am looking at this notion from the angle of the Izala and Sufis.  
This study combines a historical and empirical approach. The history of Izala 
in Nigeria and its relationship to Sufis has been documented and analysed in this 
study. There is a lack of literature concerning recent developments, current leaders, 
and especially on-going discourses within the movement. The objective is to attempt 
to fill this gap in academia and especially to consider how Izala’s contemporary 
central figures reconstruct the history of the movement. Izala’s history from the 
perspective of its current members, ex-members and non-Izala seems to be 
                                                 
50 Literature on methods and approaches in the Study of Religion is diverse; for an overview on 
different perspectives dealing with this topic see for e.g. Connolly, Peter (1999) (ed.): Approaches to 
the Study of Religion, London and New York: Cassell; also Whaling, Frank (1995) (ed.): Theory and 
methods in Religious Studies. Contemporary approaches to the Study of Religion, Berlin and New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter. 
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consistent with what has been already written on the history of this movement. The 
empirical approach consists of dealing with actors from different religious 
backgrounds and affiliations (within Islam) and analyzing the actual discourse(s) and 
the doctrinal orientation of the movement.  
My field research in Nigeria took place between December 2006 and March 
2007 and again from February to April 2008. The aim of the first experience in the 
field was to build networks and connections to the Izala movement in Nigeria and to 
explore the “religious field” of the city of Jos. This endeavour was facilitated by the 
department of Religious Studies at the University of Jos.51 The first period of 
research was restricted to identifying central religious figures and leaders in Jos and 
to exploring the relationship between the movement and Sufism. It did not take much 
time to identify Izala leaders linked to the founder, Sheikh Ismaila Idris and within the 
Jos faction and finally, others linked to the second group: the Kaduna group which 
split from the Jos faction. The Izala was established in Jos and its headquarters are 
still in Jos. Today, followers of Sheikh Ismaila Idris have their national office at Sarkin 
Mangu, Jos. The Kaduna faction and its leaders are based in the same town, as well 
in Kaduna. The leaders of Izala can also be found in other northern states.  
Being affiliated with Izala as a movement or as a religious organization doesn’t 
require any initiation, ritual, official forms or membership fees. The organization 
requires the acceptance of its doctrine and rejection of Sufism as basic elements of 
                                                 
51 I am thankful to the Head of the Department of Religious Studies, Prof. U. Danfulani who hosted me 
and introduced me to his colleagues but also for his assistance in all directions; I am also thankful to 
all staff of the department. Through Mallam Dawood Abubakar I had my first contacts with Sufi 
Sheikhs and Izala members in Jos. I really appreciate his valuable support and patience.  
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association. The same is true if a member decides to leave Izala. There are no 
requirements or restrictions. Affiliation or membership of ordinary people among 
Muslims in more than one Islamic group or organization is socially accepted and 
widely practised in Nigeria. Very often I have heard statements like “when I was 
affiliated with the Tijāniyya” or, “when I left the Qādiriyya” or, “I am a member of the 
Izala Jos faction”. In most cases this kind of membership or affiliation has to do with 
the social environment of the person being interviewed. If a person grew up in a Sufi 
community, then it is plausible that he or she became a Sufi and the same thing is 
true if most family members are Izala adherents.  
 
Interviews and discussions:  
During the first field research (2006 and 2007) I conducted thirty-five 
interviews and five informal discussions with experts of Islam and other religions in 
northern Nigeria. At the very early stage in my research I restricted myself to 
interviews with experts. I spoke to leaders from the Izala affiliated with the Jos or the 
Kaduna branches (sixteen interviews). I also interviewed seven Sufi leaders (two 
from Qādiriyya and five from the Tijāniyya). In addition, twelve subjects were 
interviewed from different groups and religious orientations in order to understand 
their points of view on Izala, Sufis and sharīʿa. Part of this group provided outsider 
perspectives as former Izala members or religious leaders who are related neither to 
Izala nor to Sufis. The most important thing during this field work was to identify the 
actual leaders of Izala and interview them about the history of the movement as well 
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their relationship to other Islamic groups, past and present. Their views are 
complemented by the views of Sufis as well as by ex-members of Izala, but also by 
leaders from different doctrinal orientations (Salafi, neutral, sharīʿa expert, etc.). All 
subjects were male. Concerning the five informal discussions they were conducted at 
the University of Jos with scholars (Muslims and Christians) from the departments of 
Islamic, religious, and historrical studies.52  
 During the second stay in the field thirty-eight interviews were conducted 
(thirty-two with male subjects and six conducted by a female research assistant with 
six women in Jos). During this period of time, the viewpoints of ordinary Izala 
members in Jos were added to further interviews with Islamic scholars. Biographical 
interviews with members of the Jos faction of Izala (eight in Jos, one in Dutse) were 
conducted in addition to expert interviews in different local contexts of northern 
Nigeria (Gombe, Gashua, Maiduguri, Dutse, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, and Gusau).  
The interviews were conducted in English and Arabic. Only in two cases were 
interviews conducted in Hausa with simultaneous translation. Arabic interviews were 
transcribed and translated into English. During the first field research a voice recorder 
was used during the interviews. In many cases, my interview subjects were sceptical 
about recording the interview and I decided to take notes only. 
During the analysis of the interviews many statements (like the history of Izala, 
reasons for the split, its relationship to Sufism, sharīʿa-contribution, etc.) were 
repeated several times by different interviewees. That is the reason why not all 
                                                 
52 Discussion with Dr. Gwamna (Religious Studies), Dr. Yilpet (Theology), Prof. Dahiru Yahya (Islamic 
Studies), Prof. Sati Fwatshak (History) 
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interviews were considered in my work. My selection was related to the importance of 
the information and the position of the interview subject in relation to Izala or other 
relevant groups.  
Observation(s):  
 During my stay in Nigeria I visited several mosques and institutions belonging 
to both Izala and Sufi-brotherhoods. These visits were not related to interviews or any 
academic work, but rather to build networks as well to develop a personal view about 
the religious field in northern Nigeria. Performing prayers was always an opportunity 
to meet people and to think about the views and differences reflected during the 
interviews by the different interview subjects. In some cases I interviewed Sheikhs in 
the mosque and during the interviews believers came to perform their ṣalāt  (in 
Arabic: prayer) or practice their congregational obligation (Arabic: waẓīfa) for e.g. 
Besides mosques, I visited classes of the School for Higher Islamic Studies in Jos 
and a primary school in Kano (both belong to the Jos faction of Izala). In Gombe, I 
also visited the Izala headquarters linked to the Jos faction and had a unique 
opportunity to visit a hospital belonging to the organization.  
Material collected: 
 Besides the interviews, additional materials and sources of information were 
collected. I used the opportunity and the networks with Nigerian scholars to access 
the libraries of religious studies, history and Islamic studies departments. These 
libraries were a treasure of unpublished material on Islam in northern Nigeria. They 
provided information on Izala, Sufis and other Islamic groups in the local context. 
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Some BA-, MA-, and PhD-dissertations relevant to my topic and found in Jos, 
Sokoto, and Kano were also consulted and collected.  
I also collected publications mainly from the Izala branch in Jos. There are 
pamphlets, books, booklets, and publications of leaders, such as published 
transcripts of Friday-sermons. Izala Izala faction in Jos has a shop in which all 
material related to the movement (sermons, seminars, meetings) are VHS-recorded 
and sold to their members as well as to the public. CDs and audio-cassettes of Izala-
leaders (and others) circulate in the market. I have collected samples of this material 
as well material from libraries and bookshops in Jos and other towns in the North. 
 
4 Theoretical framework 
 The rapid growth of Izala in northern Nigeria was outstanding and has 
attracted the attention of scholars from different academic disciplines.53 The 
explanations for this development vary. An analysis of the whole situation in Nigeria 
in the 1970s proposes that political, economic and social disorder and uncertainty 
lead to the rise of new religious movements like Izala. Such a development does not 
occur only in the Muslim context.54 The role of charismatic figures like Sheikh Gumi 
or Sheikh Idris and their call to reform Islam in Nigeria also played a crucial role in 
                                                 
53 See obve my literature review. 
54 New religious movements regularly appear and disappear in Christian and other religious contexts; 
for a good summary on religious movements in Africa in both Christian and Muslim contexts see 
Hackett, Rosalind (2011): Millennial and Apocalyptic Movements in Africa. From Neo-Traditional to 
Neo-Pentecostals, in: Wessinger, Catherine (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism, New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 616-674. 
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transforming the Izala into a mass-movement. On the one hand nobody can claim 
that Izala is the most influential Islamic organization today since we lack reliable 
statistical figures. On the other hand we cannot deny that Izala developed into a 
significant actor on the Islamic landscape alongside the influential and diverse 
communities of Nigerian Sufi-brotherhoods. Both Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya are 
historically the two major actors in “Nigerian” Islam. Even today, places like 
Maiduguri, Kano, and Sokoto are Sufi centres par excellence. However, we are not in 
the position to offer a final overview about the different groups and orientations of 
Nigerian Muslims.  
 In my project, I do not try to develop a theory of religious organizations 
although I am dealing with a religious group from a sociological perspective. I am 
also not discussing whether Izala is a religious “organization” and/or a religious 
“movement”.55 I believe that Izala fulfils the requirements of both: it started as a 
movement of a single charismatic person and developed into a modern organization. 
Thus, I am using both terms interchangeably. Furthermore, I am looking at Izala’s 
recent development(s) and aspects that have not been studied in academia or within 
a new religious field of sharīʿa re-implementation.  
 The tools of my analysis are the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Harvey 
Whitehouse and Rodney Stark. Why these three approaches? There is something 
the three have in common: they are not defining religion or restricting their theories to 
                                                 
55 I am thankful to Prof. Dr. Achim von Open who directed my attention to this point during the BIGSAS 
Advanced Work in Progress Colloquium, Iwalewa Haus, University of Bayreuth, Germany, 3rd 
December 2010.  
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a particular group or religious tradition. The theories can be applied to various 
religions. In addition, none of these three theorists use data derived from an Islamic 
context. All three seem to offer a model for a better understanding of religious groups 
in general. I will implicitly use these theories to analyse and interpret the development 
of Izala in the conclusion. I think that Bourdieu’s terminology for instance offers an 
excellent tool not only for describing the Izala movement, but also the change(s) that 
occurred within it.56 Furthermore, the theoretical frameworks of Whitehouse and 
Stark generate new insights into the dynamics of Izala as a religious phenomenon. In 
the following these theories are introduced.  
4.1 Bourdieu applied to Izala57  
Steven Engler emphasizes that the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has 
recently been (re)discovered by scholars of religion and he expects a further growth 
of this tendency. According to his observations, a number of scholars, especially in 
the field of sociology of religion, are attracted by Bourdieu’s theory and his 
terminology.58 This surprisingly late interest in Bourdieu’s concepts by scholars of 
religion might be explained by the fact that he undertook research on religion only to 
                                                 
56 Ousmane Kane (2003) uses Bourdieu’s theory in dealing with the Izala movement. It is interesting to 
show the changes in the religious and political “field” of Izala he has described. Big events in the 
history of the movement like the division and later on the Sharīʿa re-implementation are new elements 
in the history of Izala.  
57 Some aspects of my theoretical framework were presented at BIGSAS-Colloquium “Advanced 
Works in Progress”, 4-5 February 2010, Iwalewa Haus, University of Bayreuth, Germany as well 
during the Workshop “Continuity and Change in the Religious Field: Perspectives from Africa, 12-16 
July, 2010, Chair of the Study of Religion 1/BIGSAS of the same institution. I am thankful to all 
participants of both events for their comments and recommendations. 
58 Engler, Steven (2003): Modern Time: religion, consecration and the state in Bourdieu, In: Cultural 
Studies 17(3/4), pp. 445-446. 
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a limited extent as David Swartz observes. Bourdieu only published a study on 
French Catholic Bishops in 1982 and two articles on sociology of religion in 1987 and 
1991.59 Some key concepts of Bourdieu’s theory are capital, habitus, field, and 
symbolic power. They are compatible with more than one academic discipline. They 
are applicable to culture but can also be used in the context of economy, religion or 
philosophy.  
Bourdieu’s notion of capital60 is manifold. The most important are: economic 
capital, which can be converted into money and is institutionalized in property rights; 
cultural capital which is under certain circumstances related to economic capital and 
its institutionalization manifested in educational qualifications; and finally social 
capital based on social obligations and institutionalized in titles of nobility. 
For my project the concepts of cultural and social capital appear important and 
appropriate. Thus, I want to explain both concepts in more detail. Concerning the 
cultural capital, Bourdieu differentiates between embodied, objectified, and 
institutionalized forms.  
By embodied he means the notion of culture, cultivation, or “Bildung”. This capital can 
be converted into habitus and “cannot be transmitted instantaneously” like money or 
property. It is acquired and it depends on time, society and social class. It is 
unequally distributed and needs power in order to be imposed and transmitted.61 
                                                 
59 Swartz, David (1996): Bridging the study of culture and religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s political economy 
of Symbolic power, In: Sociology of Religion 57 (1), p. 71.  
60 Bourdieu, Pierre (1986): The Forms of capital, In: Richardson, John (eds.): Handbook of theory and 
research for the sociology of education. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-258.  
61 Ibid., pp. 244-245. 
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The objectified state of cultural capital is related to the first type (embodied) 
and is “objectified in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, 
monuments, instruments, etc.” It is transmitted materially but also symbolically.62 The 
last state of cultural capital, the institutionalized, is more related to academic 
qualifications that gives its holder a kind of “certificate of cultural competence”. These 
qualifications are differentiated between people in a particular society and establish a 
system of values.63 
If the cultural capital is more or less related to the individual, the social capital 
is related to groups of people. Bourdieu also calls it “collectively-owned capital”. Its 
volume depends on the networks of an individual and on his or her capital. It is based 
on the principle of “solidarity” and “durable obligations”. A kind of “symbolic 
constitution” emerges from these and “recognition” (in the group) takes place. 
Production of social capital requires – according to Bourdieu – “an unceasing of 
sociability” and “a series of exchanges” in which recognition is “affirmed and 
reaffirmed”. A group regulates its own rules internally and appoints a representative 
as a leader who enjoys symbolic power.64 
 The described forms of capital and people’s habitus are to be found in every 
field of the society (politics, religion, education, art, etc.). These various fields are not 
isolated from each other, and are based on symbolic power. In all fields a struggle for 
                                                 
62 Ibid., pp. 246-247. 
63 Ibid., pp. 247-248.  
64 For more details on the “cultural capital” see ibid., pp. 248-253.  
50 
 
this symbolic power takes place. These dynamics and the interactions between the 
fields constitute the habitus of a particular society. Bourdieu defines that notion as:  
“The habitus is the source of these series of moves which are 
objectively organized as strategies without being a product of a 
genuine strategic intention – which would presuppose at least that 
they are perceived as one strategy among other possible 
strategies.”65  
 
Actors produce and reproduce “objective meaning”. Important for Bourdieu is the 
“orchestration” of the different meanings to produce a “common-sense world” on the 
basis of common practices. These actors come across as “similar” or “identical” 
experiences. The common habitus of these actors is then perceived as “immediately 
intelligible and foreseeable” and “hence taken for granted”.66  
The production of habitus requires “mobilizers” (prophets, leaders) who master 
common codes and who can undertake “corrections” and “adjustments”.67 The 
reproduction of habitus can take place as a result of an “inculturation” and 
“appropriation” through which “objective structures like language or economy can 
reproduce themselves”.68  
In the course of the development of a common habitus a new form of capital 
emerges: the so-called symbolic capital. This type is characterised by Bourdieu as 
“the most valuable form of accumulation” and has to do with acknowledgment and 
                                                 
65 Bourdieu, Pierre (1977): Outline of a theory of practice, Cambridge: University Press, p. 73. 
66 Bourdieu (1977), pp. 79-80. 
67 Ibid., p. 81. 
68 Ibid., p. 85. 
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prestige.69 This capital is better called “symbolic violence” and is necessary because 
it is the “only way in which relations of domination can be set up, maintained, or 
restored”.70 This “invisible” form – as qualified by Bourdieu – is “neither officially 
declared nor institutionally guaranteed”71. This power cannot be acquired by a 
distribution of economic capital. It is based on what Bourdieu calls “virtue”.72  
The different types of capital as well as the construction and regeneration of 
habitus and the symbolic violence require an abstract setting. Bourdieu suggests the 
notion of field, characterised by its dynamics and based on particular rules, 
mechanisms and structures. The concept of field is located in many places of the 
society. It can be a “field” of art, of economy, politics, or religion. Magnus Echtler,73 
anthropologist and scholar of religious studies from Bayreuth, offers a good 
description of what the notion of field means in Bourdieu’s terminology. The metaphor 
of game summarizes the whole situation. In every game there are players playing 
and developing their skills to master the rules. The example given by Bourdieu is that 
of roulette. Playing the game means accepting its rules and regulations. This 
metaphor reflects a more important game which is social game. This type is a long-
term one and has implicit regulations in a particular field and depends on players and 
their positions. This social game differs from roulette as formulated by Echtler: “But 
unlike roulette, where the result of the game is determined by chance, social games 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 85. 
70 Ibid., p. 191. 
71 Ibid., p 193 
72 Ibid., p 194. 
73 Echtler, Magnus (2008): Changing rituals - The New Year’s festival in Makunduchi, Zanzibar, since 
colonial times, PhD thesis, University of Bayreuth.  
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are always rigged: the actors who accumulate the highest amount in the right 
combination of capitalia will usually succeed.”74 
According to Bourdieu, a game requires a strategy that he defines as “(…) the 
product of a practical sense, of a particular social game”.75 Players differ in their 
capacity to play by using effective strategies and by adapting to new and/or different 
conditions in particular. As Bourdieu formulates it:  
“The good player, who is as it were the embodiment of the game, is 
continually doing what needs to be done, what the game demands 
and requires. This presupposes a constant invention, an improvisation 
that is absolutely necessary in order for one to adapt to situations that 
are infinitely varied. This cannot be achieved by mechanical 
obedience to explicit, codified rules (when they exist).”76 
 
According to Echtler, Bourdieu develops his notion of habitus or his theory of practice 
respectively as an answer to “objective and subjective theories”. According to his 
theory the habitus of people is based on the experience of people in a way that it can 
be produced and reproduced.77 The concepts of field, capital, and practice are 
interrelated. Echtler formulates it accurately: “All practices are strategic in the sense 
that interested actors compete with each other, make use of the capitalia at the 
disposal in order to enlarge their capital or improve their position within the field of 
                                                 
74 Echtler (2008), p. 28. 
75 Pierre Lamaison and Pierre Bourdieu (1986): From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre 
Bourdieu, p. 112.  
76 Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
77 Echtler (2008), p. 25 
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practice.”78 Habitus is dynamic and is based on actors’ “unlimited capacities” to 
generate it.79 
Since the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria in 1999, the 
relationship between Sufi-Brotherhoods and Islamic reform movements like Izala has 
been affected in a very profound way. It changed from violent confrontations to 
peaceful co-existence. These two groups reduced their long on-going struggle over 
doctrinal questions. To elucidate this phenomenon and to put it into a theoretical 
framework I will use Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of field, capital, habitus and symbolic 
power. Kane80 uses Bourdieu’s theory to describe the religious field in Nigeria and 
particularly the field in which Izala was established. Kane agrees with Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the notion of capital that symbolic capital in a particular field is more 
important than economic capital and identifies “accumulation” and “conservation” of 
capital as key concepts of that theory.81 
For the “religious field” of northern Nigeria Kane proposes the following five 
categories of capital. 1) Non-formally certified cultural capital (exoteric knowledge 
and esoteric science - Sufism), 2) formally certified cultural capital or exoteric 
knowledge like a university certificate or mastery of Qur’ān, 3) economic capital 
(material wealth), 4) symbolic capital (fighters for the cause of Islam) and 5) social 
capital (supporters, clients, disciples, etc…).82  
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 30.  
79 Ibid., p.31. 
80 See Kane (1993) and (2003) 
81 See Kane (2003), pp. 20-23. 
82 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
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The applicability of the Bourdieu’s theory by Kane in the context of the Izala 
movement is summarized in the following:  
 
“An assumption of Bourdieu’s field theory is that, in each field, one 
finds a struggle between the “newcomers” and the “established 
dominant actors.” The strategy of each category of players (or their 
game) is determined by the quantity and the types of capital they 
possess (e.g., money, followers, prestige, knowledge, etc.). In all 
fields, established dominant actors controlling diverse sorts and 
substantial volumes of capital will tend to be very conservative in 
order to preserve the structure of the field – understood as "the state 
of power relations among the agents and institutions engaged in the 
struggle […] to defend the monopoly and keep out competition".”83  
 
 The category of “newcomers” is very important when it comes to the start-up of 
Izala. This group is represented by the youth, women, and a new generation of 
entrepreneurs who supported Izala from the beginning. Through biographies of some 
actors of Izala Kane shows how capital was obtained and how it was converted within 
the Izala religious field into other forms, for instance: economic capital to a social or 
symbolic one. This change offers the movement an opportunity to set up its own 
ideology against the traditional religious institution.84 
Kane uses Bourdieu’s theory to explain the Izala phenomenon. An important 
question arises here: what is the relevance of using the same approach with the 
same movement again? The answer is: since Ousmane Kane’s research the 
                                                 
83 Ibid., p. 227. 
84 For a brief summary on the application of Bourdieu’s theory of field on Izala see Kane (2003), pp. 
228-233. 
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religious field is entirely re-defined. Izala has new leaders, the movement is divided 
into two major factions, and the discourse is different to the 1980s and 1990s. Even 
more important is the whole new setting: re-implementation of sharīʿa by the northern 
states. These new challenges affected Izala politically, economically and religiously. 
 The Izala of today is faced with many challenges. The new religious and more 
precisely the Islamic religious field is different from the past. The Izala of today is 
divided between the Jos and Kaduna factions and both are contending for 
acknowledgement among their adherents. The Izala is also part of the Muslim 
community as a whole at a national level as the sharīʿa issue shows. 
 The religious field in which Izala is acting nowadays is different from how Kane 
described it. The setting he illustrated and in which Izala evolved has changed. 
During the time of Sheikh Idris, the establishment of a strong mass-movement with 
many followers was at the top of his agenda. The category of “newcomers” (youth, 
women, etc.) as well of those who possessed an economic capital (merchants for 
e.g.) played an important role in the start-up phase of Izala. Islamic preachers 
(Arabic: duʿāt, sing. dāʿi) who joined the Izala-founder came with their cultural capital 
and assisted in the process of recruitment. The founder enjoyed loyalty and respect 
and Izala was mainly focused on fighting Sufis and Sufism and attracting new 
adherents and followers.  
 Today the movement is affected by internal strife and friction. The religious 
field is re-defined. The Jos-faction’s leader, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir, a former 
student of the Izala founder and current leader of the Izala faction in Jos, is attached 
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to the tradition of Sheikh Idris and defines all aspects of “being-an-Izala” in relation to 
the tradition originally established by him [Idris]. In Kaduna group, the two 
distinguished Sheikhs are Sheikh Yusuf Sambo and Sheikh Rabiu Daura.85 The Izala 
religious field in Kaduna is different from what the founder of the movement 
established. Defining Izala-identity internally and acting as a dynamic movement 
within the Muslim community of Nigeria are the new challenges that Izala are facing 
today. These challenges are elaborated in the coming chapters.86  
4.2 “Modes of Religiosity” theory 
The “modes of religiosity theory”87 of Harvey Whitehouse can also be a model 
for explaining the Izala development. This type of cognitive approach is new in 
religious studies and has not been applied to any Islamic context. In his theory, 
Whitehouse is interested in religious experience and in explaining cognitive 
mechanisms in the transmission of religion or any religious ritual.  
This theory recognises remembering and motivation as crucial elements for 
any particular religion or ritual that wants to survive. Religious beliefs and rituals 
should be repeated and easily accessible to people. They must be meaningful for 
believers in order to be transferred from one generation to the next.88 
                                                 
85 Both Sheikhs Yusuf Sambo and Rabiu Daura are the leaders of the Kaduna faction of Izala that split 
from the founder Sheikh Idris. 
86 See chapter “Reform Islam vs. Sufism.” 
87 This approach is elaborated by the author in several of his publications and especially in his book 
Whitehouse, Harvey (2004): Modes of Religiosity: A cognitive theory of religious transmission, Walnut 
Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press.  
88 Whitehouse (2004), p. 64. 
57 
 
Based on literature in psychology, Whitehouse analyses the notion of memory 
and divides it into two types: an implicit and an explicit one. By “implicit memory” he 
means “those things that we know without being aware of”. For the explicit memory – 
which is more important for us – he distinguishes a short-term from a long-term 
memory.89 
The long-term memory is also sub-divided into semantic and episodic. The 
semantic type reflects “knowledge about the world” and the individual is unable to 
remember the point in time of its adoption. The episodic type deals with particular 
events in life (death, war, etc.). According to Whitehouse, these types of memory are 
activated differently in what he calls “doctrinal” and “imagistic” modes of religiosity.90 
These two modes occur separately or together in a single religious tradition. 
For the doctrinal modes, frequent repetition of religious rituals, a long-term-episodic 
memory, religious leaders, hierarchy, and orthodoxy are important for a doctrine to 
survive. The imagistic mode of religiosity is characterised by its low frequency 
(initiation for e.g.) and its high emotional arousal. It doesn’t need orthodoxy, it is hard 
to spread, and it appeals episodic memory.91 
In the case of Izala the doctrinal mode appears more applicable. Why? We 
might get the impression that Izala tends to the doctrinal mode of religiosity while 
                                                 
89 Ibid., p 65 
90 Ibid.  
91 The two modes are explained in detail in Whitehouse (2004), pp. 65-85; Whitehouse (2002): ‘Modes 
of Religiosity: a cognitive explanation of the sociopolitical dynamics of religion’, In: Method and Theory 
in the Study of Religion 14 , 2002, pp. 293-315;  
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Sufism is the imagistic one. This superficial assumption can not explain a complex 
religious field like northern Nigeria. 
Since the establishment of Izala in Nigeria a conflict emerged between the 
movement and the Sufis. Applying Whitehouse’s theory, the conflict was a matter of 
doctrine, or a matter of doctrinal mode of religiosity to be more precise. The Qādiriyya 
and Tijāniyya Brotherhoods have a long tradition in northern Nigeria and are well-
established. These two brotherhoods dominate Sufism in northern Nigeria. They offer 
two different methods for drawing closer to God. Their differences are doctrinal in 
nature. Through the intermediaries of sheikhs/saints both of them construct a silsila, 
or a chain of knowledge going back to the Prophet and from him to God. Sufis keep 
the basic tenets of Islam. In addition, they have their own practices generally 
established by the founder. In most cases, the founder of the order is identified with 
miracles. Adherents of the Tijāniyya for example claim that the founding Sheikh 
Aḥmad al-Tijānī saw the Prophet in daylight. Qādiris also associate many miraculous 
events with ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, their master. Tijāniyya and Qādiriyya followers 
believe in baraka, or benediction of the saint. Both seek for tarbiyat al-nafs, or 
guiding of the soul. Unlike Qādiri, Tijānī followers reject asceticism, zuhd.  
Tijānīs cannot be affiliated with another Sufi order. When they are initiated by 
a muqaddim (in Arabic: introducer, initiator) they are asked to recite the daily litany, 
and participate in special Tijānī congregational prayers. The ḥaḍra (in Arabic: séance 
in congregation) on Friday is central to the doctrine of the Tijānī. Qādiriyya have also 
their special prayers. They celebrate mawlid, the birthday of the Prophet. They 
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commemorate their sheikhs, visit tombs, organize naming ceremonies for new-born 
babies, and participate in walīma (in Arabic: gatherings for things like death, marriage 
or birth).  
 Izala has questioned the relevance of Sufism and expressed doubt about its 
theological sources. For Izala, Islam is only based on the Qur’ān, the sunna of the 
Prophet, and the tradition of “al-Salaf al-ṣāliḥ” – the pious predecessors. The 
movement does not believe in sainthood, miracles, or any existing intermediary 
between God and human beings. Izala preaches tawḥīd (the oneness of God) and 
sees the message of the Prophet as the last revealed one. The movement was 
mainly established to fight bidʿa and to “purify” Islam from all aspects of shirk and kufr 
(Arabic: non-belief).  
The elements described by Whitehouse can be identified in these different 
religious groups. The presence of religious charismatic leaders is assured. The 
doctrines are preserved through repetition, and rituals are memorised by adherents 
and followers.  
 The imagistic and doctrinal modes of religiosity are related to each other and a 
deeper analysis of this theory may gives us an opportunity to better comprehend 
what is happening between Muslim groups in northern Nigeria. Historically a doctrinal 
struggle among Sufi brotherhoods took place in the 19th and 20th centuries. To what 
extent this theory is applicable to Sufis groups as well to Izala will be shown in the 
coming chapters.  
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4.3 Religious Market Theory & Religious Movements 
 The history of Izala has been characterized by a perpetual struggle against 
Sufis and Sufism. Through this conflict the Izala emerges as a conservative 
organization looking for its own identity among many other Islamic groups in northern 
Nigeria. When it was established, the Izala “changed” its course and concentrated 
more on education and daʿwa-activities than on attacking Sufism.  
 The following chapters summarize the achievement(s) of the Izala over the 
course of its more than thirty years of history. This period of time is characterized by 
success and failure at different levels: internally and externally. The limits of these 
accomplishments are shown by the Izala itself. A crucial question is wether we can 
speak of success or failure of a religious movement that has been divided into two 
major factions? Furthermore, wether or not, and how the movement achieved its 
goals? In order to understand the limits of the success or failure of Izala, the 
Religious Market Theory is applied since it offers a model of understanding of growth 
and decline applicable to any religious movement.  
 In the religious context, the Religious Market Theory/Religious Economy was 
developed by the sociologists of religion Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge in 
the mid-1980s. This approach to explain the phenomenon of religion with a 
terminology usually used in economics is discussed extensively and controversially. 
The so-called “religious economy” is a religious activity that can be found in any 
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society – according to Stark and Finke.92 In a “religious market” there are “potential 
adherents, a set of one or more organizations seeking to attract or maintain 
adherents and the religious culture offered by the organization.”93 Religious 
organizations are compared to “firms” competing for members. These firms are 
differently organised and have various regulations and logics. Lay people are seen 
as consumers following their demands and have the choice between several offers. 
Religious leaders are the “religious producers” who produce religious goods for the 
needs of their clientele. They make efforts to satisfy the needs of their followers, 
advertise their products and compete with others in order to protect their adherents 
and gain new-comers. The religious market needs to be pluralistic and all “religious 
firms” have the opportunity for marketing their ideas. This plurality depends on the 
number of “firms” existing in a particular religious market. This market generally 
consists of “niches“, which are “market segment of potential adherents sharing 
particular religious preferences (needs, tastes, and expectations).”94 
 Stark conducted his field research in the U.S.-American society and most of 
his studies are generally located within a Christian context - he published extensively 
on the notion of “God” and on “monotheism” - just to mention some. His theory could 
be applied universally to any religious movement. He defines religious movements 
                                                 
92 Stark, R. and R. Finke (2000): Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
93 Stark and Finke (2000), p. 203. 
94 Stark and Fink (2000), p. 284. 
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as: “social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply 
religion to some set of individuals.”95 
 According to Stark, if a religious movement wants to achieve a certain level of 
success certain requirements must be fulfilled. He summarizes them in the following 
ten points. 
1. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they retain 
cultural continuity with the conventional faith(s) of the societies in which they 
seek converts.  
2. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that their 
doctrines are non-empirical. 
3. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they maintain 
medium levels of tension with their surrounding environment – they are strict, 
but not too strict. 
4. New religious movements are likely to succeed to the extent that they have 
legitimate leaders with adequate authority to be effective:  
i. Adequate authority requires clear doctrinal justifications for an 
effective and legitimate leadership;  
ii. Authority is regarded as more legitimate and gains in effectiveness 
to the degree that members perceive themselves as participants in 
the system of authority.  
                                                 
95 Stark, Rodney (1996): Why Religious movements succeed or fail: a revised general model, in: 
Journal of Contemporary Religion, Vol. 11 (2), p. 134. 
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5. Religious movements will grow to the extent that they can generate a highly 
motivated, volunteer, religious labour force, including many willing to 
proselytize. 
6. Religious movements must maintain a level of fertility sufficient to at least 
offset member mortality. 
7. New religious movements will prosper to the extent that they compete against 
weak, local conventional religious organisations within a relatively unregulated 
religious economy.  
8. New religious movements will succeed to the extent that they sustain strong 
internal attachments, while remaining an open social network, able to maintain 
and form ties to outsiders.  
9. Religious movements will continue to grow only to the extent that they 
maintain sufficient tension with their environment i.e. they have to remain 
sufficiently strict. 
10. Religious movements must sufficiently socialize to young people so as to 
minimize both defection and the appeal of reduced strictness.96  
 
Stark regards religious movements as things that appear and disappear depending 
on the conditions of any given society. They evolve either from an old religious 
tradition or can be initiated through a person who invents them. These movements 
share one feature: all of them bear the risk of failure:  
                                                 
96 Ibid., pp. 136-144. 
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“This year, hundreds of new religious movements will appear on 
earth. Some will be formed by disgruntled members who withdrew 
from older religious bodies. Others will be born because someone 
created or discovered new religious culture and convinced others of 
its authenticity. However, whatever their origins, virtually every new 
group will have one thing in common: eventual failure.”97  
 
 The approach of Stark goes further and applies the so-called “rational choice 
theory” to religion. This theory is well-known in economics and to some extent in 
sociology and a few other disciplines. From an economic point of view, individuals try 
to maximize benefits on the one hand, and on the other to minimize their expenses. 
Economists observe that market mechanisms depend on daily decisions made by 
“consumers and producers (who) rationally calculate profit and loss”98 In the context 
of religion the theory of rational choice combines market behavior with individual 
religious action.99  
As mentioned above, religious institutions are considered “firms” offering 
different products and compete against each other for a monopoly within the market. 
Consumers (or adherents) have the choice to define their needs and calculate their 
benefits. 
When it comes to Islam, the Religious Market Theory seems to draw the attention of 
scholars. The sociologist of religion, Massimo Introvigne, applied it to Islam in Turkey 
                                                 
97 Stark (1996), p. 133. 
98 Spickard, James V. (1998): Rethinking religious social action: What is „rational“ about rational 
choice theory?, in: Sociology of Religion. Vol. 59 (2), pp. 99-115. 
99 Spickard (1998), p. 99. 
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and few other Muslim societies.100 He focuses on the concept of “niches” – developed 
by Stark – and its relationship to “strictness”. Religion is often perceived to be stricter 
when its symbolic costs are higher and when its members are expected to believe 
and behave in more traditional and conservative ways than society at large.”101 He 
developed a model where he classified Islamic groups into five categories:  
 ultrastrict (Al-Qāʿida for e.g.);  
 strict (like Brotherhoods, Wahhabism); 
 moderate-conservative (Naqshabandiyya Sufi brotherhood); 
 liberal (Baʿath Party); 
 ultraliberal (Islamo-Marxism).  
 
Following this categorization he designed a “Model of the Turkish Religious Market” 
and proved that Stark’s theory can be validated empirically in an Islamic context.  
Introvigne’s insight generates the question of the applicability of the Religious 
Market Theory vis-a-vis the Izala movement in northern Nigeria. Does it help to 
understand the enormous growth of Izala during its first two decades of existence? 
Does it also explain a potential failure of the movement?  
 If we apply the “Religious Market Theory” in the north Nigerian context we can 
state that the “religious market” in which the Izala operates is “pluralistic”. In addition 
to Muslims, Christians and adherents of African Traditional Religions are part of the 
                                                 
100 Introvigne, Massimo (2005): Niches in the Islamic Religious Market and Fundamentalism: 
Examples from Turkey and Other Countries", Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion: Vol. 
1(1), Article 3, pp. 1-23. 
101 Ibid, p. 3. 
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general religious landscape of Nigeria, and there are sub-categories in each of these 
communities. Among Muslims, the two Sufi-brotherhoods (Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya) 
had a quasi-monopoly because of their well-established tradition in northern Nigeria. 
Loimeier102 elaborates on the struggle between them during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Sufi Brotherhoods made big efforts to win new affiliated members in their ṭuruq 
(Arabic: brotherhoods). The theological and to some extent political debates came to 
an end with the appearance of the Izala movement at end of the 1970s. 
                                                 
102 See Loimeier, Roman (1997): “Islamic reform and political …”, especially chapter two “The 
development of Sufi Brotherhoods in Nigeria”, pp. 19-104. 
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Chapter Two: Religious Landscape in Nigeria  
 This chapter serves as a historical background to the current development in 
the country. It gives an overview on the spread of both Christianity and Islam in 
Nigeria. The focus here is the religion of Islam. In this context, these chapters 
highlight the establishment of the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya Sufi brotherhoods, give 
insights into the Britisch colonial policy of “indirect rule”, and finally document the rise 
of anti-Sufism during the post-colonial period.  
1 Christianity in Nigeria 
 Unlike Islam, Christianity found its way to Africa’s most populous country 
through missionaries. The first “sporadic” activities of Christian missionaries in the 
southern part of Nigeria took place in 1515. In the early 16th century, a few Christian 
missionaries like Gregorio Lourenço and Afonso Anes were in Nigeria but without 
much success.103 The following attempts to Christianize Nigeria suffered from the 
same set-back. The historian Toyin Falola explains this fact in three basic elements: 
slavery and trade of slaves at that time, lack of missionaries who were able to 
undertake proselytization, and lack of finances. The activities of missionaries were 
intensified by the end of the 19th century in the south of the country. Christian 
organizations (esp. Protestant and Catholic ones) from Europe and North America 
were interested in a “great missionary expansion”. Some introduced Christianity as 
                                                 
103 Isichei, Elisabeth (1983): A History of Nigeria. New York: Longman Group Limited, p. 318. 
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an alternative to slave trading and found a way to enter the West African country.104 
To some extent, this mission can be interpreted as an answer to the presence of 
Islam that has a long tradition in the country.  
 The Christian missionaries opted to spread Christianity amongst Africans 
themselves. This strategy is known as “native agency”. It reduces costs, protects 
non-Africans from diseases, and especially mobilizes Africans to propagate 
Christianity in their local regions.105 
After Slavery was abolished many former slaves from Sierra Leone, Cuba, and 
Brazil returned to Nigeria after 1830. They were considered by Europeans to be 
potential missionaries who could expand Christianity. Furthermore they were 
essential elements needed in the education and health sectors.  
 In 1840 a British expedition, The Niger Mission, came to the Niger River area. 
This organization had a religious background, but tried through trade activities to 
come in contact with local leaders. This can be considered one of the most 
successful activities of the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.) and led to the 
conversion of many people in Nigeria.106 
The C.M.S. was successful especially among the Yoruba in the south (Lagos, 
Abeokuta, Ibadan und Ilesa), and in the Delta Region. In that area Methodist and 
                                                 
104 Falola, Toyin (1999): The History of Nigeria. Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, p. 
40. 
105 Ibid., p. 41. 
106 Falola points out the success of this mission through the activities of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, a 
former slave known as the „hero of the Niger Mission“. This man is the first African Bishop of the 
C.M.S., see Ibid., p. 41. 
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Catholic Churches were established. Catholicism spread among the Yoruba and the 
Ibo. 
The success of Christian missionaries in Southern Nigeria can be explained by 
the fact that Yoruba-leaders expected that “the missionaries would help them win 
their wars and procure arms and missionaries.”107 
 Concerning the Delta Region there were more economic interests behind the 
success of the missions. Local traders were interested in contacts with Europeans. 
This explains why leaders in those areas allowed the establishment of Christian 
schools in their territories.  
The spread of Christianity in southern Nigeria is due to the fact that people 
associated reforms with Christianity. For the local leaders of that time Christian 
missions offered solutions to their problems. Missionaries were involved in local 
politics and played the role of intermediaries, for instance, missionaries were 
responsible for putting an end to the Yoruba confrontations. This kind of role brought 
missionaries more respect and confidence from local rulers, but also amongst 
common people. In addition, missionary schools played a crucial role in converting 
people: “in many places, the church and the school went together”108 – as Falola 
points it. 
 When Christianity in Nigeria gained a foothold, African religions were 
increasingly characterized as symbols of “paganism”. Traditional deities, priests and 
                                                 
107 Ibid., p. 42. 
108 Ibid., p. 42-43. 
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temples were rejected. Traditional values were not respected and were largely 
replaced by new Christian norms and values.109 
Christianity in Nigeria came through the southern region before it spread to other 
parts of the country. By the end of the 19th and 20th centuries and through the 
activities of the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and Sudan United Mission (SUM) 
several Christian missions were initiated in the Middle belt region and spread from 
there to the north. This enterprise was interrupted by the coming of the British who 
restricted missionary activities in the north. The “Nigerian Christianity” – as Klaus 
Hock connotes it – became more fastened (“befestigt”) through the independence. 
From that time Christian missions became more intensified in the north. Klaus Hock 
calls it the “strategic counter-invasion” (“strategische Gegeneroberung”) of Islam. In 
addition to the SIM, the SUM intensified their missions, as well as the Catholic 
Church, the Methodist, the Church of Brethren Mission (CBM), the Qua Ibo Mission, 
and the United Missionary Mission (UMS) undertook the same project.110 Klaus Hock 
observes that the Christian Churches in northern Nigeria had no split like what 
happened in the south of the country with the establishment of African Independent 
Churches.111 
Christian missions played a central role in spreading Christianity. Through the 
structure of the missions and especially their concentration on education led to their 
                                                 
109 Ibid., p.44; also Isichei (1983) confirms that both the Catholic and Protestant Mission condemned 
aspects of traditional religions, p. 326. 
110 Hock (1996), p. 46. 
111 Ibid., p. 48; the absence of such a split does not mean that African Independent Churches are not 
to be found in northern Nigeria. Churches like Celectial Church of Christ and Aladura are well 
established in especially in big towns of the north, see Ibid., p. 49. 
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success among the African population of Nigeria. Christian missions started in the 
south of the country and succeeded in recruiting African missionaries familiar with 
their local communities. At a later stage, European missionaries themselves 
intensified their activities in all directions. Concerning northern Nigeria missionary 
activity was restrained by the policy of “Indirect Rule” of the British before entering in 
the post-colonial period, and a new and more successful era.  
 
2 History of Islam in Nigeria112 
 The territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its political borders is a 
product of the colonial era. Nigeria as a state did not exist before the coming of the 
British. The first contact between the population of what is today known as Nigeria 
and Islam happened during the 8th and 9th centuries through tradeing caravans 113 
coming from North Africa. The German scholar of religion and theologian, Klaus Hock 
describes this period as “superficial Islamization” (“oberflächliche Islamisierung”). 
This first contact took place especially in the north-western part of the territory. 
Concerning the north-eastern area located near Lake Chad known as Kanem-Bornu, 
Islam came during the 11th century with traders from Egypt and Fezzan (Libya). Islam 
especially attracted people elite members of the society and remained for a long time 
                                                 
112 This chapter is based on my unpublished M.A.-Dissertation (2005) “Die Entwicklung der Šarī‘a-
Frage in Nigeria…”. 
113 The majority of these traders were Ibadites belonging to Charijite-Islam. This group of people were 
pushed back as well in West Africa as in North Africa. Instead of this version of Islam, Sunni Islam 
became dominant; for more details see Hock, Klaus (1996): Der Islam Komplex. Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 
p. 14.  
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as such. After a period of weakness during the 16th and 17th centuries Islam became 
a “religion of the masses” in that area.114 
 In the Hausa states, the Algerian Islamic scholar and reformer ʿAbd al-Karīm 
al-Maghīlī played a crucial role in the process of Islamizing the region. Islam was 
spread by this scholar at the end of the 15th century and was adopted by Hausa kings 
from the beginning of the 16th century. Al-Maghīlī’s influenced the masses as well the 
Hausa kings who adopted his ideas and suggestions for reform.115  
 The history of Islam in Nigeria remains incomplete if the Sokoto Caliphate of 
the 19th century and the jihād movement of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio are not 
mentioned. The Sokoto Caliphate was one of the important kingdoms in West Africa. 
It spread beyond the current borders of Nigeria. Sheikh Dan Fodio was from the 
                                                 
114 Ibid., p. 15; Klaus Hock mentions the establishment of the Kingdom of Kanem-Bornu in the 14th 
century in the Lake Chad area as a “stabilizing factor” of the region at that time. This stability explains 
the spread of Islam to the masses. Hock compares the Islamization of Kanem-Bornu with a model of 
Islamization in West Africa suggested by Forstner, M. (1987): Der Islam in der westafrikanischen 
Sahel-Zone. Erscheinungsbild- Geschichte-Wirkung. In: Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und 
Religionswissenschaft 71. This Islamization model consists of a period of “Islam as religion of 
minority“(9th-12th centuries), “Islam as religion of the elites” (12th-16th centuries), “Islam on the way of 
being the religion of the majority” (17th-18th centuries), and finally the period of “Ğihād-movement” 
(18th-19th centuries). According to Klaus Hock, this model is applicable to Kanem-Bornu but only to its 
third level “Islam on the way…”. 
115 For detailed information on the life and influence of al-Maghīlī in Nigeria see Batran, Abd al-Aziz 
Abd-Allah (1973): A contribution of the biography of Sheikh Muhammad (‘Umar-Amar) al-Maghīlī al-
Tilimsāni, in: Journal of African History, Vol. 14. p. 381-394; Hunwick, John O. (1974): Al- Maġhili's 
replies to the questions of Askia Al-Hajj MuÎammad ed. and transl. with an introduction on the history 
of Islam in the Niger Bend to 1500, Brit. Thesis Service, Betchworth. - London, Univ., Diss.; for the 
expansion of Islam in Hausa land see Meunier, Olivier (1997): Les Routes de L’Islam. Anthropologie 
politique de l’islamisation de l’Afrique de l’Ouest en général et du pays hawsa en particulier du 8ème au 
19ème Siècle. Paris: Editions L’Hartmann; according to Klaus Hock the Islamization of Hausa land took 
place later than Kanem Bornu. Islam came to Kano through traders from Mali during the 14th and 15th 
centuries; see Hock (1996), p. 16.  
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ethnic group known as the Fulani. He was born in Gobir in 1754. He received a 
traditional Islamic education and at the age of 20 he was already a student, teacher, 
and preacher.116 Sheikh Dan Fodio moved from place to place throughout Hausaland 
and attracted many followers along the way. He criticised prevalent practices in that 
area and considered them to be un-Islamic innovations (bidaʿ). This attitude was also 
supported by his adherents. The well-known jihād of Usman Dan Fodio started 1804 
and was interpreted differently. Some scholars interpret it as “holy war” as well as 
Islamization of north Nigeria and neighbouring areas. The historian Jamil Abun-Nasr 
considers it as a “militant answer“ vis-à-vis the leadership of that time. According to 
Abun-Nasr, the jihād started when the King of Gobir’s soldiers attacked the 
community of ‘Abd al-Salām, a former student of Dan Fodio, and captured some of 
his people. 117  
 The struggle against ʿAbd al-Salām’s community and the liberation of 
prisoners from among his community were interpreted by the Hausa king as an 
offensive against his authority. As a result he ordered Dan Fodio to leave that area. 
The answer was an “Islamic revolution” - as Abun-Nasr describes it. Dan Fodio called 
his allied people from among the Hausa, Tuareg and Fulani and mobilized them for 
war. This is how the jihād started and spread in different directions. As a result, the 
Sokoto Caliphate was established and became the dominant authority in that region 
                                                 
116 For the life of Sheikh Dan Fodio see: El-Masri, F.H. (1963): The life of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio 
before the jihād, In: Journal of The Historical Society of Nigeria 2 (4), pp. 435-448. 
117 Abun-Nasr, Jamil (1993): Muslime im Nationalstaat Nigeria, in: Abun-Nasr, Jamil (Hg.): Muslime in 
Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel seit den 50er Jahren. Münster, Hamburg: Lit-
Verlag, p. 3. 
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especially at the beginning of the 19th century.118 After the death of Usman Dan Fodio 
in 1817, Muhammed Bello, his son, took over as Caliph until 1837.119 
 The Sokoto Caliphate developed into one of the strongest empires in West 
Africa. The jihād resulted in victory over the Hausa-states, but also to the Islamization 
of new areas. Klaus Hock mentions that the borders of the Caliphate in the year 1840 
extended from north Cameroon in the east, Illo in the west, far as Adrar in the north 
and Yorubaland in the south.120 
 As a summary of the spread of Islam in Nigeria one can say that the first 
contact happened through trade caravans from North Africa. After that Islam began in 
the region as the “religion of rulers” before became the “religion of the masses”. Al-
Maghīlī’s influence during the 15th century and the establishment of the Sokoto 
Caliphate in the 19th century can be seen as basic elements in the spread of Islam in 
northern Nigeria as well as in West Africa generally.  
The Sokoto Caliphate started as a reform movement led by Sheikh Dan Fodio 
and lasted for about one hundred years and affected not only northern Nigeria, but 
the whole region. By the end of the 19th century the Caliphate entered a period of 
weakness, eventually lead to its decline. The coming of the British put an end to the 
hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate. In the year 1900 northern Nigeria was declared a 
British protectorate. The policy of “Indirect Rule” and a project of reforming Islamic 
                                                 
118 For a detailed description of establishing, spread, and structure of the Sokoto-Caliphate see the 
valuable publication of Last, Murray (1967): The Sokoto Caliphate. London: Longman Group Limited. 
119 Abun-Nasr (1993), p. 3-4. 
120 Hock (1996), p. 18. 
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law were both part of the British strategy to control the north until 1960, when Nigeria 
gained its independence.  
2.1 Sufi Brotherhoods 
The landscape of Muslim groups and orientations in Nigeria is complex. In this 
chapter only a few of them are introduced. The Qādiriyya is one of the oldest Islamic 
Sufi brotherhoods in West Africa and it played (as did the Tijāniyya) a crucial role in 
spreading Islam in that area. It is known that Sheikh Dan Fodio was a follower of the 
Qādiriyya. The Tijāniyya came later to Nigeria and established itself as anti-pole to 
the well-established Qādiriyya. Especially in the pre-independence period affiliation to 
one of these orders had political implication – as shown by Loimeier.  
2.1.1 The Qādiriyya 
 Studying the Qādiriyya (or any other Sufi order), its founder or sheikhs, 
writings, doctrines, or its development in a particular context deserves more than one 
book. The brotherhood is still powerful in matter of followers and influence on the 
northern Nigerian religious landscape and even in the politics of the country.  
 According to Abun-Nasr121 the origins of the Qādiriyya date back to the 
thirteenth century. This ṭarīqa is named after Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (1077-
1166). The Sheikh established himself in Bagdad as a preacher and a scholar of 
Sufism. He was influenced by Hanbalī teachers and by the Hanbalī School of law, but 
at the same time by Sufi Sheikhs. The madrasa (in Arabic: school), in which ʿAbd al-
Qādir al-Jīlānī acted as Sheikh continued to exist as an Islamic centre for teaching 
                                                 
121 Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. (2007): Muslim Communities of Grace: The Sufi Brotherhoods in Islamic 
Religious Life, London: Hurst & Company.  
76 
 
even after his death. He is even buried there. Abun-Nasr speaks of three basic 
writings of the Sheikh: the first one entitled “Futūḥ al-Ghayb” (in Arabic: The 
Revelation of the Unseen) where his views on Islam and Sufism are reflected; the 
second book “al-Fatḥ al-Rabbāni” (in Arabic: The Sublime Revelation) is a collection 
of some his preaching from the year 1151 where he called his followers to “trust God” 
and obey his “commands”; and the third one “Al-Ghunya li-Ṭālibi Ṭarīq al-Ḥaqq” (in 
Arabic: Sufficient Provision for Seekers of the Path of Truth) which largely deals with 
jurisprudence, explanation of the names of God, and mysticism. Abun-Nasr 
summarizes the important points in ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī’s writings in the following 
topics: fighting against the self, the idea of wilāya (in Arabic: sainthood) and its 
difference from prophet-hood, and the Sufi Sheikh as a guide for his followers.122 
 The silsila (in Arabic: chain) of Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī can be traced 
back from both maternal and paternal sites through Hassan and Hussein, then the 
Prophet’s daughter Fatima, and finally to the Prophet himself. This affiliation gives 
Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī the position of being a quṭb (in Arabic: pole, axis). 
Believing in the Sheikh as ghawth (in Arabic: savior) and reciting his poem (al-
Ghawthiyya) eleven times daily is considered to be beneficial for any Qādiriyya 
adherent. Those who trust the Qādiriyya founder do not have to fear “divine 
punishment”. The “spiritual” connection of the Sheikh is added to his karāmāt (in 
Arabic: miraculous acts), which confirm his position as quṭb al-awlīya (in Arabic: pole 
                                                 
122 Ibid., pp. 86-91.  
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of all saints). Legends attributed to Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī such as fasting 
when he was a small child are narrated by Qādiriyya hagiographers.  
 The Qādiriyya doctrine spread throughout many countries in the Arab world 
and beyond during the 15th century. In the same period it reached both East and 
West Africa. The Sufi order built a network of branches in many places associated 
with different Sheikhs. The Sufi order does not have any “centralized spiritual 
leadership” or fixed guidelines – as Abun-Nasr describes it. Dhikr (in Arabic: 
remembrance) is part of its practices but is not fixed according to specific rules. In 
addition to that there are prayers for praising God attributed to Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir 
al-Jīlānī. Their selection and frequency are left to the Qādiriyya-Sheikh.123 
 In the case of Nigeria, the Qādiriyya came to Borno, in the north east of the 
country, through the Sahara trade during the 12th and 13th centuries.124 The order 
contributed to the expansion of Islam in that area, as was the case in West Africa as 
a whole. Sheikh Dan Fodio was affiliated with the Qādiriyya or “was not devoid of 
mystical experience” - as Qadri emphasizes.125 The Qādiriyya affiliation may have 
helped the Jihadist around Sheikh Dan Fodio in their war. Dan Fodio himself 
introduced many followers to the ṭarīqa. Thematically Sheikh Dan Fodio wrote on 
Sufism and Sufi topics. After his death, many miracles were attributed to Sheikh Dan 
Fodio himself. Also Abdullahi, Dan Fodio’s brother, as well Muhammad Bello, his 
                                                 
123 Abun-Nasr (2007), pp. 92-96; the author provides a good summary of the Qādiriyya doctrine and 
practices. The son of the Qādiriyya founder, Abdurrazaq, seems to play an important role in compiling 
his father’s ideas and writings. The legends of the Sheikh are described by other Qādiriyya writers.  
124 Qadri (1981): The Tijānīyyah in Nigeria: A case Study, University of Ibadan. p. 52.  
125 Ibid. p. 53. 
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son, were members of the Qādiriyya. “The leaders of the Sokoto jihād were not only 
Sufis but Shuyukh (pl. of sheikh) of Qādiriyya who encouraged their followers to lead 
a pious life and endeavour to seek communion with God.”126  
2.1.2 The Tijāniyya127 
 The Tijāniyya Sufi brotherhood is named after Sheikh Aḥmad al-Tijānī (1737-
1815), a Sufi from Ain Madhi, in Algeria. The founder of the order traced his silsila of 
ancestors through Hassan, who was the son of the Prophet’s cousin Ali, to the 
Prophet. Sheikh Aḥmad al-Tijānī studied among others in Fez, Morocco, and was 
affiliated with different Sufi orders. He was even affiliated with the Qādiriyya. He lived 
for a while in Tunis, moved to Cairo and then to Mecca. He spent the last stage of his 
life from 1785 until his death in Fez. In 1800 he initiated the building of his zāwiya (in 
Arabic: Sufi lodge) in Hawmat al-Blida.128 Apart from North Africa, the presence of the 
Tijānī ṭarīqa in West Africa nowadays, and particularly in Senegal and in northern 
Nigeria, cannot be ignored. 
 Sheikh Tijānī did not leave a book or manuscript in which his doctrine or world 
views are documented. This gap was filled by his companions ʿAlī Ḥarāzim who wrote 
                                                 
126 Ibid. p. 63; for more details on the Qādiriyya in Nigeria see ibid. pp. 53-63. 
127 There are a lot of publications on the Tijānīyya Sufi order like: Triaud, Jean-Louis and David 
Robinson (ed.) 2000: La Tijâniyya. Une confrérie musulmane à la conquête de l'Afrique. Paris: 
Karthala; Tal, Madina L. (1991): Un Islam militant en Afrique de l'Ouest au XIXe siècle: La Tijānīyya de 
Saïku Umar Futiyu contre les pouvoirs traditionnels et la puissance coloniale; For the Tijānīyya 
Niassiyya branch as well for the life of Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse see the work of Seesemann, Rüdiger 
(2004): Nach der “Flut” Ibrāhīm Niasse (1900 - 1975), Sufik und Gesellschaft in Westafrika; University 
of Bayreuth, Habilitation; as a general overview I rely on the standard publication of Abun-Nasr, J. M 
(1965): The Tijānīyya a Sufi order in the modern world, London: Oxford Univ. Press; for the Nigerian 
case on the PhD work of Quadri, Yasir A. (1981) 
128 Abun-Nasr (1965), pp. 15-22. 
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Jawāhir al-Maʿānī […] (in Arabic: Gems of Indications and Attainment of Aspirations 
in the Overflowings of Sīdī Abil ʿAbbās Tijānī), Ibn al-Mushrī who authored Kitāb al-
Jāmiʿ li-l'ʿUlūm […] (in Arabic: The Absolute in What Has Separated from the 
Sciences) and finally Muḥammad al-Ṭayyib al-Sufyānī who wrote Kitāb al-ifāda al-
Aḥmadiyya (in Arabic: Profit to the Seeker of Eternal Felicity).129 
 The Tijāniyya founder considered himself the “pole of the poles” and the “seal 
of the Muhammadan saints”. He was influenced by Ibn al-‘Arabī, a very important 
Andalusian Sufi scholar and Philosopher of the 12th and 13th century. He enjoyed a 
luxurious life and this explains the Tijānī stance on wealth and asceticism. The 
Sheikh claims direct communication with the Prophet and to have received the 
teachings of the order from him. This connection confirms the authenticity of the 
order and the origin of the teaching of the Tijāniyya. Followers of this brotherhood are 
not allowed to join other Sufi orders or visit tombs of other non-Tijānī saints.130 Being 
affiliated with the Tijāniyya also means the recitation of the wird (in Arabic: litanies of 
the order), practising the so-called waẓīfa (in Arabic: office) at a particular time, and 
participating in the ḥaḍra.131 
                                                 
129 Ibid., p. 24. 
130 Ibid, pp.28-49. 
131 Ibid., pp. 50-51; a Tijānī-wird is practiced twice every day and it consists of repeating “astaghfiru 
Allah” (asking Allah for forgiveness) one hundred times, pronouncing the so called Ṣalāt al Fātiḥ one 
hundred times, and reciting the hailala (there is no God, but Allah); The so called Ṣalāt al Fātiḥ is 
controversial and its recitation is equivalent to 6000 times of a Qur’ān-recitation. When it comes to 
waẓīfa which is practiced at least one time daily in congregation, it consists of repeating the formula 
“astaghfiru Allah al-ʿAzīm la Ilaha illa huwa al hay al Qayyūm” thirty times, performing Ṣalāt  al Fātiḥ 
fifty times, repeating the hailala one hundred times, and finally the so-called Jawharat al kamāl (a 
Tijānī formula) twelwe times.  
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 The Tijāniyya was initiated in West Africa through Mauritania by Sheikh 
Muḥammed al-Ḥāfiz (1759-1830). From there it spread to Senegal through al-Hajj 
Umar Tall (1794-1864). He was not only the Caliph of Aḥmad al-Tijānī, but also an 
Islamic scholar and political leader. He visited Nigeria in 1826 on his way to Mecca 
and married a daughter of Muhammad Bello, the son of Sheikh Dan Fodio. From 
1831 al-Hajj Umar Tall stayed in Sokoto for six years. During that time the Tijāniyya 
expanded throughout what is now Nigeria and beyond. The Tijāniyya became an 
influential Sufi order in West Africa especially after the jihād-movement of al-Hajj 
Umar against the French colonial expansion in the mid-1850s.132 
 In Nigeria, the advent of the Tijāniyya is throughout to be related to al-Hajj 
Umar’s visit to the country, although some views confirmed the presence of this Sufi 
order in Kano and Borno as early as the time of Aḥmad al-Tijānī, the founder. Umar 
Tall contributed to the spread of the brotherhood as he initiated many people to it.133 
During his stay in Sokoto, he seems to have initiated Muhammad Bello to the 
Tijāniyya. This claim is still controversial.134 Furthermore, the initiation of many 
people to the Tijāniyya in different parts of the north (especially in Zaria, Kano, Borno, 
and Sokoto) contributed to its spread. This resulted in a struggle for hegemony 
                                                 
132 Quadri (1981), pp. 39-51. 
133 Ibid., pp. 64-66. 
134 The debate whether Muhammad Bello was a Tijānī or not was debated by many scholars in and 
outside Nigeria. One cannot deny the influence of Sheikh Umar Tall on Dan Fodio’s son. Muhammad 
Bello was also inspired by the Tijānīyya in some of his writings; see Qadri (1981), pp. 66-72. 
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between it and the well-established Qādiriyya particularly in the late 19th century and 
even during the colonial era.135 
2.2 The Indirect Rule136 
 The colonial occupation of Nigeria started in the south during the second half 
of the 19th century. Lagos and its hinterland became a British protectorate in 1867. 
The expansion to the north occurred during the first years of the 20th century after a 
period of weakness of the Sokoto Caliphate at the end of the 19th century. According 
to Klaus Hock, Muslims reacted to the British in three different ways: some Muslims 
reacted with a kind of hijra (emigration) according to the example of the Prophet who 
migrated from Mecca to Medina; some ʿulamā' in Sokoto seemingly accepted the 
presence of the British but in fact practiced an “inner-emigration”; and the third group 
of Muslims preferred military confrontation.137 
 The British administration was aware of the fact that invading such a vast 
territory like modern-day Nigeria would be very difficult. The obstacles seemed 
insurmountable, especially in light of the absence of an appropriate number of British 
officers, adequate finances, and necessary military capacities.138 Thus, they divided 
                                                 
135 See more details on the Tijānīyya-Qādiriyya struggle as well on the attitude of the British to the 
Tijānīyya, in Qadri (1981), pp. 81-106. 
136 This policy of Indirect Rule practiced in British colonies was developed by Lord Lugard, former 
Governor in Nigeria and high-ranking colonial officer in other British colonies. The theoretical 
dimensions as well the applicability of this approach are explained in detail in Lord Lugard, Frederick 
D. (1965): The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London. 
137 Hock (1996), p. 22. 
138 Isichei (1983) mentions that the British administration lacked officers, soldiers and especially 
monetary resources to be able to control the Nigerian territory. Their strategies consisted then of using 
African soldiers to fulfill this task; see p. 380. 
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the country into northern and southern regions. They designed their approach of 
“indirect rule”. This policy was especially formulated for the northern region. The 
British learned from the history of Islam in northern Nigeria that intervention in Islamic 
affairs is risky. Because of that they guaranteed Muslims that they could keep their 
old structures of authority. The first British Governor in Nigeria, Lord Frederick 
Lugard, promised Muslim rulers that they could keep their system of education and 
their Islamic courts. Furthermore, he prohibited Christian missionary activities in the 
north without prior agreement of northern rulers.139 
 The British implemented “indirect rule” in Nigeria as their way of colonial 
domination. For Michael Crowder the way Britain ruled in Nigeria became exemplary 
for other British colonies.140 The policy stipulates that British officers serve as 
advisors for native rulers and allowed them to interfere in local decisions. Local 
governments based on “single executive authority” or a “council of elders” were 
supported by the British to continue acting as such. Lord Lugard acted until 1906 as 
first High Commissioner of the Protectorate of northern Nigeria, between 1912 and 
1914 as the Governor of the two Nigerian protectorates and finally from 1914 to 1919 
as the Governor of the amalgamated Colony of Nigeria, which relied in northern 
Nigeria on the emirs’ authority to govern this vast region. As part of his plan he 
                                                 
139 Hock (1996), p. 23. 
140 Crowder, Michael (1964): Indirect Rule: French and British Style, in: Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, Vol. 34 (3), pp.197-205. 
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suggested changing the system of taxation as well as modernizing the administration 
in general.141  
 These reforms changed the status of the emirs within the political power 
structure. They were originally allies of the Sultan of Sokoto. After the establishment 
of indirect rule they came under the supervision of the British administration and had 
to collect taxes in its name. They retained up to seventy percent of money collected 
from taxes to finance their own native administration.142 “Indirect rule” was applied in 
the north and succeeded because of the pre-existing political struture of authority. In 
other parts of Nigeria, like the east, it was hardly applicable. British political officers 
stayed for a long time in their position and worked as advisories to the local 
chieftaincy. They also adapted to the needs of their administration; for example, 
those who learned languages were often promoted.143 
 This “indirect rule” policy was a necessity for the British administration 
because only a few officers (thirty one to be exact) were sent from London to the 
protectorate in Nigeria.144 The British took advantage of the ethnic factor in the north 
                                                 
141 Ibid., p. 198; Crowder mentions that Sir Donald Cameron, who served in Tanzania as governor was 
inspired by Lugard’s policy in Nigeria. When he came to Nigeria (Sir Cameron), where he took the 
same position between 1931 and 1935 he was surprised by the level of independence of the northern 
Emirates that developed a kind of “Indian-style native states”.  
142 Ibid. 
143 Crowder (1964) distinguishes here between the French and the British in dealing with their former 
colonies. The French choose a policy of “assimilation” and the British that of “indirect rule”, pp. 203-
205. 
144 Ikime, Obaro (1970): The establishment of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, in: Tarikh (Indirect 
Rule in British Africa), Historical Society of Nigeria, pp. 8; the author speaks of foury-two officers 
approved by the British government in London, but only thirty-one were appointed in Nigeria. In fact, 
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and at the same time recognized the attachment of the population to the emirs. From 
a historical perspective, Obaro Ikime speaks of two reasons which led to the 
establishment of “indirect rule”: on the one hand Lord Lugard legitimated the British 
occupation over the Fulani and Hausa emirs as similar to the Fulani occupation over 
the Hausa during the jihād of Dan Fodio. On the other hand those emirs who died or 
fled their territories were replaced by new ones appointed by the British. Their 
appointment took into consideration their acceptance within the local communities as 
well as their intention to cooperate with British officers who represented the British 
High Commissioner and the Governor, respectively. As exchange for their loyalty 
which manifested itself in collecting taxes, building roads and establishing “good 
governance”, the British promised not to intervene in religious affairs.145 
 In 1914 the amalgamation of Nigeria was declared and indirect rule was 
extended to the south of the country. This situation was not an easy task. The 
southern parts of the colony lacked clear structures of “traditional rulers” which was 
not the case in the north.146 The reason for the centralization of the protectorates was 
economic in nature. It happened under the governorship of Lugard. The well-
established direct taxation system that worked well in the north failed in the southern 
part of the country. Falola and Heaton explain the British economic interest in three 
main points: first of all expanding Nigerian commerce, second introducing an 
                                                                                                                                                        
many of them were not able to work because of diseases. Because of that the cooperation with the 
Northern emirs was more than a necessity.  
145 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
146 See more details in Falola, T. & M. M. Heaton (2008): History of Nigeria, Cambridge: University 
Press, pp. 112-116.  
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economy based on UK currency, and third, to force Nigerians to work in this 
direction.147 Both authors conclude the efficiency of indirect rule in the following:  
 
“In the period before the 1930 the British colonial regime developed 
and implemented its program for imperial dominance in Nigeria. 
Indirect rule became the cheapest, easiest, and most ideologically 
attractive way to justify the colonial presence. Indirect rule 
theoretically preserved indigenous political institutions, but the nature 
of these institutions was significantly altered by the colonial 
presence.”148 
 
 The transformation of the Nigerian economy and society soon became visible. 
Indirect rule contributed to that change. Britain benefited from Nigeria and exploited 
its mineral and human resources. Additionally, the colony became a market for British 
industrial products. Nigeria on the other hand benefited from imported European 
goods, and the construction of railways and roads. Prior to the 1930s a Nigerian 
national identity was not yet constructed: “Prior to the 1930s Nigerians by large did 
not see themselves as ‘Nigerians’ at all”.149 This explains the rise of national 
movements after that period of time. Better educational facilities in Nigeria and in 
Europe educated Nigerian intellectuals contributed to the formation of a sort of 
national consciousness which was deeply rooted in the region.150 The formation of 
associations and the intensification of political activism were basic elements for 
                                                 
147 Ibid., p. 119; see also pp. 116-118 for the amalgamation of Nigeria.  
148 Ibid., p 134.  
149 Falola & Heaton (2008), p. 137. 
150 Ibid., pp. 137-139; the authors mentions the increase of primary and secondary schools in Nigeria 
between 1912 and 1937. In addition to that the number of students and western educated Nigerians 
increased as well.  
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politically oriented organizations. These institutions were the result of personal 
initiatives of Nigerian activists. That is why Nigerians used to be very regionally and 
ethnically oriented. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was 
founded in 1944 in the south east of the country. In 1943, the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) was established in the North. The Action Group (AG) was set up in 
the south west region.151  
 We return our focus to Islam and British policy during the colonial period – the 
title of Jonathan Reynold’s publication on “indirect rule” in Nigeria summarizes the 
British policy on Islam in Nigeria up to the 1930s, in which the categorization of “good 
and bad Muslims” is made.152 The author points out that the British kept the structure 
of governance established by Dan Fodio in the Sokoto Caliphate intact. 
Centralization of power and affiliation to the Qādiriyya were basic elements of the 
system.  
The British explicitly declared respect for the Islamic faith and allowed Muslims 
continue practicing their religion without disturbance. The experiences in India and 
Egypt compelled the British administration to change its strategy and to avoid 
confrontation with Islam. The colonial administration made efforts to keep its “image” 
towards Islam and Muslims as neutral – as Reynolds confirms it.153 This policy was 
perceived even by the different Muslim groups in the north as tolerant, and they 
                                                 
151 See Ibid., pp. 140-154 for more details on political activism and initiation of ethnic- and regional-
based organizations/parties. 
152 Reynolds, Jonathan (2001): God and bad Muslims. Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, In: 
The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 3/4 ( 3), 601-618.  
153 Ibid., p. 601. 
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readily accepted imposed categorizations of “good” and “bad” Muslims according to 
their affiliation, resistance to the British, and readiness to cooperate.154  
 The Qādiriyya Sufi brotherhood, the largest Sufi order in the north, was 
positively perceived by the colonial authority. The British characterized it as a 
“peaceful sect”, “state friendly”, a “non-fanatical branch of Islam”, and “the tarika of 
the region”.155 Its previously established structures were maintained and integrated in 
the indirect rule guidelines. No doubt that this understanding was good for both the 
Qādiriyya and the British; the Qādiriyya kept its hegemony over the northern region 
and the British relied on a strong partner.  
 A good example of the success of this partnership was the appearance of a 
Mahdist movement in the northwest in 1906. This movement revolted against British 
presence and rallied people to revolt against Christians and not to cooperate with 
them. Collaboration between the Sokoto army and the British forces succeeded in 
putting an end to this upheaval. This served in enhencing the Qādiriyya image. 
Furthermore, the order was for the British more or less isolated from external 
influences since they did not want the whole northern region to be exposed to 
“Islamic thought” from outside.156  
 The Qādiriyya were classified among “good Muslims”. Other Sufi groups like 
the Tijāniyya, the Sanūsiyya, and Mahdist oriented Muslims were considered by the 
British to be among the “bad” ones. Reynolds indicates that the British neither made 
                                                 
154 Ibid., pp. 602-3.  
155 Reynolds (2001), p. 605. 
156, Ibid., pp. 606-8.  
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clear differentiations between Muslim groups nor between their doctrinal differences. 
Realistically, British colonialists tended to avoid any possible resistance, especially 
from those groups with ties to other parts of Africa were there was resistance to 
French colonialism i.e. that resistance from Mahdis or Tijānī's in a different context 
could take place in northern Nigeria. When Nigerian Muslims passed by several other 
Muslim communities on pilgrimage routes to Mecca and came in contact with other 
Muslim communities, they were at risk of exposure to ideas of resistance.157 The 
Tijāniyya was largely suspected by the British because of its relation to other centres 
in Africa like Senegal, Algeria, and Morocco. Its exclusiveness means that Tijānī's 
cannot join another order and cannot pray behind another ṭarīqa-imam. This was a 
source of suspicion for the British.158 Reynolds revisits the strategy behind the British 
indirect rule and its relationship to the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya as well to other group 
as follows: 
 
“(…) British rulers of northern Nigeria were instead evaluating orders 
such as the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya according to a complex set of 
assumptions about Islam. Chief among these was the association of 
Islamic education and piety with "fanaticism," but other important 
issues included the structural relationship of each group to the system 
of Indirect Rule and their spiritual linkages beyond the region of 
northern Nigeria.”159 
 
                                                 
157 Ibid., pp. 609-111.  
158 Ibid., p. 613; also p. 616. 
159 Ibid., p. 618.  
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In addition to this policy of understanding the religious landscape of northern Nigeria 
the British planned on reforming Islamic law and reducing its validity. All judgements 
which were not compliant with the British law tradition were to be revised and 
corrected. 
 
2.3 English Law or Islamic Law  
 The juridical aspects of “indirect rule” were implemented in three different 
proclamations: the first one was the Native Courts Proclamation of 1900 and 
consisted of the institutionalizing of native courts at four different levels (A, B, C, and 
D). The first level A, headed by the Grand Qadi and the emirs, was able to impose 
the death penalty (with approval by the High Commissioner). At a later stage 
judgements defined by the British as “inhuman” were revealed and abolished. The 
second proclamation known as the Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906 consisted 
of implementing a direct taxation, assisting the emirs in fixing the level of taxes and at 
the same time to give them the opportunity to keep a considerable part of the 
revenue to manage their territories. The last proclamation of 1907, called, the Native 
Authority Proclamation, legally recognized local chiefs even outside of the emirs’ 
juridiction. It fixed the duties of district heads, as well as their salaries within the 
emirates or native authorities.160 
                                                 
160 Ikime (1970), pp. 8-12; see also Reynolds, Jonathan T. (1999): The Time of Politics (Zamanin 
Siyasa). Islam and the politics of legitimacy in Northern Nigeria 1950-1966, San Francisco: 
International Scholars Publications, pp. 60-61. 
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 Islamic Law was categorized under “native customary law”. The existing 
Alkalai (Hausa: judges) as well as the Sharia Courts kept their jurisdiction. In 
addition, English law was implemented. The so-called “residents” controlled the 
application of Islamic Law. Through this measure, Sharia Courts were placed under a 
British tradition of law. The Emirs protested against such measures insisting that 
Islamic Law should not be revised by the British. The establishment of the Supreme 
Court signalled the end of all speculations and hopes of Muslims. British Law became 
superior to Islamic law.161 
 The juridical landscape in northern Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s was 
characterised by the presence of two different law traditions: British Common Law 
and Islamic Law, which was based on the Mālikī School of law. The classification of 
the cases according to the four grades (A, B, C, and D) mentioned above allowed for 
the handling of court cases according to their importance and the competence of the 
judges (Alkalai). In the late 1950s the so-called Moslem Court of Appeal and Sharia 
Court of Appeal were instituted to deal with Islamic matters. The general structure 
was initiated by the British within their indirect rule policy. The British gave the 
impression that they were not intervening in Islamic law affairs. In fact they were 
interested in increasing the legitimacy and the significance of traditional rulers in the 
north. The supreme authorities of the judicial system were British Magistrates 
                                                 
161 Sodiq, Yushau (1992): A History of Islamic law in Nigeria: Past and Present, in: Islamic Studies, 31 
(1), pp. 85-108; the author narrates an example of a Christian woman who was banned from 
inheritance she was to receive from her Muslim father by an Islamic Qadi. The woman appealled the 
case to the Supreme Court which gave her the right of inheritance. The judgement of the Islamic Court 
was then invalidated; see pp. 97-98. 
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assigned to deal with cases involving British citizens and appeals from Alkali Courts 
grade A. 162  
 The British attempted to restrict Islamic Law to personal, family, and 
inheritance matters. Criminal law with corporal punishments such as stoning or 
amputations was not applied. Interestingly, the recognition of Islamic Law was 
strategic. The British recognized Islamic jurisprudence but put it under strict 
supervision. The important changes of Islamic law in northern Nigeria under the 
British occupation are summarized by Oba in three stages: “accommodation phase”, 
“domination and control phase”, and “the living under the shadow phase”.163  
 Islamic Law was classified as customary law in Nigeria, as was the case in all 
British colonies. According to Oba this classification was advantageous for the 
colonial authority because it “retards the growth” of Islamic law and “allows the British 
to impose their values and customs” over Muslims, and gives common law judges an 
opportunity to “adjudicate on Islamic law matters”.164 Furthermore, this classification 
restricts Islamic law and avoids any possible conflict with other laws, especially on a 
religious basis. Being a Muslim was not the only criteria for handling cases of legal 
conflicts amongst Muslim parties. The identification with Islamic law is decisive to its 
                                                 
162 Reynolds (1999), p. 60-63; the author indicates that most cases of appeals from Alkali Courts to 
British Magistrate were “cases of political nature”. 
163 See Oba, A. A. (2002): Islamic Law as customary Law: the Changing Perspective in Nigeria, in: 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51 (4), p. 825; the author took this classification 
from: Yadudu, A. H. (1988): “We Need a New Legal System”, in: Ibrahim Suleiman and Siraj 
Abdulkarim (ed.), On the Future of Nigeria (Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Co, 1988), pp. 4-5. 
164 See more details in Oba (2002), p. 827.  
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applicability.165 This classification allowed the judges trained in customary law to deal 
with cases of Islamic law and at the same time allowed Muslims to escape Islamic 
law.166 
 According to Abun-Nasr, Islamic Law was classified under native law and 
custom of Muslims until the year 1956, when a Muslim Court of Appeal was 
established. This means that Islamic law was a matter of Native Courts (proclamation 
of 1900) whose jurisdiction was limited by a “repugnancy clause” defined by the 
British authority and allowing them to repeal any judgement.167 
 The emirs were given the authority to impose punishments like the death 
penalty after 1906. These kinds of sentences could only be enforced by the governor 
of Nigeria. The death sentence could be replaced by imprisonment. The strategy of 
the British consisted of reducing the Emirs’ judgements to ta‘zīr (in Arabic: 
discretionary penalty of judge) and avoiding the ḥudūd-punishments (in Arabic: one 
of the four categories of Islamic penal law, mostly associated with corporal 
punishment)168. These expectations were confronted by an internal judicial struggle 
between the Emirs and Islamic judges.169 Chief Alkali Courts and Judicial Councils 
                                                 
165 Ibid., p. 828. 
166 Ibid., p. 829. 
167 Abun-Nasr, Jamil (1993): Islamisches Recht im nigerianischen Rechtssystem, in: Abun-Nasr, Jamil 
(Hg.): Muslime in Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel seit den 50er Jahren. 
Münster, Hamburg: Lit-Verlag, p. 204; the repugnancy clause consists of stopping any judgement of 
the Native Courts when it is not conform to “natural justice, equity, and good conscience”.  
168 See Ibid., p. 206; for more details on the Islamic criminal law see my MA-Dissertation (2005): “Die 
Entwicklung der Šarī‘a-Frage…”; esp. chapter 5 “Die Šarī‘a-Rechtsprechung”.  
169 Abun-Nasr (1993) mentions a judicial struggle that lasted until 1906 between the Emirs and the 
Chief Alkali. The Idea of Lugard was to restrict the jurisdiction of the Emirs Court to siyasa (political 
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(under the supervision of the Emirs) existed side by side in the north and was 
categorized under grade A of Jurisdiction until the judiciary reform of 1933. Abun-
Nasr counted 19 Chief Alkali Courts and 22 Judicial Councils that existed at the time. 
The goal of the British to make homicide cases a duty of Alkalai failed and the 
colonial authority attempted to change its strategy of improving Alkali Courts over the 
Emirs’ authority.170 
 The fact that the Alkalai cooperated in many cases with the Emirs more than 
with the British when it came to homicide decisions confirms that the old judicial 
structure continued to exist. The new tactics of the colonial authority consisted of 
translating standard books of Islamic law used by Nigerian Islamic jurists. This 
approach should have given British officers some knowledge of Islamic law and at 
the same time the ability to monitor judgements made by Islamic courts. In 1933 the 
so-called Native Courts Ordinance was established. An English court existed on top 
of this institution. It was the last court of appeal (High Court, in Kaduna) to which 
cases from Alkalai Courts and Judicial Councils were directed.171  
 Abun-Nasr observes that the clash between Islamic and English law took 
place especially when the colonial authorities tried to change the penalty designated 
for homicide. According to the Mālikī School of Law followed in northern Nigeria, the 
intention in homicide cases is decisive in defining the penalty. If the crime took place 
with intention to kill then the penalty is death. If it is not the case, then diya (in Arabic: 
                                                                                                                                                        
decisions) and to allow Alkali-Courts to decide over homicide cases. This vision was not easily 
manageable, see p. 207. 
170 Ibid., p. 207. 
171 Ibid., pp. 208-9. 
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blood money) could be paid to the victim’s family. The British preferred not to apply 
capital punishment whose applicability was a marker of Islamic law and the identity of 
the Emirs. The colonial administration avoided declaring the Emirs’ decision as 
invalid and put it in the hands of the governor. The governor was in the position to 
change the penalty according to the “right of pardon” (“Begnadigungsrecht” – to use 
Abun Nasr’ word) or even annul it if they deviated from English law.172  
 The applicability of Islamic law including Islamic criminal law through the Emirs 
is part of the Muslim identity. The British insisted that by including Islamic law in 
customary law that it can be applied to the entire country. Muslims were never happy 
with such a policy and they called for the establishment of the independent Islamic 
Courts of Appeal and for the application of Islamic law in all its aspects.173 The 
situation changed before the independence of Nigeria through the partition of the 
country into three major regions and the drafting of the constitution of 1954. This 
constitution aimed to establish a Muslim Court of Appeal in the north. At the same 
time a Penal Code which was inspired by British India and Sudan was set up, as well 
a Criminal Procedure Code. Even though this Penal Code retained some aspects of 
Islamic Criminal Law (such as lashes for adultery or drinking alcohol), it put an end to 
Islamic Law as a whole.174 This fundamental change of Islamic law was the result of 
political compromise and has served the interests of northern politicians as well as 
the British colonial administration. Islamic Law was then limited to personal law and 
                                                 
172 Abun-Nasr (1993), pp. 209-210. 
173 Ibid., p. 212.  
174 See Ibid., p. 213. 
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the Sharia Court of Appeal replaced the Muslim Court of Appeal.175 With the 
independence of Nigeria in 1960 the debate on Islamic Law in the federation took a 
new direction. How Nigerians deal with Islam and Islamic law and what kind of 
debate(s) took place will be discussed in the next chapter. Certainly, Islamic law 
which was reduced to personal law by the British will be a subject of debate not only 
in the north, but in the entire country.  
2.4 Islam in Nigeria during the postcolonial era 
 Nigeria’s independence and the formation of the modern state in 1960 was a 
challenge for Muslims, Christians, and adherents of African Traditional Religions. The 
preparation for independence started several years earlier with the constitution of 
1946 (Richards Constitution), the constitution of 1952 (McPherson Constitution), and 
finally the constitution of 1954.  
 Nigeria was divided into three major regions before 1960: north, east and 
west. Additionaly, Lagos was declared a federal territory. There were High Courts in 
these regions and Federal Supreme Courts on the federal level. For the local context 
the Native Courts of Appeal as well as the Moslem Court of Appeal existed under 
supervision of the High Courts. Through this structure the British colonial 
                                                 
175 According to Abun-Nasr, Ahmadu Bello who was the Chairman of the ruling party of the north 
Region (the Northern People’s Congress; NPC) was ready to compromise on Islamic Criminal Law. He 
sent a delegation to Libya, Pakistan and Sudan in 1957 under the premise of comparing their law 
systems influenced by the British law tradition. In 1958 a committee of law experts was initiated by the 
government of the north and asked to prepare a report as well as a recommendation for northern 
Nigeria. After a long debate and political pressure the Emirs accepted the reform in September 1959; 
for more details see Ibid., pp. 213-216. 
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administration succeeded in limiting Islamic criminal law and situating it under the 
British law tradition.176 
 The new Penal Code (mentioned above) which was inspired by the Sudanese 
judicial system was ratified in September 1960. Islamic Law became more 
meaningful especially in civil matters. The so-called Moslem Courts of Appeals were 
replaced by Sharia Courts of Appeals.177  
 Hock describes the judicial system in Nigeria in the early years of 
independence as follows: the top of the system consisted of the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria, followed by the Federal Court of Appeal and Federal High Court. At the level 
of the provinces there were State Courts represented in all states by the State High 
Court or by the State Sharia Court of Appeal and in some states by the State 
Customary Court of Appeal. The last category of the judicial system is represented by 
the Area Courts and the Customary Courts at the local level. Judicial cases were 
handled according to this hierarchy from the local to the federal level. The Federal 
High Court was the place where ultimate judgements were taken. In case of conflict 
between two different law traditions (e.g. a struggle between a Muslim and a 
Christian) an agreement over one court (Islamic or not) was agreed upon. 178 
 According Ostien and Dekker, the implementation of the Penal Code of 1960 
was to the advantage of Muslims in northern Nigeria. Although the new Penal and 
Criminal Procedure Codes replaced the Native and Customary Criminal Law and 
                                                 
176 Hock (1996), p. 191. 
177 Reynolds, Jonathan T. (1999), pp. 95-96.  
178 Hock (1996), p. 192-193. 
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became standardized for all Nigerian citizens, and although Sharia Court jurisdiction 
was reduced to personal matters, and the Emirs Courts lost much of their juridical 
weight to the Provincial Courts, and the Alkalis’ Courts were asked to rely on the 
Penal Code (translated into Hausa) instead of using Arabic law books, Muslims 
nevertheless maintained higher legal prestige in the federation.179 This prestige was 
achieved through the establishment of the Sharia Court of Appeal whose judgements 
(usually restricted to Islamic family and personal law) were final and could not be 
revised by other courts. In addition, the Native Courts Appellate Division was 
instituted with the duty of listening to cases of Native Courts directed to the High 
Court. The Native Courts Appellate Division consisted of three judges: two from the 
High Court and one from the Sharia Court of Appeal. Another advantage for Muslim 
judges was that they could handle cases according to Islamic Law as long the 
conflicting parties agreed on it and confirmed it in written form.180 
 The judicial system introduced in Nigeria after independence worked well and 
judges were in a position to handle Islamic, English, or customary law. Problems 
started in 1967 when Nigeria was divided into twelve states instead of the existing 
four regions. Through this partition six new High Courts, six Sharia Courts of Appeal 
and later on a Court for every state was established. Ostien raises the problem in the 
following statement: “How to harmonize the work of all these new state courts, while 
                                                 
179 Ostien, Philip and Albert Dekker (2010): Sharīʿa and national law in Nigeria, in: Otto, Jan Michiel 
(ed.): Source Sharīʿa Incorporated: a Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of twelve Muslim 
Countries in Past and Present, Leiden: Leiden University Press, pp. 564-566. 
180 Ibid., p. 567. 
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preserving the essential elements of the settlement of 1960?“181 For the High Courts 
the situation was unproblematic since they could appeal to the Federal Supreme 
Court. For the Sharia Courts of Appeal the situation was more complex: judgements 
from these courts were divergent and could not be directed to any other court. The 
establishment of a final, Upper or Federal Sharia Court of Appeal was suggested as 
a solution to the issue. This kind of court’s role was to solve cases from the different 
Sharia Courts and to solve all judicial questions between them.182 
 Throughout the 1970s the need for establishing a Federal Sharia Court of 
Appeal became more apparent. Particularly in relation to debates over the new 
constitution of 1979 and the transition to the Second Republic183, sharīʿa turned out to 
be an issue in the country. The preparation for the new constitution started 1976. 
Two years later, the Constituent Assembly turned the proposed establishment of a 
Federal Sharia Court of Appeal down and suggested the related section 180 (1) c 
from the planned constitutional draft be removed. As a protest against this decision, 
Muslim deputies left the assembly.184 The then head of the state, General Obasanjo, 
appealed to all factions to engage in dialogue. The Constituent Assembly proceeded 
                                                 
181 Ibid., p. 569. 
182 Ibid. pp.569-570; for more details see also Ostien, Phil (2006): An Opportunity missed by Nigeria’s 
Christians: The 1976-78 Sharīʿa Debate revisited, in: Soares, E. Benjamin (ed.): Muslim-Christian 
encounters in Africa, pp. 221-255. 
183 The First Republic in Nigeria was between 1960 and 1966. After that the Civil War (Biafra) took 
place. A military government took over from 1970. General Murtala Muhammad, the head of State at 
the time, announced in 1975 a transition to civil government. He formed a Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC) with the aim of sketching the new constitution of the federation; see Ostien and 
Dekker (2010), p. 570. 
184 According to Abun-Nasr (1993), 88 among 93 Muslim deputies left the Assembly, see p. 221; Hock 
(1996) indicates that all 93 Muslim members protested by boycotting the meeting, see p. 194. 
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with its task on the 29th August 1978, and the new constitution was presented on 1st 
September 1979 without the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal clauses. Apart from that, 
states could create State Sharia Courts of Appeal in case they elected to establish 
such courts.185  
 The debate on Islamic law did not stop in the postcolonial period. For many 
Muslims this law is part of their identity and cannot be replaced by any other law. If 
Muslims were ready to compromise that Islamic law was reduced to personal and 
family matters by the British and that Islamic Criminal Law was integrated in the 
Penal Code of the whole country, they were not ready to compromise when it came 
to the Sharia Court of Appeal.  
 The democratization process in Nigeria in the 1980s was interrupted by the 
military, and the Second Republic came to an end in 1983 when General Buhari 
became head of State. Two years later general Babangida took over after a 
successful coup d’état. Babangida announced a transition to a civilian government by 
end of the 1980s and a new discussion about the constitution of the federation in the 
Third Republic of Nigeria arose again. The head of the state set up a political board 
in 1986 with a consultative function of pertaining to the judicial situation of the 
country. Muslim leaders of the ten northern states asked Islamic Law beyond 
personal matters to be extended. Replacing the expression “Personal Law” with 
                                                 
185 In Section 240 (1) of the 1979-constitution it was indicated that establishing State Shari‘a Courts of 
Appeal is allowed “for any state that requires it”; see Ostien and Dekker (2010), p. 572. 
100 
 
“Islamic law” in Decree 26 in 1986 of the constitution of 1979 made this expectation 
feasible. Also the creation of Sharia Courts of Appeals was allowed.186 
 The constitution of 1979 was again revised in 1988 and several committees 
were asked to come up with suggestions. According to Hock, Committee 16 was 
concerned with the sharīʿa-issue. From the beginning, views were divided between 
Muslims asking for obligatory Sharia Courts of Appeal in all states and Christians 
suggesting removal of all sharīʿa sections from the constitution. The representative of 
the military government on 28th November 1988 stated that the absence of any 
compromise, all negotiations over sharīʿa were halted. A few days later an official 
declaration was announced, keeping the 1979 constitutional formulation.187 
 Hock describes the sharīʿa -discussions in the 1980s as the “second round” of 
the debates on Islamic law. Several factors hindered the establishment of a law 
system combining British secular law with traditional Islamic law. Muslims never 
forgot the devaluation of their law through the British and used any opportunity to 
revive it. Christians considered sharīʿa a danger and tried every means to have it 
removed from the constitution. The Military government failed to solve the sharīʿa-
controversy. At the same time Nigeria was passing through a political, economic, and 
social vacuum during the 1980s. The division between Christians and Muslims took 
on another dimension with absence of a compromising policy of Babangida’s 
administration. Hock articulates the controversy surrounding Nigeria’s membership in 
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 and the crisis related to it. The 
                                                 
186 Hock (1996), p. 196. 
187 Ibid., pp. 197-198. 
101 
 
author wonders if such a membership can be explained as “grand design” or a 
“misleading step” of the government of Babangida. Certainly, such an event 
challenged Muslims and Christians to place their religion an increasingly central 
aspect of their interest in the federation.188 
 The 1980s were not different from the crisis of 1979 when it came to the 
sharīʿa-issue. Questions related to Islamic law in the constitution were still not 
answered. The establishment of Sharia Federal Courts failed several times since 
Muslims and Christians did not find a way to compromise. The democratic election of 
1993 with the elected President Abiola gave Nigerians hope that the third transition to 
civilian government (the Third Republic) could solve the country’s problems, including 
judicial controversy. These hopes disappeared very soon when a new coup d’état 
occured in the same year and the military took over again until 1999. The era of 
General Sani Abacha was one of the most unstable periods in Nigerian postcolonial 
history. The turmoil in all sectors deeply affected the Nigerian experience with 
democracy. According to the historian Toyin Falola „...General Abacha (...) abolished 
all the elected national and state assemblies, dismissed all the state executives, 
dissolved all the local government councils, and banned all political parties.“189 
 General Abdulsalami Abubakar became head of state after Abacha died 
unexpectedly in 1998. As part of his accession, he promised a speedy transition to 
                                                 
188 The OIC is an Islamic organization that was established 1969 in Fez, Morocco. General Babangida 
registered Nigeria 1986 in that organization apparently for economic reasons. This act raised a big 
controversy between Muslims and Christians in the federation. The form of the state (secular, Islamic) 
was especially contested; for an overview on the debate see Hock (1996), pp. 212-235. 
189 Falola (1999), p. 195. 
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democracy. Within a few months new presidential elections were organized and 
Olesegun Obasanjo was elected President of Nigeria. From 1999, the Fourth 
Republic was declared and a new controversy over constitution and Islamic law 
arose once again. 
 The civil war, the military regime, the transition to democracy, the 
constitutional and judicial debates, and the political discussions about Islamic Law in 
Nigeria during the postcolonial era overshadowed other debates within the different 
religious communities. The ongoing political discussions in the federation seemd to 
be confrontation between the two major religious communities: Muslims and 
Christians. Religious struggle and political interest can be found in any religious 
community. In the following section, the intra-Islamic debates between Muslims in 
Nigeria, especially the struggle between the Sufi-brotherhoods and subsequently 
against Sheikh Gumi are evaluated. These debate(s) can be understood as the 
historical background of the Izala formation. 
2.5 The conflict between the Sufi Brotherhoods 
The Qādiriyya Sufi-Brotherhood is the oldest and most dominant Sufi-order in 
northern Nigeria. The Sokoto-Caliphate played a decisive role in spreading the 
Qādiriyya. Most leaders of the jihād movement of Usman Dan Fodio were members 
of the Qādiriyya.190 
                                                 
190 Loimeier, Roman (1993): Auseinadersetzungen im islamischen Lager, in: Abun-Nasr, Jamil (ed.): 
Muslime in Nigeria: Religion und Gesellschaft im politischen Wandel seit den 50er Jahren. Münster, 
Hamburg, p.129. 
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The Tijāniyya came to Nigeria in the 19th century and soon became a counter-pole 
ṭarīqa. If the leaders of Sokoto were members of the Qādiriyya, then the Tijāniyya 
spread among traders and religious scholars. According to Loimeier, the controversy 
between both brotherhoods dates back to 1845 when a debate arose about the 
affiliation of Dan Fodio’s son, Muhammad Bello, to the Tijāniyya. That was the 
starting point when affiliation to one of these ṭuruq (pl. of ṭarīqa) became religiously 
and politically meaningful. Being “Qadiri” means the conservation of Dan Fodio’s 
tradition and changing to Tijāniyya means a rebellion against Sokoto rulers and the 
old tradition. In addition, Kano emerged as a new centre of the Tijāniyya that became 
increasingly independent from Sokoto, the Qādiriyya centre. At the beginning of the 
20th century the two brotherhoods started looking for more adherents and prestige in 
northern Nigeria and building networks with Sufi centres outside of the country, 
particularly via Kano, where trade and religious contact was intensive.191 The more 
Kano became economically prosperous and religious affiliation became an important 
part of social life, the more the growth of the Tijāniyya became visible. The contact 
with Morocco and Senegal was intensified. Even the Emirs of Kano were affiliated 
with the Tijāniyya and stove for legitimacy through their membership to the ṭarīqa.192  
The Tijāniyya changed from being a ṭarīqa of traders and scholars to a mass-
movement in Kano and in other parts of northern Nigeria. This can be attributed to 
                                                 
191 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
192 Loimeier indicates that the Emir of Kano between 1903 and 1919 ‘Abbas was a member of the 
Tijānīyya. The Emir Abdullahi Bayero who ruled from 1926 to 1954 was initiated to the Tijānīyya by the 
Senegalese Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975) during the Pilgrimage to Mecca in 1937. Also 
Muhammad Sanusi, Emir of Kano between 1954 and 1963 took advantage of the contact with the 
Tijānīyya in order to become more independent from Sokoto; see more details in Ibid., pp. 131-133 
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the success of Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse193 as the Tijāniyya caliph of West Africa as well 
as the affiliation of the Emirs of Kano with this ṭarīqa. The Qādiriyya reacted to such a 
development through the actions of Sheikh Nasiru Kabara (1925-1996) who tried to 
reform his own brotherhood. Apart from building networks with the hometown of the 
Qādiriyya, Bagdad, Sheikh Kabara initiated a reform-project of his ṭarīqa in Nigeria. 
Among others he introduced the celebration of the birthday of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī 
in Kano as well as the bandiri-celebrations (Hausa: drum) in the mosques. He also 
became the Qādiriyya Caliph in West Africa.194 
 The Sufi dispute over hegemony and followers within Muslim Nigeria took on a 
political dimension during the 1950s. For political parties, Sufi brotherhoods 
represented a source of networks and potential voters. The brotherhoods themselves 
became involved in politics and increased their political influence and the numbers of 
their followers. Having religious, economic and political influence was part of the 
“rules of the game”. Nevertheless, the more the political weight of religious leaders 
increased the more this influence turned out to be ambivalent and risky.195 
 The politicization of religion in northern Nigeria can be seen through the 
debate on the identification of many Tijānī  youth with the political party, northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and the reaction to that by Ahmadu Bello 
                                                 
193 For more details on Sheikh Niasse’s life and influence see Seesemann, Rüdiger (2011): The Divine 
Flood: Ibrahim Niasse and the Roots of a Twentieth-Century Sufi Revival, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
194 Loimeier (1993), p. 134.  
195 Ibid., p. 135; the author speaks of the “political instrumentalization” of religious debates among 
religious scholars from the 1950s.  
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northern People’s Congress (NPC) as well by other religious leaders. In addition, a 
religious debate over the correct way to perform prayers (with qabdh or with ṣadl)196 
emerged. The Tijāniyya leader Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse tended to pray with qabdh and 
Sheikh Nasiru Kabara preferred ṣadl. This became a political issue among adherents 
and a reason to divide mosques as well for blaming kufr (non-belief) on each other 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The discourse consisted of finding proof for each point 
of view in the tradition of the Prophet. This controversy was used by Sardauna 
Ahmadu Bello in his political program. The political leader tended to condemn qabdh 
and distanced himself from Ibrahim Niasse as well from the NEPU. This pragmatic 
choice reflects Bello’s interest in avoiding any obstacles blocking his political agenda 
of “one north”. The qabdh-ṣadl-controversy came to an end in the mid-1960s. In the 
following years it became a minor issue particularly with the appearance of Sheikh 
Gumi as an opponent to Sufis and Sufism.197 
 Reynolds understands the link between the Qādiriyya and NPC as well as 
between the Tijāniyya and NEPU as a “cooperation (…) [that] was constantly being 
renegotiated as necessitated by changing political conditions.”198 Historically, the 
spread of the Tijāniyya in Kano and Zamfara State was a continuation of a long 
resistance against the center of Qādiriyya, Sokoto. The Qādiriyya was linked to the 
                                                 
196 Qabdh means praying with arms crossed in front of the navel and sadl means having them 
alongside the body. 
197 Ahmadu Bello set up the Kaduna Council of Malamai in 1963 in order to solve the issue of qabdh-
sadl. The report recommended that Imāms should practice Sadl since it is the common practice of the 
Maliki School of Law, see ibid., pp. 136-138.  
198 Reynolds (1999), p. 179. 
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authority of the emirs and was positively perceived by the British. In times of violent 
clashes, sanctions were imposed on the Tijāniyya.199 The measures against the 
Tijāniyya varied from banning the order from building mosques to stopping some of 
its practices (waẓīfa200, qabdh) in the public sphere.201  
 The Sufi-orders’ involvement in politics does not mean that all Qādiriyya 
followers are members of the NPC and that all Tijāniyya are members of the NEPU. 
Reynolds gives examples of Tijāniyya members who were in leading positions of the 
NPC. There were also leaders of NEPU who were not affiliated with any brotherhood. 
Ordinary members of political parties are from both the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya.202 
The rivalry between the two parties and two Sufi orders was a feature of the 1950s 
and 1960s. The situation was complex and boundaries between religion and politics 
were in many cases blurred. At the beginning of the 1960s the NPC set up a new 
brotherhood called Usmaniyya, as an attempt at reunification of all Sufi Brotherhoods 
under the umbrella of Dan Fodio’s tradition. These efforts failed to attract the 
attention of Sufi leaders and came to an end with the Sardauna’s death.203 
                                                 
199 Reynolds (1999), p183; the author gives an example of the clashes between the Qadiriyya and 
Tijānīyya-followers in the 1940s. In Sokoto, the riots in 1949 resulted in many mosques of the Tijānīyya 
“levelled on the order of the Sultan of Sokoto”.  
200 Waẓīfa is especially practiced by Tijānīyya adherents in Nigeria. It consists of a daily remembering 
of Allah through reciting “la ilaha illa Allah” (there is not God but Allah” 100 times, 100 times ṣalāt al-
Fātiḥ (a special Tijānī prayer), and 100 times of istighfar (seeking forgiveness from Allah).  
201 See Reynolds (1999), pp. 184-185. 
202 Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
203 Reynolds summarizes the complexity of affiliation to a Sufi order and at the same time being 
member of political party (NEPU or NPC) during the 1950s and 1960s. The affiliation to the Qādiriyya 
or Tijānīyya was used to achieve political goals. The efforts of the Sardauna to unify the north under 
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 The rivalry between the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya was largely due to their 
struggle for space in northern Nigeria. Both brotherhoods attempted to attract more 
followers. Over time both developed two different indications of identity. The 
Qādiriyya was (and is) related to the Sokoto caliphate. This gave it the opportunity to 
be in the centre of events. The Qādiriyya, was the Sufi order associated with the 
state. It was then the order of the political elite within the NPC. The Tijāniyya was a 
symbol of rebellion against established structures and a symbol of opposition. The 
link between Tijāniyya and the NEPU is intelligible. The ideology of the party and its 
founder (Aminu Kano) was based on criticism of the elites in the North as well of the 
authority of the emirs and the colonial administration. No wonder that NEPU was 
perceived as a symbol of opposition in the north as was the case with the Tijāniyya. 
John Paden makes an interesting observation when he compares NEPU to a Sufi-
brotherhood: 
“(…) a network similar to the zāwiya [Sufi corner or place] structure of the 
reformed brotherhoods was developed. Members of NEPU referred to 
each other during this period as “brothers” (‘Yan Uwa).”204 
Yasir A. Quadri confirms that the relationship between the Qādiriyya and the 
Tijāniyya during the period of 1956 and the mid-1960s was violent.205 Both 
                                                                                                                                                        
one party (NPC) and one Sufi order (Usmaniyya) on the eve of the independence failed; for more 
details see Ibid., pp. 185-206. 
204 Paden, John (1973): Religion and political culture in Kano, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
pp. 295-296; for more details on NEPU actors as well its political program see Ibid., pp. 273-305.  
205 Quadri (1981), p. 373; the author narrates violent events between the Tijānīyya and Qādiriyya in 
Sokoto in the year 1956; see pp. 378-380; in the same area riots between the two groups took place in 
1965 leaving eleven victims. These events reflected the high tension between the Qadiris and Tijānīs 
especially in Sokoto province, for details see pp. 280-282. 
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brotherhoods were concerned with propagating their ideology and attracting more 
members. Both claimed superiority over the other ṭarīqa. They tended to “convert” 
new members to the order and at the same time warn adherents about the 
consequences of leaving their ṭarīqa-path. These ideas were propagated in the form 
of writings by leaders who expressed their reciprocal criticism. From the Qādiriyya 
side, Sheikh Nasiru Kabara in one of his publications criticized the Tijāniyya order 
and warned his followers not to become a member of it. The Tijāniyya answer came 
from Sheikh Abubakar Atik who offended Sheikh Kabara and even doubted Kabara’s 
status as a Sufi.206 
 In conclusion, the two dominant Sufi-Brotherhoods in Northern Nigeria 
struggled for authority and power within the religious field. This contestation was 
based on winning new adherents, strengthening networks to other religious centers 
in and outside of Nigeria, and opposing each other’s ideologies. The Qādiriyya and 
Tijāniyya both presented themselves as the most appealing ṭarīqa to Nigerian 
Muslims. They criticized each other’s path, questioned each other’s rituals, and 
legitimacy of each other’s sources. Both orders claimed supremacy and the 
authenticity of their origin. The Tijāniyya succees in attracting many followers was 
considered dangerous by the Qādiriyya. Loimeier formulates it rightfully when he 
describes the growth of the Tijāniyya in the following: “The Tijāniyya was about to 
                                                 
206 Ibid., pp. 376-377; Sheikh Kabara wrote his ”al-Nafaḥāt“ in which he attacked the Tijānīyya heavily. 
Sheikh Atik replied in two books entitled “Risāla fi Taḥdhīr al ʿIṣābah al-Aḥmadiyya al-Tijānīyya” (1958) 
and “Al-Ṣarim al-Mashrafi al-Maslūl ‘ala al-Munkir al-ghabi” (1959). In both he criticized Sheikh Kabara 
and at the same time defends the Tijānīyya; see also Paden (1973), pp. 143.144. 
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literally remove the ground from under the feet of the Qādiriyya.”207 After the 
formation of political parties from the 1940s the ṭarīqa-controversy took a political 
dimension. For politicians, ṭarīqa including its leaders and followers presented a 
potential medium through which to reach the masses. For Sufi Brotherhoods, dealing 
with political parties and being involved in politics was a way to broaden their 
influence and protect their interest.208 With the appearance of Sheikh Gumi as an 
active member in the religious politics of Northern Nigeria, the Sufis had to change 
their strategy towards fighting a “common enemy” who started attacking Sufism in all 
its aspects.  
2.6 Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and his struggle against Sufism209 
 The intra-ṭarīqa controversy ended in the mid-1960s. This period of time was 
characterized by several events in Nigeria. Apart from gaining independence and the 
introduction of the penal code, the death of the Sardauna and the subsequent civil 
war in 1966, Nigerian Muslims witnessed the establishment of Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām 
(in Arabic: Society for Victory of Islam, JNI) in 1961, which was an institution to unify 
all Muslims irrespective of their social background and religious convictions.  
 Sheikh Gumi (1922-1992) was not only a religious authority in northern Nigeria 
during the 1960s, but also a political figure. The Sheikh served as a religious adviser 
of the Sardauna and accompanied him on several trips to Arabic and Muslim 
                                                 
207 See Loimeier (1997), p. 72. 
208 For more details on the Qādiriyya-Tijānīyya conflict as well their involvement in politics see Ibid., 
pp. 71-82. 
209 For details on biography and writings of Sheikh Gumi as well his reform-program and the 
relationship to Sufi orders see chapter “Reform Islam versus Sufism”. 
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countries. The idea behind setting up the JNI was to unify all Muslims in Nigeria 
despite of their religious orientations. Sheikh Gumi was at the head of the JNI and 
received financial assistance for the institution from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Sheikh 
Gumi was fluent in Arabic and knowledgeable in Islamic law and tafsīr (in Arabic: 
exegesis of the Qur'ān). In addition to that, he was privileged to be very close to the 
Sardauna. This position gave him the opportunity to build networks of contacts in 
Nigeria as well in the Islamic world. Sheikh Gumi became the Grand Qadi of the 
north in 1962, a prestigious post that afforded him influence in Arewa (the north). 
 The political and religious influence of Sheikh Gumi made him a “supervisor” 
of Islam and Muslims in Nigeria. From his position he even criticized the well-
established brotherhoods as well as the traditional authority of the emirs or the 
Sultan. The Sheikh confessed: “I knew I was not in their [the emirs] good books. (…) I 
often criticized their deviation from Dan Fodio path.”210 Sheikh Gumi criticized the 
position of Sufism in Islam and the way sainthood was propagated and practiced. He 
even doubted what has been said about Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (Qādiriyya) 
and Aḥmad al-Tijānī  (Tijāniyya): “Both Sheikh Abdul Qadir and Sheikh Aḥmad al-
Tijjani were innocent of most what was written about them, including many practices 
which they were said to have advocated or sanctioned.”211 Sheikh Gumi criticized the 
supernatural power attributed to Sufi-Sheikhs. He opposed considering them as 
intermediaries who are able to communicate with God. He refused the claim that Sufi 
Sheikhs received special prayers through the Prophet. He denounced the 
                                                 
210 Gumi and Tsiga (1992), p. 108.  
211 Ibid., p. 147. 
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expectation of favors through sacrifices and the use of drums and in mosques. For 
Sheikh Gumi, Sufis have neither access to the hidden nor are they privileged among 
other Muslims.212 
 After the death of Ahmadu Bello in 1966 Sufis reacted to the attacks of Sheikh 
Gumi and wanted him to leave the JNI: “at times, even the meetings of the Jamāʿat 
Nasril Islam (JNI) became more an avenue to isolate me and charge me with sowing 
crisis in the society” - as Sheikh Gumi formulated it.213 Because of his opposition to 
them he lost the legitimacy and political backing that was present during the lifetime 
of the Sardauna. In addition, the JNI failed to be an organization for all Muslims of 
Nigeria in absence of a compromise between the leaders from the different Muslim 
groups. During the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s Sheikh Gumi 
concentrated on his tafsīr-sessions as well his writings.214 
2.6.1 Sheikh A. Gumi: his early life until 1972215 
One cannot study the postcolonial history of Islam in Nigeria without dealing 
with Sheikh Abubakar Gumi.216 He was one of the most influential Islamic scholars 
from the 1960s until his death in 1992. He was present in religious circles, served as 
Grand Qadi of the northern Region (1962-67), worked as a pilgrim’s officer in Saudi 
Arabia, and was a member of the Constituent Assembly of the Rābiṭat al-ʿālam al-
                                                 
212 See more details in Ibid., pp. 138-142. 
213 Ibid., p. 149. 
214 See Loimeier (1993), pp. 140-141.  
215 The choice of 1972 is related to the publication of Gumi’s book in which he attacked Sufism. The 
biography of Gumi himself in this chapter goes beyond 1972. 
216 For the life of Sheikh Gumi I rely on his Autobiography Gumi, A. with I. A. Tsiga (1992) and 
Loimeier (1997). 
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islāmī (Muslim World League).217 He was also close to Sardauna Ahmadu Bello218 
(1909-1966), Premier of the northern Region, and acted as his religious adviser. 
Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi was born in 1922, in Gumi, in the modern-
day Sokoto State. He was educated by his father, Mallam Mahmud na-Gumi. He 
attended the Central Middle School (1936-42) in Sokoto and moved to Kano to study 
Islamic Law at the prestigious Sharia Law School. He traveled to Sudan where he 
studied Arabic and graduated in 1951. Upon his return to Nigeria Sheikh Gumi was 
appointed as a teacher in Maru, in what is now Zamfara State before he moved to the 
School of Arabic Studies in Kano, the same institution he attended several years ago. 
Gumi was appointed as deputy Grand Qadi of the north in 1960 and three years later 
he served as Grand Qadi of the northern Region. In 1976 he was appointed as 
Pilgrims Board Chairman219. General Murtala Muhammad (1938-76), president of 
Nigeria (1975-6), appointed Gumi as Grand Mufti but the coup d’état of 1976 and his 
assassination hindered this measure.220  
In his autobiography, Sheikh Gumi mentioned that he was a peaceful person, 
who avoided any kind of conflict. He was “blessed with an excellent memory” and he 
liked mathematics, geography and history, and had trouble with the English 
                                                 
217 For an overview on the Muslim World League see Schulze, Reinhard (1990): Islamischer 
Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zur Islamischem Weltliga, Leiden: Brill; in this 
book Sheikh Gumi is mentioned with other prominent Islamic personalities as member of  the 
Constituent Assembly of the IWL in 1964, p. 227; also as member of the Majlis al-ala al-‚alami li-l 
Masajid, MAAM (World High Council of Mosques) in 1975, p 285; It is also mentioned that Gumi was a 
delegate in the Egyptian Organisation Majma’ al-Buhuth al-islamiyya (Academy for Islamic Studies) 
from 1972, P. 237. 
218 See Paden, John (1986): Ahmadu Bello. Sardauna of Sokoto, Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing 
Company.  
219 For details on pilgrimage politics in northern Nigeria see Loimeier, Roman (1988): Das Nigerian 
Pilgrimage Scheme" In: Afrika Spectrum, 23, 2 (1988), pp. 201-14. 
220 Shehu, Balarabe I. (2001): The Light of Truth, Kano: Gidan Dabiro Publisher, p. 1. 
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language. At an early age, he started identifying himself with religion: “Identifying me 
with the religion quite early in life, was, indeed, a moral and social check.”221 He 
studied the classical work of Islamic law like Mukhtassar, al-Risala – to mention 
some.222  
At school, Gumi met prominent personalities who later became famous figures 
of the country. Among others, Gumi was taught by Mallam Junaidu, the later Wazir of 
Sokoto. Also the Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello was teaching in the same school in 
Sokoto. Shehu U. Shagari, who headed Nigeria as President between 1979 and 
1983, was a classmate of Gumi in Sokoto and later on in Kaduna College.223 During 
his time in Sokoto, Sheikh Gumi was close to Aminu Kano, one of the prominent 
activists and oppositionists to the British colony. Both of them, along with Shehu 
Shagari, were known in Sokoto as trouble- makers: “…the three of us, Malam Aminu, 
Shagari and I were marked down as being dangerous to the peace in Sokoto 
province.”224 
 After primary school, which Sheikh Gumi finished in three years instead of 
four, he attended a Middle School in Sokoto, and then he attended a Qadi School in 
                                                 
221 Gumi (1992), p. 20.  
222 Ibid., p. 23; the Mukhatassar al-Risala is considered a standard book of Islamic law in Nigeria. It is 
written by Sidi Khalil (d. 1365) on the basis of the al-Risala, a work by Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 
996); on an overview on Maliki law and its application in Nigeria see Ghazali,  Abdullahi (n.d.): Maliki 
Law: The Predominant Muslim Law in Nigeria, published online at 
http://www.gamji.com/article4000/NEWS4601.htm (21/05/2011). 
223 Gumi (1992), pp. 22-34. 
224 Gumi (1992), p. 48.  
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Sokoto between 1942 and 1943.225 Later on, Sheikh Gumi went to Kano where he 
joined the School of Arabic Studies226 and graduated with the highest distinction in 
four years.227 After his graduation he served as Secretary of the Chief Alkali between 
1947 and 1948. Being uncomfortable with his job, Sheikh Gumi left Sokoto again to 
teach in the newly-established Teacher Training College in Maru, Katsina. The 
Sheikh remained at that institution for 18 months. He was unsatisfied, especially 
regarding the ignorance about religion and basic knowledge of Islam: 
“I observed quite early that both students and workers in the school 
were in many respects ignorant about their religion. They had no 
significant knowledge about the proper Islamic regulations even as 
they affected their daily life. They did not observe Islamic Etiquette in 
much of their conduct. Many could not say their prayers well. In fact, 
some could hardly perform the ablution.”228 
 
In town, Sheikh Gumi observed that people performed tayammun (in Arabic: 
connotation of ablution with sand if water is not available) and not wuḍū' (in Arabic: 
ablution) and even the Imam of the Central Mosque did so. As a result Gumi started 
praying with students on the school grounds and warned them about going to the 
mosque in town.229 
                                                 
225 Sani, Abul-Mumin (1994): The image and legacy of late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, unpubl. 
BA-Dissertation, Islamic Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria. 
226 Sani Umar points out that „…the School (School of Arabic Studies, Kano) came to be regarded as 
the breeding ground of Anti-Sufism in Nigeria“, See S. Umar (1988): Sufism and Anti-Sufism in 
Nigeria, MA-dissertation, ABU Kano, p. 169.  
227 Gumi (1992), p. 34.  
228 Gumi (1992), p. 47-8.  
229 Gumi (1992), p. 48.  
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At the same time, the Sultan of Sokoto gave a speech during the Muslim Eid 
celebration230 thanking Allah, the Prophet, Usman Dan Fodio, and the King of Britain. 
Gumi sent the Sultan a letter warning him about thanking the King of Britain. 
Disappointed, the Sultan wanted to punish him. Gumi was charged with illegal 
praying in the school grounds, stopping students from going to Friday prayers, and 
for pretending to be a mahdī.231 
The next step in Gumi’s life was his move to Kano where he began to teach in 
the same School of Arabic Studies that he attended as a student. During this period 
Gumi applied for a scholarship to study in Egypt, but the government decided to send 
him with seven others to the Institute of Education in Khartoum, Sudan.232 
Sheikh Gumi left Sudan in 1956. In the year 1957 he became the Pilgrims 
Welfare Officer in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He was confronted in Mecca by established 
Sheikhs who guided pilgrims for money and he tried to change their attitude towards 
pilgrims.233 According to Loimeier, the fact that Sheikh Gumi was close to “religious 
scholars of the neo-Wahhâbiyya in Saudi Arabia”234 and a leading member of the 
                                                 
230 Eid is the most important religious feast of Muslims. The are two different Eid celebrations: the first 
one is the first day after the fasting month of Ramadan and the second one occurs during the Hajj 
period and during which all Muslims sacrifice (a sheep/a cow  in memory of the Prophet Ibraham’s 
sacrifice story in the Qur’ān).  
231 Gumi (1992), 49-51; being a mahdi seems to have a negative connotation in northern Nigeria 
during Gumi’s time. 
232 Paden (1986) mentioned that 6 students (including A. Gumi) traveled to Sudan for Bakhter-Ruda 
School in Khartoum, Sudan, see p. 301. 
233 Gumi (1992), 69. 
234 Loimeier (1997), 182.  
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Rābiṭat al-ʿālam al-islāmī founded in 1962 meant that he was largely identified by 
Sufis and others in Nigeria as representative of Wahhābiyya in the country. 
Back in his country, Sheikh Gumi served as Deputy Grand Kadi for two years 
(1960-2) and was promoted to Grand Kadi, when Sheikh Awad, of Sudanese descent 
and holder of that position, went back to Sudan. Gumi described his years in the 
Sharia Court of Appeal as “memorable” and he appreciated the work of that body to 
establish justice in northern Nigeria.235 Of course such a position allowed the Sheikh 
to come closer to politicians. He became the “principal adviser” of the Sardauna 
Ahmadu Bello. Both of them travelled together to several countries in Africa and the 
Middle East and went on ‘umra to the Mecca every year during Ramadan.236 
This opportunity of travelling in the Islamic world and observing Nigerian 
Muslims especially during their visits to the Holy Land provoked Sheikh Gumi to 
establish an organisation to educate Nigerians about their Islamic faith. That was the 
idea behind the JNI (Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām: Society for the Victory of Islam) 
established in 1962 with financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.237  
Although Sheikh Gumi held the position of Grand Kadi, he was passionate – 
as he confessed – about teaching and preaching. The opening of the Sultan Bello 
Mosque in Kaduna in 1963 gave him a good opportunity to fullfil this passion. His 
tafsīr sessions were attended – apart of ordinary people – by prominent politicians 
                                                 
235 Gumi (1992), pp. 96-97. 
236 Gumi (1992), pp. 100-104. 
237 Sheikh Gumi wrote to the Saudi government asking for assistance to set up the JNI. The Saudis 
donated ₤ 100000; also the government of Kuwait contributed ₤ 300000, see Gumi (1992), p. 107. 
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(the Sardauna amongst others). This opportunity was used by Sheikh Gumi to 
transmit his message(s):  
“I was happy with the mosque especially because it allowed me 
to talk directly to those in authority. (…) It has always been to my 
conviction that the best way to effect change in the society is to 
educate those who have power, about the virtue of justice and 
the fear of God.”238 
 
In Kaduna, the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation started recording the tafsīr 
sessions of the Sheikh in 1967 and transmitting them over the the radio.239 This 
happened without special organization or any financial support to the Sheikh.240 In 
addition, in 1970 Gumi started writing in the daily Hausa newspaper Gaskiya ta fi 
Kwabo. This access to the media allowed him to propagate his ideas about many 
religious issues and particularly about Sufism. Gumi dealt with many issues in the 
religion of Islam from sacrifice to communication with spirits and from attributing a 
divine nature to Sufi Sheikhs to criticism of drums and songs in mosques.241 Andrea 
Brigaglia speaks of three phases when it comes to Gumi’s tafsīr: the first one was 
between 1962 and 1966 when Gumi was preaching in Ahmadu Bello Mosque in 
Kaduna and his audience was “made up of the administrative bourgeoisie of this 
                                                 
238 Gumi (1992), p. 130.  
239 Brigaglia, Andrea (2007): The Radio Kaduna 'Tafsir' (1978-1992) and the construction of public 
images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian media, Journal for Islamic Studies, vol. 27, pp. 173-210. 
240 Sheikh Gumi mentioned that he neither visited a radio studio nor received money for recording his 
Tafsir sessions, Gumi (1992), p. 133.  
241 Gumi (1992), p. 138.  
118 
 
political centre.“242 During this first period Gumi “attributed specious elements to 
Sufism”; the second phase suggested by Brigaglia was between 1967 and 1976 
when Gumi’s preachings were broadcasted for the first time by Radio in Kaduna. 
Here Gumi avoided open conflict with Sufism and “moderated the anti-Sufi tones of 
his comments”243. The last phase which began in 1977 was characterized by “explicit 
tones” that go as far as to takfīr (in Arabic: charge of kufr, non-belief).244 
Sheikh Gumi was a distinguished Islamic scholar. His closeness to the 
Sardauna Ahmadu Bello opened several doors for him. Gumi travelled to many 
Islamic countries; He established a network of contacts in and outside of Nigeria, and 
found access to the media in order to propagate his ideas and ideology. His criticism 
towards Sufis and Sufism reached an apogee when the Sheikh published his book 
“al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa bi muwafaqat al-sharīʿa” which is regarded by Loimeier as the 
major religious work of Gumi – apart of his Qur’ān translation into Hausa.245 
2.6.2 Sheikh A. Gumi: from al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (1972) to the establishment of Izala 
(1978) 
Gumi wrote his book “al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa…”246 in Arabic language, gave it to a 
Mallam Galadanci, who at that time was a member of the academic staff at the 
University of Kano, to be revised and then to a Syrian publisher in Saudi Arabia for 
                                                 
242 Brigaglia, Andrea (2005): Two published Hausa Translations of the Qur’an and their doctrinal 
background, in: Journal of Religion in Africa, 35 (4), p. 429.  
243 Ibid., 
244 This takfir was especially directed to the Tijānīyya followers as Brigaglia mentions; see Brigaglia 
(2005), p. 430.  
245 Loimeier (1997), p. 186. 
246 Abubakar Gumi (1972): Al-ʿaqīda al-saḥīḥa bi muwafiqat al-shari'a (The Right Belief Is Based on 
the Sharīʿa), Ankara: Hilal Yayinlari. 
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publication. Gumi opposed certain doctrines of Sufism in his book, criticized their 
“access to the hidden” (Arabic: al-bāṭin), “their communication with the Prophet” and 
“receiving special prayers from him”. Gumi drew upon the writings of Usman Dan 
Fodio that there is “nothing after the sunna of the Prophet.” 247  
Gumi denounced the idea that a Sufi sheikh can intervene for their disciples 
during the Last Day (the Day of Resurrection). He criticized the presence of drums in 
mosques.248 He insisted on the idea of oneness of God (Arabic: tawḥīd) and 
confirmed that Muhammad is the seal among all Prophets. Gumi opposed the Sufi 
idea that the Prophet still exists mystically and continues to transmit instructions (to 
particular persons, Sheikhs, etc.). Gumi analyzed the issue of sainthood and insisted 
that “religious obligations” (Arabic: wajibāt) are as important as faith (Arabic: īmān). 
He then discussed the concept of bidʿa. He considered bidʿa to be all practices that 
contradict the Qur’ān and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Sheikh Gumi 
criticized the Tijāniyya Sufi Brotherhood and its practice. Tijānī’s believe that ṣalāt al 
Fātiḥ (one of their important prayers) was revealed to the founder of the order by the 
Prophet himself and reciting it is equivalent to six thousand recitations of the Qur’ān. 
Gumi criticized practicing witchcraft and looking for blessings for a particular purpose. 
He attacked practicing dhikr and categorized it as bidʿa. He also attacked hierarchies 
                                                 
247 Gumi (1992), p. 142-4. 
248 Sani, Abul-Mumin (1994), p. 31. 
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in Sufi orders and how leaders are considered as aqṭāb (in Arabic: poles) who can 
receive revelations or communicate with the Prophet.249  
Gumi’s book was not written for the public as he himself confessed: 
“The book had not been written for general reading, and I was 
aware that in formulating its major arguments a lot had been 
taken for granted.” 250  
 
His book was taken by one of his students, Ismaila Idris, who used it to preach 
in Kaduna to the public in absence of its author who was by then in Saudi Arabia. 
This provoked a big controversy and a campaign against Gumi in the media. Sufi 
Brotherhoods defended their doctrines in the media and especially through writings 
of their leaders at that time. Both Sani Kafanga and Nasiru Kabara, leaders of the 
Tijāniyya and the Qādiriyya, wrote replies to Gumi’s books. They used a polemic 
language to defend Sufism. They blamed Gumi of being a Wahhābī who 
misunderstood the language of Sufis and their interpretation of the text. The Sufi 
leaders traced Sufism in the tradition of the Prophet. They claimed to follow 
orthodoxy and by no means deviate from it. According to them Sufism is a part of the 
sunna.251 
The situation escalated and reached the grassroots level. Sheikh Gumi was 
isolated in the JNI (where many Sufi leaders were present) and common people 
(among Sufis) became agitated against him. The reactions went as far as several 
                                                 
249 Loimeier (1997) provides a detailed analysis of al-ʿaqīda al-saḥīḥa and the major argument and 
criticism of Gumi towards Sufi Brotherhoods see pp. 186-196. 
250 Gumi (1992), 145. 
251 For an overview of the Sufi answers see Loimeier (1997), 197-206.  
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attempts to kill him in Kano and Jeddah – as mentioned in his autobiography. The 
relationship between Gumi and the Sufi Brotherhoods took on another dimension 
when a new organization called Jamāʿat Izalat al-Bidʿa Wa Iqamat as-Sunnah, 
abbreviated as J.I.B.W.I.S. or simply, Izala, was established in Jos 1978. The founder 
of the organization was the same Ismaila Idris who used Gumi’s book to preach in 
Ahmadu Bello Mosque in Kaduna. 
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Chapter Three: Reform Islam versus Sufism 
The success of Sheikh Gumi in building a counter-pole to Sufi-Brotherhoods 
has been limited by the death of the Sardauna. It was necessary for the Sheikh to 
find other strategies to “survive” politically and religiously. Amongst others he heavily 
criticized General Gowon (1966-1975), head of the military-administration, and 
accused him of corruption and mismanagement. This reflected the feelings of many 
unsatisfied young northerners and Sheikh Gumi sympathizers.252 Furthermore, 
broadcasting Sheikh Gumi’s tafsīr on the radio contributed a lot to his reputation and 
the transmission of his ideas in northern Nigeria. Sani Umar observes two aspects of 
the “popularization of anti-Sufism” at that period of time. On one hand the radio 
presence of Sheikh Gumi as well his publications in the newspaper Gaskiya Ta Fi 
Kwabo were published in Hausa. On the other hand Gumi’s criticism was shifted from 
verbal attacks in public discussion to written articles and books.253 
 Gumi’s ideas and ideology attracted many in northern Nigeria. This can be 
understood within the context of Nigeria as a whole. The mid-1970s were 
characterized by another coup d’état which resulted in the appointment of General 
Murtala Muhammad as head of the state. He was killed only a few months later, and 
                                                 
252 According to Loimeier (1993) young people under the Muslim Students Society (MSS) were 
especially attracted by Sheikh Gumi’s criticism of General Gowon. They were also unhappy with the 
military regime of a Christian leader; see p. 141.   
253 Umar, Muhammad Sani, (1993): Changing Islamic identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: 
From Sufism to anti-Sufism, in: Louis Brenner (ed.), Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, London, Hurst, p. 163; in his autobiography Sheikh Gumi himself confessed that he never 
visited a radio station or prepared a particular tafsīr for the radio. He added that he never earned 
money for answering questions or for being interviewed by a radio program, see Gumi and Tsiga 
(1992), p. 133.  
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General Obasanjo took over as military president. According to Loimeier, Sheikh 
Gumi lost his political ambition through these events especially once the head of the 
state was a Christian and not a Muslim.254  
 Nigeria reached a certain level of economic stability in the 1970s. This was 
due to the oil boom at that period of time. This wealth allowed the country to 
reconstruct parts of what was destroyed during the civil war. The economic prosperity 
influenced Nigeria’s position internationally. Nigeria attracted not only big 
international oil-companies but it became another chance for the country to be 
integrated in the world community. Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971. The country also 
started playing an important role in Africa and ameliorating its relationship with 
Europe, China and the Soviet Union. Internally, the economy was based on oil 
revenues. The currency was stabilized and money reserves were ensured. This 
wealth also had a dark side. Falola formulates it rightfully “Oil has been a blessing 
and a curse for Nigeria”.255 Especially during the Gowon-era several sectors of the 
economy were neglected. The oil industry did not solve all the problems of the 
country like unemployment, bureaucracy, bad infrastructure, and mismanagement. 
The short military-regime of Murtala Muhammad was promising in regards to fighting 
corruption and introducing new reforms. The civil service sector was particularly 
affected by these reforms which were continued by general Obasanjo. Other reforms 
                                                 
254 Loimeier (1993) mentions that General Murtala Muhammad appointed Sheikh Gumi as Grand Mufti 
of Nigeria. This was never realized, for details see p. 142. 
255 Falola (1999), p. 138; the author describes the economic and socio-political situation in Nigeria 
during the 1970s and compares the era of General Gowon, General Murtala Muhammad, and of 
General Obasanjo; for more details see Ibid., pp. 137-164 (chapters 9 and 10). 
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of government structures were undertaken particularly at the local level. 
Internationally, Nigeria succeeded in internationalizing problems of the African 
continent like the conflicts in Angola and South Africa. Dissatisfaction and 
government opposition started in 1978 when oil-revenues decreased and the living 
standard of Nigerians went down.256 
 For the Muslim community in Nigeria, the period of time between the 1970s 
and 1980s was characterized by the penetration of a “new trend” – as it is called by 
Anwar – namely Wahhabism. Anwar explains the rise of these kinds of ideas through 
both internal and external forces. Internally, the assassination of the Sardauna and 
the division between Sheikh Gumi and the Sufis destabilized the fragile unity of 
Muslims. Externally, the socio-economic and political instability as well the 
connection of Nigerian Muslims with the Muslim community as a whole led to the 
penetration of reform ideas as a proposed solution to the country’s problems.257  
 The transition to democracy and the new constitutional draft that started in 
1976 and the Muslim call for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal were important events 
in that period of time. The rivalry between Sheikh Gumi and Sufi-groups led to his 
isolation from political participation in the name of the Muslim community. Being a 
single preacher and ambitious politician against the strong Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya, 
Sheikh Gumi faced disequilibrium of capacities and power. The formation of a group 
or organization sharing Gumi’s ideology was only a question of time. If Gumi himself 
                                                 
256 Ibid., pp. 151-164; high military expenses and the neglect of other sectors like education, inflation 
and high taxes as well bad living standards led to protests against the military regime. Falola gives the 
examples of demonstrations by high school and university students in 1978; see pp. 158-159. 
257 See more details in Anwar (1981), pp. 191-215. 
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was indirect in his criticism of brotherhoods and Sufism, then his student Sheikh 
Ismaila Idris (1937-2000) was more outspoken and direct in denouncing Sufism.  
 The basis for an anti-Sufi organization was arranged. Unsatisfied young 
people in a politically, economically and socially unstable state like Nigeria 
appreciated Gumi’s ideas and identified themselves with his writings and statements. 
The enemies are not only the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya who deviated from the “right” 
path of Islam but also the Nigerian state that failed to find solutions to people’s 
problems. 
1 What is reform in “Nigerian” Islam?258 
As a way of enhancing the discussion on the issue of reform, this chapter tries 
to deal with the following questions: Can we speak about reform in African Islam?259 
What does reform mean to Islam? What are the concepts used by African Muslims 
when they refer to reform? Who can be considered as reformers and who cannot? 
Are Sufis also reformers or do they oppose reform? Can we consider reformers and 
Sufis as two opposite poles? Do we need this concept at all? What does “reform 
movement” mean? 
During my fieldwork in Nigeria and my interviews with Izala followers, Sufis, 
and other scholars, the terms tajdīd (in Arabic: renewal), mujaddid (in Arabic: 
renewer) seems to be widespread among Nigerian Muslims. Interestingly, both Izala 
                                                 
258 Here I mean Islam in Nigeria in all its forms: Sufi-Islam; Reform Islam; and all other Islamic 
traditions in the West African country. 
259 The term “African Islam” is contentious. For an example of the discussion surrounding this issue 
see the book by Rosander, Eva Evers and David Westerlund: (1997): African Islam and Islam in 
Africa. Encounters between Sufis and Islamists. Athens, Ohio Univ. Press.  
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and Sufis refer to the same source of tajdīd: the Sokoto caliphate and its main figure 
Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817).260 He is considered to be the first mujaddid of 
Islam in Nigeria. When I asked about the importance of these concepts and why 
Muslims need their religion to be renewed, my interviewees drew my attention to one 
Ḥadīth of the Prophet mentioned by Abu Dawood (d. 888), one of the most important 
Ḥadīth-collectors in the Islamic tradition:  
”At the beginning of every century God will send to this community 
someone who will renew/revive/restore religion.”261  
 
Theologically, there has been an on-going discussion concerning the meaning of 
tajdīd. The majority of scholars of Islam link the term tajdīd with “explanation”, 
“correction”, “revival”, and several other meanings. 
In Nigeria, many Izala followers consider Sheikh Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992) 
to be the most important figure of tajdīd in the post-colonial era. The fact that he 
came in the 20th century confirms their understanding that a reformer appears every 
hundred years. This is interesting because the 14th Islamic century commenced in 
                                                 
260 On the History of Islam and the Sokoto Caliphate as well for the life and influence of Usman Dan 
Fodio see the introductory chapter on the History of Islam in Nigeria. 
261 The Book: Sunan Abi Dawood is considered as one of the most important sources of ḥadīth 
collections. In the science of ḥadīth (ʿIlm al-ḥadīth), many discussions took place on the authenticity of 
any statement by the Prophet. Without going deeper into those discussions, we have to mention that 
there are categories developed to classify any ḥadīth. The most known are saḥīḥ (in Arabic: authentic), 
ḍaʿif (in Arabic: weak); other use the terms ḥasan (in Arabic: good) and munkar (in Arabic: rejected) 
but many other connotations and categorizations exist. More important for one ḥadīth is if it is 
mutawātir (in Arabic: narrated by several known narrators) or not; considering the quotation from Abu 
Dawood’s collections, a discussion concerning the authenticity of the ḥadīth (mentioned above) if it is 
authentic or not? There is no clear answer to that question although the majority of Islamic scholars 
consider it as such. 
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1882 and ended in 1979. Many theologians accepted the mentioned ḥadīth, but its 
authenticity is still debated. The literature on reform (tajdīd) is linked to diverse 
definitions and interpretations. In the following, a few approaches will be illustrated.  
The historian, Mukhtar Umar Bunza, tries to look at the impact of “north African 
Tajdeed Tradition”262 on northern Nigeria. According to him, “Tajdeed refers to a 
periodic renewal of faith. It is thus considered to be rebirth, puritanism, 
fundamentalism, re-assertion, awakening, reformism, resurgence, renewal, 
reassurance, revitalization, militancy, activism, integrism, millenianism, messianism, 
return to Islam, march of Islam, etc.”263 The first experience with reform in northern 
Nigeria came – according to Mukhtar Bunza – with the Algerian Islamic scholar al-
Maghīlī (d. 1505)264 who came with a religious mission and he furthermore 
“advocated the socio-economic transformation and political restructuring of the state 
to conform to sharīʿa.”265 The distinguished Egyptian scholar al-Suyūṭī (1445-1505) 
who visited West Africa and then corresponded with Hausa kings is by the same 
author also considered to be one of the contributors to “reform” in that area. Also 
local ʿulamā' seemed to be regarded during the 16th century as a continuation of the 
                                                 
262 Bunza, Umar Mukhtar (2005): The North African factor in 'tajdeed' tradition in Hausaland, Northern 
Nigeria, In: The Journal of North African Studies 10:3/4, pp. 325-338. 
263 Ibid., p. 325.; the author sees that Tajdeed started in Nigeria from the 15th century, although the 
relationship between North Africa and Hausaland goes back to the 7th century, the period when Islam 
reached the north of the African continent.  
264 For life and influence of al-Maghīlī in Hausaland see Batrān, 'Abd-Al-'Azīz 'Abd-Allah (1973): A 
Contribution to the Biography of Shaikh Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd-Al-Karīm Ibn Muḥammad ('Umar-A 'Mar) 
Al-Maghīlī, Al-Tilimsānī, in: The Journal of African History, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 381-394; also see 
Gwarzo, Hassan Ibrahim (1972): The life and teachings of al-Maghīlī with particular reference to the 
Saharan Jewish community, PhD, SOAS, London.  
265 Bunza (2005), p 327.  
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reform project in northern Nigeria. They brought several writings and books of the 
Mālikiyya in North Africa.266 The period between the 16th and 18th century is called by 
Bunza, or a period of “emerging scholars” and resulted in the establishment of the 
Sokoto Caliphate as part of Usman Dan Fodio’s reform program during the 19th 
century.267 Also during the colonial and postcolonial period of the 20th century, 
revivalism in the Hausaland seems to have its roots in North Africa’s experience with 
Islamism. Scholars like Ḥasan al-Bannā’ (1906-49), Sayyid Quṭb (1906-66), 
Muḥammed ʿAbduh (1849-1905), al-Afghānī (1838-1897) are considered by Bunza to 
be “sources of materials and inspiration” for the Nigerian revivalism movement.268 To 
give examples of reform in post-colonial Nigeria, Bunza mentioned Sheikh Abubakar 
Gumi and the major Islamic organizations that he deeply affected: Jamāʿat Naṣr al-
Islām (JNI) and the Izala-movement. Also Zakzakys Muslim Brothers movement and 
others have been influenced by writings from North Africa (e.g. Sayyid Quṭb and 
Ḥasan al-Bannā’).269  Bunza goes further in recognizing that the call for sharīʿa in 
northern Nigeria should also to be understood in the context of tajdīd inspired by 
Mālikī jurisprudence and North African scholars of Islam.270 Thus, Bunza’s historical 
account highlights the distinctive role of the North African scholars over reform in 
Nigeria. 
                                                 
266 Ibid., p 328; al-Mudawwana al-Kubra, al-Risala al-Qayrawaniyya, Mukhtassar Khalil are some 
examples mentioned books of Malikiyya  by the author.  
267 Ibid., p 330. 
268 Ibid., p 331. 
269 Ibid., pp 331-333. 
270 Ibid., p 333. 
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According to Loimeier “reform” has no fixed definition (it is rather a described 
but not defined concept). In an Islamic context, reform is linked to several 
connotations like tajdīd (in Arabic: renewal); iṣlāḥ (in Arabic: restitution, restoration); 
iḥyā’ (in Arabic: revival); ṣaḥwa (in Arabic: awakening).271 For Sub-Saharan-Africa, 
Loimeier identifies the concept tajdīd as key concept for reform during the 19th and 
20th century. He summarizes his understanding of the concept of reform as “change 
with a program”. Its meaning is especially related – according to Loimeier – to 
criticism of immoral life or government. Loimeier regards a change during the 20th 
century at the level of terminology from using tajdīd to iṣlāḥ which is more related to 
“programmatic reorientation of Muslim reformers” as well as to “new types of Islamic 
reform movements in Sub-Saharan Africa.”272 Generally, “reform” is to be found in 
both in academic and non-academic literature and is related to societal, political, and 
religious movements. The concept is translated as “progress” and “modernization” or 
as “renewal of Society on the basis of “fundamental” dogma.273 Loimeier suggests 
the following definition of reform: “Reform has many meanings. It has modernizing as 
well conservative, liberal, progressive, egalitarian, elitist, activist or revolutionary 
connotations.”274 He adds that any reform movement “conduct a specific dialogue 
                                                 
271 See Loimeier, Roman (2007): ”Yesu Hakusulubiwa –Jesus wurde nicht gekreuzigt”: Möglichkeiten 
und Grenzen des Vergleichs religiöser Reformbewegungen; Paper presented at the University of 
Leipzig, 11/10/2007, p 2. The Author mentions that other concepts are also found in literature like 
nahda (renaissance), taraqqi or taqaddum (progress), see footnote (4). 
272 My English translation of Loimeier’s German Terminology „programmatische Neuausrichtung 
muslimischer Reformer“ and „neuer Typus islamischer Reformbewegungen im subsaharanischen 
Afrika“, Ibid. 
273 Ibid., p 3. 
274 Ibid. (my translation). 
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with history and the canon of its own religious tradition (…).”275 Loimeier speaks of 
“markers” that characterize religious reform movements. He listed eleven markers: 
having particular religious reference (particular person or event), using specific texts 
and particular interpretation, choosing particular types of organization, particular 
position to the state – just to mention some.276 The example of Loimeier hints at the 
fluidity of the term “reform”. 
 Ousmane Kane, from political sciences, refers to “reform movements” as 
“those Islamic movements that attempt to reform social and religious practices”277 
and differentiates between them and “islamist movements” that “attempt to capture 
political power and establish the rule of God.”278 Kane’s approach links a reform 
program to social change. This aspect is missed in several studies on Islam in and 
outside of the African continent.279 Furthermore, Kane understands reform – of Izala 
(the movement he is dealing with) – as a modernity project.280  
According to Peter Clark, sociologist and historian of religion, “Islamic reform 
in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon.”281 It becomes more visible in the context of the 
                                                 
275 Ibid., p 4 (my translation) 
276 See these eleven “markers” explained by Loimeier; Ibid., pp 4-5. 
277 Kane, Ousmane (2003): Islamic Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria. Leiden, Boston: Brill, p. 7. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ousmane Kane listed several case studies dealing with reform Islam in Algeria, Indonesia, 
Morocco, Egypt, Oman, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, and Guinea. In these examples, the author 
misses a “direct causality between social change and the rise of a new Islamic attitudes or beliefs” – 
as he said. See pp. 8-14. 
280 Ibid. especially see pp 1-7 and Kane’s discussion on his understanding of “modernity” in 
relationship to reform Islam (Izala Movement). 
281 Clarke, Peter (1988): Islamic Reform in contemporary Nigeria: methods and aims, in Third World 
Quarterly 10 (2), p. 519. 
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“nation-state” where Muslims as well as Christians were, and still are asked to 
answer the demands of one nation. From their site, Nigerians (Christians and 
Muslims) questioned the “character and orientation” of that state.282 Clarke locates 
Islamic reform in Nigeria in the 19th century. The Sokoto jihād of Usman Dan Fodio 
has not only “religious, political, social, and economic” effects on Muslims and non-
Muslims, but it also led to “fear and opposition to Islam which persist to this day”.283 
In contemporary Nigeria, Clarke identifies two types of reform: moderate and 
radical. Clarke makes his differentiation on the basis of the sources used by 
reformers. He considers those who only rely on the Qur’ān and the sunna of the 
Prophet as “fundamentalists”, while moderates are those relying on other sources (in 
addition to the two). When it comes to sharīʿa, both (moderate and conservative types 
of reform) have similar attitudes. Both of them desire to Islamize Nigeria although the 
“fundamentalist” invests more energy in that direction.284 Furthermore Clarke 
understands Reform in its social and economic circumstances. By giving the example 
of Maitatsine riots in Kano in the beginning of the 1980s and the Kafancan 
disturbance of 1987, Clarke tries to find a link between fundamentalism and Islamic 
reform. He suggests the following definition:  
“Fundamentalism is essentially about the reform of Islam for the 
purpose of creating a more just society along Islamic lines. It is not 
only a moral response to what it sees as the corrupting influence of 
western libertarianism and exploitation, and godless socialism, but 
                                                 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid., pp 521-2 
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also a failure of western, secular (…) political, economic, and 
educational systems to provide solutions to the country’s problems.”285 
 
Clarke concludes by making a distinction between what he called “intellectual and 
moral” reform of the Sokoto Caliphate and between the “purifying” reform that fights 
innovation and tends to Islamize Nigeria.286 
 The expert on Nigerian Islam, Andrea Brigaglia287, observes the 
transformation of the concept of Islamic “reform” in Nigeria. He stresses that the 
Muslim identity of the elites during the Sokoto Caliphate was related to Sufism and 
was adopted by the masses. Interestingly, “reform” as a concept is also present in 
Sufi milieu. Brigaglia gives the example of the “doctrinal reorientation” of the Tijāniyya 
headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (d. 1975)288 and also of the Qādiriyya led by 
Sheikh Nasiru Kabara (d. 1996)289 in Kano. He also quotes the concepts used by 
John Paden who speaks of “traditional” and “reformed” brotherhoods (Qādiriyya, 
Tijāniyya)290 respectively. 
The appearance of a “counter-reform” project of Sheikh Gumi (d. 1992) and 
the Izala movement inspired by him drew attention to a new discussion about reform. 
The internal discussion among Sufis on reformism seems to have taken a new 
                                                 
285 Ibid., p 527 
286 Ibid, p 538. 
287 Brigaglia (2004). 
288 For more details, see Seesemann (2004); also Brigaglia, Andrea (2001), "The Fayda Tijānīyya of 
Ibrahim Niasse: Genesis and implications of a Sufi doctrine", Islam et Sociétés au Sud du Sahara 
14/15, pp. 41-56. 
289 Among others see Loimeier (1997), pp. 52-70 on the Life of Sheikh N. Kabara and the development 
of the Qādiriyya-Nasiriyya.  
290 Brigaglia (2004), pp 108-109. 
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dimension. This tendency is a result of the anti-colonial resistance of many West 
African Muslims against colonial masters, but also is due to Islamic education and 
rapprochement to the Arabic and Islamic world.291 Sheikh Gumi is the pioneer of 
religious reformism in post-colonial Nigeria (from 1969), but it seems that “reform” or 
“reformism” appear to have been used even during the colonial time.292 
Sani Umar293, an expert on Islam in Nigeria, uses the concept of “Islamic 
modernism” to qualify the Izala movement and its Salafi/Wahhābī program. This form 
of Islam seems to be the counter-pole of the so-called “popular Islam” represented by 
the Sufis. The argument of Sani Umar is that Izala adopted a modern “organizational 
format” and its leaders and members have such an educational background.294 
Dealing with the development of Izala, Sani Umar speaks of the division of Izala 
beginning in 1984 and how doctrinal differences lead to different orientations within 
the movement. On the one hand a faction of Izala follows the teachings of Sheikh 
Idris (the founder) and which is considered the “hard-liner” faction (fundamentalist) 
while the other one (those who are largely Medina-educated members) is more 
moderate or “soft-line” (as Umar calls it). In fact, Sani Umar regards the terms 
                                                 
291 Brigaglia (2004) quotes the study of Kaba Lansiné (1974) on Wahhabism in Mali and how Islamic 
education in Egypt (Al-Azhar) and Sudan (Omdourman) played a role in the “reformist” movement 
established in Mali, see pp 115-117 
292 In the context of Nationalism and resistance against the British Colony, Sa’du Zungur and Amino 
Kano criticized the established traditional authority of the Ulama in the north in that they considered it 
as an obstacle to any “reform” or political progress. See Brigaglia (2004), pp. 116-118 
293 Umar, Muhammad Sani (2001): Education and Islamic trends in Northern Nigeria, 1970s-1990s, 
Africa Today 48:2, pp. 127-150. 
294 Ibid., p. 134; Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris attended modern schools like the Kano School of 
Arabic; concerning the Sufi-context Sani Umar speaks of a transformation to “virtual civic 
associations.”  
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“fundamentalist” and “modernist” as not reflecting “stable realities”. He shows the 
flexibility of both concepts by giving the example of how the “ʿulamā'’s traditionalism 
shifts to modernism” and “Izala’s shifts from modernism to fundamentalism”.295 
 The Africanist and Historian, John Hunwick296 observes a “connection” 
between reform and revival in an Islamic context. Revivalism in Africa started in the 
19th century with Usman Dan Fodio in Nigeria and Muḥammad Aḥmad in Sudan. 
Both movements took place to “regenerate” religion (tajdīd) and the two leaders 
appeared to be the mahdī 297 (in Arabic: rightly guided restorer of religion) of their 
time.298 Although Nigeria and Sudan have two different experiences with Islam and 
colonialization, Hunwick links the idea of Islamic revival and Mahdism to social, 
political, and economical changes in both countries. In Nigeria Usman Dan Fodio is 
seen as a mahdī who brought change especially to Muslims. His “movement” 
became a source of inspiration during the post-colonial era when Muslims called for 
implementation for sharīʿa as a solution to the problems of the West African country. 
In Sudan, the situation is comparable. The rise of change is due to social and political 
problems of the country. The appearance of the Sudanese mahdī Muḥammed 
                                                 
295 For Umar’s analyses of the two Izala factions see pp. 135-138; concerning the different types of 
shifts see p. 138.  
296 Hunwick, John (2005): Islamic Revival in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. In: 
Kamari Maxine Clarke (2005): Local practices, Global controversies: Islam in Sub-Saharan African 
Context, pp. 25-42. 
297 On the concept of  mahdi see among others Kramer, Roberts S. (2009): Mahdi, In: Esposito, John 
(eds.): The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic world, pp.448-450; the author refers to standard work 
on the term mahdi.and refers to Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, chap 3 where the term is discussed in 
sunni as well as shi’a Islam. 
298 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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Aḥmad at the end of 19th century was an answer to colonialism. The religion of Islam 
became an identity marker for Muslims. This revival attempt reflects their wish. 
Similar developments can also be found in the 1989 implementation of Islamic law – 
sharīʿa – as a result of years of social and political instability in Sudan.299 
 The concept of reform narrated above is multifaceted and complex. 
Sometimes this concept is presented in relationship to new Islamic movement with 
Salafi/Wahhābī tendencies opposing Sufis and Sufism300. In other contexts reform is 
to be found among Sufis – as Brigaglia points it out.301 In some cases reform is 
related to other phenomenon (like fundamentalism) and discussed in relationship to it 
and to the Nigerian nation-state – as Clarke did.302 This demonstrates that the 
concept of reform is fluid and depends on the circumstances in which it is used. I 
would agree with Kane and Loimeier who relate reform to a “program with change”. 
Analyzing the context of reform instead of defining it appears to be more fruitful. Tariq 
Ramadan, the popular scholar of Islam, articulates it rightly: “We are in a kind of 
terminological haze in which the meaning of words is so variable that one no longer 
knows exactly what the discourse about “reform” refers to.”303 This sentence 
summarizes the dilemma of defining “reform”. In the African context, including 
                                                 
299 For more details on revival in Nigeria and Sudan, see Ibid., pp 32-40.  
300 See Loimeier 1997; Kane 2004 and Sani Umar 1983, 1988. 
301 See Brigaglia 2004. 
302 See Clark 1988. 
303 Ramadan, Tariq (2007): On the Concept of Reform; at http://www.tariqramadan.com (accessed 
01.12.09); even in the European context, debates on reform are still going on. Ramadan mentions 
different concepts meaning reform. Among others: Iḥyā’ (in Arabic: revival), tajdīd (in Arabic: renewal), 
iṣlāḥ (in Arabic: reform). According to him, tajdīd and iṣlāḥ are more related and complementary.  See 
also his book Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2009). 
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Nigeria, we witness similar developments. In times of uncertainty, turmoil and political 
instability, the door of “reform” and the need for change are more debated than in 
times of prosperity.The example given by Hunwick in Nigeria and Sudan shows it 
very well.304  
 One cannot study Islamic reform in Nigeria without speaking of the Izala 
movement. This movement stands for the recent experiences of Nigerian Muslims 
with a structured organization that took up the course of purifying Islam from 
innovation and establishing the sunna of the Prophet. Before dealing with “reform” as 
seen by Izala itself, a few other examples of Muslim groups are introduced. Shiʿites, 
JTI, Maitatsine, Boko Haram or Salafiyya oriented groups all share one goal: 
reforming Islam in Nigeria. These groups, their doctrines, and their objectives are 
introduced in the following section. 
2 Shiʿites in Nigeria305 
 This movement is led by Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky. The Movement itself was 
influenced by the Iranian revolution of 1979. This influence developed into to a full 
Shiʿite orientation. The movement calls itself “The Islamic Movement” and is known in 
Nigeria as Yan Shiʿa (Shiʿite people). The group is based in Kano and it became 
more visible among Nigerian Muslims as the only group publicly opposing the sharīʿa 
re-implementation and declaring this point of view openly.  
                                                 
304 See Hunwick 2005. 
305 Sulaiman, Muhammad Dahiru (1993): Shiaism and the Islamic movement in Nigeria 1979-1991, 
Islam et sociétés au Sud du Sahara 7, pp. 5-16. 
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The Shiʿite doctrine originates in Nigeria’s social, economic and political 
challenges during the colonial era and especially throughout the post-independence 
period.306 Inspired by the success of the revolution in Iran and due to Nigeria’s turmoil 
in many directions Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky started introducing Shiʿite ideas to the 
West African country. Sheikh Zakzaky was born in Zaria in 1950 and studied at 
Ahmadu Bello University in the same city. He was among the most active members 
of the Muslim Students Society (MSS) before he left it. He was amongst the students 
who demonstrated against the state. He visited Iran in the 1980s and came back to 
recruit new members for his “Islamic movement”. He sees in Islam a solution to the 
country’s problems and propagated these ideas through lectures and public 
gatherings in northern Nigeria. He opposed the nation-state with all its symbols and 
defined it as a ṭāghūt (in Arabic: symbol of idolatry, evil). In many cases, 
demonstrations by Zakzakys followers turned into violent contestations against the 
police. Zakzaky himself was imprisoned several times because of his ideas and 
opposition to the federal state.307 There were debates in Nigeria during the 1980s 
and 1990s concerning the “Islamic movement” and whether it was a real Shiʿite group 
or not. The debates were related to the ideology and practices of its members. There 
was no doubt that it started as a political movement inspired by Iran and the 
revolution of 1979. Nowadays the movement seems to be fully involved in Shiʿite 
                                                 
306 Ibid., pp. 5-8. 
307 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
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doctrine.308 Zakzakys position on the re-implementation and his views in this direction 
will be elaborated within the context of the sharīʿa debates.309  
3 The JTI in Nigeria 
 Jamāʿat Tajdīd al-Islām (in Arabic: Society for Renewal of Islam) or simply 
abbreviated as JTI is an Islamic group that emerged in northern Nigeria during the 
mid-1990s. This group and its main figure Abubakar Mujahid split from Ibraheem 
Zakzaky and his Shiʿism-project. Sheikh Mujahid himself teaches at Aḥmadu Bello 
University of Zaria. The group seems to have its leading personalities in Zaria, 
Kaduna, and Kano. I had the chance to visit one of their mosques during my stay in 
Nigeria. I also interviewed Sheikh Mujahid himself on the sharīʿa-issue in Nigeria. As 
he explained, the group played a crucial role in framing the sharīʿa project. Sheikh 
Mujahid was close to Zakzaky and deeply influenced by his ideas. He travelled to 
Iran after the revolution of 1979. The fact that Zakzaky “converted” to Shiʿite doctrine 
resulted in a split from Zakzaky, as well as from some former followers. Ahmad 
Bello,310 a Nigerian scholar from Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria, mentions that a 
lecture given by Zakzaky on January 7th, 1994, led to the split of a group of nine 
people including Sheikh Mujahid. In this lecture Zakzaky openly declared the 
                                                 
308 The Shiite influence is visible on the homepage of the movement www.islamicmovement.org 
especially through celebrations related to Shiite Islam; this has been confirmed by a personal visit to 
Az-Zakzaky House in Zaria in January 2007. 
309 See chapter “Sharīʿa Debate of 1999”. 
310 Bello, Ahmad (2008): The Role of Jamaat at-Tajdīd al-Islami and its role in spreading the Arabic 
and Islamic culture in Bauchi”; BA-Dissertation in Arabic Studies, Ahmadu Bello University.  
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adoption of the Shiʿite doctrine.311 Consequently, the JTI declared its own dacwa 
based on the Qur’ān and within Sunni Islam. It derives its doctrine from Ḥasan al-
Bannā’ (1906-1948), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The slogan of 
the Society is “Allah is our target, the Prophet is our example, the Qur’ān is our 
canon, jihād is our way, and dying for the cause of God is our noble wish”.312 
 The idea of founding this organization took shape in January 1995. The 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt was used extensively as model. At the head of the JTI 
there is the Majlis al-Shūra al-ʿᾹmm (in Arabic: General Consultation Board) followed 
by a Director General. At the third level there is: a general secretary, a treasurer, 
leaders of committees (culture, economy, education, media, first aid, and students 
work), and a person responsible for the different regions. Under this last category 
there are state leaders, then a consultations board at the state level, then group 
leaders, then ḥalqa-responsibles (in Arabic: circle), and finally family 
representatives.313 Sheikh Mujahid is the Director General and Ustaz Amin is his 
Deputy. The goals of JTI can be summarized in six points:  
1) having an individual Muslim obeying God;  
2) creating a Muslim house on the basis of Islamic education;  
3) development of an Islamic Society;  
4) development of an Islamic State on the basis of the Qur’ān and sunna;  
5) making the Islamic revival a reality;  
                                                 
311 Bello (2008), pp. 7-12. 
312 Bello (2008), p. 13. 
313 Ibid., p. 17. 
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6) re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate.314 
 The JTI stands for an Arabic and Islamic identity and opposes Western 
cultural colonialism especially in the field of education. To achieve its goals the JTI 
has developed Arabic and Islamic educational programs in Bauchi State. It actively 
supports ʿulamā' who feed into their doctrine, establishes schools dealing with Islamic 
thought and Arabic language, and preaches in villages.315 
 In his PhD-thesis on Islamic civil societies in Nigeria, (Bayero University, 
Kano), Tahir Haliru Gwarzu316 dedicates a chapter on the JTI. He mentions how the 
movement split from Zakzaky in 1994 and established an independent organization. 
The author describes the leaders of JTI as “ʿulamā' of solid religious knowledge, 
devoting their time to teaching, preaching, and advocating the association’s 
ideology.”317 Members of the JTI are recruited via public preaching and the activities 
of the association. Schools and mosques are both good places to recruit newcomers. 
JTI attracts youth and students. Women’s education is also part of the association’s 
concerns.318 Being associated with JTI requires registration with an usra (in Arabic: 
family or cell). Gwarzu categorizes members of JTI into religious leaders, first aid 
groups/ḥisba (in Arabic: an Islamic institution for controlling values and enforcing 
conformity of behaviour according to sharīʿa), and ordinary members.319 In the matter 
                                                 
314 Ibid., p. 18. 
315 Ibid., pp. 21-29.  
316 Gwarzo, Tahir Haliru (2006): Islamic civil society associations and the state: A Kano State case 
study 1994-2004, PhD in Political Science, Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria. 
317 Ibid., p. 192. 
318 Gwarzu (2006), p. 193. 
319 Ibid., p. 197. 
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of resources, the association relies on small donations, wealthy members, schools 
fees, and on selling newspapers and business ventures.320 The association occupies 
religious, social, and political fields in northern Nigeria. Its activities vary from 
seminars and preaching sessions, to public lectures on both national and 
international issues. Its dacwa activities tend to invite all Muslims without excluding 
any specific group. The association apparently played a crucial role in mobilizing 
people for the implementation of Islamic law at the end of the 1990s. Furthermore it 
seems that they contributed to the formation of ḥisba-groups in Zamfara State and to 
the spread of sharīʿa in northern Nigerian states.321 
4 From Maitatsine to Boko Haram - a coincidence or a continuation?  
 The heterogeneity within the Islamic community in Nigeria is a fact. Scholars 
face difficulties in giving an exact number of Muslims (and Christians as well) in the 
country. This is also the case for Islamic groups. For many people, Sufism in Nigeria 
is only represented by the Tijāniyya and Qādiriyya, but the spectrum of Sufi groups is 
wider than these two orders (Shādhiliyya and many other Sufi groups are rarely 
mentioned). Nevertheless, anti-Sufism is basically represented by Sheikh Gumi, and 
after his death it has been represented by the Izala-movement. Among Nigerian 
Muslims there are other groups and individuals rejecting Sufism but which are not 
visible in the society. There are many other groups and orientations mostly within 
Sunni Islam. The only Shiʿite oriented group is that of Zakzaky. 
                                                 
320 Ibid., p. 199. 
321  For more details see Ibid., pp. 203-279. 
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 During the postcolonial era and because of the riots during the 1980s in Kano, 
the Maitatsine movement was identified. A decade ago the struggle between 
followers of Abubakar Gumi and the representatives of Sufi-brotherhoods reached 
the highest level of contestation. Boko Haram, which existed before the events of 
2009 and 2010, became more visible. Even the mass media in Western countries 
reported about the movement, especially after the events of July 2009, which 
involved the killing of hundreds in northern Nigeria. The list of Islamic groups is long 
and cannot be fully introduced. 
 Maitatsine was the group of Muhammadu Marwa, a religious scholar and 
preacher originally from Cameron who settled in northern Nigeria. Maitatsine means 
in Hausa “may God damn you”, and was directed at Marwa’s opponents. The 
movement’s leader was related to a revolt in Kano during the 1980s and was killed 
during one of the riots. The group goes back to the beginning of the 1970s when the 
number of its followers increased massively. Maitatsine recognizes the Qur’ān as the 
sole source of Islam. He claimed himself to be a prophet. Apart from his rejection of 
some Muslim practices, he also opposed western materialism and all of its aspects. 
Any kind of dress related to the west was rejected, and even travelling by car or bus 
was not appreciated by him and his followers. Members of the group were not only 
Nigerians, but came also from neighboring countries like the Republic of Niger. The 
Maitatsine was involved in several riots against the police in northern Nigeria 
between 1980 and 1985. In 1980 in Kano, when the police attempted to arrest 
Muhammadu Marwa they were resisted by his followers. The unrest that occurred for 
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a few days resulted in over four thousand victims. The leader himself was fatally 
injured. The turbulence extended to other parts of the north like Maiduguri, Kano, and 
continued in Kaduna in 1982, Gongola state (today Adamawa and Taraba states) in 
1984, and Gombe in 1985. Many people lost their lives and Nigerian authorities failed 
even to identify the reasons behind the events. Maitatsine followers were mobile and 
hardly distinguishable from ordinary people. The majority of the group is poor. This 
may explain their rejection of the society and the potentiality of their recruitment.322 
The rise of Maitatsine cannot be studied out of its socio-political and economical 
context. The same period of time witnessed the rise of other Islamic groups and 
movements.323 
 News on Boko Haram riots in northern Nigeria attracted worldwide attention in 
the summer of 2009. The brutality and the high number of victims brought the 
                                                 
322 Elizabeth Isichei (1987): The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited, In: 
Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 17 (3), pp. 194-208; for a historical overview on Maitatsine as well its 
social, political and especially economical dimension see Lubeck Paul M. (1985): Islamic Protest 
under Semi-Industrial Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine explained, In: Africa: Journal of the International 
African Institute, Vol. 55 (4), pp. 369-389. When the Maitatsine riots started the Sufi-Izala controversy 
was going on and Izala was accused by Sufi brotherhood of being behind the violence. Izala then 
changed its tactics of physical confrontation from 1981, see more details in Loimeier, Roman (1992): 
Die Dynamik religiöser Unruhen in Nord-Nigeria, In: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 27 (1), pp. 59-80 (esp. pp. 
67-69). For the teaching and origin of Maitatsine see also Hiskett, Mervyn (1980): The Maitatsine Riots 
in Kano, 1980: An Assessment, In: Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 17(3), pp. 209-223. 
323 For the rise of Islamic organizations in northern Nigeria from the 1970s see a description of “the 
emergence of new Ideas and militant organizations, 1970-1980” by Anwar, Auwalu (1989): Struggle 
for Influence and Identity: The Ulama in Kano, 1937-1989, MA-Thesis (History), University of 
Maiduguri, pp. 180-269. Among others the rise of Izala and Jundullahi (a Sufi oriented and anti-Izala 
organization in Kano) are mentioned as well the social, political and economic circumstances of 
Nigeria.  
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Maitatsine riots of the 1980s back to into focus. Mass media324 reported extensively 
on the events and were divided in their condemnations of the movement, its anti-west 
orientation as well its ideology on one hand and criticizing the Nigerian state’s way of 
dealing with it on the other. In academia the movement seems to attract attention of 
scholars from different disciplines.  
 Boko Haram325 is an Islamic group led by Muhammad Yusuf, a Nigerian 
Muslim who was arrested and killed during the riots of 2009 in Maiduguri, the capital 
of Borno state. The name “Boko Haram” translates in Hausa as “western education is 
a sin”. The movement is often labeled as a “sect”. It is also referred to as the “Taliban 
                                                 
324 Most of German newspapers (like Die Zeit, FAZ, Süddeutsche Zeitung, etc) and magazines (like 
Der Spiegel, Focus) as well TV-programs reported extensively on the events at the end of July 2009 
and those in December 2010. Also the BBC and Aljazeera English (to mention other examples) spoke 
of the riots in Nigeria. For a comparative study of Aljazeera English and the BBC see Gerhard, Tobias 
(2010): Counter-discourse in global news media? How Aljazeera English covers sectarian violence in 
Nigeria, MA, Central European University, Department of International Relations and European 
Studies, Budapest, Hungary. 
In the first riots the media estimated the number of victims to be over 700. In 2010 several conflicts 
between Boko Haram and the police especially in Maiduguri were registered and mostly accompanied 
by deadly shootings. Boko Haram became well known because of its tendency towards western 
education and its militant answer to the Nigerian state. There was also an interpretation assuming a 
connection between that group and the Taliban of Afghanistan.  
325 Not much has been written in academia on Boko Haram but the group is gradually subject of 
intensive study by researchers from different backgrounds. Adesoji, Abimbola (2010): The Boko 
Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria, In: Africa Spectrum 45 (2), pp. 95-108; for more 
understanding of the genesis of the movement see and possible connections of Boko Haram in and 
outside Nigeria see Brigaglia, Andrea (2012): Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al-
Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria, In: 
Annual Review of Islam in Africa, Vol. 11, pp. 35-44; Brigaglia, Andrea (2012), A Contribution to the 
History of the Wahhabi Daʿwa  in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmoud 
Adam (Daura, ca. 1961/1962-Kano 2007), in: Islamic Africa, 3, 1, 1-23. 
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of Nigeria” and in many cases people have speculated about its relationship to the 
Al-Qaeda network.326 
 The group has existed under different names, and had another leader from the 
mid-1990s (if not earlier) and became visible in Yobe state as a result of its 
confrontations with the police.327 In the year 2004 some students in Borno and Yobe 
withdrew from the university and joined Boko Haram. The Nigerian federal 
government became aware of the group in 2007.328 
 The group ideology consists of denying western culture and way of life and 
establishing Islamic values and norms on the basis of sharīʿa. It opposes the secular 
state and attempts to resists it. The leader himself made use of western technology 
like “exotic cars, the latest communication equipment and the best medical 
services”329. The members of the groups come from different social backgrounds, 
and vary from former students and university lecturers to jobless and lawless people. 
The majority of them come from an underprivileged background. Many factors have 
                                                 
326 Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009) was from Yobe State. He was married to four wives and father of 
twelve children. He was educated in Chad and Niger Republic. He attended Qur’anic school and broke 
with education at the secondary level. He rejected Darwinism, the Nigerian State; and western 
civilization. His group sees establishing Sharīʿa in the whole country is a duty to be fulfilled; see 
Onuoha, Freedom C. (2010): The Islamist challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis explained, In: 
African Security Review, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 56-57. 
327; Ibid., p. 55; the author narrates that the group was known as “Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah wal hijra” 
and its leader was Abubakar Lawan. After that it has different names like “Taliban”, Yusufiyya, and 
Boko Haram. It was called by Taliban through the events of December 2003, when the group stormed 
police stations and other buildings, occupied them and hoisted the Taliban’s flag. In 2004 the group 
founded a base called “Afghanistan” in Yobe state. The new leader was Muhammad Yusuf.  
328 Ibid., pp. 55-56. 
329 Adesoji (2010), p. 100. 
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led them to join the movement of Muhammad Yusuf. Among others, lack of 
opportunities, poverty, educational deficiency, unemployment and corruption.330 
Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen see the riots related to Boko Haram as 
the first ”…intra-state governmental power since 1966.” An armed struggle that had 
already started in 2005 broke out again in 2009.331 Jonathan Hill relates the rise of 
Boko Haram to the re-implementation of sharīʿa in northern Nigeria. According to him 
the group emerged in 2002 as an answer to the re-implementation project and 
quickly recruited adherents among young people, women and students.332 
 There are speculations as to where to place Boko Haram within the Islamic 
spectrum. In the absence of evidence about a link to foreign Islamic movements and 
organizations, it is difficult to place it within a particular Islamic ideology or group. 
Nevertheless it is compared to the Taliban and its model. Apart from that, it is 
situated within the spectrum of groups with Islamic-Jihadist and fundamentalist 
orientations.333 There is no proof about monetary support from outside to Muhammad 
                                                 
330 Ibid., p. 100.  
331 Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen (2010): Armed conflict 1946-2009, In: Journal of Peace 
Research Vol. 47 (4), pp. 501-509. 
332 Hill, Jonathan N. C. (2010): Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for counter-radicalization?-
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, pp. 1-65.  
333 Adesoji (2010) mentions that the “modus operandi” of Boko Haram is “fashioned after the Taliban” 
model; The author also listed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) of Algeria, 
Tablighi of Pakistan, Wahabiyya of Saudi Arabia, and Al-Qaeda as possible links to Boko Haram. 
These all are speculations of the press in and outside of Nigeria and need further investigation; see p. 
101.  
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Yusuf. Some wealthy sympathizers from northern Nigeria seem to have supported 
him financially. One can only speculate about the reasons for this assistance.334  
5 Salafiyya335 oriented groups 
 The Salafiyya is oriented after al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (in Arabic: pious predecessors; 
first three generations after the death of the Prophet). There are Salafiyya-oriented 
groups in the country like the Izala movement, but many Salafiyya scholars act as 
individuals. The late Sheikh Jaafar clarified in an interview that the Salafiyya as an 
organized group does not exist in Nigeria.336 Salafī ideas are considered to be among 
the fastest growing Islamic orientations especially in West Africa.337 Furthermore, 
these ideas are preferred by several Muslims in this region of the continent:  
“There is a current fervour among Muslim communities for the shariah 
and the return to the Salaf’s vision ranks high in popularity with many 
Muslim masses in different parts of West Africa.”338 
 
                                                 
334 Adesoji (2010) speaks of Alhaji Buji Foi, the former commissioner of Borno State, as a supporter of 
Muhammed Yusuf. There are speculations about other religious leaders and businessmen who 
believed in Yusuf’s cause and may have assisted him financially. The failure of the “Sharīʿa project” 
and the desire to make change could be an explanation of that, see p. 101-102.  
335 For an overview on the Salafiyya generally as well for a biography of its leaders see Murtaza, 
Muhammad Sameer (2005): Die Salafiya, die Reformer des Islam: eine Darstellung der Biographien 
und des politischen Denkens von Gamal Al-Din Al-Afgani, Muhammad ʿAbduh, Muhammad Rashid 
Rida und Hasan Al-Banna, sowie der Muslimbruderschaft in ihrer formativen Phase 1928 - 1932, 
Nordersted; see also chapter “Izala and Wahhabism” for a summary on Salafiyya.  
336 Interview in Kano, January 2nd, 2007.  
337 Muhammad, G. Bala and M. Sani Umar (2002): Religion and the Pan-African ideal: The Experience 
of Salafi Islam in the West African Sub-Region; in: African Journal of International Affairs, p. 141. 
338 Ibid., p. 144. 
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 The emergence of Salafiyya ideas in Nigeria can be understood within the 
context of the struggle against “colonization” and “decolonization” and the rise of 
Islamic activism after the success of the Iranian Revolution. Salafī ideas were 
appreciated by educated as well as non-educated Muslims. Mosques, education 
(especially women’s education) and media such as cassettes/VHS-cassettes 
contributed to the propagation of the Salafiyya.339 Its central strategy is to remind 
Muslims of the onesness of God (Arabic: tawḥīd) and reject all practices related to 
shirk. Salafists question the relevance of Sufism and its basis in Islam.340 
 Sani Umar elucidates that the emergence of Salafiyya in Nigeria took place 
during the 1960s. According to him this movement is a response to Sufism. This 
response became more structured under the Izala organization. Furthermore Izala is 
perceived by Sani Umar as a Salafiyya/Wahhābiyya oriented organization with a 
modernist agenda. 341  
 For Roman Loimeier, the Salafiyya in Nigeria is related to Sheikh Abubakar 
Gumi and his tafsīr sessions and “dogmatic” contest with Sufi leaders. Sheikh Gumi 
was inspired by writings of Salafiyya forefathers like Muḥammed ʿAbduh, Rashīd 
Riḍā, Sayyid Quṭb – amongst others.342 His interpretation of the Qur’ān is to be 
understood within that same tradition and goes beyond the tradition of the four 
Islamic schools of law (Mālikiyya, Ḥanbaliyya, Ḥanafiyya, Shafiʿiyya). Gumi’s 
                                                 
339 Ibid., pp. 145-147. 
340 Ibid., pp.148-149. 
341 Umar, Muhammad S. (2001): Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s In: 
Africa Today, Vol. 48 (2), pp. 127-150; see pp. 132-134. 
342 Loimeier (1997), p. 177. 
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terminology is strongly influenced by the language used by Salafiyya leaders 
themselves.343 
 There are many Islamic groups in Nigeria which follow Salafī ideology. They 
have different names like Ahl al-Sunna – among many others. They are currently 
modeled on Islamic centres like Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Sudan. It is difficult to speak 
of one organized group or movement called Salafiyya. It is a “trend,” or an Islamic 
orientation within the Muslim community. According to Bala and Umar this tendency 
is especially observed among youth (both men and women) and became a kind of 
“way of life,” particularly in places like university campuses.344 
The establishment of the Izala-organization in Jos in 1978 was an answer and 
a concretization of many anti-Sufi oriented Muslims. With the foundation of the Izala, 
the conflict with the Sufis turned out to be more equally weighted. The new 
organization undertook the duty of criticizing Sufism and purifying Islam in Nigeria 
from all “non-Islamic additions”. How was the Izala established? Who were its 
leaders/actors? What was the agenda introduced by the organization? To what 
extent has Izala succeeded in achieving its objective(s)? How did the conflict with the 
Sufis change over the years? What is the difference between the Izala of the late 
1970s and the Izala of today? All these questions as well as the Izala understanding 
of bidʿa, the relationship between Izala and Wahhabism, as well the division of the 
organization will be highlighted in the next chapter. 
                                                 
343 Ibid, p. 181. 
344 Bala and Umar (2002), p. 143. 
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Chapter Four: The Izala movement between success and 
failure 
After dealing with the keyword “reform” itself, the discussion proceeds to some 
biographical sketches of the life and work of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, the pioneer of 
Islamic reform in postcolonial Nigeria, and his student Sheikh Ismaila Idris who took 
over from him and established the Izala organization and proceeded with his own 
“reform” program. Furthermore, the Izala movement is to be described from its 
establishment until until now with focus on its division, attempts at reconciliation and 
its main figures in Nigeria today. Of course, the relationship with Sufis and the 
doctrinal discourses are not to be ignored. 
1 Sheikh Ismaila Idris and the Izala Question 
The person of Abubakar Gumi overshadowed Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the real 
founder of Izala in Jos. Even now, some Nigerians (Muslims as well as non-Muslims) 
still believe that Gumi is the one who set up Izala. This chapter tries to give an 
overview on the life, influence, and writings of Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris, and 
then clarify the Izala question.  
Muhammad N. Gurama345 described Sheikh Idris as someone who grew up 
without “games and sport”, without “fun and festivity”, but who was more interested in 
books since an early age.346 Sheikh Idris was born in 1937 in Gwaskwarom, which is 
                                                 
345 Muhammad Nuhu Gurama. (2000): Leadership trusless in an Islamic Organisation: A case study of 
the Jama’at Izala Al-Bidʿah Wa Iqamat Al-Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S.), M.A in Islamic Studies, University of 
Jos, Nigeria. 
346 Ibid., p.  49.  
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modern-day Bauchi State. His grandfather, belonging to the Jahun tribe (Fulani), 
came from what is now Kano State with his entire family and their belongings to settle 
in that area. Sheikh Idris’ father, Idris Zakariyya, was an Islamic scholar, imam, and 
preacher in his community. The first education of Sheikh Idris was with his father. 
Apart from recitation of the Qur’ān and the reading of classical books of fiqh, they 
looked after their cattle – as is the case for many Fulani.347 
 Muhammed Sadis tried to give an overview on Sheikh Idris’s life. He indicated 
that Sheikh Idris started learning under several Islamic scholars. He was taught 
Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and Arabic. Mallam Mahmud in Bauchi especially 
drew the attention of Sheikh Idris to the notion of tawḥīd. With him, Sheikh Idris read 
Mukhtasar – among many other Islamic books of the Mālikī School of Law.348 Sheikh 
Idris then attended the School of Arabic in Kano, where he studied Arabic under 
Gumi and Sheikh Hassan Khalil who were known for their “anti-ṭarīqa ideas” – as 
mentioned by Loimeier.349 After his graduation, Sheikh Idris was appointed as a 
teacher in Bauchi State. “He was not satisfied with that because his aim in life was to 
preach and teach about Islam”.350 As a result, he left Bauchi in order to go to Kaduna 
where he was appointed as a teacher in the Sultan Bello Primary School which was 
under the control of the newly founded organization, J.N.I. 
                                                 
347 The late Sheikh Ismaila Idris Bin Zakariyya- His contribution to the development of Jamaʿatu Izalatil 
Bidʿa Wa Iqamatis Sunnah (J.I.B.W.I.S) in Nigeria, B.A. in the Religious Studies Department at the 
University of Jos, Nigeria, p. 4; Loimeier (1997) indicates that in addition to the Fulani-language, 
Sheikh Idris spoke Hausa, Arabic and English, see p. 211. 
348 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 6-7 
349 Loimeier (1997), p. 211.  
350 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 8.  
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His dream of preaching to people was realized in Kaduna where Sheikh Idris 
started talking to people after Friday prayers in different mosques (Kawo Mosque, 
Doka Mosque), but, in particular in the Sultan Bello Mosque and from time to time in 
the barracks of the Army. Annoyed by a report of the J.N.I. which indicated that the 
Kakuri mosque had been turned by some soldiers into a “beer parlour” and the 
impossibility of any reaction, Sheikh Idris decided to join the Nigerian Army as an 
Imam and his application was successful.351 Sheikh Idris was employed as a Chief 
Imam Grade I civilian in 1st Division in Kaduna. He was known by his superiors 
because of his “harsh” preaching and from time to time they tried to send him to the 
primary schools to teach soldiers’ children, a duty that Sheikh Idris was not 
comfortable with. At the same time the Sheikh was also preaching to people in town, 
outside the barracks. Consequently he was punished, and transferred to Ibadan, 
where Muslims are few in number. Apart from leading prayers, Sheikh Idris had the 
duty of solving problems between Muslim soldiers. In Ibadan, Sheikh Idris observed 
that soldiers have to pay zakāt (in Arabic: alms) from their own salaries to the 
officers, so he issued a fatwā (in Arabic: legal opinion) condemning that act.352 This 
act influenced the relationship between Sheikh Idris and his superiors in Ibadan. 
Sheikh Idris appeared to many people as a “trouble-maker” since his first day in 
Ibadan and his open criticism of the Imam for performing additional practices and 
recitations after the zuhr obligatory prayer (after midday prayer). Sheikh Idris called 
                                                 
351 Ibid., 9-11; see also Aliyu, Tamimu (n.d.): Ingataccen Tarihin Jama’atu Izalatil Bidʿah Wa’ikamatis 
Sunnah (1), p. 17, the author confirmed the event leading Sheikh Idris to join the Nigerian Army 
352 The JIBWIS Journal 2005, Vol. 1 No. 3, p. 8 and p. 12; see also Loimeier (1997), p. 211. 
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the attention of the Imam and the congregation that there is no proof of their practice 
neither in the Qur’ān nor in the sunna of the Prophet. Furthermore, he invited them to 
read the book of Usman Dan Fodio Iḥyā’ al-Sunna (in Arabic: revivalism of the 
sunna).353 After only three months he was transferred to Kontagora, which is in 
modern-day Niger State. 
Sheikh Idris continued his preaching to soldiers in Kontagora and even people 
from town came to listen to him and record his sermons/lessons. He then examined 
the need for establishing a Friday-mosque in the barracks and obtained permission 
from his Captain for it. The mosque attracted many people from inside and outside 
the barracks and caused problems with the local authorities.354 A dispute between 
Sheikh Idris and an Imam from the town – a Sufi – occurred. The situation escalated 
and finally Sheikh Idris was demoted to Warrant Officer I. Later on, Sheikh Gumi 
intervened as mediator and organized a meeting between the former student of his 
and other local scholars in Kontagora. After the meeting, the same Imam, who was 
also the Emir of Kontagora, left his Sufi order.355 Loimeier regards this event as a 
political and religious success of Sheikh Idris in Kontagora. 
The next important step in Sheikh Idris’ life was his transfer to Jos, the capital 
of Plateau State. Jos is especially meaningful because of its ethnic and religious 
diversity. The city still holds symbolic relevance for many Izala members today. Not 
                                                 
353 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 13-14. 
354 Ibid. p. 16-17. 
355 See Loimeier (1997); Loimeier himself relies here on Umar (1983), p 51.  
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only was the Izala as an organization born in Jos, but it also succeeded in a milieu 
where Christianity has had a long tradition.356 
Sheikh Idris was sent to Jos, to the 3rd Armored Division. In Jos he was under 
the supervision of Major Alhassan who was warned about the activities and troubles 
created by the “new-comer” in the last stations he passed through. First of all a 
commitment was made that the Sheikh should not preach in places where a mosque 
does not exist. Sheikh Idris was in the Rukuda barracks when he started preaching in 
his residence. After that, he extended his activity to other areas in Jos, especially in 
the private houses of those who were attracted by the preaching of Sheikh Idris (the 
house of Alhaji Lawal Mai Suga, and the house of Alhaji Garba Pasali).357 The 
preaching activities were also extended to other areas of the town – Dogon Dutse for 
e.g. He attracted more and more people especially among the Tijānīs, the dominant 
Sufi brotherhood in Jos. As in other places, there was attempt to transfer Sheikh Idris 
to Borno State but it failed.358 The Sheikh was successful in establishing a network of 
followers. The fact that the preaching of Sheikh Idris attracted many followers was 
the basis for establishing an organized body. It is not clear if Sheikh Idris resigned 
from the Nigerian Army or if he was dismissed,359 but it is a fact that he left his job to 
form the Izala-organization in 1978. Before dealing with the Izala, the important 
                                                 
356 I spoke to many Izala people in Jos who stressed the success of Sheikh Idris in there, where many 
tariqa-people, Christians, and Pagans were/are present.  
357 Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 18-19.  
358 See Loimeier (1997), 213.  
359 Loimeier (1997), p. 214, mentioned that Sheikh Idris was dismissed from the Nigerian Army on 
April, 7, 1978; according to Muhammed, M. Sadis (2001), p. 22-23, Sheikh Idris decided to resign 
himself in order to found the J.I.B.W.I.S and restrict himself to preaching.  
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events in the life of Sheikh Idris will be summarized, and a reconstruction of his 
character and personality will be attempted.  
Loimeier observed that “recurrent manifestations of protest and rebellion (…) 
seem to have a constant feature in the life and career”360 of Sheikh Idris. This is 
confirmed by the fact that he had several confrontations in every place where he 
worked and lived. He was opposed to many wahala (in Hausa: problems) in and 
outside of the army barracks. He was under the supervision of the Nigerian Security 
Service. He was not only interrogated on many occasions, but also jailed in Kano in 
1978.361 Sheikh Idris was outspoken and more open to criticizing Sufis and Sufism – 
unlike his master and teacher Sheikh A. Gumi. In an interview with a former member 
of Izala and actual murshid of the JNI in Jos, Mallam A. Lawal Adam phrased it in the 
following:  
 
“With the coming of Sheikh Ismaila Idris things changed. Sheikh Idris 
was a student of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, but he [I. Idris] was more 
inclined to say: “this is ḥarām (in Arabic: forbidden) and this is against 
the sunna, anyone who does that is a kāfir (in Arabic: unbeliever). 
This is the way in which Sheikh Ismaila Idris came across, not like 
Sheikh Abubakar Gumi who was indirect.”362 
 
The former Qur’ān reciter under Sheikh Idris, Sheikh Alhassan Said al-Hafiz 
(in the Kanuri language ala ramma is a title for a person who memorizes the Qur’ān) 
who accompanied him for several years, also stressed that he was a strong and 
                                                 
360 Loimeier (1997), p. 212. 
361 Ibid., p214 
362 Interview with Mallam A. Lawal Adam in Jos, 27th December 2006. 
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severe person. He indicated that the character of Sheikh Idris led some Izala-
followers at a later stage to doubt his leadership and way of directing the 
organization.363  
If we compare both Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris it can be stated that the 
latter was more present at the local level. His preaching and confrontations with 
locally established religious authorities and his superiors in the Nigerian Army made 
him famous. Followers recorded his preaching and circulated it to other interested 
people. For Gumi, he was more present in a wider context. His preaching was 
transmitted in the media and his closeness to the political authority (Ahmadu Bello) 
as well his position as a Grand Kadi helped him to expand his doctrine. One common 
thing the two shared was that they preached in the same Ahmadu Bello Mosque in 
Kaduna which holds symbolic meaning for many Muslims in northern Nigeria. Both of 
them had the same attitude towards Sufis but they are distinguishable in their 
method(s) of criticism.  
There is no doubt, that Gumi’s influence inspired Sheikh Idris to continue with 
his preaching against Sufism and Sufi practices. It also assisted him in attracting 
more followers and to escape direct confrontation with well-established Sufi 
Brotherhoods and with the state. Many Muslims and even non-Muslims today identify 
Izala with Sheikh Gumi and vice versa. One cannot deny Gumi’s impact on the 
formation, assistance, and support of the organization. The role of Sheikh Idris, the 
architect of Izala, seems to have been crucial. The organization started with Gumi’s 
                                                 
363 Interview with Sheikh Alhassan Said in Jos, 12th December 2006. 
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support and established itself independently from him. In the following section, the 
circumstances of the establishment will be described and the role of Sheikh Gumi will 
be clarified. 
2 The J.I.B.W.I.S.: Formation of Izala Organization in 1978 
When Sani Umar interviewed Sheikh Idris during his lifetime, he was told that 
the idea of establishing the organization goes back to the time when the Sheikh was 
preaching to soldiers in the Dogon Dutse neighbourhood of Jos. Civilians were 
attracted by his preaching through recorded cassettes and also came to attend his 
lectures. At the next stage, Sheikh Idris was invited to preach outside the barracks in 
“private residences”. Many of these people distanced themselves from their 
brotherhoods to join Sheikh Idris.364 At that time one could observe that the Muslim 
community in Jos was divided into three major groups: those who joined or were 
attracted by the teachings of Sheikh Idris; those who were ṭarīqa members; and 
finally; the group of those neutral people who did not belong to any of these religious 
groups.365 
Many observers argue that the establishment of the organization was a way to 
protect Sheikh Gumi. The fact that he opposed the Sufi brotherhoods as a single 
person and because the same was true for Sheikh Idris made the establishment of 
an organization that was an anti-pole to the ṭuruq more than a necessity. In a wider 
                                                 
364 Umar, M. Sani (1983), p. 33 
365 Interview conducted on 28th February 2007 with Mallam Sani Modibbo, who was an Izala follower 
and held several posts between 1979 and 1987 before he resigned. He is actually a PhD candidate 
and lecturer in Islamic Studies at the University of Jos.  
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framework, “many politically interested Muslims sought alternative ways to express 
their political energies and thus engaged themselves in religious organizations”- as 
formulated by Loimeier.366   
Although Sheikh Gumi described the establishment of Izala as a “quite historic event” 
– as people reported to him – he couldn’t hide his awareness of the new movement 
and its inexperienced leaders and members:  
“I was somewhat worried that most members of the new association 
were young men and women, who combined their learning with a lot 
of vigor and enthusiasm. My fear was that they might not be very 
patient in their preaching, especially with older scholars in the society, 
many of whom had been brought up in a centuries-old ṭarīqa 
tradition.”367 
 
The launch of the organization, it took place in Jos on the 8th February 1978. Sheikh 
Gumi was invited, but could not attend. He selected two people to attend on his 
behalf: Muhammad Awwal Abubakar and Ibrahim Qarab.368 As part of the 
preparations for the establishment, a committee of seven people was set up. Among 
others, the committee included Sheikh Ismaila Idris, Alhaji Ibrahim Musalla, Alhaji 
Musa Muhammad, Alhaji Husseini, Alhaji Sabo, and Mallam Tanimu Aliu. The first 
concern of the committee was to give a name to the organization. Alhaji Musalla 
suggested “Jamāʿat al-Birr wa’l-Taqwā” (in Arabic: Society for Welfare and Fear of 
God) and the name was rejected. Sheikh Musa Muhammed suggested “Jamāʿat 
                                                 
366 Loimeier (1997), p. 214. 
367 Gumi (1992), p. 155.  
368 Interview on the 5th December 2006 with Ustaz Nasir Abdelmuhyi, Director of High Islamic School, 
Sarkin Mangu, Jos. Headquarter of the Izala A which is more attached to the founder Sheikh I. Idris. 
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Izālat al-Bidʿa” (in Arabic: Society for the Removal of Innovation).369 A comment came 
from Sheikh Gumi who was informed of the suggestions concerning the name. 
According to him, if the Society wanted to fight bidʿa so what should be established? 
Sheikh Gumi proposed “Jamāʿat Izālat al-Bidʿa wa-Iqāmat al-Sunna” (in Arabic: 
Society for Removal of Un-Islamic Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna of 
the Prophet).370 
The inauguration of the Izala happened on March 12th, 1978. However, the 
official registration took place much later in 1985. It was on December 11th 1985 that 
the Nigerian ministry of Internal Affairs signed the certificate of incorporation allowing 
Izala to be officially registered as an organization. According to my interviewee, 
Mallam Sani Modibbo, there is a rule that any organization must have a formal 
approval from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Any organization should also advertise 
its establishment (in a newspaper). The Ministry gave some time for reactions if there 
were any objections against the organization. This procedure was undertaken by 
Izala. As expected by many people, “not hundreds but thousands of objections from 
all over the country”371 were sent to the ministry to stop the registration. This “mass-
protest” was the reason why the approval of Izala happened in the mid-1980s and it 
had to do with the fact that Saidu Badawa, then a permanent secretary in the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, was an Izala patron and supporter which facilitated the official 
                                                 
369 Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Musalla on the 24th December, 2006, at his house in the Angwan 
Rogo area, Jos.  
370 Interview on 8th January 2007 with Alhaji Mustafa Imām, National Director of the Izala Kaduna First 
Aid Group, at his house in Zaria. This information was also confirmed by Mallam Sani Modibbo during 
the Interview with him on 28th February 2007 in his office in Jos. 
371 Mallam Sani Modibbo Interview, on 28th February 2007 in Jos. 
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accreditation of the organization.372 Before being registered, the Izala operated under 
the umbrella of the JNI and it had several names like Jamiyyar Yada Addinin 
Musulanci (Hausa: Society for the Propagation of Islam) in Kaduna, Kungiyar Raya 
Addin Musulanci (in Hausa: Association for the Promotion of Islamic Religion) in 
Gusau.373 
The launching of Izala was the result of the efforts of Sheikh Ismaila Idris and 
several other people around him. Loimeier identifies a crucial role of Sheikh Gumi in 
“building the organizational structure” of Izala. Furthermore he argues that many Izala 
leaders “were former students and followers of Gumi” and they benefited from the 
“existing JNI networks” in several areas of the north.374 Furthermore Loimeier 
explains the Izala Foundation as a kind of break with the existing traditional networks 
that dominated not only the JNI but also the “political establishment”.375 In addition, 
Loimeier illustrates that the continuation of the struggle between Sheikh Gumi (and 
                                                 
372 Ibid.; Gurama (2000) provides a copy of the “Public Notice” of 11th/12/1985: “This is to notify the 
general public that the association Jamaʿatul Izalatzul Bidʿa Wa Ikamatis Sunnah has applied to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs for Registration and the Lan (Perpetual Succession), Act, Cap 98, Law as of 
Nigeria”. It is also mentioned “Any objection of the registration should be forwarded in writing to the 
Permanent Secretary of the Land (Perpetual Succession) Division, Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
Ikoyi, Lagos within 21 days of this publication, see p 157.  
373 Yandaki (1997) lists more names of the Izala in different places in Nigeria: Association for 
Extinguishing Excesses and Establishing the Sunna or Movement of Extinguishing Innovations and 
Establishing the Sunna (Anka district, Zamfara State), The Association of the Upholding of Islam 
(Katsina). See Yandaki, A. I (1997): The Izalah Movement and Islamic Intellectual discourse in 
Northern Nigeria: A case Study of Katsina, in: Tsiga, I. Abubakar and A. Uba Adamu (1997): Islam and 
History of Learning in Katsina, p 48; Sani Umar (1983) uses the name “The Movement of Orthodoxy 
against Heterodoxy”, see p 31. 
374 Loimeier (1997), p. 214-5. 
375 Ibid., p. 208; Loimeier relies here on Sani Umar (1988), p. 191 in explaining the fact that the JNI 
“was no longer an adequate platform for his (Gumi’s) own efforts of Tajdīd”. 
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his supporters) and the Sufi in Kaduna inspired the “establishment of an organization 
(…) for any effective opposition to the Sufi brotherhoods.”376 
Yandaki elucidates the emergence of Izala as a protest against “socio-cultural 
and economic milieu” on one hand, and on the other hand against “ignorant followers 
of Izala” and the juhhal (in Arabic: ignorants) of Hausa society”377. Yandaki – as a 
historian – recognizes three different phases when it comes to the development of 
Izala: the formative period (1978-82), a period of consolidation (1983-88), and “Izala 
as a reality”. He adds a fourth and final phase that he called a “critical phase”.378 
Yandaki tries to understand Izala in the context of its time and relates it to 
several social, religious and political events of the late 1970s. He especially stresses 
the presence of laborers and students in the movement as crucial elements in the 
emergence of the movement in both towns and villages. According to him, students 
are to be found everywhere and at different levels, while laborers are “all over”. The 
Izala protest was against three major groups of the society: the ʿulamā' who 
abandoned Islam and followed “mystification and innovations”, the majority of the 
Muslims who followed their sheikhs blindly (Arabic: taqlīd aʿmā:), and finally the group 
of traditional rulers (like Emirs) who kept practices that were non-Islamic.379  
Yandaki considers the first years of the Izala establishment to be the years of 
“struggle for survival” and of establishing adherents and followers among Muslims. 
The movement succeeded in recruiting preachers and followers who joined Sheikh 
                                                 
376 Ibid., p. 210. 
377 Yandaki, p. 136.  
378 For more details see Yandaki (1990). P 116-193.  
379 Ibid., p. 146-8. 
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Idris in his daʿwa. In 1978, the Sheikh wrote a polemical treatise in Hausa entitled 
Gane bambanci gaskiya da karya (in Hausa: Towards the difference between truth 
and lies) in which he shows his criticism of Sufism and shirk.380 Such written booklets 
– especially those written in Hausa, the dominant vernacular in northern Nigeria – are 
not only read by intellectuals but also by ordinary Muslims.  
At the initial stage, when Izala operated under the umbrella of JNI and not as 
an organized society or independent body, their scholars used Sheikh Idris as an 
example and followed his path to preach in different places. Step by step, they 
recognized the necessity of an independent organization that supports the ideology 
of its founders and protects him and their followers. This is how the idea of the 
establishment took place.381 In fact, it is not possible to speak of Izala as an 
established body in the first years after its establishment. Concerning its program, it 
was restricted to leading people to the Qur’ān and sunna as basic elements of Islam 
and to rejecting affiliations with Sufi brotherhoods. The program of Izala was 
summarized by Loimeier in three points: a) one can join Izala only if s/he abandons 
his/her ṭarīqa; b) Izala is not sectarian; c) and finally it recognizes the Nigerian 
constitution.382  
Since Islam in Nigeria was spread on the basis of a long Sufi tradition, 
especially of the Qādiriyya and the Tijāniyya, it was necessary for the Izala to look for 
a strategy to deal with the Sufi dominance. Preaching in Jos and other towns and 
                                                 
380 Loimeier (1997), p 214; also Sani Umar (1983), p 47. 
381 Interview with Mallam Sani Modibbo, 28th/2/2007. 
382 Loimeier (1997), p. 229.  
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villages was not enough for Izala. Loimeier points out that one of the basic strategies 
of the movement was to “bring as many mosques as possible under their control.”383 
This strategy succeeded to a large extent; many Sufis were sometimes inclined not to 
attend ceremonies or festivities because of the “fear” of Izala.384 Izala simply 
“invaded” mosques, took them under its control and started preaching to people. 
The situation escalated violently during the late 1970s between Izala and its 
opponents. Loimeier sees this development as “symptomatic” of that period of time, 
since it was characterized by social and political turmoil.385 When Izala gained the 
attention of many Muslims in the north and received huge support from youth, 
intellectuals, businessmen, and of course the assistance of Sheikh Gumi, the 
movement started to organize itself internally. In the year 1980 the so-called 
Maitatsine riots386 took place in Kano and influenced the first organizational stage of 
Izala. The Sufis used the opportunity to blame Izala for violence and cooperation with 
the Maitatsine.387 Many Izala were arrested and imprisoned. This was a turning point 
for the movement. As a result, they were obliged to change their strategy to a more 
peaceful program –especially since the Maitatsine riots vehemently influenced the 
development of the Izala. 
                                                 
383 Ibid., p. 216.  
384 Ibid., p. 218.  
385 See the list of riots given by Loimeier (1997), pp. 347-9 he gives a chronology of the clashes 
between Izala and Sufis. The author suggests approaching the history of these events with caution 
and understanding them in their general social and political context. 
386 For more details see Isichei, Elisabeth (1987), pp. 194-208. 
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 Concerning the Izala formation, Brigaglia speaks of an organization 
established by Gumi as the first organization of the masses “di tipo moderno”, with a 
statute and constitution and concentration on “learning”.388 This type of organization 
which adapted modern structures was a new phenomenon among Nigerian Muslims 
familiar with the traditional way of religious organizations. 
 Nobody can deny the role of Sheikh Gumi when it comes to the establishment 
of the Izala organization. This is due to his religious and political influence on 
Nigerian Muslims from the 1960s. He was not only the Grand Kadi of the north, but 
he was also present through his writings against Sufis and his name became familiar 
to people through the media because of his close relationship to the Sardauna 
Ahmadu Bello. The initiative to establish an official organization was planned and put 
into action by Sheikh Idris and his supporters. These people were divided into 
preachers and wealthy men who supported the organization with money. Sani Umar 
makes a nice differentiation that Sheikh Idris was the “principal architect” of Izala and 
Sheikh Gumi was among the “influential supporters”.389  
Through interviews that I conducted with different Izala members it is difficult 
to give a precise list of those who attended the founding meetings. It always depends 
on the perspective of the interviewee. Alhaji Ibrahim Musalla, who is now associated 
with the Kaduna faction of Izala whom I interviewed in Jos in December 2006, 
                                                 
388 Brigaglia (2004), p 226. 
389 Sani Umar (1983), among others Muhammad Abba Aji Maiduguri (Borno State), Mallam Sidi 
Attahiru (Sokoto State), Malam Tudu Shikaji and Malam Muhammad Ba’are (Kaduna State) are in the 
category of those who were close to Sheikh Idris and served as preachers; others like Sheikh Gumi, 
Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu, Alhaji Shehu Tabacco are among the “influential supporters”; there were also 
other government functionaries and politicians who also supported Izala at its initial stage, see p 48. 
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mentioned that the need to establish an organization was more than necessary 
especially to gain more recognition by the state. It also gives the people joining Izala 
a kind of “identity” especially when the organization has a name, and an address, etc.  
2.1 One constitution and two factions or many constitutions of the same 
organization? 
Izala struggled for many years to gain authenticity and legitimacy among its 
followers and also from the state. Izala was/is registered as an official organization in 
Nigeria. It also has a constitution detailing its organization, leadership, and structure. 
After the division of the movement into two branches in Jos and Kaduna each group 
considered itself to be the genuine movement. One of the major issues was the 
constitution of the Izala as a registered organization. If a faction decides to draft a 
new constitution and declares its independence from the other group, then it should 
also change its name. Neither group was ready to do so. Changing the name 
indicates loss of power and damaging the image amongst Muslims. Furthermore it 
confirms superiority of one group or the other amongst the followers. This was the 
situation at an early time of the division. After that, a new orientation took place and 
attempts to amend the constitution according to the new needs of each group took 
place. For my analysis I will be using the following documents: the constitution of 
Izala as a united organization390 , then the amendment ratified by the faction in Jos in 
2004 and the Kaduna faction in 1995. This new development explains that the “two” 
Izala redefined their objectives and continue to be a modern society by fixing these 
                                                 
390 a copy of the constitution from the headquarters (1981) which is also to be found in Loimeier 
(1997), Appendix 4, pp. 351-366; translated from Hausa by Jibril H. Yola). 
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goals in the constitution. Interestingly, both amendments cite Jos as the permanent 
headquarters of the movement.  
The constitution of Izala (Kaduna faction) is written in the Arabic language, is 
dated 3rd/08/1995, and bears the signatures of Sheikh Yusuf Sambo, leader of the 
High Council of Daʿwa wa’l-Irshād (in Arabic: propagation and guidance), Alhaji Musa 
Mai Gandu, the General Chairman of the Society, Ustaz Umar Hassan Imam, 
Secretary of the High Council of Daʿwa wa’l-Irshād, and finally Muhammad Inua, 
General Secretary of the organization. The document has fourteen pages with a 
cover containing the full name of the organization, its Headquarters (Jos) and its 
physical address. The title is Niẓām al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya (in Arabic: Code of the 
Salafī mission) of the J.I.B.W.I.S. in Nigeria. The slogan of the society is also 
indicated: al-Taṣfiya wa’l-Tarbiya (in Arabic: clearance and education). Apart from an 
introduction and a conclusion, the document is made of four sections including eight 
paragraphs. In the introduction, the situation of some Muslims in Nigeria is described 
in the following:  
“(…) some Muslims today are under polytheism, following their 
passion, under Sufi Brotherhoods, and several myths, totally devoted 
to colonial rule and to plots of communists and others have led to the 
weakness and separation of Muslims today…”391 
 
Based on these circumstances, Izala was established in order to invite 
Muslims to come back to their religion on the path of “al--Salaf al-Ṣaliḥ”. The 
                                                 
391  Izala Kaduna Draft of Constitution, 1995, p. 1 (my translation). I am thankful to Sheikh Ali 
Mustapha, leader of the Ulama Council, Maiduguri, Borno State (Izala Kaduna) for providing me with a 
copy of this constitution. 
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organization invites Muslims to al-ʿaqīda al-saḥiḥa (rightful faith) and considers the 
Qur’ān and the sunna to be principal sources for unifying Muslims. What is outside 
these two sources is the view as to whether the concept of ijtihād (in Arabic: effort, 
individual reasoning) can be considered “true” or “false”.392 
The first part of the document is comprised of five paragraphs dealing with the 
establishment of the organization, its name, headquarters, slogan, and finally, a 
general overview of the organization. In the first paragraph the formation of Izala is 
described. Interestingly, only Sheikh Gumi and his famous book (al-ʿaqīda as-saḥiḥa) 
are mentioned. The Sheikh started in Kaduna before a group of ʿulamā' continued to 
establish Izala in Jos in the year 1978. There is no single indication of the role of 
Sheikh Idris and his efforts to establish Izala. This was an attempt to discredit him as 
founding father of the organization and eliminate his name from the history of the 
movement. Even in the next two paragraphs (name, headquarters) only the 
contribution to the name of Izala by Sheikh Gumi (he added/suggested “wa Iqāmat 
al-sunna”) is indicated. In addition, the capital of Plateau State, Jos is named as the 
headquarters of Izala. 
Paragraph four defines the slogan of Izala as “al-Taṣiya wa’l-Tarbiya” without 
giving details. The last paragraph (§ 5) is made of four points and gives an overview 
about of organization.  
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1. The situation of Muslims is described and Izala is established to bring them 
back to the sunna and free them from Jahl al-ʿaqīda al-Islāmiyya (in Arabic: 
ignorance of Islamic faith).  
2. Izala is not a political organization acting secretly. It is an organization of 
daʿwa along the lines of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa. When it comes to Islamic 
sharīʿa (Arabic: Siyāsat al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya) Izala is regarded to be part of 
it.  
3. Izala tries to avoid any ethnic, sectarian or provincial differences. It works for 
the oneness of God (tawḥīd) both in- and outside of Nigeria. 
4. Izala does not rely on a particular madhhab (in Arabic: school of Law), group 
of people, or person. The difference is based on taqwā (in Arabic: Fear of 
God).393 
 
The second part of the constitution (§ 6) deals with objectives of the organization. 
These are summarized in ten points:  
1. Returning to the Qur’ān and the sunna following al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ in faith, 
worshipping, human transactions, and in all fields of life;  
2. showing Muslims their religion and inviting them to follow its rules;  
3. warning Muslims against polytheism, innovation, new ideas of atheists and 
communists;  
                                                 
393 Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
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4. unify Muslims under the same faith and same path in order to establish an 
umma organized under one flag and one Imam;  
5. purify the Islamic Society from polytheism, innovations, myths,… etc. in order 
to create a comfortable atmosphere in which to educate generations of 
Muslims;  
6. establish “the good Muslim” who is far from polytheism, fundamentalism and 
belief in myths;  
7. free the Muslim world from its enemies who destroyed the unity of Muslims;  
8. warn Muslims against sectarianism;  
9. al-Taṣfiya wa‘l-Tarbiya;  
10. attempt to set up an Islamic society and practice the rule of God on earth. This 
is the path of Izala in Nigeria. The organization invites people in- and outside 
the country to assist in propagating the message of Islam.394 
 
In order to achieve these goals the following means are proposed in the third part of 
the document (§ 6). These means are, among others: establishing Quranic schools, 
establishing an institute for preachers, creating an Islamic cultural center, organizing 
educational workshops in the entire country, founding a school for Muslim women, 
assisting orphans and weak people, assisting newly converted, and giving 
scholarships to needy people.395 
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The fourth and last part (§ 8) elucidates the administrative structure of the 
organization 
 
1) The organization has a General President and two deputies. He is 
responsible for leading and organizing meetings and for representing 
Izala.  
2) The General Committee of Organization: comprised of seventy 
members representing local governments. The committee elects 
members of the advisory committee and executive committee of the 
Society. This committee is headed by the leader of the organization or 
one of his deputies.  
3) Department of Daʿwa or Advisory Committee: comprised of twenty-five 
members and is headed by the leader of al-Majlis al-aʿlā li’Shuʾūn 
Daʿwa wa Irshād wa Taʿlīm (in Arabic: High Council of Daʿwa  Affairs, 
Orientation and Education), a secretary and his deputy. This 
department deals with daʿwa , schools and mosques, fatwās, and 
teaching. The committees of Education, of fatwās, of Mosques are 
headed by Administrative leaders within this department.  
4) The Executive Committee: made of fifteen members, its meetings are 
headed by the General Leader of Izala or his deputy (head of the “al-
Majlis al-aʿlā li’Shuʾūn Daʿwa wa Irshād wa Taʿlīm). In this part, 
qualifications of dāʿi (in Arabic: a person practicing daʿwa) are fixed. 
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Every member of Izala is considered to be dāʿiya. He should be well 
versed in the teachings of Islam. His work should be to please Allah 
and not because of maṣlaḥa (in Arabic: personal benefit). He should be 
far from any political practice. Any political activity should take place 
outside of the organization and not in the name of Izala. Everybody 
should strive to follow sunna personally and in his family and should be 
an example for others. He should protect the society from any 
defamation. 
5) First Aid Groups: trained members who assist sick and injured people. 
They also organize places of gathering and meetings. They have a 
particular uniform similar to the armed forces.  
6) Secretariat: is responsible for letters, prints, and everything needed by 
the society. This body is headed by a General Secretary who has a 
deputy.  
7) Information Section: shows activities of the organization through 
publications, loudspeaker, records, and cassettes.  
8) Communication Section: Communication within local governments and 
Islamic organizations in- and outside the country. It represents the 
Society in any location within the Islamic world.  
9) Organization Section: organizes meetings and workshops of Izala. It 
fixes the date of meetings. It collects daʿwa requirements and directs 
preachers to their places of daʿwa. This body is made of eleven 
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Members (the president and his deputy, Secretary and his deputy, three 
from the Council of ʿulamā', Leader of Information Section, two 
representatives from the First Aid groups and a representative from the 
Finances Committee.  
10) Finances Section: collects money and plans the budget of the Society 
and organizes the management of resources. Cannot act without the 
treasurer of the Society, the Leader of Izala, and leader of the ʿulamā' 
Council. A seal is necessary for all documents and no transaction can 
be achieved orally. This section can also initiate projects for the Society 
to fulfill its objectives.396  
 
The second document is entitled “The Constitution of Jama‘tu Izalatil Bidʿah 
Wa’Ikamatis Sunna”.397 It has twelve pages (the first and last ones are stamped 
indicating name and headquarters in Jos) and is divided into two major parts. The 
first part deals with the name, objectives, and membership in Izala. The second part 
concerns sponsorship and structure of the organization.  
On the first few pages give the name of Izala and its meaning, Sheikh Ismaila 
Idris (written in capital letters) is introduced as the founder, Chairman of the 
Preachers Council and the “Grand Mufti”. Again this is a marker of Izala in Jos to 
identify the organization with Sheikh Idris and Sheikh Idris with Izala. Also in this first 
                                                 
396 Ibid., pp. 9-13. 
397 I am thankful to Kadi Muhammad Adam Farinkasa for providing me with a copy of this constitution; 
he ensured that the copy dates from the year 2004. The document itself has no indication of day or 
year of the amendment.  
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part, the headquarters is indicated to be in Jos, with offices in the entire country. 
Concerning membership, it is open to every Sunni Muslim who “protects the dignity of 
the Organization and Sovereignty of the Nation.” The aims and objectives of Izala are 
specified in the following. The organization is purely Islamic and relies only on the 
Qur’ān and sunna. It is neither political nor tribal. It works to unify Muslims and teach 
them about the “true teachings of Islam”. It alerts Muslims about “confusing books” 
written on Islam. It confirms that the message of the Prophet Muhammad is the last 
one and opposes any new Prophecy. The organization makes efforts to set up 
education and health in Nigeria in respect of law. It organizes teachings and 
preaching and makes use of media. It assists the state to keep peace. These 
objectives are to be achieved in accordance with the Qur’ān and the sunna.398 
The second part of the constitution begins with an indication of monetary 
sources of Izala. The organization relies – as mentioned – on voluntary donations, 
publishing (books, journals, etc), and farming (§ 4). Also a bank account and a 
regulation about important documents of the organization are indicated (§5). Izala 
holds different meetings at different levels. They can be quarterly or organized when 
it is necessary. All meetings of the Council of ʿulamā', the Administration or First Aid 
Groups can only be held in Jos, the headquarters. Any meetings of one of these 
councils take place when the Chairman, secretaries and nine members are 
present.399  
                                                 
398 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 
399 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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The constitution fixes the structure of the organization (three councils/basic 
bodies), the composition and function of each council (§ 7 to 11).  
1. The National Council of Preachers consist of 1) a Chairman; 2) a Deputy; 3) a 
Secretary; 4) an Assistant Secretary; 5) a Chairman State Council of 
Preachers; 6) secretaries to the State Council of Preachers; 7) ten preachers 
and reciters of Qur’ān. This council is considered to be the highest authority 
and policy maker for the organization. It organizes policy with administration, 
appoints or removes trustees, solves problems within the organization, and 
trains preachers. It has the highest authority as indicated in the following: “The 
common SEAL of the organization shall only be used or affixed on the 
authority of a special resolution duly passed by the National Council of 
Preachers.” 
2. The National Administrative Council also considered the executive council, is  
comprised of 1) a Chairman (surprisingly here it is the same Chairman of the 
National Council of Preachers; 2) a Deputy Chairman; 3) a National Secretary; 
4) All registered Trustees; 5) a National Director of First Aid Groups; 6) All 
State Chairmen of Administration and Preachers’ Councils; 7) All National 
Officers of the Organization; Secretaries of the Administration Council and 
Preachers’ Council; ten representatives appointed by the Chairman of the 
Council of Preachers and a Deputy Chairman of Administration. The function 
of this body is to execute decisions of the organization, approve proposals and 
reports of Committees, approve the budget of the Society, and secure the 
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Organization’s assets. It can only act under supervision of the National Council 
of preachers.  
3. The National Directorate of First Aid Groups is the third important body fixed in 
the Izala constitution. It consists of 1) a National Director; 2) a National 
Advisor; 3) All National Officers of Air Groups; 4) All State Directors of First Aid 
Groups; 5) All State Secretaries of Aid Groups; 6) All State Organizing 
Secretaries of First Aid Groups; and 7) All State Discipline Officers of First Aid 
Groups. It is also under the Council of Preachers in the matter of rules or 
regulations. First-Aiders have a brown uniform and badge with two cross-
swords and a palm tree in the center. They wear blue berets and white belts. 
This body is allowed to initiate divisions or units.400 
Apart from the three mentioned councils, Izala has Committees that can be set up 
when necessary: Education Committee; Finances and General Purpose; Health; 
Personal and Discipline; Elders. Depending on the field of action, these committees 
assist with improving policy of Izala. Concerning the Elders committee, it serves an 
advisory function for the purpose of rightly directing the Organization.401 
It is stated that the organization should have trustees (between five and 
seven) who hold this position for the rest of their life. They are under the Council of 
the Preachers and are members of the Council of Administration (§14).  
An authoritarian sign of the organization is given under General matters (§ 17). This 
paragraph gives more influence to ʿulamā' in the organization. It can be interpreted as 
                                                 
400 Ibid., pp. 5-8.  
401 Ibid., see pp. 8-10. 
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an answer to the split group and at the same time as a protection of the Izala leader. 
These appear in paragraph 17 (b): “The Chairman of the National Council of 
Preachers shall NOT be suspended or otherwise be removed except if he commits 
any indecent or criminal offences…” Also paragraph 17 (d) allows the National 
Headquarters of the Organization to appoint or remove the Deputy Chairman of 
Administration and the Chairman of the State Council of Preachers.402 
The two versions provided by the headquarters (1981) and the translation of 
the constitution from Hausa are different in some aspects from the amendments of 
Jos and of the Kaduna faction. While the constitution of 1995 proposed by Kaduna 
recognizes Sheikh Gumi as the founder and initiator of the Organization and 
completely ignores Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the Izala Jos version of 2004 dignifies 
Sheikh Idris as the founder, leader of the Council of ʿulamā' and the Grand Mufti of 
Izala. This is not surprising to non-Izala, since the division in Izala happened at the 
level of leadership. The objectives and aims of the organization seem to be similar in 
all versions. This is a confirmation that the split in Izala did not occur at the level of 
doctrine and objective. The new amendment of the constitution is more about 
prestige and protection of personalities of the movement. This is visible when it 
comes to the institutional structure. For both factions, Jos was and is the 
headquarters of the movement. For the Jos faction, the important change in the new 
version is the position of the leader and the Council of ʿulamā'. Both are given more 
power and action in the Society and have the opportunity to appoint or remove any 
                                                 
402 Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
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person in the organization. The Council of preachers supervises the other two 
councils in all directions and has the highest authority when it comes to decisions and 
policy-making.  
For the Kaduna faction of Izala, the new version of the constitution recognizes 
a general president of the Society. This person represents the organization and 
chairs meetings. The most important body for this group is the so-called al-Lajna al- 
ͨamma li’Tanẓīm (in Arabic: the General Committee of the Organization). This 
Committee has the exclusive right to change the other two: the advisory and 
executive ones. It designs the major structures of the organization and elects 
members of the other two committees. This is a hint from the Kaduna faction that the 
ʿulamā' are part of the organization, but not the most important one. It is an answer to 
Sheikh Idris that the Administration played and still plays a crucial role for in 
organization. This council has seventy members, which is larger than the two others 
(twenty five for the Preachers Council and fifteen for the Executive Council). Maybe it 
is a message that the organization should be more “democratic” rather than being 
under the authority of a single person or a small group of people.  
Until April 2008403, there has been no confirmation as to whether one of these two 
versions was officially approved or not. From the point of view of the State, 
recognizing one faction’s constitution amendment means denying the existence of 
the other one. This risky decision can influence the stability not only within Izala, but 
also the Muslim community as a whole. 
                                                 
403 Time of my second field work in Nigeria.  
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2.2 Structure of the Organization404 
The Izala organization developed a threefold structure since the early years of 
its establishment. Even after the division into two major branches, the organization 
kept its three-dimensional setting. The three bodies of Izala are called councils: The 
first is the council of ʿulamā'; the second is the council of Administration, and the third 
is the First Aid Group. The three councils are related to each other and are in place to 
satisfy the needs of the organization. Preachers and other servants of the 
organization needed an administrative setting that facilitated the work of Izala 
(authorization to preach; registration of events, official letters, salary management, 
etc.). These two bodies are complemented by the first aid groups’ work.  
2.2.1 The Council of ʿulamā' 
 
The ʿulamā' constitute one of the most important categories in the hierarchy of 
the organization. Izala needs well educated Islamic scholars who are familiar with 
Islamic tradition, Islamic law, and are experienced in preaching. ʿulamā' can be 
considered to be the “elementary capital” of Izala. They organize preaching and 
                                                 
404 This chapter relies basically on material collected from the Izala branch in Jos. I am grateful to 
Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir for providing me with some of the organization’s publications as well some of 
his writings; the publications of the headquarters in Jos J.I.B.W.I.S (n.d.): al-Jamaʿa fi Sutūr (the 
Organization in a few lines), National Headquarters, Jos, Nigeria, Abdulazeez Printing Press Ltd, p. 
58; this booklet is written in three languages (Arabic, Hausa and English, and provides important 
information on the structure of Izala as well the duty of the different councils and committees of the 
Organization. The document also provides a statistical overview about the different instituions under 
Izala. 
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seminars, give lectures, fix the guidelines of the organization and provide adherents 
with written material. Being an ʿālim (in Arabic: singular of ʿulamā') requires deep 
knowledge of Islam, the different schools of thought among Muslims, the Quranic text 
and the tradition of the Prophet. Apart from traditional Islamic education and mastery 
of the Arabic language, many contemporary ʿulamā' of Izala attended (and still 
attend) universities and acquire official diplomas in various fields. 
2.2.2 The Administration Council 
The task of this council is defined by the Izala Jos branch in four different points:  
1) achieving decisions undertaken by the ʿulamā' Council,  
2) reporting suggestions of the different committees,  
3) supervising the achievement of projects or programs,  
4) and clarifying as well protecting the organization’s belongings.405 
One of the crucial problems leading to the division of Izala was the discussion about 
whether the Council of Administration headed by Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu is higher-
ranking than the ʿulamā' Council, or vice versa. The Kaduna faction still supports and 
considers Mai Gandu to be the Izala leader. The Jos branch considers the ʿulamā' 
Council to be the highest authority in the organization. The entourage of Mai Gandu 
tried to impeach Sheikh Idris at the beginning of 1991. During the same period of 
time Sheikh Idris, as well as some of his followers excluded Alhaji Mai Gandu from 
Izala. These events within Izala are qualified by Loimeier as a “crisis of orientation” in 
                                                 
405 J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.), p. 5. 
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mid-1991. This crisis took on another dimension a few months later, especially after 
the death of Sheikh Gumi who was considered to be the “spiritual father of Izala”.406 
 
2.2.3 First Aid Group (FAG) 
The FAG was formed in 1978 to assist in the logistics of the Society and give 
practical assistance to the two other Izala councils. FAG is hierarchically organized 
from the local level, then the state, and finally national director. Members of FAG are 
trained in first aid basics. They practice sport in order to be ready for intervention. 
They wear uniforms and are easily identifiable. During Izala gatherings, the FAG is 
responsible for organizing the meetings and to uphold the order. They control the 
traffic in front of mosques during times of prayer, and collect alms after the prayers. 
Due to their training in first aid they assist weak, injured or sick people before 
bringing them to a medical doctor or to the hospital. The FAG is active in Islamic 
charity projects. They even plant trees or repair roads. Besides such basic tasks like 
maintaining religious facilities, the FAG manages more complex duties like assisting 
pilgrims at airports.407  
At the top of the organization there is a national director who controls the 
organization at a national level. A state director of FAG has the same duty at the 
state level. On the local government level a division leader is responsible. At the 
district level there is a detachment leader. Concerning the ward level there is a unit 
                                                 
406 See Loimeier (1997): ”Die Radikale Islamische Opposition ...”, p. 8.  
407 J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.), pp. 22-24. 
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leader. This structure more or less mirrors the Nigerian state. All these directors are 
supervised by a committee of people controlling their work. The FAG aid group has 
its own regulations which assign duty, dress, and grades at all levels.408 FAG 
opposed the participation of women as first aiders with the argument that such a 
participation lead to ikhtilāṭ (in Arabic: mixing of men and women in public). Other first 
aid groups of other Islamic organizations encouraged the participation of women with 
the argument that “a woman should assist her sister when it is necessary.”409 
2.2.4 Other Committees410 
The three councils mentioned above are complemented by different committees 
which are established according to the needs of the organization and are specialized 
in particular matters. The Jos branch counts five different committees:  
 education,  
 finances,  
 health and welfare,  
 personal and discipline,  
 committees of elders.  
The education committee is responsible for the educational system of the 
organization and is under the supervision of the ʿulamā'. This committee is 
                                                 
408 Ibid., pp. 24-25; see also p. 72. 
409 See A. Lawal Adam (1992), p. 43.  
410 Also based on information from the J.I.B.W.I.S. publication; for a comparison with the five 
committees (finance, guidance, discipline, communication, and central committees) of Izala are 
introduced in the first constitution of the Organization (8 February 1978) see also Loimeier (1997): 
“Political change…”, pp. 360-366. 
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responsible for preparing curricula and providing materials for schools. The 
organization also made efforts to obtain recognition from the state. The Director of 
the Diploma Section, Sarkin Mangu, Ustaz Nasir Abdelmuhyi ensured that the 
examinations of Izala are recognized by the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU).411 
Students who have completed their three-years diploma from the Izala High School 
for Islamic Studies can join ABU in their second year.  
The educational system of Izala consists of schools from nursery to the 
diploma level. There are also certificates that are issued (by Izala, State ministry of 
Education, ABU Zaria, or by the Institute of Education in Bauchi) after an 
accomplished period of studies. Nursery school for example lasts three years and is 
under the supervision of the State Ministry of Education, while the primary school 
called Maljaus Sunnah is under the supervision of the Directorate of education of 
JIBWIS. Izala defines thirteen types of schools with different names, levels and 
orientations. These schools are set up in a hierarchy from bottom to top; the top 
being the Diploma Section.412 Concerning the number of schools, the Jos Branch 
specifies that in any local government in Nigeria where members of Izala reside there 
should be two primary schools, one Arabic/Muslim-style and one western-style 
education school. At the state level a taḥafiẓ (in Arabic: Qur’ān recitation school), a 
                                                 
411 Interview in Jos, 5th December 2006. 
412 Asas Nursery (3 years), Asas Primary (6 years), Maljaus Sunnah Primary School (5 years), 
Sat/Sun Mutawssid School (3 or 4 years), Upliftment School (3 years), Tahafiz School (5 years), 
Junior Islamic Studies (3 years), Muassasah School (6 years), Senior Islamic Studies (3 years), Junior 
Sec School (3 years), Senior Sec School (3 years), and finally Diploma in Arabic and Islamic Studies; 
For more details see table J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.) pp. 63-64. 
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secondary and a Higher Islamic Studies schools are found.413 In 2000 the Jos branch 
counted one Diploma Section school and eighteen Higher Islamic Studies Schools in 
eight different Nigerian States. The organization has four preparatory and secondary 
English schools in three different states. Among the concerns of the organization is to 
establish schools for elderly people. Izala lists ninety Saturday/Sunday schools in 
eight different states. Quranic schools are also an important part of the educational 
system. There are fifty-two Quranic schools in ten states and the so-called Martau 
Awlad (Quranic School for children) with one in Jos and one in the Republic of 
Niger.414 
The committee of finance has the duty to supervise the economic aspects of the 
organization. It also proposes budgets as well as expense reports to the 
Administration. The committee of health is concerned with building hospitals, centers 
for orphans and widows, and introducing programs for disease prevention. The 
committee for personal matters and discipline is under supervision of the 
administration council. It organizes employment and promotion or suspension of staff. 
The elders committee has an advisory task to direct the organization to conform to 
the Qur’ān and the sunna.415  
There are also other mosque committees. These committees are made for every 
mosque and consist of seven members (head, secretary, the imam, muezzin, and 
three other people). They are controlled by the ʿulamā' council. Mosques are built 
                                                 
413 J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.), p. 64. 
414 J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.), pp. 15-16; for the hierarchical set up of schools see p. 17.  
415 See Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
184 
 
through alms collection or through donations from individuals, the state or Islamic 
associations. A committee for ṣulḥ (in Arabic: reconciliation) comprised of ʿulamā' is 
charged with resolving disputes between Muslims according to the Qur’ān and the 
sunna. Another important committee is that of preaching which is organized 
according to the different levels mentioned above (local, state, national and 
international). This committee is concerned with daʿwa activities. It organizes 
meetings for imams and propagates Islamic knowledge through mass media, 
publications, cassettes and videos.416 
The Qur’ān recitation competition belongs to the most prestigious activities of 
Izala. It was established in Nigeria in 1986 and Izala members have participated in it 
since 1987. This competition follows the example of Saudi Arabia which commenced 
this contest in 1979. This activity encourages young people to memorize and study 
the Qur’ān. The Izala introduced such an activity at all levels and there is a 
committee that organizes this event as well as a jury of fifteen members under 
direction of the leader of the council of ʿulamā'.417 
                                                 
416 J.I.B.W.I.S. (n.d.), pp. 8-10. 
417 Ibid., pp. 18.20. 
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The Sketch showing the Administrative Set up of the Izala Organizations418 
 
2.3 Current leadership in Izala419 
The split of the organization led to a division at the level of leadership as well 
as between the two highest councils of Izala. The ʿulamā' are in the leading positions 
of the organization for the Jos branch. This is also confirmed in the new draft of the 
organization (see section “one constitution and two factions…”). These events led to 
a struggle for identity and authenticity within the movement. Neither of the two 
branches was ready to give up the name or the constitution. Both still refer to Jos as 
the origin of the movement. Both groups still refer to the initial objectives of the 
                                                 
418 Ibid., p. 58. 
419 Most of the written material (pamphlets, booklets, copies of ceremony) collected is largely from the 
Jos branch of Izala. This is not due to a personal choice but rather to the availability of the material. 
The Jos branch of Izala seems to be more productive when it comes to publications.  
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organization and ensure that the division has nothing to do with faith-based issues, 
but rather with ideological and organizational matters. 
2.3.1 The Jos branch of Izala 
The founder of the organization and leader of the ʿulamā' was the late Sheikh 
Ismaila Idris (d. 2000).  His deputy was Sheikh Uthman Muhammad until his death in 
Zaria in 1991. Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir took over as Idris’ deputy and became the 
head of the organization and its council of ʿulamā' from 2000 until today. His deputy is 
Sheikh Alhassan Said Jingir. Most if not all Izala institutions (schools, hospitals, 
shops, etc.) related to Jos have the marker “Jamāʿat Izalatul bidʿa Wa Iqamatis 
Sunnah allati assasahā Sheikh Ismaila Idris” (J.I.B.W.I.S. founded by Sheikh Idris). It 
is always indicated on the first page of Izala publications that Jos is the national 
headquarters. Again this is a sign of authenticity from this branch of the movement.  
The current Izala leader, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir is regarded as a 
distinguished scholar in northern Nigeria. He was born in 1950, and originates from 
the Bassa local government in the Plateau State. He is fluent in Arabic and has 
studied the Qur’ān since his childhood. He worked as primary school teacher. He 
joined the Islamic Institute of Teachers in Jos and later moved to Maiduguri where he 
completed secondary school. In 1984 he went to Kano where he later received a 
Diploma in Arabic and Islamic studies. In 1997 he went back to the University of Jos 
where he completed his studies in 2001 with a B.A. in literature and education. In 
Jos, Sheikh Jingir served as director of the School of Higher Islamic Education for ten 
years and contributed to the spread of the Arabic language as well as to the daʿwa of 
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Izala in some areas of Nigeria.420 Sheikh Jingir is the head of the council of the 
ʿulamā' for the Jos branch of Izala. After the death of the founder he became the 
highest religious authority of the movement. He is still very active in preaching, 
present in the mass media and is the first speaker of Izala in Jos. 
Fatwās expressed in his preaching, seminars, meetings and lectures are 
either recorded or printed and circulated among the Izala Jos followers. The leader 
also has several publications edited by the headquarters which deal with different 
subjects. To reach a large readership these publications are published in Hausa, 
Arabic and English. The main topics of these publications are focused on specific 
religious matters, like the issue of sacrifice, leadership or tawḥīd which is a central 
concept in the doctrine of Izala.  
His view on this concept is introduced by Sheikh Jingir in a publication in the 
Arabic language.421 Tawḥīd is related to the number “one” (in Arabic) and al-Wāḥid 
(in Arabic: the Unique, the only One) is one of the ninety-nine names of Allah. There 
are two different types of tawḥīd:  
1. Oneness of God (Arabic: tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya), names (Arabic: tawḥīd al-
asmā’), and attributes (Arabic: tawḥīd al-sifāt),  
2. Oneness of actions (Arabic: tawḥīd al-ṭalab) and intentions (Arabic: tawḥīd al-
qaṣd).  
                                                 
420 For his biography in the Arabic language, see Jamila Adam Abdallah (2005), pp. 54-55; for a more 
detailed biography in the Hausa language see Muhammad, Saliḥu Idris (n.d.): Gwagwarmayar. Sheikh 
Sani Yahaya Jingir (the Struggle of Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir).  
421 See Jingir, Muhammadu Sani Yahya (2006): Tawjīh a-l-Tālib ilā ‘Ibādat Allah ʿIbadatan wa 
Muʿāmala (Guidance of the Student to the Oneness of God in the context of worshipping and religious 
transactions), Jos: JIBWIS-Headquarters.  
188 
 
The oneness of God is a central doctrine for every Muslim. All the prophets invited 
humanity to believe in the oneness of God and the term is mentioned in the Qur’ān 
several times.The Prophet Muhammad also spent several years calling people to 
tawḥīd.422 The advantages of tawḥīd are summarized by the Izala leader in three 
major points:  
1. achieving the guidance of Allah,  
2. spiritual tranquility/peace (Arabic: sakīna),  
3. unity of the umma (in Arabic: Islamic community).423  
 
After elaborating on the concept and its different categories, the Sheikh emphasizes 
how polytheists are in a status of anxiety and skepticism and contrasts them with 
believers [monotheists] and their status of peace.424 Speaking of tawḥīd led Sheikh 
Jingir to reject Sufism and the Sufi way of worshipping God. For the author 
worshipping Allah is based on three basic elements:  
1. maḥabba (in Arabic: love),  
2. rajā‘ (in Arabic: supplication),  
3. khawf (in Arabic: fear).  
In the case of Sufism this relationship is based on ʿajab (in Arabic: wondering) and 
loving the Prophet in a way different to Allah’s guidance.425 
                                                 
422 Ibid., pp. 4-5; for this differentiation the author relies on the categorization  of  the prominent Islamic 
scholar Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350). 
423 For more details see Ibid., pp. 7-10.  
424 Ibid., pp. 19-29. 
425 See Ibid., pp. 29-32. 
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 Leadership is one of the most controversial issues in Izala. The organization’s 
split took place because of a struggle for leadership. Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir426 
points out that leadership starts at home until it reaches the global level. He confirms 
that leadership needs obedience and that the “absence of leadership led to anarchy 
and insecurity”.427  
Leadership is as old as Islam and goes back to the time of the Prophet. All 
successors followed his leadership in the context of religion (Arabic: dīn) and state 
(Arabic: dawla). Sheikh Jingir insists on the concept of bayʿa (in Arabic: oath of 
allegiance to a leader) which means the obedience to the leader and his 
leadership.428 The author insists that leadership requires piety i.e. fearing Allah and 
following His Prophet, trustfulness, and just deeds.429 His arguments are 
complemented by references from the Qur’ān confirming his point of view. Finally, the 
Sheikh stresses the importance of shūrā (in Arabic: consultation) within the context of 
Islam and leadership and considers it to be compulsory for any leader in order to 
avoid “dictatorship and anarchy”.430 This publication reflects the Sheikh’s view on 
leadership and can be considered a general overview of the concept. It can be 
                                                 
426 Jingir, Muhammadu Sani Yahya (2006): Leadership in Islam, Jos: National Headquarters.  
427 Ibid., p. 3. 
428 See more details in Ibid., pp. 7-16. 
429 As part of the qualifications of the leader, Sheikh Jingir lists twelve points of a successful leadership 
in Islam: purity of intent, humility and modesty, patience and perseverance, being calm and gentle, 
being subtle and forgiving, being kind hearted, leading by example, being honest and sincere, has the 
ability to reward good words and punish bad ones, considers specialization when attending to the 
division of labour, accepting criticisms, and being moderate, see Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
430 Ibid., p. 25. 
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considered by Muslims in general and to Izala members in particular as a guide for 
following their leader and not deviating from him. 
In my opinion this booklet is an implicit message to all those who split from the 
Izala founder and deviated from his path. If Sheikh Idris requires adherence to all the 
features described by Sheikh Jingir, then the division from him was not based on 
comprehensible reasons. 
In addition to the ʿulamā' of the Jos faction who are in the foreground of the 
society, the other two councils play a crucial rule to facilitate the achievement of the 
leaders’ ideology. The Council of Administration has been headed by Alhaji Ibrahim 
Na Alhaji Azare since the death of the former leader Alhaji Habibu Gado Damasu. 
His Deputy is Alhaji Marafan Tambuar, and the Secretary of Administration is Alhaji 
Abdurrahman. Concerning the FAG, the national Director is Alhaji Captain Issa 
Waziri and his deputy is Alhaji Ibrahem Shuayb. The secretary of FAG is Alhaji 
Muhammad Abubakar.431   
2.3.2 The Kaduna branch of Izala 
The Kaduna faction of the Izala does not accept the leader of the Izala in Jos. 
In Kaduna, Alhaji Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu is regarded as the head of the Izala 
as a whole. It is interesting to note that he was not among the religious scholars but 
headed the Administration Council during the lifetime of Sheikh Idris, the founder. 
                                                 
431 Interview in Gombe on 20th February 2008 with Captain Alhaji Issa Waziri, the National Director of 
the First Aid Group of Izala, Jos branch.  
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The leader of the Izala in Zaria insists that the current leader of Izala and even during 
the lifetime of Sheikh Idris was and is Alhaji Mussa Mai Gandu:  
“The people of Jos are hardliners in the context of this conflict. They 
want to keep the conflict to prove that they were the initiators of the 
Society. This is not true because the first leader of the Society was 
Mussa Muhammad Mai Gandu – he is still alive – and the people of 
Kaduna are to this day on his side. Mai Gandu was the first leader 
and even Sheikh Ismaila Idris was under his authority.”432  
 
Most names given to the government for official registration of the society 
were from the Kaduna faction – five altogether. Two of them already passed away but 
three are still alive. From the three alive; two of them are with the Kaduna branch and 
only one with Jos.433 
Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu was born in 1930. He is a businessman who was active in 
the politics of northern Nigeria. He used to be a member of the Northern People’s 
Congress (First Republic) and later on was a member of the National Party of Nigeria 
(Second Republic).434 Even before Izala became recognized as an official 
organization, he supported it financially. He served as the chairman of the Elders 
Committee. The actual national chairman the Council of the ʿulamā' of Izala, Kaduna 
faction, Sheikh Yusuf Muhammad Sambo Rigachikum insists that Alhaji Mai Gandu 
was and still is the leader of the entire organization:  
                                                 
432 Interview in Zaria with Ali Abdallah Telex, 7th January 2007. He is an Imām, advisor and member of 
the Council of Ulama. He is affiliated with the Kaduna faction of Izala. 
433 Ibid.; my interview subject mentioned the name of Sheikh Cikaji, Sheikh Yakubu Musa (Izala 
Kaduna), Sheikh Alhassan Said (Izala kaduna) , and Cap. Isa Waziri (Izala Jos). He couldn’t 
remember the fifth name. 
434 Kane (1994), p. 498. 
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“Alhaji Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu is the leader of the organization. 
The leader even before the name was given to the organization. He 
was the first leader, and still is the leader, and has never been 
impeached by any person.”435 
 
Sheikh Yusuf Sambo insists that during the founding stage of Izala and during 
an early meeting in Kaduna Sheikh Rabiu Daura who is actually the chairman of the 
Council of ʿulamā' of Kaduna State (with the Kaduna faction of Izala) was nominated 
to become the head of the ʿulamā' Council of the organization. Since Sheikh Idris was 
the founder of Izala, the decision was to appoint him to the head of the ʿulamā' 
Council.436 Alhaji Mai Gandu’s nomination as leader of the Izala initiated a 
controversial debate. The entourage of Sheikh Idris refused to accept a person who 
is not an Islamic scholar, ʿālim, as head of the directing committee of an Islamic 
organization like Izala. The leader of the council of ʿulamā' in Katsina (Kaduna 
branch), Sheikh Yakubu Musa Hassan (Kafancan) clarifies:  
“(…) the followers of Sheikh Idris claimed that Alhaji Mai Gandu was 
not an ʿālim [Islamic Scholar]. We answered that we were aware that 
and we elected him as a leader of the organization. How can we 
remove him from his position when the organization became stronger 
and more successful among people under his leadership?”437 
 
The organizational structure of the Kaduna faction of Izala is comparable to 
that of Jos. In every state there are three leaders of the organization. The leadership 
starts at the level of local government, then the state level and finally at the national 
                                                 
435 Interview in Arabic with Sheikh Yusuf Sambo in Kaduna; 15th January 2007. (my translation) 
436 Ibid. 
437 Interview with Sheikh Yakubu Musa Hassan (Kafancan) in Katsina, 12th March 2008.  
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level. The Izala faction is active through preaching. Topic(s) like zakāt, ṭalāq, or nikāḥ 
at any religious gathering are announced in advance on the radio and people travel 
to the mentioned preaching-place. Preachers normally travel Saturday for daʿwa 
activities and come back home on Sunday. The so-called waʿẓ (in Arabic: preaching, 
moralizing) usually takes places once a month in the federation. At the state level this 
activity happens twice monthly. The Izala faction in Kaduna is financially assisted by 
wealthy people and through the contributions of its members. The organization has 
its own schools, mosques, hospitals, and pharmacies. There is a chairman who is 
responsible for mosques and schools. There is also a leader appointed to manage 
daʿwa activities. The current chairman of daʿwa is Sheikh Yakubu Musa Kafancan.438 
Speaking of the contribution of Izala to Islam, Sheikh Rabiu Daura refers to the 
several Quranic schools that attract many people. The activities of Izala vary from 
calling people to teaching about the oneness of God, to teaching about the Qur’ān 
(recitation, exegesis) and Islamic law. As a result of the organization’s work Sheikh 
Daura mentions that more women are wearing ḥijāb (in Arabic: veil) and more young 
people (between 15 and 16 years) are studying and memorizing the Qur’ān. In the 
beginning of the Izala movement there were only two mosques in Kaduna, where 
Sheikh Daura is based. Now there are seventy five Friday-mosques and many 
Islamic schools. His organization is also active in other countries like Togo, the 
Republic of Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.439  
                                                 
438 Ibid.; Sheikh Y. Sambo couldn’t give any official statistics about schools or other institutions of the 
organization. 
439 Interview with Sheikh Rabiu Daura in his House in Kaduna, 15th January 2007. 
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In 2005 the Kaduna branch counted thirty-three sheikhs and mallams who 
were active in preaching and propagating the message of the organization. These 
scholars are active in different parts of northern Nigeria (like Sheikh Yusuf Sambo in 
Kaduna, Sheikh Usman Isah Taliyawa in Gombe, and Sheikh Alhassan Said in Jos. 
Sheikh Abdullahi Sale Pakistan in Kano, and Dr. Ibrahim Jallo in Jalingo – to mention 
a few), but also in the south of the country (like sheikh Buhari Yakubo in Lagos) or in 
the east (Sheikh Abdullahi Bala Lau in Yola, Adamawa state.). The organization also 
has thirteen Qur’ān-reciters or alarammomi (sing. Alrama, in Kanuri language) – as 
they are known locally.440 
Like the Jos faction, the Kaduna faction has its own FAG. The tasks and 
duties of both FAGs – Jos and Kaduna – are the same. In fact FAGs are a crucial 
part in many Nigerian Islamic organizations, only in Izala. Their role is indispensable 
in logistics and organization as well as in assistance work. The FAG of the Kaduna 
group are headed by the Zaria based leader and National Director Mustapha Imam. 
The FAG of Izala are under National supervision of the organization. Apart from that, 
there are leaders at the state, division, and detachment level. In Nigeria, Izala 
Kaduna has one General Director, thirty-one state directors, and every state director 
has thirty two-officers. There is also a divisional leader under which there are twenty-
four officers (division refers to local government). Concerning the detachment leader 
                                                 
440 See more details in the publication written in the Hausa language explaining the system of Izala as 
well the way of preaching of the organization. Rigachikun, Yusufu Muhammad Sambo (2005): 
Ayyukan Majalisar Malamai Da Siffofin Mai Wa’azi Da Manifofin Kungiyar J.I.B.W.I.S Ta Kasa, 
Kaduna: Al-Amana Printing Press, pp. 47-48; the Qur’ān recitors are in Katsina, Kaduna, Kano, 
Gwando, Gusau, Argungu, Shendam, and Gashuwa. 
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of FAG there are twelve officers under his supervision. The lowest level is that of unit 
leaders (small area). FAG assists in fire and water disasters, and they also take care 
of Ḥajj and pilgrim matters. They give assistance to hospitals and cooperate with the 
government. Most FAG members rely on donations from wealthy people or they get 
assistance from the government.441  
Apart from the ʿulamā' and the FAG, the Izala branch of Kaduna also has also a 
council responsible for administrative matters.442 In addition to that there are several 
committees established to facilitate the activities of the organization. Amongst others 
there is a committee responsible for education and the educational programs of the 
society. There is also a committee for fatwās concerned with legal aspects as well as 
facilitating the work of the Islamic scholars. An important committee is responsible for 
daʿwa activities. Izala Kaduna also has a committee responsible for the printing, 
publication and translation of material used by the organization in both education and 
preaching. The committee of finances is responsible for the monetary aspect. Finally 
there is a committee of revision which revises the work of imams, preachers and 
controls the processes of education.443 
 
                                                 
441 Interview in Zaria with the General Director of FAG, Kaduna Branch, Ustaz Mustapha Imām, his 
House, 8th January 2007. 
442 The material I collected on the Kaduna faction does not include information on that council of the 
organization. 
443 See more details on these committees in Rigachikun (2005), pp. 42-46 
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3 Izala and Innovation  
Since its establishment, the Izala movement has considered fighting bidʿa as a 
crucial element on which the entire organization is based. This concept is not only to 
be found in the official name of the Society: “Jamāʿat Izalatul Bidʿa...”  (Society of 
Removal of Innovation...), but also reflects its doctrine and understanding of Islam. In 
the coming paragraphs the concept of bidʿa is introduced and analyzed from different 
angles. Dealing with the concept itself is by no means an attempt to reach a final 
definition or to legitimate its use(s) or mis-/understanding, it is instead an attempt to 
show the complexity of such a notion like bidʿa. The discourse surrounding bidʿa 
among the Izala themselves as well as between Izala and ṭarīqas seems to be more 
fruitful to look at. The discussion on the concept and the way in which Izala uses it 
appears more interesting than any other concept used by the movement.  
3.1 Definition(s) of bidʿa 
In the Arabic dictionary “al-Munjid fi-l-Lugha w-al-Aʿalām” of 1986 we read five 
different forms of the root (b, d, ʿ) from which the word bidʿa is derived.  
1) “badaʿa” means to invent something and create it without following a model; 
concerning the concept bidʿa (pl. bidaʿ) it means “what was established without 
being there before”; one of the names of Allah is “al-Badīʿ” – which is 
mentioned in the Qur’ān – it means the Creator (of Heaven and Earth); “al-
Mubtadiʿ” is the one who creates something new. 
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2) “baddaʿa” means someone related to bidʿa; “ibtadaʿa” means somebody 
comes out with a bidʿa; (bidaʿ in plural) is a doctrine (Arabic: ʿaqīda) different 
from faith (Arabic: imān); “Mubtadiʿūn” are those who come up with bidʿa.  
3) “abdaʿa” means somebody does his work perfectly. 
4) “istabdaʿa” signifies being astonished by something. 
5) “abdaʿa (bihi)” means to ignore something and abandon it.444 
 
In his article on bidʿa for the first edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam, D. B. 
MacDonald defines bidʿa as the opposite of the sunna. The concept can be 
understood as “Neuerung oder Neuheit” (innovation or novelty). The word bidʿa 
developed into a “theological keyword” (theologisches Schlagwort) connoting “new 
Ideas and practices, (...) which deviates from the uṣūl (in Arabic: Fundamentals of 
Islamic Jurisprudence). (...) The meaning “individual specific point of view” 
(individuelle Sonderansicht), “legal entity” (Selbständigkeit), and even “heresy” 
(Ketzerei) cover the concept bidʿa. The meaning doesn’t reach the level of kufr (non-
belief).” MacDonald adds that in dealing with bidʿa, two main points of view have 
been developed: one is conservative and the other is liberal. The first one – basically 
the Ḥanbali School of Law and the Wahhābī Doctrine – follows the sunna and rejects 
bidʿa, while the second (liberal) deals with the development of the concept and 
                                                 
444 Al-Munjid fi-l-Lugha w-al-Aʿalām (1986), Dar al-Mashreq, Beyrouth, p 29; this is only a sample from 
the mentioned dictionary. There are several other meanings and categorization of the term.   
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categorizes bidʿa under several categories (necessary, good, bad, rejected, possible 
– to mention some).445 
J. Robson points out that bidʿa is understood by some Muslims as “something 
that must be wrong”. In fact there is a distinction between a good or praiseworthy 
innovation (Arabic: bidʿa ḥasana or maḥmūda) and a bad or blameworthy (Arabic: 
sayyi’a or madhmūma). This differentiation is a “necessary principle”. The author 
indicates that according the Shafiʿi School of Law any bidʿa contradicting the Qur’ān, 
sunna, consensus, and the tradition of the Companions can be considered to be 
“erring innovation”, but any bidʿa not contradicting these sources can be seen as 
praiseworthy. Robson identifies the following categories of bidʿa in the Islamic 
tradition: prohibited (Arabic: muḥarrama), recommended (Arabic: mandūba), 
disapproved (Arabic: makruha), and permitted (Arabic: mubaḥa). He adds that bidʿa 
is distinguishable from heresy. An innovator is defined as “one who introduces 
something on an arbitrary principle without having any basis in the recognized 
foundations of Islam”.446 
In the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam bidʿa is explained as 
“innovation, a belief and practice for which there is no precedent in the time of the 
Prophet”; here we find an example of how bidʿa was understood by the Ottoman 
administration. Bidʿa was seen as a contradiction to the sharīʿa and the “Ottoman 
principles”. The Ottomans differentiated between two types of bidʿa: a) “bidʿat 
                                                 
445 MacDonald, D. B. (1913): „Bidʿa“, in: Enzyklopädie des Islam, Leiden: Brill & Leipzig: Otto 
Harrassowitz, pp. 742-3. 
446 Robson, J. (1960): „Bidʿa“, in: The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition. Leiden: Brill & London: 
Luzac & Co., p. 1199. 
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marfuu‘e” which means, “pre-conquest taxes and dues that were abolished by the 
sultan’s specific order”; b) “bidʿat ma‘ruufe” which are “pre-conquest taxes and dues 
that were customarily recognized”.447 
The well-known program in Arabic countries “al-Sharīʿa wa’l-Ḥayāt”448 aired on 
the 24th January 2008 by Al Jazeera was devoted to discussing the issue of bidʿa : 
“al-bidʿa wa majālātuhā al-muʿāṣira” (in Arabic: Innovation and its contemporary 
fields). The Syrian Islamic scholar and law expert Wahba Zuhayli was invited to 
speak. Zuhayli began by mentioning the famous ḥadīth “kullu bidʿa dhalāla wa kullu 
dhalāla fi-l-Nār” (in Arabic: every innovation is an errancy, and errancy leads to hell) 
and raised a number of questions dealing with the essence of bidʿa, as well as 
theological discussion(s) on the concept and the contemporary fields of bidʿa. Wahba 
Zuhayli begins his statement by illustrating the difference between bidʿa and sunna. 
According to him, “sunna is what was transmitted from the Prophet (PBUH) and 
everything contracting and deviating from it is considered bidʿa.” The prominent 
scholar adds that something can be considered bidʿa if it is associated with issues of 
ʿaqīda or ‘ibādāt (in Arabic: worship). This led the Sheikh to differentiate between 
bidʿa that contradicts basic elements of faith or worshipping and ijtihād which exists 
within the Islamic sharīʿa. The fundamental difference that he points out is that bidʿa – 
                                                 
447 Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition. Glossary and Index of Terms to Volumes I-IX (2000): „bidʿa“, 
Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, p. 52.  
448 This is a weekly platform to discuss religious, social and political issues of the Islamic Society. 
Every week a prominent Islamic scholar is invited to talk on a particular topic. People from all over the 
world can call and raise questions to the expert. The entire show is then recorded live; all speeches 
are transcribed and archived at www.aljazeera.net (accessed 4/4/2010) where they are accessible to 
the general public. 
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in contradiction to ijtihād – lacks proof. Concerning the question of the relationship 
between innovation in religion (Arabic: ibtidāʿ fi‘l-dīn) and non-belief (kufr), the Sheikh 
mentions that an innovation can lead to non-belief if it falls in the context of ‘ibādāt or 
muʿamalāt (in Arabic: worship or human transactions). He mentions the example from 
the history of Islam when the group of “al-Mushabbaha” who identified the 
dimensions of the Creator (God) or the group of “al-Mujassama” who described the 
Creator as having a body. These examples can be considered kufr. Sheikh Zuhayli 
confesses that the understanding and interpretation of the concept is in many cases 
exaggerated and returning to the basic sources (Qur’ān and sunna) of Islam solves 
this problem. When it comes to a contemporary issue such as visiting of the tomb of 
the Prophet during pilgrimage, celebrating the Prophet’s birthday or even Issa’s 
(Jesus) birthday, the Sheikh considers such practices to be bidʿa except if the reason 
behind them is seeking thawāb (in Arabic: reward) and by no way imitating others or 
expressing regards or exaltation to a particular person. He concludes that personal 
intention (niya) is crucial in deciding whether it is a case of bidʿa or not.449 
The historian, Bernard Lewis deals with the complex concept of heresy in 
Islamic history and shows the existence of more than seventy-two terms connoting 
heresy. 450 These words have different meanings and reflect in no way the exact 
expression of “heresy” as understood in the Christian sense. The term bidʿa is one of 
                                                 
449 www.aljazeera.net (accessed 4/4/2010); the printable version of the discussion is comprised of 
eight pages. In reflecting the point of view of Sheikh Zuhayli, a summary of his views is given rather 
than quoting his statements and indicating the number of the page(s). 
450 Lewis, Bernard (1953): Some observations of the significance of Heresy in the history of Islam, In: 
Studia Islamica 1, pp. 43-63. 
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these meanings of heresy. B. Lewis understands bidʿa as “innovation, and more 
specifically any doctrine and practice not attested to in the time of the Prophet. The 
term is thus the opposit of sunna. 451 Lewis sees the “extreme” form of bidʿa as 
everything not identified during the time of the Prophet or the time of his companions. 
In his later analysis, Lewis sees the differentiation between a “good” and a “bad” 
innovation. This distinction is based on the so called ijmāʿ or consensus of the Muslim 
community and because of that the author claims that “the bidʿa of today may 
become the sunna of tomorrow (...) since bidʿa may thus vary with place as well as 
time:”452 The author concludes that although in some contexts bidʿa is translated as 
heresy, both are “far from being exact equivalents”.453 
Mohammed Talbi454, the Islamologist, considers the discussion on bidaʿ (he 
uses the plural of the term) as “rich and promising” when dealing with the 
development of fiqh and generally with the Islamic civilization.455 Talbi thinks that 
because of historical context of the mid-first century hijri (622 CE), anything 
“nouveau” (new) became a synonym for “condemnable” (condemnable, 
rejectionable).456 Talbi considers the first three generations after the Prophet as a 
period during which the big theories of fiqh were largely developed. At that period of 
time two concepts were common to people: bidʿa on the one hand and muhdath 
                                                 
451 Ibid., p. 52.  
452 Ibid., p. 53.  
453 Ibid. 53; in the same context of heresy B. Lewis discusses other terms like ghuluww, zandaqa, 
hartaqa, kufr, ilḥād, and all of them seem to be complex – as it is the case of bidʿa 
454 Talbi, Mohammed (1960): Les bidʿa, In: Studia Islamica 12, 1960, S. 43-7. 
455 Ibid., p. 43.  
456 Ibid., p. 46.  
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(new) on the other hand. In the next two centuries, intensive engagement with bidaʿ 
as a notion took place. It was during the first century of Islam that the concept was 
developed, but the author sees the second century in which the important books of 
fiqh were written as a more significant period. In the context of defending dar al Islam 
(house of Islam) from novelty/innovation the issue of bidaʿ and the entire discussion 
behind it represented an “aspect of defence”.457 Talbi draws attention to the idea that 
bidʿa is related to the concept of sunna. Both are interrelated and represent the two 
sides of the same coin: one is positive and the other is negative: “bidʿa and sunna 
were inseparable, correlative. They constituted the two aspects of the same ideal 
order that we tried to follow on immutable basis- two faces of the same reality. If one 
(of the two) taught what should be avoided, the other proposes the model to be 
followed.”458 The author mentions that the notion bidʿa hasana is an output of the 
“bidʿa controversy”. Especially in the Shafiʿi School of the Law, the notion of 
muḥdathāt (Arabic: novelties; sg. muḥdatha) was introduced and differentiated from 
bidʿa.459 Talbi also mentions the well-known categorization of bidʿa into five 
categories: obligatory, recommended, illicit, blameable, and licit.460 This classification 
is a model among others. In other cases bidʿa exists only when there is a 
                                                 
457 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
458 Ibid., p. 52. (my translation) 
459 Ibid., pp. 61-64; Talbi mentions that this differentiation (bidʿa and muḥdatha) or Shafiʿi’ „solution“– 
as he calls it – led to the understanding of bidʿa as contradiction to Usūl al Fiqh.  The differentiation did 
not survive may be because it was rejected or ignored –as the author explains. 
460 According to Talbi, this differentiation seems to be developed during the 13th century especially with 
Ibn Abd al-Salam; for more details see ibid., pp. 64-66.  
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contradiction to Islamic law.461 Far from the meaning of bidʿa, Talbi considers it a 
“phenomenon” and a “tool of social conservatism” (facteur de conservatisme social). 
In the context of the discussion surrounding bidʿa and sunna, reformers have used 
the former concept as a way to protect the religion of Islam (Wahhabbis opposition to 
visiting saints and marabouts for e.g.).462 As for whether bidʿa can be considered 
innovation in and of itself, M. Talbi answers: “elle ne l’est pas toujours!” (It is not 
always the case). It can be something that existed previously, but recently considered 
to be strange to Islam. By giving this answer Talbi is aware of the absence of a high 
authority defining “la veritable orthoxie” (the ideal orthodoxy). The concept of bidʿa 
thus remains dynamic and changeable.463 As a conclusion, Talbi assumes that bidʿa 
cannot be defined through the “domaine assez complexe” (quite complex field) that it 
covers. It can be more easily defined through the attitude of the authority that 
condemns it. Talbi sees bidʿa as a deviation from the path of sunna – a deviation 
through ideas considered as “nouvelles” or “extra-islamique”. 464 
In his book Muhammedanische Studien, Ignác Goldziher deals with the issue 
of bidʿa. In his approach, Goldziher spoke of the use of “politische bidʿa” (political 
                                                 
461 In this context, Talbi quotes the Islamic scholar al-Shatebi (d. 1388) who opposed the 
categorization of bidʿa as well the so called bida’ ḥasana. According to al-Shatebi can only be 
understood in relationship to law. Furthermore, al-Shatebi understands bidʿa in the context of “cult” 
(ʿibādāt); see pp 66-69. 
462 Ibid., p. 71; as part of the Wahhabiyya use of the concept of bidʿa M. Talbi mentions Muhammed 
Abdu and Rashid Ridha who criticized the situation of the Islamic Umma. Both Abdu and Ridha gave 
the spread of bidʿa as an explanation for the stagnation of Islam. 
463 Ibid., p. 75. 
464 Ibid., 
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bidʿa) during the early stage of Islam. 465 The concept was generally understood as 
“following law” long before it was specified – “following religious law”. The author then 
referred to the so-called “ritualistische bidʿa” (ritualistic bidʿa). He situated sunna as 
an opposite of bidʿa. Interestingly, Goldziher related the two concepts to a particular 
place- Medina. This place that he called “house of the sunna” is considered to be the 
origin of the Prophetic tradition.466 The sunna is as old as Islam and developed at an 
early stage into a “normative principle the in life of Muhammedaner”467 (Muslims as 
called by Goldziher). During the 2nd century of Islam (722 CE), sunna – like the 
Qur’ān – reached a level of standardization.468 Later on the concept of Iḥya al-sunna 
(revival of the sunna) appeared as in opposition to imātat al-bidʿa” (killing of 
innovation).469 According to Goldziher, “Muhammadan theologians” understand two 
different types of bidʿa: practical (every practice that was not exercised during the 
time of the Prophet) and dogmatic (heresy). Goldzieher proposed a simple definition 
of bidʿa as an “arbitrary individual insight whose admissibility to religious sources is 
not documented”.470  
Maribel Fierro471, historian of Islam, offers an overview of writings on bidʿa 
from the history of Islam and focuses on two of the oldest treatises (that of Ibn 
                                                 
465 Goldziher, I. (1971): Muhammadanische Studien II, Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms Verlag. 
(First published 1890).  
466 Ibid., p. 15.  
467 Ibid., p. 19.  
468 Ibid., p. 20 
469 Ibid., p. 22.  
470 Ibid., p. 23. 
471 Fierro, Maribel (1992): The treatises against innovations- (kutub al-bidaʿ), In: Der Islam 69, 
(Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients), pp. 204-246. 
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Waddah (d. 900) and of al-Turtushi (d. 1126) dealing with the issue of bidʿa. First of 
all, the author indicates that the term bidʿa has a negative connotation in an Islamic 
context. The meaning of bidʿa in the Islamic legal tradition, deals with innovation in 
rituals and practices and also with dogma.472 Fierro stresses that accusations of bidʿa 
can happen within an Islamic School (institution against individual) or between two 
different institutions (institution against institution). Accusations can also occur 
between Sunni and non-Sunni Muslims.473 The author sketches a list of “kutub al-
bida‘” (books of innovations) dealing with specific innovations.474 Within the Mālikī 
School of law, the issue of innovation goes back to the end of the 8th century (CE). 
The topic was also presented and discussed by Islamic scholars during the 9th, 10th 
and 11th centuries (CE) in North Africa.475 Although a number of scholars handled 
bidʿa, Maribel Fierro considers Ibn Waddah to be the first who directly wrote a treatise 
on the subject. Concerning al-Turtushi, he is also seen by the author as an authority 
that influenced literature on bidʿa. Both of them are Mālikī scholars of Andalusian 
origin.476  
                                                 
472 Ibid., p 204; the author – a part of classical Islamic writings on bidʿa - relies on the publication of 
Goldzieher, McDonald, M. Talbi, and B. Lewis summarized above.  
473 Ibid., p. 206.  
474 This list is made up of twelve books and their authors. Among them six are from the Maliki School 
of Law; interestingly the famous book of Usman Dan Fodio on bidʿa is also among them; see ibid., pp. 
207-209; the author mentions that kutub al-bidaʿ was a widespread genre especially among the Malik 
writers, see p. 210.  
475 Ibid., p 210; the author mentioned a few Maliki Scholars from North Africa like Muhammad b. 
Sahnūn (d. 870), Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996), al-Qabisi (d. 1012), and al-Baji (d. 1081) who 
wrote about the issue of “bidʿa”. 
476 Ibid. 
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Maribel Fierro thematizes the issues considered to be bidʿa discussed by the 
two writers. The first point concerns the recitation and writing of the Qur’ān. Both Ibn 
Waddaḥ and al-Turtushi criticized the so-called qirā’a bi’l-alḥān (Arabic: musical 
recitation) stressing that it influences the meaning of and comprehension of of the 
Qur’ānic text – apart from the fact that it is un-Islamic. Also qirā’a bi’l-idāra was also 
criticized. In this case the recitation is performed simultaneously and there is no 
possibility to both listen and understand the text. Another innovation identified by al-
Turtushi in the context of the Qur’ān is reciting the text for money, or reciting the 
Qur’ān quickly without understanding its meanings. He also criticized dividing the 
written Qur’ān into small parts, numbering the verses of each surah or punctuating 
the text.477  
The second field of innovation is the mosque. Al-Turtushi sees miḥrab (Arabic: 
niche in the wall of the mosque indicating the direction of Mecca) as an innovation. 
An Imam should not stand in it and it shouldn’t be decorated by Qur’ānic text. 
Decoration of mosques is rejected by al-Turtushi since it “corrupts” people. Ibn 
Waddaḥ criticized the practice of ittibāʿ āthār al-Nabi (Arabic: following the steps of 
the Prophet), in particular, praying in places where the Prophet prayed. There is a 
risk that they will be transformed into sanctuaries. Al-Turtushi also criticized putting 
boxes in mosques for the collection of alms, eating and drinking in mosques, making 
noise, writing copies of the Qur’ān in the mosque, etc. When it comes to the mosque 
of Mecca, Al-Turtushi criticizes “raising the hand in front of the Kaʿba” since it is a 
                                                 
477 Ibid., pp. 213-215.  
207 
 
Jewish practice. Concerning the Mosque in Medina he rejects the practice of 
touching the tomb of the Prophet.478  
The third context of criticism is regarding the month of Ramadan. Al-Turtushi 
considers the tarāwīḥ-Prayer in Ramadan to be recommendable, but criticizes some 
practices associated with it, such as the mixing of men and women. Both Ibn Waddah 
and al-Turtushi denied celebrating the night of mid sha’ban or fasting the whole 
month of rajab, celebrating the day of ʿArafa (9th of the month dhu’l-Hijja) when 
people go to local mosques to celebrate it, festivals on the night of the 10th 
muḥarram, and celebrating non-Islamic festivals.479  
Prayers are the fourth field where innovation(s) occurs. Ibn Waddah criticized 
the practice of calling people to morning prayer through the sentence “prayers are 
better than sleeping”480 that follows the adhān (in Arabic: call for prayers). He and al-
Turtushi refused the raising of hands during duʿā (in Arabic: invocation) since it is 
practiced by the Jews. Ibn Waddah also considers the use of a rosary to be bidʿa.481  
The fifth point concerns the issue of funerals. Al-Turtushi advises that funerals 
should be short. He heavily rejected funeral ceremonies as – bidʿa –, as well as 
reciting the Qur’ān at tombs or practicing tasbiḥ.482 The next innovations condemned 
by al-Turtushi and Ibn Waddah are related to food and clothes, the quṣāṣ (in Arabic: 
                                                 
478 Ibid. pp. 217-221. 
479 Ibid. pp. 221-228; the practices considered here as innovations are not explained in details as the 
author did this article; shaʿban is the 8th month in the Muslim calendar, rajab is the 7th, dhu-l-Hijja is the 
12th, and muharram is the 1st one.  
480 This practice is spread today in many Islamic countries.  
481 Ibid., pp. 229-231. 
482 Ibid., pp. 231-234. 
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people telling their stories in mosques), and substituting somebody to perform 
pilgrimage on one’s behalf.483 Maribel Fierro concludes on the basis of the works of 
these Islamic scholars that bidʿa is a dynamic concept in the history of Islam. 
Although many practices were defined as innovation and excluded from the Islamic 
canon, they persisted in being part of the Islamic history.484 
The concept of bidʿa is also studied by Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio (d. 1817) 
who is an Islamic authority for contemporary Nigerian Muslims regardless of their 
different affiliations (Sufis, Salafī, etc.). In his book Iḥyā al-Sunna wa Ikhmād al-
Bidʿa485 (Revival of the sunna and the Extinguishing of Innovation) the Sheikh deals 
with innovation and its manifestation(s). As a definition, he agrees with the point of 
view of Abu al-Hassan al-Saghir that bidʿa is “what is outside the Book (Qur’ān), the 
sunna, and the consensus.”486 Dan Fodio like many previous scholars positioned 
innovation in opposition to the sunna. When it comes to the categories of innovation, 
Dan Fodio spoke of the above five already mentioned categories. Dan Fodio 
distinguishes a bidʿa that can be denied and an innovation that cannot be denied: 
“…it is not allowed to you to deny (somebody’s bidʿa until you know that it is among 
the forbidden ones (through consensus).”487 In Dan Fodio’s book a duality can be 
observed from the beginning to the end. In all of the thirty-three chapters, only in the 
first three did he define what he understands as sunna and bidʿa, while all the other 
                                                 
483 Ibid., pp. 236-238.  
484 Ibid., p. 240. 
485 Dan Fodio, Usman (n.d.): Iḥyā a-l-Sunna wa Ikhmād al-Bidʿa, Al-Fikr-Distribution.  
486 Ibid., p. 10. 
487 Ibid., P.  15. (my translation). 
209 
 
chapters are constructed according to the following schema: an issue is introduced 
and how it is understood in the context of sunna and then innovation(s) related to that 
issue are listed and studied (for e.g. īmān (faith) is evaluated in the context of sunna 
and then innovation(s) related to it are analyzed). Thematically the whole book can 
be divided into the following categorizations: issues on the relationship between God 
and human beings (īmān: faith, invocation, etc.); issues related to ʿibādāt (worship) 
(prayer, ablution, pilgrimage, times of calls for prayer, etc.); issues dealing with 
human transactions (selling of property, inheritance, etc); issues of human behavior 
(ways of eating or dressing, etc.); and finally issues associated with specific 
knowledge (healing, vision, Sufism). All these examples are studied according to their 
position in the sunna and in relation to bidʿa.488 Dealing with the first topic 
(relationship between God and human beings), īmān (faith) comes early in the book. 
Īmān means for Dan Fodio that “every believer should take his faith from the Qur’ān. 
All regulations of faith are to be found in the Qur’ān.”489 The Sheikh elaborates on 
this point, indicating that somebody’s shahada (confession of faith) allows somebody 
to get married, to lead people in prayers; people can eat his slaughtered animals, to 
inherit and to bestow inheritance, and to be burried in Islamic cemeteries.490 
Concerning the issue of bidʿa in the same context, al-taʿssub fi-l-dīn (fanaticism in 
religion); corrupting a Muslim’s faith, bringing common people to struggle, “dark” 
                                                 
488 The thematic categorization of the chapters allows us to gives few examples of Dan Fodio’s 
analysis of “bidʿa”. All issues of the book will not be introduced here but only a sample from each 
subject. 
489 Ibid., p. 24.  
490 Ibid., p. 28.  
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philosophy are considered to be aspects forbidden as bidʿa.491 In the same category, 
a believer should only swear by Allah – as the Prophet did. The act of swearing 
implies that the believer should restrict him or herself to that. Swearing by the 
Prophet or by the Kaʿba can be considered bidʿa. Also the practice of fasting for three 
days is taken into consideration. When somebody cannot remember what he has 
sworn for and consequently free somebody, clothe ten poor people or feed them – 
can be considered as bidʿa. Also fasting on Fridays or praying during the entire night 
of Friday falls under the category of bidʿa.492  
The second category is that of ʿibādāt (in Arabic: worship). Two examples –
prayers and pilgrimage – will will be introduced in the following. Performing prayers 
should follow the example of the Prophet. The famous Ḥadīth collectors al-Bukhārī (d. 
870) and Abū Horayra (d. 681) described the way the Prophet performed prayers as 
an ideal way to practice this religious duty. As for the issue of bidʿa in the context of 
prayers, no adjustment of lines (Arabic: taswiyat al-ṣufūf)493 before prayers is 
considered a “disapproved innovation” (Arabic: bidʿa makrūha). In addition, using 
sajjāda (in Arabic: a carpet for prayers) is considered bidʿa. Dan Fodio’s argument is 
that the pious predecessors preferred praying on the ground without any carpet or 
any other similar item whatsoever. It was known that some people used the so-called 
khumra (in Arabic: a small palm leaf used to place face and hands on during prayers) 
and this practice was rejected. It is preferred to pray on the ground, and if this is not 
                                                 
491 Ibid., p 29, the author did not explain what he understands under “dark” philosophy. 
492 Ibid., pp. 119-121.  
493 This is a duty of any Imām leading ṣalāt . He should look for Taswiyat al-Sufūf  
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possible on a thick mat (Arabic: hasīr ghalīẓ), or on a thick linen (Arabic: kittān 
ghaliẓ), or on cotton (Arabic: quṭn).494  
Pilgrimage is the next issue discussed here. Dan Fodio emphasizes that 
everybody should perform ḥajj (in Arabic: pilgrimage) following the way the Prophet 
performed it. This way is described in the Ḥadīth tradition. What is considered bidʿa 
shaytaniyya (in Arabic: Satanic innovation) is the practice of kissing al-ḥajar al-
aswad” (in Arabic: the Black Stone in the Kaʿba, in Mecca) or putting one’s cheek and 
forehead on the stone. Touching the Kaʿba’s wall or that of the Grand Mosque in 
Mecca is also considered innovation. In addition to that having a special du‘ā’ (in 
Arabic: supplication) for a particular place during ḥajj (like du‘ā’ in the Mosque in 
Mecca, another one for the mosque in Medina, particularly at the Black Stone) is also 
considered bidʿa. Furthermore Dan Fodio rejects surrounding the tomb of the Prophet 
and touching it, condemning this practice as bidʿa.495  
Among the categories of issues dealing with human transactions only the 
issue of bay’ (in Arabic: sell) is discussed. Dan Fodio indicates that facility (Arabic: 
suhūla) and generosity (Arabic: samaḥa) but also not cheating are required for any 
transaction (buying, selling, or borrowing). Concerning bidʿa in the context of buying 
and selling, a jāhil (in Arabic: ignorance of the buying and selling rules) is not allowed 
to practice this activity and considered to be innovation. Also the fact that men stay at 
home and women go to the market and compete with other men is also a bidʿa. It is 
                                                 
494 Ibid., pp. 58-70; the examples given here are only a sample from many issues related to prayers 
raised by Dan Fodio. 
495 Ibid., pp. 107-110.  
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also bidʿa when a woman goes out to buy something from a seller, or if she is alone 
with a seller in his shop. Dan Fodio adds that if a woman is obliged to go shopping in 
the market, it is allowed since there is no possibility of being alone with a man.496  
The next type of issue discussed by Dan Fodio in his book is human behavior. 
The Sheikh describes regulations concerning clothing and eating. In the sunna of the 
Prophet it is preferred that clothes are white, and not very long. Clothes made of silk 
are not allowed for men. Bidʿa is when clothes are too large and long (only for 
women). Also imitating non-Muslims in clothing is bidʿa, but also when men imitate 
women. In addition to that pride in one’s clothes (Arabic: mubāḥāt) is a form of bidʿa. 
Sleeping without clothes is also bidʿa. When a woman wears her best clothes and 
jewellery when going out in public, this is bidʿa muḥarrama (in Arabic: forbidden 
innovation).497 Concerning the issue of eating, only a few examples are mentioned. 
Sitting – and not leaning – when eating is sunna. Also giving food to people sitting on 
one’s right side is sunna. However, making food for a particular person is bidʿa, since 
food is to be shared. Eating with a spoon is bidʿa and joking while eating is also 
bidʿa.498  
The last category of innovations is special knowledge like healing, visions or 
Sufism. A few examples of bidʿa related to healing and to Sufism are given here. In 
the sunna and among the methods of healing is the use of the Qur’ān. Honey is one 
recommended method. The use of kay (in Arabic: cautery by fire) as a remedy is 
                                                 
496 Ibid., pp. 125-130.  
497 Ibid., pp. 142-153. 
498 Ibid., pp. 153-159; only some examples are listed here and not all points reflected by Dan Fodio.  
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rejected. What is considered bidʿa is for e.g. the use of trash or alcohol in the healing 
process. Also in the Mālikī School of Law the use of foreign or incomprehensible 
language or statements is forbidden. Also any practice resembling magic is bidʿa.499 
Sufism is covered in the last chapter of Dan Fodio’s book. Any practice (binding 
oneself, cautery, etc.) leading to damage of oneself (Arabic: idhrār al-nafs is under 
bidʿa muḥarrama or forbidden innovation. Also listening to singers is bidʿa. 
Additionally, the so-called karāmāt al-awliyā (in Arabic: marvels of the saints) is a 
bidʿa for those who claim it without proof or without going back to the Qur’ān, the 
sunna, and the tradition of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.500 
From this by far not exhaustive discussion on the concept of innovation in 
Islamic history it is clear that bidʿa is a complex and multifaceted notion. From the 
definition of the term bidʿa, the meaning varies between innovation in a positive and 
negative sense. The meaning of bidʿa can change drastically from innovation and 
novelty to creativity and heresy. In many cases bidʿa is presented as an antithesis of 
the sunna. Some researchers think that bidʿa does not mean kufr (MacDonald, 1913). 
For other scholars (Robson, 1960), the concept is misunderstood and it has negative 
connotations for Muslims. In some contexts, bidʿa is related to state administration – 
often related to taxes during the Ottoman administration (Encyclopaedia Islamica, 
2000). In other cases, it is related to heresy without being synonymous to it (Lewis, 
1953). Innovation can be “good” or “bad”. It can be considered an aspect of non-
belief if it concerns faith and worship (Zuhayli, 2008). The expression bidʿa has 
                                                 
499 Ibid., pp. 164-166. 
500 Ibid., pp. 170-175. 
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different forms and occurs differently. For these reasons, maybe it is better to use it in 
the plural: bida‘. Historically, the concept goes back to the first century of Islam and 
was debated along with other terminology like muḥdath (in Arabic: new). The famous 
categorization of bidaʿ classifies it into: obligatory, recommended, illicit, blameable, 
and licit. This is not the only one. Islamic authority(ies) plays a crucial role in defining 
innovation (Talbi, 1960). Bidʿa can be political or ritualistic. By the time a sunna is 
revived, bidʿa is uprooted (Goldzieher, 1971). Innovation can occur among 
individuals, between an individual and an institution, or between two institutions. 
Innovation can also be in a particular place (mosque) or time (Ramadan). It can touch 
orthopraxy (prayers, funerals, recitation of the Qur’ān) or behavior (ways of dressing, 
eating, etc) (Fierro, 1992). Innovation is dynamic and is to be found in many fields of 
Islamic tradition. There are various examples of innovation(s) – as shown by Dan 
Fodio in his book. Surprising for an eminent Sufi leader is his criticism of certain Sufi 
practices. Bidʿa is dynamic and it changes from time to time depending on 
understanding(s), definition(s), and interpretation(s) of Islamic scholars of a particular 
period of time. Bernard Lewis’ statement can be used as a sort of conclusion since “a 
bidʿa of today may become a sunna of tomorrow.”501  
Bidʿa and its different meanings and connotations, the topic is studied in the 
Nigerian context. The approach of Izala to bidʿa is introduced and the discourse 
between Izala and Sufis in particular is analyzed. The book of Dan Fodio seems to be 
a good introduction to the next section since the Sheikh is considered by Izala to be a 
                                                 
501 Lewis, Bernard (1953): Some observations of the significance of Heresy in the history of Islam, In: 
Studia Islamica 1, p. 53. 
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fighter and opponent of both bidʿa and Sufism. From their point of view, Sufis 
consider Dan Fodio a Sufi and a religious authority for Nigerian Muslims.  
3.2 The Discourse of Izala on bidʿa 
 When asked about the history of Izala in Nigeria, the current Izala leader in 
Jos, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir responded: “Sheikh Ismaila Idris tried to show people 
how some enemies of Islam practice some things in the name of religion and by 
doing that they deviate from the path of the Prophet.”502 The Founder of the 
movement directed his criticism towards Sufi brotherhoods. He belongs to the 
tradition of Sheikh Gumi, the initiator of anti-Sufi tendencies in Nigeria. Izala sees 
itself as protector of the sunna of the Prophet and the fighter against innovations in 
the religion of Islam. Criticism of Izala is related to issues of faith. The so called Ṣalāt 
al-Fātiḥ503 (a Tijāniyya prayer practice) was heavily criticized by Izala. The claim that 
reciting this prayer is 6,000 times better than the recitation of the Qur’ān raised a 
huge debate and heavy criticism from Izala. This debate concerns a crucial element 
of the Izala world view: the Qur’ān. The Holy book of Islam is the central source and 
the basis of the Islamic faith. It is also the basis for the tradition of the Prophet. Izala 
doubts the credibility of this prayer, Ṣalāt al-Fātiḥ, and its origin. If this prayer was 
revealed only to Sufis, why it is mentioned neither in the Qur’ān nor in the sunna? 
This is the main argument of Izala. And why do only members of the Tijāniyya 
(among all Muslims) know about it? Is it possible for certain Muslims to have 
                                                 
502 Interview with Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir, Izala Jos leader, Jos, 28 January 2007.  
503 Abun-Nasr (1965) mentions that this prayer “came from heaven to the Sufi Muhammad al Bakri 
(1492-1545) and Sheikh Tijānī was told about it through the Prophet.” see p. 51. 
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something better or more valuable than the Qur’ān? Something that is 6,000 times 
better? These kinds of questions have been raised by the Izala concerning the 
“extra-prayers” recommended to the Tijāniyya and only to them. In a letter entitled 
“Risāla ila’l-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fi’l-Radd ʿalā Qawl al-Sheikh al-munḥarif ʿan al-Kitāb 
wa‘l-Sunna” (Letter to Muslim Brothers as an answer to the Sheikhs deviations from 
the Qur’ān and sunna) written by Sheikh Ali Mustafa Abubakar Alburnawi, an Izala 
leader from Maiduguri, who was linked to the Kaduna faction of Izala, the Sufis are 
criticized of pretending to have a hidden and unrevealed source in the Islamic 
tradition:  
“Allah - glorious and exalted is He – did not order us to follow what 
has not been introduced through the Prophet Muhammad – peace be 
upon Him. Sufi Brotherhoods: Tijāniyya, Qādiriyya, Shādhiliyya, 
Rifāʿiyya, Hurūriyya, Aḥmadiyya, and others – you can’t find a 
concrete indication (mran dhahiran) related to them in the Qur’ān, in 
the ḥadīth of His Prophet – PBUH –, or in the sources of the Saḥāba 
(campanions). These ṭuruq (Brotherhoods) are a sum of 
interpretations of some Qur’ānic verses and weak ḥadīth. So don’t 
cheat yourself so that you lose your knowledge through total following 
of saints and Sheiks in erratum (khata’) and correctness (ṣawab), in 
what is admissible (ḥalāl) and what is forbidden (ḥarām), in guidance 
(huda) and aberration (dhalāl), and in non-belief (kufr) and conviction 
(īmān).”504  
 
                                                 
504 Alburnawi, Ali Mustafa Abubakar (1990): Risāla ila al Ikhwa al-Muslimīn fil Radd ʿala Qawl al-
Sheikh al-munḥarif ʿan al-Kitāb wa-l-Sunna (letter to Muslim brothers as an answer to the Sheikh who 
deviated from the Sunna); pp. 5-6; the author indicates in this letter that it is an answer to Gonimi “who 
deviated from the “path of truth” (…) and who wrote strange things that nobody in Maiduguri 
understood the content and he distributed it among the Ulama and the Zawāya” (corners; usually 
areas surrounding Sufi tombs), see p. 4. (my translation) 
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The author doubts that Sufism has its origin in Islamic tradition and criticises 
the misguidance of Sufi Sheikhs vis-à-vis their followers. His argument in the entire 
booklet is that there is no mention of saints (Sheikh al-Tijānī or Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir 
al-Jīlānī) in the Qur’ān. Also in the ḥadīth neither Sufi leader is mentioned. The Izala 
leader condemns Sufi practices as litanies, and indicates that no one among the 
Ṣaḥāba and the four Imams (Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfa, Ibn Ḥanbal, and al-Shafi‘ī) have 
heard about it.505 He adds that it is a bidʿa to claim “prophecy” through receiving 
something more valuable than the Qur’ān.506 Alburnawi opposes the claim that 
Sheikh al-Tijānī belonged to the family of the Prophet or that any silsila (in Arabic: 
chain) – confirming that – ever existed in Islamic History.507  
If there is something that has been more heavily criticized by Izala, then it was 
the celebration of the mawlid (in Arabic: birthday of the Prophet). Izala draws attention 
to the fact that neither the Prophet himself nor his companions celebrated this event. 
That is why this celebration feeds into the category of bidʿa. Ustaz Nuhu Tahir 
Tajudden, the Centre for Islamic Development in Zaria, linked to Izala Jos indicates 
that mawlid was rejected by Izala and categorizes it as a small bidʿa within the larger 
system of Sufism:  
“Mawlid was among the things they do and that we criticize, but we 
consider it a small bidʿa (innovation), smaller than Sufism itself. The 
smallest bidʿa…”508 
                                                 
505 Ibid, pp.7-8. 
506 Ibid., p. 10. 
507 Ibid., pp. 14-15; the author raises the question here as to how Sheikh Tijānī can be related to the 
Prophet? He criticizes the “salasil” (chains) made by Sufis to reach the Prophet or his family.  
508 Interview with Ustaz Nuhu Tahir Tajudden, Centre of Islamic Development, Zaria, 10 January 2007.  
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Izala does not recognize any statement or practice which is not mentioned in 
the Qur’ān, the sunna, or the tradition of the pious predecessors. Izala presents itself 
as the “guardian” of the sunna. Anything that is outside this system is categorized as 
innovation. The Izala’s understanding of bidʿa compares the issue to an antipode in 
relation to sunna – as presented by MacDonald.509 Beyond that, Sufism is considered 
an aspect of non-belief – as presented in the context of heresy by Brenner.510 The 
Kaduna-faction of Izala avoids declaration of non-belief (takfir) towards other 
Muslims.511 
The late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam of Kano summarized the following 
points of criticism from Izala towards Sufis and Sufism: unity of universe, incarnation, 
practicing dhikr, amulets, etc:  
 
“Certainly, in my opinion, Sufism has ways of thinking common in 
most Sufi brotherhoods: “wiḥdat al-wujūd” (the unity of universe); 
“ʿaqīdat al-ḥulūl” (infusion of substance, incarnation) which means 
the incarnation of human beings in God and God in the human 
being. This idea has been massively opposed by Izala.  
Also the issues of “dhikr jamāʿi” (collective remembering of God) and 
reciting of “adhkār” (pl. of dhikr) in congregation have been rejected 
by the Izala.  
                                                 
509 See MacDonald 1913. 
510 See Brenner 1953. 
511 During an Interview with Sheikh Alhassan Said in Jos, he mentioned that the Kaduna faction of the 
Izala doesn’t go so far as to declare Sufis “kuffar” (non-believers) – as the Izala Jos did/does; 12 
December 2006. This information is also confirmed by Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid, leader of the Tajdīd-
group, 05 January 2007, Zaria. 
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Also hanging of “tamāim” (amulets) and “taʿwidh” (exorcism) with the 
motive of protection from “al-ʿayn” (the evil eye) and from al-shaytan” 
(Satan)…this was also was refused  
Again some formula of praising the Prophet Muhammad – peace be 
upon him – that is not to be proved in the sunna is also condemned by 
the Jama‘a. So there are many issues, but we can say that these are 
the most important.”512  
 
The ex-Izala member and a JNI-murshid (in Arabic: advisor) in Jos, 
Abdurrahman Lawal Adam lists eight points on the issue of bidʿa that have been 
condemned by Izala and especially by Sheikh Idris during his life time: 1) the mawlid 
is considered something “new” which was not celebrated during the time of the 
Prophet or by his disciples after the Prophet’s death; 2) the book of Jawāhir al-Maʿāni 
and the prayer Ṣalāt al-Fātiḥ were rejected by Sheikh Idris; 3) Sheikh Idris criticized 
the practice of jawharat al-Kamāl by Tijānī s and also the use of the word saqam (in 
Arabic: seek) to qualify the Prophet; 4) practicing dhikr, waẓīfa (Friday, after 
afternoon prayers) during which the Prophet appears, seems to be heavily rejected 
by the Izala founder and his followers; 5) The giving of ṣadaqa (in Arabic: voluntary 
alms) after someone’s death and that people come after the 3rd, 7th or 40th day after 
someone died in order to supplicate Allah; 6) the lāzim (in Arabic: binding; obligatory 
custom) especially practiced by the Tijāniyya brotherhood and consists of someone 
engaging him or herself in praise of the Prophet or tasbīḥ (in Arabic: glorification of 
God) everyday for 100 or 1000 times; 7) Sheikh Idris also considered the 
recommended number of awrād (in Arabic: special prayers supposedly 
                                                 
512 Interview, 02 January 2007; late Sheikh Jaafar can be considered part of the Salafiyya movement 
in northern Nigeria.  
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recommended by the Prophet) that should be practiced to be bidʿa; 8) finally the so-
called al-qubūriyya (from Arabic: qabr: tomb; visiting tombs).513  
Again we see that most issues criticized by Izala and considered bidʿa belong 
to the category of orthopraxy. Only a few examples relate to ʿaqīda. Izala condemns 
issues related to ʿibādāt and demands their origin. The organization raises the point 
as to why Tijānīs practice certain litanies and prayers which are not known by the rest 
of the Muslim community. Izala doubts the source of these prayers and has failed to 
identify these practices in the sunna. Yandaki mentions that Izala condemned Sufi 
concept such as “blameworthy innovations”. These concepts are related to 
sainthood, intuitive knowledge, mediumship to spirits or to God, control of jinn, etc. 
Also practices like dhikr, the use of drums in mosques are condemned. Yandaki 
proposes another category of innovations criticized by Izala: those related to the 
Hausa culture and seen as un-Islamic, those related to marriage, birth, and naming 
ceremonies or death (burial ceremonies).514 
The national secretary of Izala, Bashiru Makama, from the Kaduna faction of 
Izala, raises a basic point of criticism against Sufism. He explains that recognizing 
ṭarīqa and its practices as something revealed by God means opposing what 
occurred in the Qur’ān- that the Prophet Muhammad is the seal of all Prophets and 
his message is the last one addressed to mankind:  
“All these ṭuruq or Sufi Schools are not organized in a proper way. 
Why? This Islamic religion was revealed to Muhammad – ṣallā Allahu 
                                                 
513 Interview 27 December 2006; for more details on the issue of ”bidʿa“ see also his (A. Lawal Adam, 
1992) MA-Dissertation, pp. 132-155.  
514 Yandaki (1990), pp. 133-134. 
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alayhi wa sallam- and Allah – subḥanahu wa ṭa‘āla – it is stated in the 
holy Qur’ān that Muhammad is the final messenger of Allah and after 
him (the messenger) there is no more revelation to anybody.”515 
 
This movement denies any type of “divine” character of Sufi practices with the 
argument that it was not mentioned in the basic sources of Islam (Qur’ān and sunna). 
Interestingly, Sufi brotherhoods counter with the same argument. They also blame 
Izala of practicing bidʿa. Sheikh Tijani Ibrahim from Kano points out that the 
expression Ahl al-Sunna (in Arabic: people of the sunna) does not occur in the 
Qur’ān and it was not mentioned by the Prophet himself. He questions, astonished; 
“Is that not bidʿa?”516  
This concept of innovation is a complex and dynamic term in Islamic context. It 
demonstrates again the problem of definition of the concept and the issue of 
authority. Who has the right to define the concept? How can it be rightfully 
understood? How can it be used correctly?  
Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh al-Husseini, the Tijāniyya leader from Maiduguri, 
dedicates a chapter (chapter 33) of his book al-Mughir517 to the issue of bidʿa 
introduced – according to him – by Izala. The Sufi Sheikh criticizes the fact that the 
new “sect” (Izala) declared other Muslims “non-believers” and abandoned the 
mosques to establish their own. According to the Sheikh, this is a deviation from the 
                                                 
515 Interview in Zaria, 09 January 2007. 
516 Interview with Sheikh Tijani Ibrahim in Kano, 03 January 2007. 
517 Al-Husseini, Ibrahim Saleh (1986): Almughīr ʿala Shubuhāti Ahl al-Ahwā wa Akādhīb al-munkir ʿala 
Kitāb al- Takfīr (The Agressor), Beirut; here I am using the second edition (2003) of Almaktaba 
Alibrahimiyya publications.  
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path of Ahl al-Sunna and the Mālikī School of Law. Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh provides 
evidence that establishing a new Friday-mosque has particular regulations. The 
ʿulamā' defined certain extenuating circumstances under which two Sunni groups can 
establish a new mosque. If the conflict is between a Sunni group and what he calls 
Ahl al-Ahwā (people of the passion; Izala in this case), then they should be banned 
from performing the Friday prayer:  
“If there is a struggle between Ahl al-Ahwā and Ahl al-Sunna, then it 
shouldn’t be taken into consideration. The judgment for Ahl al-Ahwā is 
that they should be banned from performing the “jumu’a prayer” – they 
should even be banned from anything allowing them to spread their 
innovations (bidaʿ) and aberration (dhalāl).518 
 
Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh indicates that a meeting was held by a committee of Islamic 
scholars to discuss the issue and came to the result that the Mālikī School of law 
does not allow a new mosque if there is no need for it. There are cases when the 
mosque may be too small and cannot be extended or where two Sunni groups are at 
odds. On struggle, there are four major points:  
1. The impossibility of solving the problem.  
2. If one group bans the other from praying in the mosque and fights them when 
they come for prayer;  
3. If there is a ruler banning both groups from fighting;  
                                                 
518 Ibid., p. 395; Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh indicates that in May 1984 the Izala-Group sent a letter to the 
High Council of Islamic Affairs in Borno asking for a permit to establish his own Friday-mosque in 
Potiskum as well as his own abattoir.  
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4. If there is a distance of three miles between the two communities.519  
The Sufi Sheikh concludes that none of these requirements are available and 
adds that the committee agreed that such a step led to division of the Islamic umma. 
Furthermore, he sees the call to build a new mosque as bidʿa and deviation from Ahl 
al-Sunna since the “innovator” (Arabic: mubtadiʿ ) is someone who believes in 
something different from the (path of) Ahl al-Sunna.520 Again we have an example 
showing the precarious use of concepts like bidʿa and Ahl al-Sunna. In this context 
we have Sufis harnessing the concept of Ahl al-Sunna and accusing Izala of 
practicing bidʿa.  
Even before the establishment of Izala as an organized institution, the founder, 
Sheikh Idris criticized Sufis and Sufism. He distinguished between a small bidʿa that 
deals with practices (naming ceremonies, marriage, etc) and a “major” or “serious” 
ones that corrupt faith (īmān). This second type seems to be more dangerous:  
 
“He [Sheikh Idris] started discussing issues of bidʿa like the practicing 
of the naming ceremony, in regard to the institution of marriage, and 
social activities of Muslims in general. Let’s put it in that way. This is 
one sight of the bidʿa. Then the second sight of the bidʿa comes to a 
major bidʿa which can corrupt faith (īmān). He called it a major and a 
serious one.”521 
 
                                                 
519 Ibid., p 398.  
520 Ibid., pp. 400-1; chapter 34 of the book also discusses ḥukm (regulation) of establishing two 
Jumuʿa mosques in the same town. Islamic Scholars of the Committee agreed that Izala should not be 
allowed to establish its own mosque.  
521 Interview in Jos with Mallam Sani Modibbo, 28 February 2007 
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Sheikh Idris went beyond bidʿa by classifying Sufi practices as “non-Islamic” 
and as a “polytheistic performance”. He concluded that praying behind Sufis during 
group prayers or getting married to their daughters “is not accepted, not correct, and 
is invalid”.522 The Izala founder regards such innovations as leading to hell. His 
interpretation of the famous ḥadīth kullu bidʿa dhalāla wa kullu dhalāla fi’n-Nār (all 
innovation goes astray, which leads to hell fire) is that “kullu” means in Arabic “all” 
(grammatically it is known as “kullu al-kulliyya”) without exception. On the basis of 
this understanding, Sufism is categorized under kufr and all innovations will lead 
believers to hell. Some followers of the movement looked for a confirmation of such 
an approach regarding the concept of innovation. Renowned scholars from outside 
Izala were asked for more clarification on bidʿa and on the meaning of the mentioned 
ḥadīth.523 Interestingly, a new category of bidʿa was added to its several meanings:  
 
“Then there is Sheikh Abū Bakar al-Jazā’irī who was also delivering 
lectures at the mosque, on Medina premises, and between Maghreb 
and Ishā’. We went and asked him a question on bidʿa to explain what 
the meaning of kullu kulliyyin is? Kullu bidʿa dhalāla.  
He cited that there are certain bidʿa, which are unwanted but are 
compulsory. He gave one example: circumambulation on the top of the 
Kaʿba. When we go there, there are stairs leading to a walkway for 
circumambulation above the Kaʿba. The Prophet did not perform 
circumambulation in this way…he performed it only on the ground 
floor. There are those who refused to perform it in this way…; this is 
                                                 
522 Ibid. 
523 Izala members used the opportunity of the Hajj in Mecca to clarify the meaning of ”bidʿa“ as given 
by Sheikh Idris and inquired with Islamic scholars for more clarification. Sani Modibbo (and few Izala 
followers), (interview 28th February 2007) also used the example of the Hajj to ask scholars like Sheikh 
Umar al-Fulati (Imām in Mecca) and Abdelqadir al-Jazairi (Imām al-Medina).  
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one of the controversies we raised there. We went to him to ask 
question: Are there those who say: “whoever who performs the 
circumambulation at the top, is not accepted because it is a bidʿa? So 
we raised such questions.”524 
 
This example shows how the issue of innovation is debated not only among 
Izala and Sufis/non-Izala but inside the Izala movement itself, especially during the 
initial stages of its development. The issue of bidʿa not only drove a wedge between 
the ʿulamā', but also among the followers who started questioning the correctness 
and basis of such a concept. During and after the division of Izala, the issue turned 
out to be a matter of trust between those who trusted Sheikh Idris and followed him in 
all directions and those who doubted his fatwās and deviated from his path.  
In conclusion, the matter of bidʿa is a central concept used by Izala. The 
meaning of the word has been widely debated among the Islamic ʿulamā'. Having the 
concept as part of the name of the organization summarizes its aim: “fighting bidʿa”. 
In the absence of a clear definition and the limitations of the concept, Izala followers 
have nothing but to rely on their leaders’ views. Bidʿa as defined by Islamic scholars 
of Izala is basically directed at the practices of Sufis (dancing, prayers, celebrating 
mawlid, burial ceremonies, etc.) and asks for the relevance of their sources. Izala 
sees itself as having access to relevant sources and at the same time controlling any 
deviation from the Qur’ān and the sunna. Bidʿa is an open system of meaning. 
                                                 
524 Ibid.; another example raised by the Izala followers here is the issue of paying taxes to the Saudi 
state through Hujjāj (pilgrims) and if it is bidʿa or not. They received the answer that there are some 
innovations which are necessary and others which are forbidden. Concerning the meaning of kullu in 
the mentioned ḥadīth: “So there are certain bidʿa which are not kullu kulli, but kullu Jozi’. “Kollu Jozi”. 
The Prophet said “kullu” but not all. It is not general. 
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Sometimes it is used in a negative way and sometimes it has positive connotation(s), 
as shown above. The categorization of the concept depends on the perspective from 
which it is understood. In most cases, dealing with the concept is subjective and if a 
Sufi is an innovator from the perspective of a follower of Izala, then a follower of Izala 
can also be considered an innovator from the perspective of a Sufi. Within the Izala 
itself views on innovation are different – especially for those who left the movement 
either to study abroad, to join another movement, or those who simply left. Meanings 
and interpretations change over time. After the division of Izala, it became evident 
that meanings are more related to personalities than to any other thing. The Jossawa 
(Jos faction) are more fixed on the views of Sheikh Idris while the Kadunawa 
(Kaduna faction) invoke different interpretations. The limits of using the concept are 
also limitless. Every Muslim can interpret a particular practice as bidʿa and can blame 
another Muslim for deviating from the ‘right path’ of Islam. During a discussion in 
Kano, I once heard a Sufi saying astonished; “Did Muslims have loudspeakers during 
the time of the Prophet? If Izala now uses them, can’t we also speak of a bidʿa?”  
There is no doubt that the issue of innovation is still central for the Izala 
movement, but during and after the split of the movement into two major groups the 
concept was more related to leaders in particular. Innovation was used in the inner-
Izala conflict to develop a new definition of bidʿa – among other concepts.525 From a 
politico-psychological point of view, Jerrold M. Post’s analysis – although in dealing in 
                                                 
525 See chapter 4.5. on division and the debate between Izala Jos and Kaduna. Many concepts here 
are newly defined and directed towards the political dispute in the movement. The whole conflict was 
between those following Sheikh Idris and those who were against him.  
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a different context of follower-leader relationships-reflects this point. 526 The author 
speaks of a “mirror-hungry” personality and “ideal-hungry” followers. In the first 
category, the charismatic personalities, “… convey a sense of conviction and 
certainty to those who are consumed by doubt and uncertainty.”527 “Ideal-hungry” 
people “(…) can experience themselves as worthwhile only so long as they can relate 
to individuals whom they can admire for their prestige, power, beauty, intelligence, or 
moral stature. They forever search for such idealized figures.”528 The issue on bidʿa 
can be understood through this approach. In other words, Izala followers obtained 
their understanding of the concept from the guidance of their leaders. Even after the 
death of Sheikh Idris, the debate continued amongst those defending the founder 
and those who separated. The leader is the source of orientation in most religious 
organizations. He has the access to the Islamic sources and has the potential to 
guide followers in a ‘right way’. The issue of innovation became a personal issue and 
overshadowed a theological debate. The whole discussion became an approval and 
disapproval of Sheikh Idris’ views on the concept. This development is common 
especially when it comes to successions in religious organizations. The identification 
with the founder and with Jos as reference is still symbolic today. 
                                                 
526 Post, Jerrold M. (1986): Narcissism and the Charismatic Leader-Follower Relationship, In: Political 
Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 675-688. 
527 Ibid., p. 680. 
528 Ibid., p. 679.  
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4 Izala and Wahhabism 
In many cases, the Izala movement is understood as part of or connected to 
Wahhābiyya, not only amongst Nigerian Muslims (esp. Sufis) but also outside of 
West Africa. There are different connotations of Izala. The movement is considered 
by some to be among the Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamā‘a (in Arabic: people of the sunna 
and the Community). Some people labelled it as Wahhābiyya and link it to the 
Wahhābī movement which originated in Saudi Arabia, and others consider it to be a 
Salafiyya-movement. This section serves as a clarification of Ahl al-Sunna, Salafiyya 
and Wahhabism and especially where to place Izala. 
The prominent Nigerian Tijānī Islamic Scholar Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh al-
Husseini warns in his book1529 about a group of people of who are innovators (in 
Arabic: mubtadiʿa) who sometimes claim to be Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamā‘a and 
sometimes on the path of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ, but in reality they are neither nor. In fact 
this category of people belongs to madhhab al-mushabaha and can be considered 
neither among Ahl al-Sunna nor al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ. Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh clarifies the 
existence of three different directions when it comes to understanding the concept of 
madhhab (in Arabic: school of law or jurisprudence):  
                                                 
529 Al-Husseini, Ibrahim Saleh (2005): A-l-Durar al-lammā’a fi Haqiqati Maʿna Ahl a-l-Sunna wal 
Jamāʿa (The Shiny Pearls in the really meaning of People of the Sunna the Community). 
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He calls the first category Madhhab Ahl al-Taʿtīl, or those scholars who use 
their reasoning and by doing so deviated in their interpretation from the scripture 
(Qur’ān) – amongst others the so-called Jahmiyya and Muʿtazila.530  
The second group is that of al-mushabaha who exaggerated in demonstration 
so that they were mistaken when it came to the attributes of God. When it came to 
the explanation of faith they showed explicit confusion. 
The third and last category is Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa. This madhhab believes 
that anything related to the Prophet (Qur’ān and sunna) is “absolute” (Arabic: qatʿī) or 
“rightful” (Arabic: ṣaḥīḥ). This should be confirmed by trustworthy scholars. Any issue 
which is categorized as mutashābih (in Arabic: ambiguous) is only known by Allah. 
Scholars interpret it only in case of necessity, unlike the appearance of “innovators” 
who can influence people’s faith.531 
The scholar and dāʿi (in Arabic: the one who practices Daʿwa; preacher, 
“missionary”) Ahmad Bello Dogarawa does not see much difference between Ahl al-
Salaf, Ahl al-Sunna or Ahl al-Ḥadīth”. According to him, after the death of the fourth 
“Rightfully Guided” Caliph ʿUthmān Ibn ʿAffān (d. 656), the Islamic umma witnessed 
the appearance of different Islamic groups like the “Qadariyya”, and the “Muʿtazila” – 
as a result of the Charijites. This was seen by some Muslims as innovation in dīn (in 
Arabic: religion). He elaborates his argument by dividing the Islamic umma into two 
                                                 
530 Al-Jahmiyya is named after Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān (d. 745); al-Muʿtazila is an Islamic school of thought 
which emerged between the 8th and 10 centuries (CE); both orientations were controversial among 
Muslims and were known for using reasoning to define the nature of God.  
531 Al-Husseini (2005), pp. 18-19; I tried to summarize the explanation given by the author in his Arabic 
text. The author elaborates more on the third category and narrates several sources agreeing that Ahl 
al-Sunna is basically comprised of the four Schools of Law (Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī and Ḥanafī).  
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major groups: the Shiʿites and Ahl al-Sunna (Sunni Muslims). He categorizes Ahl al-
Sunna in: 
1. al-Marjiʿyya;  
2. Charijites;  
3. al-Muʿtazila; 
4. Ahl al-Ḥadiīth wa‘l-Athar.  
The debate was raised concerning belief in the Qur’ān and the sunna of the Prophet. 
Especially during the time of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855, CE) the community was 
“divided” between those who followed Ahl al-Sunna and those who did not. 
The Salafiyyūn believe in the Qur’ān, the sunna, as-Ṣaḥāba (the 
Companions), al-Tabiʿūn (the followers), and Tabiʿu al-Tabiʿīn (the followers of the 
followers) – in general the first three generations of the Muslim community. 
Concerning Ahl al-Sunna, there is no substantial difference. Both Salafiyyūn and Ahl 
al-Sunna agree on matters of tawḥīd (oneness of God) and ʿibāda’ of al-Salaf al-
Ṣāliḥ.532 
Ustaz Umar Adamu Muhammad (al-Hafiz), an imām and scholar of Arabic, 
constructs a link between Izala and Wahhābiyya as a movement. According to him, 
Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb denied anything which outside of Islam – a point of 
view which is similar to Izala. In addition, Izala uses the book of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, 
although they (the Izala) don't call themselves Wahhābbis. He mentions an 
interesting point that Sufis call anything coming from Saudi Arabia “Wahhābi”. Since 
                                                 
532 Interview with Ustaz Ahmad Bello Dogarawa in Zaria, 8th January/2007. 
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Sheikh Gumi, the spiritual father of Izala, was linked to Saudi Arabia, the Izala is thus 
‘connected’ to Wahhabism in many cases.533 
The Islamic scholar and student of Sheikh Gumi, Sheikh Muhammad Sanusi 
Gombe categorizes Nigerian Muslims as Mālikīs following al-‘ʿaqīda al-ashʿariyya. 
Apart from the Sokoto Caliphate and the call of Usman Dan Fodio to the sunna, 
Sheikh Sanusi Gombe considers the call of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi to be awwalu 
daʿwa ʿalā ṭarīqa Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa (the first call to people following the path 
of Ahl al-Sunna) in modern Nigeria. According to him, Sheikh Gumi preached to 
people following the path of Salafiyya – al-ʿaqīda al-Salafiyya.  
When it comes to the Izala movement in Nigeria, Sheikh Sanusi Gombe 
mentions that the organization was established on the basis of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ. 
Furthermore, Sheikh Sanusi Gombe finds a connection between the Izala and the 
Wahhābiyya-movement especially in their methods. He argues that both Izala and 
Wahhābiyya are against visiting tombs and istighātha (in Arabic: supplication; relying 
on an intermediary between creator and creature). He adds that Izala teaches the 
books by Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. The interviewee differentiates between 
Izala and the Wahhābiyya-movement in the following: 
“The Wahhābīs have nothing to do with this life, but Izala do. The 
Wahhābī consider leadership [the Sheikh is the leader], but in Izala 
everyone is considers himself a leader”).534 
 
                                                 
533 Interview with Dr. Umar Adamu Muhammad, 18th January 2007, Kaduna. 
534 Interview with Sheikh Sanusi Gombe, 17th January 2007, Kaduna. 
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Sheikh Sanusi Gombe further elaborates in his argument that the Tijāniyya 
and the Qādiriyya brotherhoods in Nigeria are also among Ahl al-Sunna, following 
the Qur’ān and the sunna of the Prophet. Although the two are older than the 
Wahhābiyya, they were attacked by the Wahhābiyya-movement. He gives an 
example from the Sudan where the Mahdī Muḥammad Aḥmad opposed the Tijāniyya 
and the Qādiriyya. At the same time, the Tijāniyya opposed the Qādiriyya and al-
Mahdī, etc. He concludes that the Wahhābiyya “cleansed” (Arabic: masaḥat) any type 
of Sufi-Brotherhood.535 
According to the Izala leader in Lagos (linked to the Jos faction) Dalhah 
Abubakar Abdullah, every contemporary Salafiyya-follower was associated with Izala 
before. He cannot see a big difference between Izala and the Salafiyya movement. 
He is surprised to identify a Salafiyya outside of Izala:  
 
“As you know and as I told you, the people of Nigeria like leadership. 
Everybody who belongs to Salafiyya now was an Izala before. He 
wants to have a specific name different from Izala and he calls his 
followers to recognize him as a leader. I don’t know how we can 
differentiate between the Izala and the Salafiyya. 
There is only a Salafiyya muʿāsira (modern Salafiyya) that from 
renowned ʿulamā' and denied the Salafī-ʿulamā'. This is what they do 
and it is a mistake. They take from a famous ‘alim and leave all that 
comes from Salafī-ʿulamā'. People who call for Salafiyya doctrines 
don’t like to belong to any of the four schools of law. They think that 
they are able do deal with law without the opinion of old and new 
ʿulamā'. These people call for the Salafiyya-doctrines.”536 
 
                                                 
535 Ibid. 
536 Interview with the Leader of Izala, Dalhah Abubakar Abdullahi in Lagos, 18th February 2007. 
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One can understand from this statement that the Izala leader regards the 
Salafiyya-movement in Nigeria to be a kind of deviation from Izala. He criticizes the 
fact that the current Salafiyya establishes itself in a tradition outside of the four 
Schools of Law. He mentions the examples of late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam, the 
Kano Salafiyya scholar, who was with Izala - according to the Izala-leader in Lagos – 
and then travelled to Medina (Saudi Arabia) to study and when he came back, he 
established the Salafiyya movement. 
When asked about the doctrine of the Salafiyya in Nigeria and whether they 
are following the path of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ, Mallam Dalhah Abubakar Abdallah cited 
that the movement [Salafiyya] follows only what is in conformity with its own 
standpoints and everything which in not it is rejected. He adds that they claim to 
belong to the tradition of Sheikh al-Albānī (d. 1999), a controversial Islamic Scholar 
from Albania who taught ḥadīth at the Islamic University in Medina and who belonged 
to the Salafiyya movement. He gives the example that al-Albānī accepted three types 
of taslīma (in Arabic: closing prayers), but the Salafiyya denied them. He also 
mentions the example of jinn-Possession and the communication with jinn which was 
rejected by al-Albānī, which is not the case for the Salafiyya.537 
Concerning the issue of Wahhabism and whether the Izala was influenced by 
the movement, Mallam Dalhah confirms that Izala reads and teaches the books of 
Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhābelwahhab especially when it comes to the issue of 
tawḥīd. He mentions the title of the book “Fatḥ al-Majid” written by Ibn ʿAbd al-
                                                 
537 Ibid. 
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Wahhāb which is used by Izala in the context of the oneness of God. For this, this 
reason Sufis call Izala “Wahhābiyya”. He adds that Izala uses books by Ibn al-
Qayyim (d. 1350) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), but he makes it clear that: “We agree 
with every book that attests to the oneness of Allah.”538 
The caliph of the Qādiriyya-Nasiriyya in Kano, Sheikh Qaribullah Nasiru 
Kabara, avoids using the word “Izala” at all. He compares the relationship between 
the Sufi brotherhoods themselves and between Sufis and Wahhābiyya as “totally 
different”. The Sheikh confirms that Sufism is older than Wahhābiyya. He observes 
what he called “al-Ṭā’ifa al-Wahhābiyya” (the Wahhābī-Sect) in Nigeria develop 
during the post-colonial time after it garnered support from politicians. Without 
mentioning the name of the Wahhābiyya-leader [Sheikh A. Gumi], he describes how 
he was close to the Sardauna and Prime Minister Ahmadu Bello. Declaring the 
existence of Wahhabism implicitly or explicitly was not easy at that time since Dan 
Fodio was a Qādirīand the Sardauna himself. After the assassination of the Premier 
of the northern Region of Nigeria in 1966, a big change happened since the 
“Wahhābi-leader” declared that Sufis are practicing shirk. Since that time a kind of 
struggle between the Sufis and the Wahhabbis has taken place. Sheikh Qaribullah is 
convinced that the Sufi-brotherhoods resisted and succeeded in stopping to 
Wahhabism. This is confirmed – according to him – by the fact that Sufis today 
represent the majority of Muslims in the West African country.539 
                                                 
538 Ibid. 
539 Interview in the House of the Qādiriyya in Kano with Sheikh Qaribullah Nasiru Kabara, 2nd/1/2007 
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Although Sheikh Qaribullah relates the issue of shirk and takfir (in Arabic: 
declaring non-belief) to the rise of the “Wahhābī-Sect” in Nigeria, he shows in a 
chapter of his “al-Mir'āt al-ṣāfiya fi Bayāni Ḥaqiīqat al-Taṣawwuf wa baʿdi Rijālihi 
dhawi al-Maqāmāt al-ʿaliya” (in Arabic: The Clean Mirror in the Truth of Sufism and 
some of his highly-ranked Representatives) that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb stood against 
takfīr of Muslims. Sheikh Qaribullah warned that declaring Muslims as “non-believers” 
is associated with incorrect interpretations of the Qur’ān and the sunna. After listing a 
number of Islamic scholars like Ibn Ḥanbal and Imam al-Ghazālī - to mention a few – 
who rejected takfīr, Sheikh Qaribullah quotes the book “al-Taḥdir mina Mujāzafa bi‘l-
Takfīr” (in Arabic: Warning of the Risk of “Takfīr”) by Muḥammad Ibn  ʿAlāwī al-Mālikī 
al-Ḥusnī who explains his point of view of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb:  
 
“Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb – God bless him – has a negative attitude 
towards takfīr, especially when it is related to him in declaring kufr by 
those who opposed him and his ideas. This is Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
denying all that was related to him among these lies and claims 
(...).”540 
 
On the first page of the journal “al-Burhān” (the Proof) edited by the Izala 
headquarters in Jos we read the sentence “al-ʿaqīda al-Salafiyya khayr mina al-
Shahāda al-ʿilmiyya” (in Arabic: The Salafiyya path is better than any academic 
certificate). The Izala itself insists on its original name and it neither accepts nor 
denies other connotations like “Salafiyya” or “Wahhābiyya”. The Sokoto-based 
                                                 
540 Nasiru Kabara, Qaribullah (n.d.): “al-Mir'āt a-l-ṣāfiya fi Bayāni Haqiqat a-l-Tasawwuf wa baʿdi 
Rijālihi dhawi al-Maqāmāt al-ʿaliya”, Darul Qādiriyya Publications, Kano, Nigeria. 
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historian Yandaki interprets the relationship of Izala and Salafiyya and the 
relationship of Izala and Wahhabism as follows: Salafism goes back to the first three 
generations of Islam. Salafism in general is opposed to Sufism. The Ḥanbalī School 
of Law is especially clear on this issue. The famous Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263–1328 CE), a Ḥanbalī himself, rejected Sufism and regarded it as “corrupting 
the teachings of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ”. Ibn Taymiyya rejected the visiting of tombs in order 
to obtain baraka (in Arabic: blessing). He refuses the idea of tawassul (in Arabic: 
continuity, intercession) in Sufism and understands it as a form of shirk. Yandaki 
observes similarities between this attitude and the attitude of Izala in rejecting Sufism 
and their practices.541 When it comes to Wahhabism, Yandaki sees it as an external 
factor in the rise of the movement. He traced the roots of Izala back to the Saudi-
dominated Muslim World League (Rābiṭat al-ʿᾹlam al-Islāmī):  
 
“The Izalatul Bidʿah movement is directly influenced by the Saudi 
based Rabita. In short, Izalah is the result of the outreach of the 
Rabita.”542 
 
Yandaki explains that Wahhabism is behind the Muslim World League and 
concludes that Izala is indirectly influenced by the movement. Yandaki explains that 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb after whom the Wahhābiyya is named led a “puritanical” 
movement that opposed Sufism and any innovation in Islam. Yandaki adds that the 
                                                 
541 Yandaki, I. Aliu (1990): The History of Izalah Movement in Northern Nigeria up to 1989; M.A.-
Dissertation in History, University of Sokoto, pp. 86-90. 
542 Ibid., p. 101. 
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books of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb touch on problems of ʿaqīda and concentrate on the 
issue of tawḥīd. The historian sees Wahhabism as a common phenomenon in Africa 
from east to West and in the north of the continent. Especially in West Africa, he 
relies on the PhD-Thesis of Lansiné Kaba to explain the spread of Wahhabism. 
According to Kaba the spread of Wahhabism is explained in three elements: 
pilgrimage to Mecca, trade, and finally nationalism and the rise of revivalism.543 
During the 1930s in particular, Wahhabism took root in the Ivory Coast before it 
reached Mali, Niger, and some other countries in the region. The coming of Wahhābī 
ideas to Nigeria is similar to their spread in other West African countries. Students 
who studied abroad in Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia contributed to the coming of 
Wahhabism. A comparable situation was created by teachers and lecturers 
originating from these countries. They heavily influenced the religious landscape of 
West Africa. As a prominent exampleYandaki mentions Sheikh Gumi.544 
The late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam of Kano, who underwent a 
transformation from a member of Izala to a Salafī scholar after he studied in Medina, 
remarks that both factions of Izala in Jos and Kaduna as well those who left the 
movement are similar in the way they act and in their religious outlook and goals. 
According to him they all practice daʿwa for the Qur’ān and the sunna of the Prophet. 
He called all of them Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa. When he was asked about the 
Salafiyya in Kano, he responded: 
                                                 
543 Yandaki (1990), p. 104; he relies on Lansiné, K. (1972): Evolution of Islam in West Africa, the 
contribution to political Islam 1945-58; PhD-Thesis.  
544 Ibid., see p. 106-7.  
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“Salafi orientation (Ittijāḥ al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya) is unstable because 
Kano is more a center of Sufism. Salafiyya is to be found more in Jos 
or Kaduna.545 
 
From the different points of view shown above, the Izala can be classified as a 
Salafiyya movement i.e. its primary focus is to fight innovation in Islam and to 
establish the sunna on the basis of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.  
Although most Islamic scholars tend to define al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ as the third generation 
after the death of the Prophet, it is difficult to trace the origin and exact time of this 
generation. The Encyclopaedia of Islam lists the three generations in the following:  
1. The golden age;  
2. a second period of “relaxation of standards and deviation”;  
3. and a period of division.  
It was the generation of the Ṣaḥāba (companions), al-Tābiʿūn (successors), and Atbāʿ 
al-Tābiʿūn (successors of the successors) that are considered the “norm” and the 
“model” for all Muslims, called al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ. It is debatable when this period ends. 
It should be noted that some scholars consider only the period of the companions as 
the age of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ. In addition, there is a differentiation between raditional 
and modern Salafiyya.546 The Izala with both its branches sees itself in that tradition 
of Salafiyya. Of course, it is difficult for the movement a build its silsila - if we can use 
a Sufi terminus – in the tradition of Salafism.  
                                                 
545 Interview with late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam in Kano, 2nd January 2007. 
546 Chaumont, E. (1995). al-Salaf wa 'L-Khalaf, In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Leiden: Brill, p. 900. 
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When it comes to Wahhabism, it seems to be more incomprehensible. The 
claim that Izala is a manifestation of the Wahhābī-movement is due to the same 
reasons. First of all, the Izala “spiritual father”, Sheikh Gumi was linked to Saudi 
Arabia and to Wahhabism. Secondly, the Izala itself uses the books of Sheikh Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, especially those which deal with tawḥīd, the oneness of God. Ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792) himself was influenced by the two Ḥanbalī scholars: Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) and depended on them 
in many issues. The historian Michael Cook concludes that this “dependence 
provides the target for some of the earliest attacks on the doctrines of the Sheikh.”547 
Concerning the prevalence of shirk Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb seems to be influenced by 
the Islamic scholar Ibn al-Amīr (b. 1688).548 
It is known that the name “Wahhābī” was given to sympathizers of Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb’s teachings. Wahhābīs distinguished themselves as al-Muwaḥḥidūn (the 
puritans) or Ahl al-Tawḥīd (people of the oneness of God).549 Hamid Algar, specialist 
of Persian studies, warns that there is no connection between the Wahhābiyya 
movements than we know in different parts of the world today and the initial stage 
instigated by Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. The author rejects the idea of identifying 
Wahhabism as a reform movement that mushroomed to the rest of the Muslim 
                                                 
547 Cook, Michael (1992): “On the Origins of Wahhabism”, In: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Series 3(2), pp. 199-200.  
548 Ibid., p. 201. 
549 Algar, Hamid (2002): Wahhabism: A critical Essay. Oneonta, New York: Islamic Publications 
International, p 1. 
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world.550 He points out the connection between Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Ibn 
Taymiyya mentioning that the latter used to be a member of a Sufi order unlike the 
former.551 The misinterpretation of Wahhabism started – according to Algar – with the 
formation of the first Saudi state during the mid-18th century. The founders of that 
state proclaimed jihād against all who opposed their understanding of tawḥīd. Those 
who opposed their doctrines were declared mushrikūn (in Arabic: polytheists) and 
apostates.552 Returning to the doctrine of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Algar stresses that the 
Sheikh concentrated on tawḥīd and especially on one particular type of it: tawḥīd al-
ʿibāda (in Arabic: oneness in worshipping context). Algar consider this fact important 
when it comes to shirk.553  
There is a similarity between that doctrine of the Wahhābiyya and the formation 
period of Izala. The Izala developed its own arguments, attacked Sufis in the past 
and declared their practices as an act of shirk. Additional prayers and Sufi-beliefs are 
irrelevant for the Izala and cannot be found in the tradition of al-Salaf.  
One common thing between Izala and Wahhābī is that both use the concept bidʿa in 
a negative way. Algar clarifies it in the following:  
 
                                                 
550 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
551 Ibid., p. 10.  
552 Ibid., p. 20.  
553 Ibid., p31; Algar lists three types of tawḥīd; tawḥīd a-l-rubūbiyya, al- asmā’ was ṣifāt , and al-ʿIbāda 
(Oneness of God; of his attributes; worshipping). 
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“This concept has been defined as “an innovated matter not followed 
by the Companions or the Followers and not part of that which a legal 
proof (dalīl sharʿī) necessitates.”554 
 
According to Algar this rejection of Sufism, the attachment to the tradition of al-
Salaf al-Saliḥ and the abandonment of affiliation with a particular Islamic school of 
law seems to be a common feature of Wahhābiyya and Salafiyya.555 The author 
makes the distinction between both on the basis of two elements:  
“Two important and interrelated features have usually served, 
however, to distinguish the Salafis from the Wahhabis: a reliance on 
attempts at persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other 
Muslims to their cause; and an informal awareness of the political and 
socio-economic crises confronting the Muslim world.”556 
 
The Izala can be placed in the Salafiyya tradition with Wahhābiyya influences. 
It is also part of Ahl al-Sunna wa‘l-Jamāʿa as are most Sunni Muslims and 
movements. The Izala defines itself as “fighters” against innovation and as 
establishers of the sunna of the Prophet. Tawḥīd plays a crucial role in the Izala 
doctrine. Izala relies on the teachings of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, but also on other 
Islamic scholars like Ibn Taymiyya, Imam Mālik, al-Albānī, and many others. Izala can 
be more closely identified within the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī School of law, although 
as mentioned above, it doesn't restrict itself to a particular school of law. 
                                                 
554 Ibid., p. 35.  
555 Ibid., p 47. 
556 Ibid., 
242 
 
5 The Division of the Movement: One organization and two doctrines or 
two organizations and one doctrine? 557 
In most northern Nigerian states (and the whole country) institutions (schools, 
mosques, hospitals, etc.) of the 1978-established-Izala are separated according two 
centres: Jos and Kaduna. The Jos-faction and its current headquarters in the Sarkin 
Mangu neighbourhood of Jos tries to keep the flag flying for the tradition of the 
founder, Sheikh Idris, and his doctrine. The Kaduna-faction is made of those who 
opposed him and chose to deviate from his path. Even if they decided to give their 
organization a new direction, they stick to the same name. Kaduna as the former 
capital of the northern Region is also symbolic for Muslims of the north. Of course 
there are those who witnessed the development of Izala and never belonged to one 
of the two faction or those who were members of the movement and left it at different 
stages. The division commenced in the mid-1980s. It was related to ideological 
differences in the movement. As a result, a separation at the level of institutions took 
place. Both major factions kept the initial constitution of the organization. 
I summarized558 the reasons of the division in four major elements:  
 
                                                 
557 Dealing with the division of Izala here is more focused on the discourse going on in the society and 
by no way a trial to side with one or the other faction. 
558 On February 7th 2007 I presented a paper at the Department of Religious Studies, University of 
Jos, Nigeria, summarizing the reasons for the division of Izala into two major groups (Jos and Kaduna 
factions). Many Izala Jos followers (mostly students) attended the seminar and questioned the 
reasons for division, especially those of money-issues and the person of Sheikh Idris. This 
presentation opened the door for me to meet the actual leader of Izala and other personalities of the 
movement in northern Nigeria. 
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1. Questions of leadership, especially the position of ʿulamā' in the Society. 
Members of the Jos faction consider the late Sheikh Idris, the head of the 
Council of ʿulamā', to be the highest authority of the organization. Izala 
Kaduna regarded Musa Muhammed Mai Gandu, the head of the Council 
Administration as the true leader of the Izala at that time.  
2. The issue of finances of the organization. There was a discussion as to 
whether donations were directed to the Izala as an organization or to the 
person of Sheikh Idris. 
3. Doctrinal division especially when it comes to takfir (declaring for non-believer) 
and the relationship with other Muslims.  
4. The person of Sheikh Idris and his way of managing Izala. One crucial 
question was raised as to whether he is an ordinary preacher or if he is the 
highest religious authority of the movement. These issues will be discussed in 
the coming paragraphs. 
5.1 Time of the division 
The division of Izala took place after the celebration of the thirteen year -
existence of the organization. All the Izala leaders, members and sympathizers were 
invited to join the celebration in Jos. This date was symbolic for the movement and 
meant its attachment to the sunna of the Prophet. It was not by chance that the event 
coincided with the hijra of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina (which also occurred 
after 13 years). The Prophet also spent the time [of the hijra] inviting people to Islam 
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and introducing his message before he migrated to Medina.559 The Izala event was a 
celebration that turned into an event of accusation. 
Ousmane Kane spoke of a “process of domestication that led to the break-up 
of the society.”560 He believes that efforts by political institutions to limit the influence 
of Izala and to restrict its emergence at the end of the 1970s and into the mid-1980s 
created problems in the organization. Kane regards measures taken by Maj. Gen. 
Muhammadu Buhari (Head of State 1983-85) as “backlash” to the Izala doctrine. As 
the head of state, Buhari grasped the nettle in order to restrict religious preaching 
and the building of new Friday mosques without permission.561 Also the relationship 
between Buhari and Sheikh Gumi seems to have affected the movement as a whole. 
Izala preaching in Kano from the beginning of the movement until the mid-1980s was 
not permitted. The situation changed after the bloodless coup d’état of General 
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (1985-1993) whose administration – according to Kane 
– supported more reforms.562 
Taking Kano State as an example, a trial to “turn the preachers to an 
institutional channel for negotiation with the state”563 (in this case A.K. Daiyyubu, 
former Izala leader in Kano) is considered to be one of the many explanations for the 
split. According to Kane, Daiyyubu organized the Izala in Kano and succeeded in 
                                                 
559 Interview with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, 18th February 2007, Lagos. 
560 Kane (2003), p. 207; preaching and establishing new mosques/bringing many mosques under their 
control were two of the most successful strategies followed by the Izala movement at an early stage of 
the establishment; see also Loimeier (1997), p. 216. 
561 Ibid., pp. 208-9. 
562 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 
563 Ibid., p. 217.  
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becoming a representative of the movement by end of the 1980s. Daiyyabu used his 
position in Izala to clarify his position vis-à-vis the state and its policy.564 Kane 
expected the ʿulamā' of Izala to be “frustrated” over being “relegated to the 
background”.565 This is of course a good example which shows the kind of problems 
the movement had to face. Apart from the internal dogmatic controversies between 
leaders of Izala, the organization was used as a forum for propagating individual 
ideas and points of view. This is what Kane called an attempt to use Izala as a 
“channel of negotiation with the state”.566 Another reason leading to the break of the 
Society can to be explained given the fact that “patrons of the movement” who were 
also part of the state apparatus tried to exercise power over Izala. As examples of 
this strategy Kane mentions the cases of Daiyyabu in Kano and an Izala leader in 
Borno who were both dismissed in 1990.567 
The issue of the split mentioned above was in the context of Kano state. 
Concerning the Izala as a whole, the conflict between Sheikh Idris and Musa Mai 
Gandu escalated. It was a kind of struggle for power within the movement. The 
monetary aspect also seemed to play a critical role in the division. In the year 1991, 
the two parties of Izala started “discrediting each other”.568  
                                                 
564 Kane (2003) mentions how A. K. Daiyyabu criticized the new government population policy. During 
an Izala meeting in Kano, 1989, Daiyyabu turned the event into a “one-man-show”- as described by 
Kane- to heavily denounce the implementation of a so-called structural adjustment policy (SAP) 
through the government; see pp. 218-219. 
565 Ibid., p. 220. 
566 Ibid., p. 222. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Ibid. 
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The crisis of Izala started in the mid-1980s and intensified at the beginning of the 
1990s. The Gulf war between 1990 and 1991 can be considered an external factor 
influencing the Izala movement. The leaders of the Society were divided between 
those who supported Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait and those who 
opposed it. Interestingly, two groups within the movement emerged: Saddamawa 
(supporters of S. Hussein) and Bushawa (named after G.H. Bush; supporters of the 
Saudis). The entire discussion developed from the question of whether Saddam 
Hussein was permitted to invade a Muslim country (Kuwait) or not. In addition, a 
heated debate arose among Izala as to whether it was permitted to station American 
troops in Saudi Arabia or not. 
The events are nicely described by Sani Modibbo as follows: 
 
“(…) When Saddam invaded Kuwait, Mallam Ismail was not in favor of 
supporting the invasion and then condemned the act and also support 
Saudis for giving Americans military bases in the Holy Land. We were 
not active in the Izala when this controversy emerged. It was around 
1990, isn’t it? Around 1991 was the Iraqi invasion. So politically the 
ʿulamā', those ʿulamā' who said: “let us fight, said let us support 
Mallam (Idris).” They were also divided. Those who said: “no” 
although they were not supporting Saddam 100%, they disagreed; 
they condemned the Saudi Government for providing these 
Americans with military bases in the Holy Land because they will bring 
“fassad” (decline). And Mallam came out and said that they are right, 
they were right and have right.”569 
 
                                                 
569 Interview with Sani Modibbo, 28 February 2007, Jos.  
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There are several speculations about the event and the Izala reactions to the 
Gulf War. Some views took the opportunity to confirm that Sheikh Idris was 
sponsored by Kuwait,570 and that is why he opposed Saddam Hussein. In absence of 
any evidence, such a claim can neither verified nor falsified. Izala is known to 
Nigerian Muslims as an organization which self-reliant in matters of finances. It is 
possible that during a very early stage Izala was financially assisted by networks 
associated with Sheikh Gumi outside of Nigeria, but it is very difficult to find any 
proof. When asked about possible financial support to the organization originating 
from Kuwait and the fact that Sheikh Idris opposed the invasion of Kuwait, the Izala 
leader in Lagos (Jos-faction), Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, gave the following answer:  
 
“From the Sheikh’s standpoint; we are not allowed to rely on any 
Arabic country, and what Arabs give as financial support is only for 
the improvement of Islam and also for the purpose of reaching 
paradise. And when he asked us if we don’t like al-Janna (paradise); 
we said that we do like it, and he continued: “we should rely only on 
ourselves and on what we have.” 
I don’t know if Kuwait supported the Society but I don’t agree with it. It 
is not true.”571 
 
Interestingly when leaders make decisions in Izala, they try to link followers to 
their views and interpretations. This has social implications in the movement, like 
                                                 
570 Loimeier (1997) mentions that Yan Izala and Sheikh Gumi were supported by the Saudis and 
Kuwaitis see p. 287.  
571 Interview on 18th February 2007, Lagos.  
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warning followers about getting married to a member of the group of opponents 
within the movement.  
 
“And even when I heard, that even your daughter is married to a 
Saddamawa that marriage is annulled and thus void. So we have a 
controversy now.”572 
 
Besides the concern at the social level, followers within the Izala are warned against 
opponents, but it also often becomes an identity issue of being Izala or not:  
“If you are Saddam’s supporter for any cause, if you support Saddam, 
if you support the course of Saddam, you are not an Izala.” 573 
 
This is quite a widespread phenomenon in Izala. Even today the question of 
authenticity is crucial within the movement. Being Izala requires for example 
identifying with the founder Sheikh Idris and his fatwās for the Jos-faction. 
Furthermore it also requires protecting him in all directions (see chapter “The War of 
Word”). For the Kaduna-faction, guidance by other ʿulamā' in the organization is more 
important.  
To conclude, the major problem causing the division of the Izala started in the 
mid-1980s. This was a period of time marked by political instability. In the year 1986 
and during the presidency of Babangida, the OIC-controversy574 was highly debated. 
In addition, the Muslim community in Nigeria witnessed events like the Maitatsine 
                                                 
572 Interview with Sani Modibbo, 28 February 2007, Jos. 
573 Ibid. 
574 See Hock (1996) more details on the issue. 
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riots in 1980. Finally the long lasting Sufi-Izala conflict over doctrines turned into a 
violent struggle several times. 
Furthermore after being officially registered in 1985, the Izala movement 
entered into a phase of “consolidation” and at the same time tried to “cleanse itself” 
(from the Maitatsine riots and all accusations against Izala) – as Yandaki 
emphasizes.575  
The period of division of Izala was an unstable one both within and outside the 
movement. The pressure on leadership inside and outside the movement was strong. 
A new and fast-growing movement like Izala faced challenges and ended up dividing 
into two major groups - or possibly even more. In several parts of northern Nigeria 
signs of division became more visible and influenced the movement. In Sokoto state 
for example, Sidi Attahiru, one of the major figures of the movement, broke with Izala 
in the mid-1980s and publicly disassociated himself from Izala before joining a Sufi 
Brotherhood. The case of Usman Dangungu is also well-known. He was very 
influential amongst the youth. In 1983, he criticized the governor of Kano in an audio 
cassette recording. Afterwards he was “excommunicated” – to use Yandaki’s word – 
from Izala. In Kano and during the same time, the Islamic scholar Aminud Deen 
                                                 
575 Yandaki (1990) identifies the period between 1982 and 1988 in the history of Izala as a ”phase of 
consolidation“. During that time Izala started growing and became “more tolerated in the society”, pp. 
159-164; Izala also tried between 1982 and 1984 to polish its image and distance itself from the 
Maitatsine events of the 1980s, see p. 163.  
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Abubakar left Izala and established his own movement. Sheikh M. Sanusi Gumbi 
(based in Kaduna today) struggled with the leadership of Izala and left the society.576 
The coming paragraphs will deal with the reasons for division. It is in no way an 
attempt to make any group or person in Izala responsible for the division. 
Furthermore, it is an analysis of discourse and arguments from different angles. 
  
5.2 Reasons of the Division 
In his study on different Islamic institutions in Nigeria A. Lawal Adam 
summarizes four reasons for the division of Islamic groups: political (Arabic: siyāsa), 
faith (Arabic: ‘aqīda), behavior (Arabic: sulūk), and fanaticism (Arabic: ʿaṣabiyya).577 
In fact, a division of any religious movement is often due to internal and external 
reasons. Izala is not an exception in this respect. In the movement itself as well as in 
the entire country, the split damaged the image of the movement in many ways. 
Nevertheless, following the crisis within Izala the same constitution and structures 
were kept. 
The majority of people inside and outside the Izala movement confess that the 
issue of division was not at the level of ʿaqīda or about the goals of the society. The 
type of leadership of the founder and his relationship to other ʿulamā' of the 
movement as well as to other leaders of the Society created a fissure within Izala. Of 
                                                 
576 Ibid., the author gives different examples showing that the division of Izala was a question of time in 
the mid-1980s a question of time; for more details from different regions of the north see pp. 176-180. 
577 Lawal Adam, A. (1992), pp. 45-46. 
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course one cannot deny the general situation during the time of division on many 
levels: economically, politically and religiously. 
There are many reasons leading to the division of Izala into two major groups. 
One cannot separate them from the political and religious context in Nigeria. The 
1970s was a time of economic instability and political turmoil in Nigeria. Apart from 
the discussion on the new constitution of 1979, a series of ethno-religious clashes 
took place in the West African country. Additionally, events in the Islamic world 
affected the Izala movement in one way or another.  
M. N. Gurama stresses that the media played a significant role in escalating 
the situation during the 1980s between the Izala and Sufis in the 1980s. This 
influenced the movement in one way or another.578 Furthermore, Gurama related the 
crisis of Izala to other crises in the Muslim world. He mentions among others the 
Gulf-War, the case of Algeria during the 1990s, the sharīʿa debate in Nigeria, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the war in Bosnia during the 1990s.579 Concerning the 
direct reasons for the division of Izala, Gurama lists several reasons leading to the 
division of the movement. The author lists ten details causing the movement’s crisis. 
Among others, some scholars left Izala since they refused Sheikh Idris’ leadership. In 
addition, there were some tribalistic issues; some scholars were still affiliated with 
Sufism and Sufi practices; there was the involvement of Shiʿites in the movement; the 
use of the organization to achieve leaders’ personal goals; the call to separate a 
                                                 
578 For more details see Gurama (2000), pp. 62-65; most of the events described by the author are 
articles related to the Maitatsine riots of the 1980 written by Sufis and Izala leaders. Izala was accused 
of being irresponsible. The Society defended itself and distanced itself from the happening.  
579 Ibid., p. 70.  
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women’s wing of Izala; and the so-called academic terrorism i.e. deviating from the 
Mālikī School of Law.580 Gurama speaks of secret meetings to impeach Sheikh Idris 
and compares what happened in Izala to what happened to Sheikh Gumi when he 
left JNI. Furthermore, Gurama speaks of propaganda against the founder of Izala. 
According to him, Sufis also got involved and used the situation to circulate “baseless 
stories” on Izala.581 
The author mentions an important meeting held in Hadeja, Jigawa State, for 
the purpose of impeaching Sheikh Idris. The result of the meeting was the decision 
that the founder of Izala should be expelled because of:  
 
1. Using law for his own purpose;  
2. calling people “non-believers”;  
3. preferring things that contradict Islam;  
4. considering ṭarīqa people to be mushrikīn (in Arabic: polytheists).582 
 
After the struggle within Izala, a declaration over the Radio in Kaduna was 
made in 1991, that Sheikh Idris was not leading the Izala council of ʿulamā' anymore 
and was replaced by Sheikh Rabiu Daura. In addition, the head of the First Aid 
Groups, Alhaji Issa Waziri, was removed from his position. Many other changes at 
the level of leadership were made by the Kaduna-faction of Izala. All these decisions 
                                                 
580 Ibid., pp. 72-74. 
581 Ibid., p. 77.  
582 Ibid., p 78; the author quotes a pamphlet in Hausa written by sheikh Muhammad Umar Nasarawa, 
Adamawa state leader of the Council of Ulama and affiliated with the Kaduna faction of Izala. 
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were explained by the fact that Sheikh Idris handled matters individually, that he 
refused advice, and used the organization’s money for his own purposes (donations 
in matters of books or cars), and that he announced the thirteen-year anniversary  
celebration of Izala without the consultation of other ʿulamā'.583 The answer of Sheikh 
Idris himself reflects his point of view: “Even if a non-Muslim is asked who founded 
Izala, he will tell you that Isma’ila Idris founded it."584 As an explanation of the crisis 
within Izala given by the founder of the movement, Sheikh Idris spoke of the selfish 
interest of many people involved in Izala, Shiʿa involvement in the Society, revival of 
innovation through some preachers, and opposition to a women’s wing of Izala.585  
As Kane shows, the issue of leadership of Sheikh Idris is mentioned as a 
reason for division. Apart from that money seems to play a role in the split.  
In the following, the reasons for division are analyzed from different 
perspectives: from the perspectives of leaders in Jos and Kaduna, from the point of 
view of some former Izala followers, from the perspective of ordinary members of the 
movement and of those who never joined Izala.  
For the current leader of Izala in Jos Sheikh Jingir, the division of the 
movement is due to three major reasons, among others. According to him, one of the 
reasons is the Shīʿa influence of some preachers of the movement: 
 
“(…) the influence on some preachers by Shiʿite ideas, which came to 
Nigeria and spread out. The daʿwa started by telling people not to go 
                                                 
583 Gurama (2000), pp. 81-82. 
584 Ibid., p. 86. 
585 Ibid. 
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to schools belonging to the state and so on. Some students left their 
schools since these institutions were under a taghut (devil, Satan) 
rule. This is one reason.”586 
 
The leader adds that some preachers who belonged to political institutions of 
the state influenced the movement. In addition to that some people blamed Sheikh 
Idris for using the money of the Society for his own purposes. Furthermore they 
complained about his inability to obtain financial support from Arabic countries.587 
Sheikh Yusuf Sambo, the leader of Izala (Kaduna-faction) saw a structural 
misunderstanding behind the whole issue of Izala. In his opinion, since the 
establishment of the organization Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu was and is the leader of 
Izala. He mentions that since the Izala is a religious organization, a Council of ʿulamā' 
was established during a meeting held in Kaduna. Leaders of the movement elected 
Sheikh Rabiu Daura but since Sheikh Idris was the founder of Izala he was given the 
position. He agrees that the conflict was in no way a matter of faith. He points out:  
 
“As we removed Sheikh Idris from his position, they refused. They 
said: “this is not possible!” “Nobody can say this or that”.588 
He adds 
“They blame us for being Shīʿa and Saddamawa (followers of 
Saddam). They blame us for many things but we don’t answer 
them.”589 
 
                                                 
586 Interview on 28th February 2007; (my translation from Arabic). 
587 Ibid. 
588 Interview with Yusuf Sambo on 15th January 2007 in Kaduna (my translation from Arabic) 
589 Ibid. 
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This view is also confirmed by Sheikh Ali Abdallah Telex, the Izala leader in Zaria 
(Kaduna-branch). He confirms that Alhaji Mai Gandu was and is still the leader of the 
Society as a whole:  
“(…) Money; I it was think monetary issues. They insulted each 
other. I would also say that the problems are also political because 
when the conflict matured, they started insulting each other’s in 
some cases – as I said. 
The political conflict reached the leader of the Council of ʿulamā' of 
the Society: Sheikh Ismaila Idris. 
The Society was founded on three basic elements: 1- the 
Administrative Council which is the strongest; 2- Aid groups; 3- and 
Knowledge and Education. The problem took place at the third level 
among the ʿulamā'. The monetary and political problems among the 
ʿulamā' affected the entire Society until the “Jossawa” (people of 
Jos) and “Kadunawa” (people of Kaduna) were established. They 
are known by this name even today. 
I really know that the ones who belong to Izala in Kaduna try as 
much as possible to reconcile, but until now without success. 
People of Jos are hardliners in the context of this conflict. They want 
to continue the conflict to prove that they were the initiators of the 
Society. This is not true because the first leader of the Society was 
Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu – he is still alive – and the people of 
Kaduna are today on his side. Mai Gandu was the first leader and 
even Sheikh Ismaila Idris was under his authority.  
Most of the names given to the government for registration of the 
Society were from the Kaduna-faction. There were five: two of them 
died and three are still alive. From the three alive; there are two in 
Kaduna and one in Jos.”590 
 
For the Kaduna branch of Izala, Sheikh Idris - although he was the founder of 
the Organization, is considered to be a ʿālim by many Izala members. According to 
                                                 
590 Interview with Sheikh Ali Abdallah Telex on 07 January 2007, Zaria. (my translation from Arabic). 
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them, he neither was the leader nor was he registered as such. They criticized his 
lack of transparency in guiding Izala in financial matters. Very often the question was 
raised as to whether money (also other donations like cars, etc.) was donated to 
Sheikh Idris as a person or to his organization as an institutional body. Accusation 
and counter-accusations regarding the financial management of Izala played an 
important role in the division. The discussion about the structure of the society also 
took place. The main question concerned the structure of the organization: what is its 
paramount body? Is it the Council of ʿulamā' - since the organization is a religious 
one? Or is it the Council of Administration? Who was leading Izala? Is it Sheikh Idris 
who is an Islamic scholar, or Alhaji Mai Gandu who was not a scholar?  
The struggle within Izala was directed against Sheikh Idris, accusing him of 
selfishness in guiding the organization, but also for violating the constitution. Sheikh 
Idris blamed his opponent’s deviation and rebellion against him. The actual leader of 
Izala in Lagos (linked to Jos-faction), Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, describes the 
situation as follows:  
“In the center of accusation was Sheikh Ismaila Idris. Those who split 
from him accuse him of being selfish in guiding the society. They 
blame him of deviating from the initial goals outlined in the beginning. 
Sheikh Idris was charged with dominating Izala and “breaking” its 
constitution. He was accused of going beyond his position as an 
“ordinary scholar” among many others and deviating far from the 
leadership of Musa Muhammad Mai Gandu. The latter is not an 
Islamic scholar but an administrator and official leader of the society.  
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From his turn, Sheikh Idris accused the group that deviated from his 
path of ’rebellion‘ when they split from him – as the leader and 
architect of the organization.”591 
 
For Alhaji Ibrahim Musalla (Kaduna branch of Izala, served as state treasurer 
of the organization at a very initial stage), the issue of division started in the year 
1981 in Saudi Arabia when Sheikh Idris contacted the Muslim World League and 
introduced himself as the leader of Izala. He was confronted by the fact that they 
recorded the name of Alhaji Mai Gandu as leader. Annoyed by this experience, 
Sheikh Idris started a struggle for power within the society: 
 
“He went to Rabita and introduced himself as a leader of the 
organization. After sending the message the officer asked him:’ is he 
the one called Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu?’ He said: ‘no’, he is Sheikh 
Ismaila Idris.’ 
They told him that the man in their record is Sheikh Musa Muhammed 
Mai Gandu. He is the leader of the organization in Nigeria. ‘Did the 
organization have two leaders?’ 
He said: ‘yes, he is the leader of the Imam committee, as Imam 
among preachers and Musa Muhammed Mai Gandu is the head of the 
entire organization’s administration.’ That is according to him. 
They said:’that they are very sorry and they can only attend to Musa 
Muhammad Mai Gandu as the leader in their record which they 
received from the embassy.’ 
Then he was annoyed, and was very very angry. He was complaining 
about why he was suffering and that somebody else is taking the all 
the credit. There is the beginning of the problem in the organization.  
                                                 
591 Interview in Lagos on 18th February 2007, (my translation from Arabic); in another occasion the 
interview subject compared the split of the group in Kaduna to the Charijites: the first Islamic group 
who split from Caliph Ali during the 7th century, See Gurama (2000) p. 110. 
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The moment he came back, he started bulldozing his way around, 
looking for a way to turn against Alhaji Musa Mai Gandu and place the 
fault with him.”592 
 
The informant adds that according to the constitution of Izala, the executive 
chairman of the entire organization is Alhaji Mai Gandu who was elected by 
unanimous vote. When it comes to the Council of ʿulamā' and the First Aid Groups, 
both of them are under the chairmanship of the administration council. This was 
rejected by Sheikh Idris who considered the ʿulamā' to be at the top of the 
organization. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s Sheikh Idris started excluding members 
from the organization.593 
If some leaders of Izala did not accept the way Sheikh Idris headed Izala, 
there were others who were also frustrated and left him because of a negative 
personal experience. An example of this is evident in the Jos-based Sheikh Alhassan 
Said Alhafiz, the former Qur’ān reciter under Sheikh Idris. He is now linked to the 
Kaduna-faction of Izala. Sheikh Alhassan Said points out that from the beginning he 
was on the side of the Izala founder and never thought of deviating from him:  
 
“I swear by Allah that I did not belong to any other group when I was 
with Ismaila Idris. I was with him until they removed him from his 
position. They organized a meeting at Hadija – the name of the town 
as I told you – and some brothers asked us to go there to that meeting 
so if they say something wrong we can answer.  
                                                 
592 Interview in Jos on 24th December 2006.  
593 Ibid. 
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Sheikh Idris agreed and appointed me as the leader of a committee 
that should go to Hadija and put a car under my disposition. We were 
on the way to leave and he stopped us and said: “No”, he didn’t want 
us to go there.  
Since we didn’t go, they decided to remove him from his position. If 
we were there, this would not have happened. This is the will of 
Allah.”594 
 
Sheikh Alhassan Said adds that other reasons led him to join the Kaduna 
branch of Izala. His relationship became worse with Sheikh Idris because of 
misunderstandings and wrong stories transmitted to the Izala founder. After leaving 
Nigeria to study at the Islamic University in Medina, Sheikh Alhassan Said came back 
for a visit in 1992/3 and preached against riyā (in Arabic: hypocrisy) of some people. 
He was misunderstood and blamed of bringing a “new religion” to the country. 
Furthermore Sheikh Idris was angry with him and advised him to abstain from that 
type of preaching which is not allowed among Ahl al-Sunna. The situation escalated 
when Sheikh Said was accused of being a shīʿa follower: 
“He [Sheikh Idris] said: ‘Where are you and your Shiʿite teachers?!’ I 
said: ‘me’ and he added: ‘yes! In the Islamic University there are a lot 
of Shiʿites.’ 
‘No, no, no! By Allah, in the Islamic University there were no Shiʿites 
and I don’t know any teachers who are Shiʿite. Even if students, find 
out that another student is among the Shiʿites, they might kick him out 
of the University.’ And he swears by God that the majority of teacher 
in the Islamic University are Shiʿites. I said: ‘No! It is not like that’. (…) 
I said: ‘No, look; Sheikh, the books of the sunna are different from 
those of Shiʿites.’ 
                                                 
594 Interview in Arabic with Sheikh Alhassan Said in Jos on 12th December 2006 (my translation).  
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He mentioned some saying and I answered him: ‘Sheikh! These are 
the statements of Muʿtazila.’ Suddenly I had the Tafsīr of Dhahabi and 
I opened it and said to him: ‘Look! These are the sayings of Mu‘tazila 
and not of Ahl al-Sunna. You are our leaders, fathers, teachers and 
we will follow you according to the al-ʿaqīda al-ṣaḥīḥa (in Arabic: the 
right faith), but if you come with the teachings of then we will not 
agree with you.’ 
So he was angry and left. He also mentioned that if someone kills 
another person intentionally, he is a kāfīr (non-believer) even if he 
repents. I said: ‘No! This is the sayings of Charijites’ and I opened the 
same book and showed him the proof. When a person kills a human 
being intentionally and if he repents then Allah will forgive him 
because Allah is the Forgiver and the Merciful. It is mentioned in the 
Qur’ān: ‘I am the forgiver for those who repent…’ And I showed him 
the places (where it was mentioned) as well as the ḥadīth. This is 
what brought the Sheikh to say: ‘You never come to me again!’ 
I said: ‘no, I will come and greet you. I consider you to be my teacher 
and Sheikh if you are mistaken, then I forgive you and I don’t blame 
you for anything since you are a human being. This is the crisis that 
started between them and me.’595 
 
Sheikh Alhassan Said adds that he joined the Izala in Kaduna when he was 
asked to do so by that faction. He was given the opportunity to be with al-ḥaqq (in 
Arabic: truth) on the basis of the Qur’ān and sunna. From that time he could not 
remember any blame or big issues within the Kaduna group of Izala that led him to 
regret his choice.  
This is an example at the top level of the organization of the factors that led to 
the division because of the founder of Izala. At the grassroots level, people are more 
or less guided by emotions. In Izala there is no particular ritual or initiation into any 
                                                 
595 Ibid. (my translation). 
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faction of the organization. Followers can easily stop their affiliation to one group or 
the other. Followers are more directed by their own observations and interpretations 
of problems. If issues occur at the top level, interpretations of leaders circulate 
promptly and become well-known to members of the group. To identify with one 
faction means to be on the side of Sheikh Idris for the Jossawa-group and against 
him in the Kadunawa-faction. People who are in Jos and witnessed the Izala from its 
initial stage are mostly on the site of Sheikh Idris and follow his path. They also 
protect him against any accusation, be it concerning his leadership or concerning 
money.  
Alhaji Khamis Zakariyya from Jos, who affirmed his attraction to the Izala and 
the preaching of Sheikh Idris since the early stages of the foundation, explains that 
the split of the movement is basically due to al-ḥasad (in Arabic: envy). He explains 
that there was a time when Sheikh Idris was given a new car by Mallam Hamza 
Abdallah. Sheikh Idris spent six months without using that car and then called the 
ʿulamā' and asked them what to do with it. They suggested that he use it as a public 
car to generate some money. There are some people who were not happy with that. 
Mai Gandu and other Izala leaders betrayed Sheikh Idris in order to get money from 
the organization, and in the process they excluded him. Even today they blame 
Sheikh Idris for taking the money of Izala. In defence of the Izala founder, Alhaji 
Zakariyya mentions that Yusuf Sambo (leader of Izala Kaduna) also collected money 
to build his house in Kaduna. That money belonged to the organization. Also Sheikh 
Alhassan Said received money (one million Naira) from the ex-governor of Bauchi, 
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Muazu, and also collected donations in Port Harcourt and Abuja. He used the money 
to build a house. Then Alhaji Zakariyya asked, astonished, whether Sheikh Idris 
collected money or not. After his death they realized that he left behind only a house 
that was built by the organization for him. He confirms that he was present after the 
death of Sheikh Idris when his property was distributed among his children. Only a 
house was found. He says:  
 
“I swear that all the people present cried!” Each daughter of the 
Sheikh got 5,000 Naira and every son received 10,000 Naira. He 
concludes: “I know Sheikh Idris personally! I swear! He will preach 
from morning to evening without having a single Naira in his 
pocket!”596 
 
Of course such a statement cannot be confirmed or denied because of the 
absence of any evidence. It only shows how complicated the money issue in Izala is. 
The organization is based on donations – even today. Money is collected in mosques 
after prayers and at any big events organized by the society. Money is accounted for 
and directed to headquarters (local, state or nationwide). Trust plays a crucial role at 
all the different levels. The definition of donations is also important: are they directed 
either to a person or to the organization. There are always those who blamed, and 
still blame Sheikh Idris for using the organization’s money for his own purposes. The 
absence of clear evidence makes any accusation or counter-accusation void. 
                                                 
596 Interview with Alhaji Khamis Zakariyya in his shop in Jos, 14th February 2008; (interview conducted 
in Hausa with simultaneous translation into Arabic by Mallam Sani Abdurrazzaq). 
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The growth of Izala particularly in northern Nigeria made control over it 
complicated. It’s no wonder that money became an issue since the increase of the 
organization’s resources. A struggle for power between the ʿulamā' and executive 
members of the Izala internally affected credibility and transparency in the 
organization. Many questions were raised within Izala: are ʿulamā' only preachers or 
can they also act as treasurers of Izala? Can money go to individual accounts of 
ʿulamā' or only into the account of the organization? If it goes to the ʿulamā'’s account 
then how can the organization know about that? Is that money a private one or does 
it belong to Izala as a whole?  
Ustaz Sani Modibbo who hold several positions597 in Izala since its 
establishment and was familiar with its internal affairs illustrates how the issue of 
money developed into one of reasons for division in Izala. To some extent he 
considers money to be one of the major sources of the split:  
 
“Money is one of the major factors because when the ʿulamā' decided 
to have their own accounts, we said: “no!” at that time; because the 
account was for the organization. Nothing was wrong if one of the 
ʿulamā', if Ismaila himself was the signatory to the account, but they 
should not have a separate account. Anything belonging to the Izala 
should go into the main account. Later on we heard that they had their 
own accounts in case there is a donation from an individual. So if you 
are donating to account A, the executive will not have any idea; if the 
donation goes to the account of the executive account, then 
everybody will know. And then there are audits; and we have audit 
                                                 
597 served as Secretary General of the Nasarawa-Gwon- Branch (Jos) between 1979 and 1985; State 
Secretary General in Plateau State from 1985 to 1986; Administrative Secretary 1985/86; National 
Executive Secretary 1985/1986 to 1987; National Escort Member of the organization.  
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unit and an auditor who will come and audit the account. (…) the 
monetary issue; one cannot deny that. Really!”598 
 
The structure of Izala as a religious and modern society organized after 
regulations similar to state institutions (well-established structure, documentation, 
constitution, etc.) does not guarantee equality or transparency. The religious leaders 
and ʿulamā' of the organization enjoyed, and still enjoy a special status and are in 
positions of power. It is difficult to control them and adapt them to the law or to the 
constitution of the Society. They feel that they are the law-makers and controllers of 
the organization and when it comes to money they see themselves in a position of 
trustees. They are the ones who bring in money and they are the ones who control it, 
save it or distribute it in the name of Izala. They are the policy-makers and the 
“religious capital” of the organization. So how can they mollify any regulation or law? 
Many interview subjects attested that the division of the movement was not 
because of the doctrine or concerning faith. This is also explained by the fact that 
both kept the same name even after the division: 
“Indeed! Both kept the same name because their problem was not a 
basic one that concerned ideology. There was no need for changing 
the name. They did not split because of crucial, basic or principal 
issues, but because of new economic problems; maybe you can say 
“mashākil dunyawiyya” (in Arabic: problems of this world).”599 
 
This can be also confirmed through the fact that both groups have kept the same 
name and constitution even today. As an outsider of Izala, the late Sheikh Jaafar 
                                                 
598 Interview in Jos with Ustaz Sani Modibbo, 28th February 2007.  
599 Interview in Jos with Ustaz Muhammad Khamis Idris, 11th December 2007; former Izala member. 
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Mahmud from Kano related the division in Izala to fitna600 (in Arabic: secession, 
upheaval) within the movement. He added that the financial aspect cannot be 
ignored as a reason for the division of the organization. According to him, the 
property of Jamāʿa (community; Izala) especially seems to be a source of debate. In 
addition, the intervention of politicians and ethnicity played an important role in 
splitting of the movement:  
“Despite that the Jamāʿa was founded by loyal people, their 
knowledge is very limited. Of course, if the number of followers 
increases and the leaders don’t have the proper knowledge, 
experience and study of old experiences of the daʿwa -work, this leads 
to division among people.  
The second issue is the attempt of some politicians to divide the 
Jamāʿa into two. This happened with the first founder of the Izala, 
Ismaila Idris, when they tried to seek revenge on him by separating 
people from him and inventing issues within the movement.  
They (politicians) used some members to harm to Sheikh Idris and 
blame him for things that only Allah knows whether they were true or 
not. Well, these things were mostly right. They (politicians) fear that 
the Jama‘a spread out in a short amount of time and see in it a 
danger in the future. They tried to destroy it in this way. They opposed 
it by arresting people and by involving their own agents in it. 
Well, maybe these are the main reasons. People also say that al-
taʿṣṣub al-qabalī (ethnicity) played an important role. You find ethnic 
differences everywhere and that can lead to an attempt to dominate 
the whole society. This could also play an important role in the 
division.”601 
                                                 
600 This concept is mentioned in the Qur’an. Its meaning is related to division, chaos and the situation 
of war. In Islamic History, the first civil war is known as al-Fitna al Kobra. It took place after the death 
of the third “rightfully guided Caliph” Uthman (d. 656).  
601 Interview with late Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam in Kano, 2nd January 2007; the Sheikh assured 
me that he was outside of the country studying during the time of division and his point of view was 
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When asked about the role of Sheikh Idris as a founder and leader of Izala in 
dividing the movement and increasing opposition within leadership, Sheikh Jaafar 
added:  
“Indeed, he was a very strong person towards others. He expects 
more from people than they are capable of. He has very strong and 
rigid ideas without any flexibility. If he would deal with issues with 
some of deliberation; maybe it would be better. But he was tough on 
the ones who agreed with him as well as on the ones who opposed 
him. He took things seriously. This exacerbated some sensitivity 
between him and others who wanted to eliminate him from power. 
Through that maybe the Jama‘a can be rescued from his “religious 
dictatorship.”602 
 
The internal and external conflicts of Izala created division on many levels. 
Leaders were basically divided into two groups; and institutions (schools, mosques, 
hospitals, etc) were also organized according to their affiliation to Jos or to Kaduna. 
In the same town representatives of Izala followers have the choice between Jos and 
Kaduna and to decide about the authenticity of each group. Certainly there are Izala 
adherents who do not belong to any faction and who see themselves as members of 
the Izala as a whole. Alhaji Abba Damburno for example introduced himself as one of 
the founding fathers of both groups. Not only did he witness the establishment of 
Izala, but also its development at many stages during the last 30 years. As reasons 
                                                                                                                                                        
based on news that he received from Nigeria but also through his own observation of the whole 
situation.  
602 Ibid. 
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for division he mentions “love of leadership and material things”.603 Also the above-
mentioned Ustaz Sani Modibbo who resigned from his office and left Izala in the mid-
1980s clarifies that he in fact distanced himself from Izala as an organization, but still 
entertains good a relationship with all the leaders. Is it possible to speak of a third 
group of Izala? Maybe an Izala “C”, or a third faction?  
Gurama speaks of a “third group C” in Izala and categorizes Medina students 
who broke with Izala when they came back to Nigeria as part of this third faction. 
They are called “Yan Medina” (in Hausa: people of Medina; literally, those who 
studied in Medina). Under this category he classified Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud 
Adam.604 Of course this third “group” of Izala is more heterogeneous than the two 
other factions and it is neither organized under one name nor does it have visible or 
well-known leaders and representatives in the north. During my field research in 
Nigeria I heard the following sentence several times: “Those who studied abroad left 
Izala when they came back!” This strong speech cannot be judged in the absence of 
any evidence. Perhaps those who went to Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Sudan to study 
came back with a different worldview - different from that of Izala. Those who were 
uncomfortable with the conflict and decided to withdraw from any commitment can be 
considered part of this third category.  
                                                 
603 Interview with Alhaji Abba Damburno (also known as Abba Eldanna) in Jos, 24th December 2006.  
604 Gurama (2000) speaks of Izala A, B, and C. He sees the first one as extreme in “interpretation and 
application of Islam” and uncompromising, the second one called Yan Tawaye (the seceders) as 
liberal and moderate, and the third one as trying to maintain “spirit of neutrality”, see pp. 114-116; 
during my own interview with late Sheikh Jaafar he didn’t confess any affiliation to Izala before he left 
to study in Medina. Concerning the third group, he observed its existence adding that they are not 
organized and act individually. Interview (02/01/2007) 
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5.3 The Izala “War of words” between Kaduna and Jos: “Two open letters to 
Sheikh Jingir vs. answers from Jos” 605 
 
This chapter will examine the struggle between the two Izala factions, 
demonstrated by their publications: the first is entitled Risalātān Maftuḥatāni ilā zaʿim 
al-Jamāʿa al Ismāʿiliyya, al’-Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir (in Arabic: Two open letters to 
the leader of the Jamāʿa al-Ismāʿliyya [named after Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the founder], 
Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir). This “book”606 was written by Dr. Ibrahim Jallo 
Muhammad, the second deputy of the leader of the Council of ʿulamā', Izala Kaduna. 
Jallo is also the leader of Izala in Taraba State. 
The reply to this publication was Kalimāt Wajīza li-Qamʿ Sharr al-Ḥasūd (in 
Arabic: Short Words to overwhelm envious people’s evil) written by Saleh Idris 
Muhammad.607 The current leader of Izala in Lagos (linked the Jos-faction), Dalha 
Abubakar, also wrote a booklet with the title al-Radd wa'l-Naṣīḥa (in Arabic: The 
answer and advice) responding to the statement(s) of Dr. Jallo’s document. The aim 
of this section is to illustrate the doctrinal debate through the analysis of these books.  
                                                 
605 I am using the word “war” neutrally and as a metaphor. It is to be understood as debate, dispute or 
disagreement. This term is also used in Falola (1998): Violence in Nigeria. 
606 The choice to put the word “book” between quotation marks indicates the uncertainty about the 
publication and the year. 
607 Thanks to Saleh Idris Muhammad for providing me with copies of these two publications. It is 
indicated that the booklet was printed in Jos on January 13th 2006. There is no mention about the 
publisher. It looks like the many Izala-Jos printed material printed by the headquarters and circulated 
among members and institutions. 
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These “publications” are written in the Arabic language and show the high 
level of discourse achieved by the leaders of the two different Izala groups. Arabic is 
the language of the Qur’ān and the sunna. This language is not accessible to every 
Nigerian Muslim. Only scholars who have attained a particular level of intellectuality 
can understand and speak this language. The ability to write well in Arabic is an 
advanced stage of mastering the “sacred” language of Islam. Interestingly, this type 
of polemic writing is reminiscent of the polemical writings of Sheikh Gumi about 
Sufism and the answer from the Sufi Brotherhoods.608 Writing in Arabic seems to be 
a common practice among Muslim intellectuals in Nigeria. The “religious capital” is 
not only based on reciting the Qur’ān and having knowledge of the Islamic tradition, 
but also achieving a high level of proficiency or even fluency in Arabic. Most of the 
Izala leaders master Arabic and prefer to write and publish in this language.  
The goal in the following paragraphs is purely analytical and by no way a 
search for the theological legitimacy of any statement. In Islamic theology – like in 
any other theology –, the door of ijtihād is open. Many issues were and still are 
debated among the ʿulamā'. 
The purpose of the next part is to depict the argumentation of both parties. 
The internal debate is known by many Izala insiders. Non-Izala are often aware of the 
split of the organization, but without knowing its reasons. I was abruptly drawn to 
these books through interviews conducted in Jos. The language of these texts often 
changes from the objective argumentation (showing sources, quoting classical 
                                                 
608 Loimeier (1997) shows how the leaders of both Qādiriyya and Tijānīyya answered Gumi’s polemical 
Arabic publication al-ʿaqīda al-saḥiḥa. 
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theologians, etc) to subjective criticism (mentioning of names, blaming 
ignorance/lies/rumors, defending the leaders, etc)  
In these “publications”, the issue of bidʿa is surprisingly discussed at length among 
Izala themselves. This controversy is usually only found between Izala and Sufis. 
Bidʿa is a concept that exists not only in the official name of the Izala-organization, 
but it is also a basic element of its doctrine: fighting bidʿa. This development 
concerning disagreement over bidʿa was new to Izala. The intra-Izala struggle on 
bidʿa has an effect on its image as an anti-innovation movement. This controversy 
demonstrates how dynamic and unstable religious concepts are.609  
In the following two out of the three internal Izala-publications are summarized. The 
focus is on the discourse of debate between the different factions. 
 
“Risalātān Maftuḥatāni ilā zaʿim al-Jamāʿa al-Ismāʿiliyya…“ 
Form of the two letters: This document was mentioned to me during an 
interview in Jos. The argument of my interviewee who is linked with the Kaduna 
group of Izala was that only a few leaders among the two factions of Izala write 
polemically. According to him, the ʿulamā' of Izala keep quiet on this issue. Most of 
these writings (debates) are composed by young scholars and other active members 
of both factions.610  
The “book” is addressed to the actual Izala-leader in Jos – as the title explicitly 
shows. There is no indication about the publisher or the year of publication. It seems 
                                                 
609 See chapter “Izala and Innovation”.  
610 Interview in Jos with Sheikh Alhassan Said on 12th December 2006.  
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that the book is a collection of two letters which were not published. The first one was 
written on December 4th, 2005, and the second one dates from the 17th of June, 
2006.  
The “book” is 335 pages in length. It reflects the author’s (linked with Izala Kaduna) 
message addressed to the actual leader of Izala in Jos. The text of the two letters is 
documented. The author also comments on the reactions of two Izala-Jos-writers 
who are mentioned in the work. The whole work is structured as follows: the two 
letters addressed to the leader of the Jos-faction (Sheikh Jingir), a short overview on 
the history of Izala, and comments on the answer to the two letters. These two 
introductory chapters are followed by arguments and counter-arguments. Issues like 
al-tahajjud (in Arabic: night prayers), amulets, – to mention some – etc. are 
introduced, and the matters are discussed according to classical scholars, then the 
answer of the Jos-faction of Izala is elucidated, and finally; the counter-argument(s) is 
stated. The author relies on the two main publications of the Jos-faction: that of Saleh 
Ibrahim Muhammad (Kalimā Wajīza….) and the other from Dalha Abubakar Abdallah 
(Fil’ Radd wal’-Nasīḥa…). This strategy (issue, argument, and counter-argument) is 
linear until the end of the book.   
 
Content/ Subject(s):  
The “book” starts by giving an overview on the issue of bidʿa that has occurred 
among Muslims especially since the death of the Prophet. The author gives 
examples from history in order to document how rulers fought innovation in Islam in 
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the past. He listed the first and second “Rightly-Guided-Caliphs” (Abū Bakr and 
ʿUmar) and their struggle to maintain the guidelines of Islam as established by the 
Prophet. The struggle of the ʿulamā' against new religious groups - like the Mutazilite 
(8th-10th centuries, CE) - is mentioned by Dr. Jallo.  
Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, and al-Shatebi are among the scholars – according to 
the author – who fought and responded to innovations in the religion of Islam. 
Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, Usman Dan Fodio, and Abubakar Gumi also belong 
to this category. All of them contributed to the revival and purification of the sunna of 
the Prophet.611 From this historical overview the author shifts to the Nigerian context, 
mentioning the appearance of ḥaraka muḍilla (in Arabic: delusive movement) under 
Ismaila Idris. This movement scarcely relies on the views of the founder and denies 
any advice or corrections.612 After the death of Sheikh Idris, he was succeeded by his 
murīd (in Arabic: committed one) Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir. Again the use of a Sufi 
term to qualify the Izala leader shows the deepness of the intra-Izala-conflict. The 
author concludes his introduction with the fact that he wrote the first letter to the 
leader of Jos in order to advise him and his followers. The reaction and denial of the 
first letter pushed him to write a second one, which was more detailed and 
explanatory than the first.613  
                                                 
611 See Jallo (n.d.), pp. 1-7 
612 Ibid., p. 9. 
613 Ibid., p. 9-12. 
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The first letter, written on 4th December, 2005. 
Jallo addressed his statement to the Rais al Jamāʿa al-Ismaiʿliyya (leader of 
the group of Ismaila Idris) urging him to return to the sunna of the Prophet and to 
abstain from any form of deviation from Islam. This letter relies on a study of Sheikh 
Idris’ cassettes and fatwās which conform neither to the sunna nor to the Mālikī 
School of law – as Jallo claims. 
There are five points mentioned in the letter criticizing the founder’s fatwās. 
The first and third issue are on al-tahajjud, the second on qabdh, the fourth on 
circumcision, and the last point on jinn-possession. 
The author blames the founder of Izala for lies and deviation from the Māliki 
School of law in many ways. According to him Sheikh Idris rejects the claim that his 
followers pray with qabdh or hold amulets. Sheikh Idris denies the existence of Ahl al-
Kitāb and refuses to eat their slaughtered animals or to get married to their 
daughters. He advises his followers to circumcise their children after they reach 
seven years of age. He rejects the claim that anybody can exorcise a possessed 
person from jinn. Jalo demonstrates that these fatwās are not in conformity with the 
Mālikiyya and quoted several ḥadīth indicating the opposite.614  
The author closes his letter by warning the current leader of Izala and urging 
him to avoid bidʿa and repent to Allah and return to the sunna on the path of the 
pious predecessors. Furthermore he declares his disposition for any religious 
debates:  
                                                 
614 Ibid., p. 14-27. 
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“I am ready – by the will of Allah – to meet you for any debate in order 
to clarify truth, revive the sunna of the Prophet, and eradicate satanic 
innovations. This meeting can happen in any place and at any time 
here in Jalango or any other suitable town.”615 
 
The second letter, written on 17th June, 2006.  
While the first letter is only a few pages in length, the second one is much 
longer and includes more details. The issues discussed are the same mentioned in 
the first letter. Jallo tries to legitimate the night prayers denied by Sheikh Idris. The 
author relies on different sources that mention this practice of the Prophet. Jallo did 
not restrict himself to argumentation and proof from the source (Qur’ān and sunna), 
but he goes a step further andattacks Sheikh Idris by locating him at the same level 
of Sufis and their practices:  
 
“You! Leader of the Ismaiʿliyya-Sect! [the group around Sheikh Idris] 
You are on the same path as the Sufis because you invite people (in 
your fatwās and cassettes) to undertake bidʿa and other rubbish. Sufis 
in many cases disregard what is written in the Qur’ān and the sunna 
of the Prophet – PBUH – and follow their passion (al-hawā). This is 
exactly your case. You urged your murīdīn to advance the decision of 
what you call “Headquarters in Jos” instead of what is fixed in the 
sunna. By doing that, you led your murīdīn to be like Ahl al-Kitāb and 
Sufis in making their ʿulamā' like their deity. You do that through 
denying what Allah allowed and by allowing what Allah denies.”616  
 
                                                 
615 Ibid., p. 27. (my translation) 
616 Ibid., p. 47 
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The strategy followed by Jallo in his statement is to question the fatwās or 
legal opinions of Sheikh Idris, then to compare Idris with Sufis and Ahl al-Kitāb in 
falsifying their holy books. He quotes the classical work of the Tijāniyya Jawāhir al-
Maʿāni where it is required that the leader should be followed and obeyed without any 
opposition and compares this obedience to Sheikh Idris and his followers from the 
Jos-faction. 617 
Jallo uses the opportunity to remind the Jos leader of the history of Izala. In a 
long (two pages in length) footnote on page fifty-three, he refers to the establishment 
of Izala by enthusiastic people wanting to re-establish the sunna of the Prophet. He 
denies Sheikh Idris’ taking of any leadership position apart from being on the head of 
the ʿulamā' Council. According to him Sheikh Idris deviated from that path until he – 
as a person – became the norm and not the sunna.618 
Jallo accuses Sheikh Idris of allowing aid group members to look after his 
personal security instead of performing prayers (Jallo: 61) and of banning his 
followers to listen to no other recorded preaching apart from his cassettes (Jallo: 63). 
The author criticizes the fact that Sheikh Idris’ followers would not pray behind 
somebody who is not Izala. They will not even greet a non-Izala or go to his funeral. 
This behavior is different to the tradition of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ since many ʿulamā' 
accept differences and criticism (Jallo.65). 
                                                 
617 Ibid., p. 51. 
618 For more details see pp. 53-55. 
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Similar to the first letter, the author points out to the actual Izala leader that 
Sheikh Idris took people back on the path of Sufism and not on the path of Ahl al-
Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa: 
“There is no doubt that what I mentioned to you is enough to confirm 
that Sheikh Ismaila Idris, the founder of the  al-Jamāʿa al-Ismaʿiliyya 
was the one who brought people to the pathway of Sufism by 
encouraging them to follow their passion and deviate from the Qur’ān 
and the sunna.”619 
 
The author reiterates in the very last footnote of this letter that he is preparing 
a new book entitled Ismaila Idris fi Mizān al-Sharʿ (Ismaila Idris at the Level of 
Legacy) in which he indicates the numerous mistakes and bida‘of the Izala founder.  
The next part of the “book” consists of discussing the answers from the Jos group 
(Saleh Idris Muhammad and Dalha Abubakar). Jallo considers these responses to be 
not only full of mistakes (print, language, knowledge), but also as assertions to keep 
bidʿa alive and to deviate from the Islamic sharīʿa.620  
 
Kalimāt Wajīza li-Qamʿ Sharr al-Ḥasūd 
This booklet was published in 2006. On the front page is a picture of the Grand 
Mosque in Medina and the last page has the logo of the Izala: a palm tree and two 
crossing swords in the middle. This picture is overlayed by the full name of the 
organization at the top. Below that it reads “founded by Sheikh Ismaila Idris”. Finally it 
is indicated that the national headquarters of Izala are in Jos.  
                                                 
619 Ibid., pp. 74-75 
620 Ibid., p. 77.  
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A first interpretation of the cover of this booklet is that the author locates – as 
expected– the Izala between the tradition of the Prophet that has its origin in Saudi 
Arabia, Mecca, and the tradition of Sheikh Idris who founded Izala in Jos. Identifying 
the Jos-faction with its founder is a “marker” of its originally and loyalty to him. The 
sentence li mu’aṣṣihā al-Sheikh Ismaila Idris (established by Sheikh Idris) is visible at 
all Izala schools and institutions. The name of the founder is a sign of authenticity of 
the Jos-faction. This faction of Izala insists that the movement represents the tradition 
of the founder. It gives the organization not only a historical originality but also 
legitimacy among other groups. Even when it comes to official documents issued by 
Izala in Jos, the name of the founder is always connected with Sheikh Idris’ name.  
 
Content/Subject(s): 
The thirty-six-page booklet is subdivided into twenty chapters introduced by the 
author. After the first sentence reserved for to praise Allah, Saleh Idris Muhammad 
quotes a verse from the Qur’ān (4:112) and a ḥadīth of the Prophet.  
[4:112] “anyone who commits an offence or a sin, and then throws the blame on to 
some innocent person, has burdened himself with deceit as well as flagrant sin” 
(Abdel Haleem translation of 2005)  
 
The ḥadīth quoted by Sunan Abu Dawood (book 24, 14) states: “Allah sends the one 
who tells lies about a believer (Muslim) to hell, until he repents from what he said.”  
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From the beginning the author shows that any Muslim risks committing a sin if 
he mistakenly blames an innocent of any fault. Also anyone who slanders a believer 
(a Muslim) risks going to hell until he repents. 
It is a sign that the “defense”-project of Sheikh Idris started with two major 
sources: The Qur’ān and sunna. He continued by defending the founder of Izala and 
proving that that which has been written by Dr. Jallo is nothing but a rumor. 
In the introduction the author mentions that he had the letters addressed to the 
current leader of Izala in Jos. Saleh Idris Muhammad expected a kind of warning 
about the mistakes, but he was surprised by the level of subjectivity of Dr. Jallo’s text. 
He says:  
„I observed through what I read in the “fire of jealousy”, that there is 
antagonism and abhorrence in your heart. In fact what you have 
written cannot in any sense damage the two Sheikhs. [Sheikh Idris 
and Sheikh Jingir]”621  
 
To make the argument more plausible, the author makes use of Arabic poetry by 
emphasizing the issue of jealousy and illustrating the sentiments of envy and 
jealousy towards those who are in a higher position – the Izala founder and his 
successor in this case.  
 
The first chapter of Saleh Idris bears the title “Sheikh Idris is on the side of truth”: 
here the author explains how the founder of Izala relies only on the Qur’ān and the 
                                                 
621 Saleh (2006), p. 2 (my translation) 
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sunna of the Prophet and the path of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ including the four Imams (four 
schools of law). He stresses that nobody can deny the importance of Imam Malik.  
He also defends Malik (d. 795) in front of al-Albānī (d. 1999) preferred by Jallo.  
 
“What divides us is that we invite people to learn about the Oneness 
of Allah and to avoid polytheism without restricting ourselves to the 
sayings of this or that person. And you work to destroy what we build, 
for instance, your invitation to people to keep amulets and prayers like 
every polytheist worshipping al-Tijānī or ʿAbd al-Qādir.”622  
 
The next nine chapters deal with the issue of bidʿa. The main subject is the 
night prayers during Ramadan and its evidence in the sunna. The argument of the 
author is that the Prophet practiced it, but because he feared that people would make 
it into a sunna [norm, canon], he stopped doing it. The discussion deals with the 
controversy over the ṣalāt at-tarāwīḥ (in Arabic: a prayer after night prayers during 
Ramadan) considered to be sunna (optional but a recommended practice).  
Interestingly, it is in this context that Saleh Idris Muhammad accuses his 
opponent of practicing bidʿa. First of all he criticizes the call for prayers (Arabic: 
adhān), inviting people enthusiastically to perform it, and to practice it in only during a 
few days of Ramadan.  
“You start practicing this bidʿa at midnight, five hours after finishing at-
tarāwīḥ (we don’t deny its existence). Before you start somebody can 
hear the voice of the muezzin with a new type of adhān: Prayers! 
Prayers! Prayers! And so on … continuously. You! Jallo! Keep Allah in 
                                                 
622 Ibid. p. 6. 
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mind! You and those who are on your side! Where did you get this 
[prayer]?”623  
 
Saleh Idris Muhammad relies on the statements of the Prophet, especially 
regarding his practices in insisting that he [the Prophet] preferred prayers during 
Ramadan and advised people to perform them at home.  
Consider the sentence practicing bidʿa is more difficult than practicing sunna (Saleh: 
12). The argument is to show that the Prophet considered the different categories of 
people (weak, sick, needy) before establishing any rules. The author adds that the 
practicing of this bidʿa led to the fact that many Muslims cannot perform fajr-prayer (in 
Arabic: first Muslim obligatory prayer). If Muslims – according to Saleh – would 
restrict themselves to the tarāwīḥ-prayers during Ramadan, which is recommended 
by the “pious predecessors”, that would be much better for them. The so called qiyām 
(synonym for tarāwīḥ prayers) as known by al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ is practiced during the 
entire month of Ramadan. The new bidʿa [night prayers] is only practiced during the 
last ten days of Ramadan – which is not in conformity with the practice of al-Ṣaḥāba 
(Prophet Companions). One of the practices that is harshly criticized by the author is 
what he called al-adhān al-mukhtaraʿ (the invented call for prayers).  
In chapter eleven, a new topic is introduced and discussed, namely the qabdh-
ṣadl-controversy. The author mentions that Izala in Jos prefers praying ṣadl (in 
Arabic: hands alongside the body during the prayer) instead of qabdh (in Arabic: right 
hand crossed over the left hand at the navel). He adds that followers of the Jos-
                                                 
623 (my translation) 
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faction pray in both ways and that Sheikh Idris never forbid it. The argument of Saleh 
is that Izala relies on strong sources confirming its preference for ṣadl over qabdh 
(Ibn al-Mundhir, al-Ḥasan and Ibrāhīm al-Nakh’ī, Ibn al-ʿArabī, al-Ṭabarī are some 
sources mentioned by the author in order to give legitimacy to his argument).  
The next subject, which is discussed in chapter twelve, concerns taslīma, or 
the conclusion of prayers. The Izala Jos has a preference to perfrom one taslīma 
instead of two. This practice is criticized by the Kaduna group. To show the strength 
of his argument, Saleh quotes three different aḥādīth624 (Arabic: pl. of ḥadīth) 
showing that the Prophet completed his prayers with one taslīma. Many ʿulamā' have 
not considered them [aḥādīth] weak or authentic but instead that the four “rightfully 
guided Caliphs” (the first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet) practiced only 
one taslīma, which shows that it was a widespread practice. The argument of the 
author here is to prove that the issue of “closing” prayers is debated among Islamic 
scholars. He assumes that opponents of Sheikh Idris would never agree with him.  
The next subject touched by Saleh concerns al-tamā’im (amulets). From the 
title his position is clear: holding amulets is an act of polytheism. He addresses Jallo 
directly by saying: “You defend amulets although it is related to shirk.”625 
The fact that Imam Mālik allowed this practice (of holding amulets) doesn’t 
mean that Mālik’s statement is unquestionable. Saleh’s duty is to defend Sheikh Idris 
                                                 
624 The first ḥadīth here is documented in the at-Turmudhi ḥadīth collection and corrected by al-Hakim 
(here Aisha narrated that the Prophet practiced only one taslima); the second one is to be found in Ibn 
Majah and narrated by Sahl Ibn Sa’d (one taslīma is also documented here); finally the third source is 
a ḥadīth of Salma Ibn al-Akwa’; for more details see Saleh (2006: 16) 
625 Saleh (2006:21), (my translation) 
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“who erased the state of polytheism in our country.”626 Interestingly, the issue of 
following the Sufi path is raised again. Saleh accuses his opponents of being 
followers of Sufi brotherhoods. He adds that by criticizing Sheikh Idris, he [Jallo] is in 
fact praising his own deeds (fighting of polytheism and establishing tawḥīd). 
Can Izala members marry women who are Ahl al-Kitāb, and can we eat their 
slaughtered animals? This is the focus of the next few chapters. The author 
confesses that the Qur’ān allows such a marriage. He mentions although this is a fact 
in the Islamic tradition, most of the schools of law (Mālikī, Shafi’ī, Ḥanbalī, Ḥanafiī 
advised marrying a Muslim woman instead. In addition Saleh brings up that 
contemporary Ahl al-Kitāb cannot be considered the same as the Ahl al-Kitāb 
mentioned in the Qur’ān. To make this statement stronger, the author listed situations 
of conflict between Muslims and Christians from Nigeria (in Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba, 
and Adamawa) and raises the question: how can Muslims marry non-Muslims?627 
He concludes this part of the booklet by warning Jallo against attacking Sheikh Idris 
and achieving fame by attacking the Izala founder and defender of the sunna [Sheikh 
Idris].628 
The last two chapters deal with circumcision and communication with jinn. 
Concerning the first issue, Saleh defends the attitude of Sheikh Idris in delaying the 
circumcision of children until after seven years of age. He relies on two ḥadīth 
confirming this practice and clarifies that Sheikh Idris spoke of karāha (in Arabic: 
                                                 
626 Ibid., p. 23.  
627 Ibid., p 28 
628 Ibid., p29. 
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abhorrence) and not taḥrīm (in Arabic: ban). He clarifies that many Islamic scholars 
reject circumcision on the eighth day after birth because this is a Jewish practice.629 
Concerning communication with jinn, only Prophets can communicate with them. 
Saleh opposes any person that claims the ability to see or speak to a spirit. He goes 
further by saying: 
“We will never believe in that [communication with a jinn] and we 
cannot pray behind you until you repent. We can only consider you as 
diviner and conjurer.”630  
 
The fact that the Prophet exorcised jinn from a human body belongs to his status as 
Prophet and nobody can perform the rite besides him. The author adds that the 
majority of diviners left their practices [communication with jinn], apart from Jallo and 
those who are on his side.  
The conclusion of the booklet takes the form of advice and warning. The author 
invites his opponents not to look for fame through criticism of Sheikh Idris and his 
successor. In imperative language he warns them to leave jealousy and to stop 
attacking the two Izala founders. Like Jallo in his “book”, Saleh also declares himself 
ready for any debate at any place or time.  
 
Through the comparison of both texts one can find many similarities. The main 
source of both authors is the Qur’ān, the sunna and the tradition of Islamic scholars 
of Sunni Islam. The use of Arabic poetry (which has a long tradition even in pre-
                                                 
629 Ibid., p. 30.  
630 Ibid., p. 31. 
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Islamic times especially when it comes to defending or criticizing a person) is 
common amongst them.  
The issues of ignorance and knowledge of Islamic sources occur often. When it 
comes to the strategy used by both writers, they surprisingly use the concept of bidʿa, 
which is controversial and dynamic. Almost the same vocabulary used to attack 
Sufism now is used by the two Izala writers themselves. The readiness for meeting – 
as a kind of test of knowledge or defense of argument(s) – is also a common element 
shared by both.  
5.4 Attempts at reconciliation 
When the conflict within Izala occurred and the organization faced division at 
an early stage, there were attempts to reconcile leadership in Izala. These efforts 
were noticed by different people (insiders and outsiders) from Nigeria and even 
outside the country. The fear that the division of Izala could bring another fracture 
within the Muslim community in Nigeria has led several people to attempt to reconcile 
within the Izala. Division in Izala means failure of its reform program and doctrine for 
various people. Attempts to reunify the two Izala-factions were undertaken by Sheikh 
Abubakar Gumi. The Governor of the Central Bank during the Babangida era also 
undertook an attempt at reconciliation on behalf of the movement. A delegation from 
Saudi Arabia came to Nigeria and invited the conflicting parties in Izala to engage in 
dialogue. Even the Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunna fi Gharb Ifrīqiyya (the Society of Ahl al-
Sunna of West Africa) based in Ghana sent delegates to Jos and invited the Izala 
representatives of Jos and Kaduna to engage in discussion. Dr. Ahmad Gumi 
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(Sheikh Gumi’s son) who is based in Saudi Arabia and who comes to Nigeria every 
year for tafsīr sessions during Ramadan made an effort to re-unite the Izala. These 
attempts all failed. The reasons for these failures are interpreted by Izala members 
differently. The differences seem to be more complicated than expected and each 
faction maintains its own position. In absence of a compromise, especially 
concerning the role of leadership in the movement and also about the exact reasons 
for the conflict, reconciliation could not be achieved. Although Izala today is still 
divided, there are voices arguing that reaching an agreement is only a matter of time. 
For others, the two Izala groups underwent different experiences since the split. This 
view is reflected by an informant saying: “I don’t see reunification of Izala in our life 
time! Not now! Maybe in the future!”631 
 
“Sheikh Abubakar Gumi tried during his life time to solve the problems 
in Izala. Being the father and the most respected authority in Izala, he 
invited the struggling leaders and attempted to help them reconcile. 
The fact that Sheikh Idris insisted on being the Izala leader and also 
the case of Alhaji Mai Gandu made the reunification impossible. There 
was also a delegation sent from Saudi Arabia with the aim (came to 
elect students from Nigeria) of unifying Izala but they failed as well, 
just as Dr. Aḥmad Gumi did. He never came to me! He did it 
individually and failed. If he had come to me, I would be able to 
manage it and put things under control.”632 
 
                                                 
631 Name of the interviewee hidden.  
632 Interview on 8th/9th March 2008 with Sheikh Abbas Hamid Abbas, the former leader of the Council 
of Ulama in Kano, Izala Jos branch. 
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Intensified attempts at unity within Izala took place in the year 1991. The 
Governor of the Central Bank undertook two initiatives. It was recommended that 
Sheikh Idris and Alhaji Mai Gandu keep their positions under the same constitution. 
Differences between both made agreement impossible. During the same year, a 
delegation from Saudi Arabia tried to assist with reconciliation. Here an issue was 
raised by Sheikh Yusuf Sambo who heavily criticized Sheikh Idris. The founder of 
Izala countered the issue by criticizing the involvement of politicians in Izala and the 
enrichment of some members like Yakubu Musa Kafancan (Kaduna-faction).633 Again 
the problems were not solved during this time even when Sheikh Idris intervened 
later that same year and invited all parties to a meeting in his house. The suggestion 
to impeach Sheikh Idris is the reason why this effort was unsuccessful.634 
In 2006 the “Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunna fi Gharb Ifrīqiyya” made an attempt to 
facilitate the reunification of the two Izala-factions. The organization invited the actual 
leader Sheikh Jingir to Ghana to give a lecture. The Izala leader could not attend but 
sent a representative: Dalha Abubakar Abdallah. The Kaduna-faction sent Sheikh 
Alhassan Said. Issues were discussed and another meeting at the headquarters in 
Jos with the leaders was made. Finally representatives from Ghana came to Jos and 
engaged in discussions with the two Izala-factions. This effort was not successful.635 
Concerning the attempt made by Dr. Ahmad Gumi, it was no different from the 
others and failed at an early stage. On the first page of the JIBWIS Journal of Izala 
                                                 
633 Gurama (2000), pp. 127-128. 
634 Ibid., p. 132. 
635 Interview in Lagos with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, 18th February2007. 
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Jos the title “Like father like son? Dr. Gumi’s misconception” is meaningful.636 In 2004 
he called on the two Izala groups to attempt reunification. The criticism of Dr. Gumi 
came from Jos. The Jos group blamed him of being politicized. According to them, he 
started talking to media even before talking to the Izala leaders. They accused him of 
not being an Izala member and of not being involved in any activity of the movement 
in or outside Nigeria. His plea was seen as “an intimidation and a provocation”. He 
was urged by the Jos group of Izala to curb his political ambitions:  
“Our request to him is to jettison the misconception of his sponsors 
and their political ambitions and to join us in the task of keeping alive 
the message of Allah and Ḥadith of his last Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH). The Izala National Headquarters is in Jos by the will of Allah. 
It has come to stay.”637  
 
Sharp disagreement came especially from the Jos-faction. They blamed him of being 
biased and of favoring the Kaduna-faction over the Jossawa people. It was expected 
of Dr. Gumi to be like his father in unifying the two Izala groups. At an early stage 
people were interested in the new reconciliation project before they became 
disappointed and judged his attempt as a failure. The expectations were high at first, 
but the Izala people were soon disappointed. The reasons for the failure are given in 
the following statement:  
 
“Yes, he wanted to unify the Society and reconcile between the two 
groups. Well as you know, if someone wants to reconcile between two 
                                                 
636 Gurum, H. M. and Bello A. M (2005): Like father like son? Dr. Gumi’s misconception, in: JIBWIS 
Journal, pp. 21-22. 
637 Ibid., p. 22.  
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parties, then he should not prefer one and leave the other. He should 
invite all people, meet them and engage in discussion in order to 
know the truth … isn’t it like this? 
But when Sheikh Dr. Gumi came back to Nigeria; you know that relying 
on the Mālikī Law is one thing that divides us and the Kaduna-faction. 
We say that the majority of people are ignorant and if we introduce this 
and that, people will not know how to worship Allah. So let us have 
only one stand point. 
In the first year Sheikh Dr. Gumi said: “If a person abuses the 
madhhab, then is it proof that he is ignorant?” 
Every person who abuses the Mālikī School is an ignorant person. 
This is what he said (Dr. Gumi). In that first year we supported him 
(Dr. Gumi) because we thought that he was following the way of his 
father Sheikh Abubakar Gumi in teaching people. Sheikh Abubakar 
Gumi was Mālikī and worked according the Mālikī School of Law.  
We saw that Dr. Gumi only followed the path of his father and he was 
closed to us.”638 
 
Dr .Gumi addressed the media regarding the problem of money, and provoked both 
groups by expressing the notion of takfīr. Furthermore he suggested removing the 
current leadership and replacing it with a new one: 
 
“In the second year he (Dr. Gumi) said that the Jamāʿat Izalat al-Bidʿa 
Wa Iqamat as-Sunna should be one group under one leadership, but 
we should remove the current leaders in Jos and Kaduna and elect 
new ones. He said this on the radio. It was better to invite the leaders 
and discuss the issue with them instead of saying it openly on the 
radio. 
He came as a sultan accusing both groups of kufr and tried to unify 
us. But when the Society was established, he was studying the 
modern sciences in the English language. 
                                                 
638 Name of Interview subject, place and date are hidden. 
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He also said that they (faction of Izala in Jos) should bring him our 
cars, close mosques and schools and we answered: “you were not 
the one who built these mosques or schools from your own money. 
The cars were purchased when you were in Mecca and you cannot 
have them now.” (…) So reconciliation cannot be like this.”639 
 
Dr. Gumi’s comparison of the division of Izala to Ahl Ridda (in Arabic: people 
of apostasy) that should be fought according to the Qur’ān made reconciliation 
unachievable:  
 
“He also told people one day that it is allowed to kill us according to 
the Qur’ān… 
We are allowed to be killed since we are Ahl Ridda - as he said. He 
relied on one Qur’ānic verse saying “if two sects among believers are 
fighting, then reconcile between them and if one of the two refuses 
then fight the one that refuses (the reconciliation)” this is a proof for 
people to kill us. 
We said that this Quranic verse was there when your father was alive, 
but (the father; Sheikh Gumi) never relied on it to kill the Kaduna-
faction who refused reconciliation at that time. Your father left both 
parties do what they want because Allah is on the side of those who 
are in the right. That’s it. If you want to kill us and do this and that, 
then we say: “we are ready to fight.” 
This is the reason why he failed to bring reconciliation between us. He 
was inflexible in the end. He invited people to Kaduna and even the 
leader there didn’t go: Abubakar Ikara didn’t go; Yusuf Sambo didn’t 
go; Mai Gandu didn’t go. These are the leaders; the leader of the 
ʿulamā', administration and the deputy to the leader. They didn’t 
attend the meeting.”640 
 
                                                 
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid. 
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This is one version of why the attempt at the reconciliation of Izala undertaken 
by Dr. Gumi failed. These attempts took place in 2004 and 2005 and both Izala-
factions boycotted it. During my field research in Nigeria it was not possible to meet 
Dr. Gumi or to listen to his point of view on the reconciliation project of Izala that he 
suggested. The leader of the Council of ʿulamā' in Katsina (Kaduna-faction), Sheikh 
Yakubu Musa Kafancan, assures that although several reconciliation attempts failed 
to bring Izala groups together, there are efforts still on the way. He argues that the 
intervention of the government in Izala affairs hindered its reunion. This was due to 
Izala’s boycott of a president who was not a Muslim. The Sheikh mentioned that 
Izala’s intervention was the reason why Obasanjo left his position as head of state. 
As a result of the work of Izala, the late Umaru Yar’Adua then became president of 
Nigeria.641 
 
                                                 
641 Interview with Sheikh Yakubu Musa Kafancan in Katsina, 12th March 2008.  
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Chapter Five: Sharīʿa Debate of 1999 
The military rule of Sani Abacha in 1990 was one of the worst periods of time 
in Nigeria’s modern history. The West African country suffered from repression, 
economic and political instability, ethnic conflicts, corruption, and human rights 
abuses. Abacha broke away from established democratic structures and turned 
Nigeria into an authoritarian state in which no room was given for opposition or 
political activism.642  
 After the unexpected death of Abacha on 8th June 1998, under unclear 
circumstances643 General Abdulsalami became the head of state and promised to 
initiate the transition of Nigeria to a civilian government. In February 1999, 
presidential elections resulted in Olesegun Obasanjo becoming president. This was 
the starting point of the Fourth Republic – another attempt to democratize the 
federation. This transition was accompanied with a lot of expectations in and outside 
of Nigeria. Nigerians wished for a better life with higher living standards, political and 
economic stability, and for the development of democratic structures and a more 
peaceful coexistence. Internationally there was interest in reintegrating Nigeria into 
the world community after years of political isolation.  
                                                 
642 Ogbondah, Chris W. (2000): Political Repression in Nigeria, 1993-1998: A Critical Examination of 
One Aspect of the Perils of Military Dictatorship, In: Africa Spectrum 35 (2), pp. 231-242; apart of 
dissolving political parties and general assemblies the Abacha’s regime persecuted political opponents 
and activists; see also Falola (1999), p. 196.  
643 See Maier, Karl (2000): This House has fallen. Nigeria in crisis, London: Penguin Books. 
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 The Fourth Republic faced big challenges at an early stage of its 
institutionalization. Nigeria is a rich country in terms of minerals. It is the largest 
exporter of petroleum in Africa and sixth worldwide. Nevertheless the country suffers 
from mismanagement, poverty, corruption, ethnic and religious disturbances, and 
increasing criminality.644 Before all these issues can be solved, the constitution has to 
be revised and confirmed. This was part of the democratization process and a 
chance for political parties and Nigerian citizens to participate in the political debates 
of the federation. 
 The discussions over the 1999-constitution and the future of Nigeria was 
overshadowed by another debate: namely the so-called sharīʿa-controversy. The 
decision of Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru, Zamfara’s democratically elected governor, 
to implement Islamic Criminal Law in his state in November of 1999 was reminiscent 
of sentiments in the 1970s and the political crises related to it. Zamfara’s governor 
announced that Islamic Law, sharīʿa would be fundamental in his state and that 
Muslims could rely on it in all aspects of their lives. This decision was later followed 
by another eleven states of the north that also announced sharīʿa re-implementation.  
 This chapter analyzes the sharīʿa-issue and the way in which it was initiated. 
The following questions are central: What type of socio-political setting facilitated the 
re-implementation? Who are the major actors? Who contributed to the so-called 
sharīʿa-project and who opposed it? Which Islamic groups stand for sharīʿa and which 
                                                 
644 Fatunde, Tunde (2000): Nigerias Rückkehr zur Demokratie. Eine Bewertung, in: KAS-AI/00, pp. 74-
76. 
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resisted it? What is the position of Izala in the controversy and what was its role in 
the re-implementation?  
  
1 Who implemented Sharīʿa? 
 The Houses of Representatives of the twelve northern states of Nigeria voted 
for the introduction of sharīʿa within a very short period of time. These states are 
Zamfara, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, 
Yobe, and Niger. The Federal Republic of Nigeria consists of thirty six states plus the 
Federal Territory of Abuja. The introduction of sharīʿa took place legally according to 
the laws of the states. Philip Ostien sums up the re-introduction of Islamic law and its 
implication for the north in the following five points:  
 Establishment of State Sharia Courts and its implementation in criminal and 
personal matters of Muslims. Appeal of judgement can be directed to the State 
Sharīʿa Court of Appeal;  
 introduction of new Sharia Penal Code and Code Procedure for Muslims within 
the Sharīʿa Courts of Appeal;  
 laws related to “social vices” and “un-Islamic behavior” (as Ostien calls them) 
including alcohol consumption, gambling, prostitution, separation between the 
sexes;  
 Zamfara State and Kano state introduced Public Complaints and Anti-
Corruption Commissions to fight corruption;  
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 new institutions emerged from the sharīʿa re-implementation, such as the State 
Sharia commissions, Council of ʿulamā', zakāt -Board and  ḥisba-Board 
among others.  
 
These measures are not consistent and differ from one state to another. They are 
applied only to Muslims in the sharīʿa states. These states still recognize the Nigerian 
constitution.645  
 
646 
  
Before the introduction of Islamic law, governors of the northern state constituted the 
so-called Sharia Implementation Committees. These committees defined the needs 
and wishes of the people, consulted Islamic experts, and made suggestions for the 
                                                 
645 Ostien, Philip (2007): Sharīʿa implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Source Book. 
Volume 1 “Historical Background”, p. viii. 
646 (http://undhimmi.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/nigeria_sharīʿa_states.gif; 24.4.2011) 
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future implementation of sharīʿa.647 These efforts before the re-implementation of 
Islamic law that took place implied that northern politicians were conscious about the 
importance of Islamic Law for Nigerian Muslims. From a historical perspective sharīʿa 
was a problem both during colonial rule and after independence. It was (and still is) 
an important part of the Islamic identity of Nigerian Muslims. The governor of 
Zamfara State as well as all the other northern states insisted that such a step should 
be in conformity with the Nigerian federal constitution and in no way a deviation from 
it. The re-implementation of sharīʿa and particularly criminal law meant that these 
laws should be codified as it is mentioned in chapter 36(12) of the 1999 constitution:  
“Subject as otherwise provided by this constitution, a person shall not 
be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and 
the penalty therefore prescribed in a written law; and in this 
subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or 
a law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the 
provisions of a law.”648 
 
 The sharīʿa re-implementation was part of the political campaign of Ahmed 
Sani before he was elected governor in January 1999. He promised to introduce 
Islamic law in his state and to promote Islam and Islamic values. In a speech at Ali 
Akilu Square in Gusau, the capital of Zamfara State, the governor declared “It has 
become pertinent that we wake up from this sorry state of slumber and live up to our 
                                                 
647 See Ostien, Philip (2007): Sharīʿa implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Source Book. 
Volume II “Sharīʿa Implementation Committee Reports and related White Papers”, p. 3; the author 
indicates that the governors of the twelve northern Sharīʿa states were concerned about not violating 
the constitution of the federation. “In most states it [Sharīʿa implementation] was done only after wide 
consultation”- as Ostien formulates it.  
648 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Lagos: Federal Government Press, p. 22. 
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responsibility to the Almighty in order to avoid His curse.”649 This decision was 
announced on October 27th, 1999. The Sharia Penal Code came into operation on 
January 27th 2000.  
 Ahmed Sani appointed a committee of eighteen members to review existing 
laws and prepare the implementation. This was according to the Nigerian 
constitution. The Zamfara State commissioner of Justice, Hon. Attorney-General 
Ahmad Bello Mahmud, presented thirteen points of sharīʿa re-instatement from the 
time it was merely an idea until its legalization. This was introduced as part of a 
pattern among other northern states which were also in the process of sharīʿa re-
implementation at that time. In a paper which Zamfara’s Attorney-General presented 
in a seminar on sharīʿa in Jigawa in 2000, he clarified the basic steps followed in 
Zamfara State. The elected Sharia Committee identified Sec. 6 of the 1999-
constitution as a legal framework for the implementation of sharīʿa. He defined the 
reasons behind the establishment of the law (curb social vices, moral decadence). 
Islamic Law was codified (Sharia Penal Code, Penal Code Procedure, Sharia Court 
of Appeal). The author also describes the policy of Zamfara State to fight corruption, 
to organize zakāt-collection, to make dress code compulsory (ḥijāb for women), and 
to regulate marriage and trade sectors among others. The Commissioner insisted 
that such a process needs a transition phase during which people can be informed 
about sharīʿa. He also mentions obstacles that the re-implementation could face, 
                                                 
649 Oduyoye, Modupe (2000): The Shari’ah Debate in Nigeria. October 1999-October 2000. Ibadan: 
Sefer, S. 1.  
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especially human rights laws, Christian opposition and discussion regarding the 
general outline of the state i.e. secular or not.650 
 The re-implementation of sharīʿa in Zamfara State was part of the political 
campaign of a single governor. This decision was appreciated by the majority of 
Nigerian Muslims. They expected this change of laws as a solution to many of their 
problems. Ahmad Sani’s campaign was successful twice and the sharīʿa-topic seems 
to have been a winning card during the elections in more than one state.651 
 The other northern states did nothing but answer the demands of the masses. 
Weimann observes that the example of re-implementation in Zamfara State which 
was followed by the other states led to a dilemma for some states’ governors in the 
north. On the one hand they (as Muslims governing states of predominantly Muslim 
inhabitants) were put under pressure to implement Islamic law, and on the other 
hand, they had to comprise with the federal government and especially with the 
                                                 
650 For Details see Ostien (2007), Volume II, pp. 171-176; the entire paper of Alh. Ahmed Bello 
Mahmud untitled “On the adoption and Implementation of Sharīʿa Legal System in Zamfara State”, 
presented at the JNI-sponsored seminar on Sharīʿa in Jigawa State, 6 July, 2000, is available. After 
mentioning the thirteen steps that took place in Zamfara throughout the re-implementation of Sharīʿa, 
the author insists on the necessity of dialogue between the proponents and opponents of Sharīʿa. He 
emphasizes that Sharīʿa was introduced by law and that all Nigerian states should respect the wish of 
Muslims.  
651 According to Weimann, Gunnar J. (2010) the governor of Zamfara played the Sharīʿa-card in both 
1999 and 2003 during the elections. Also Governor I. Shekarau succeeded with a similar strategy in 
Kano state during the 2003 elections, see p. 17. For an overview on the “Sharīʿa-factor” in the 2003 
elections in the federation, see Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The “Sharīʿa Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 
Elections, in: Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa. Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), pp. 256-274, Islam in 
Africa series 6. Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
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newly elected president’s party, the PDP, that had commitments towards all 
Nigerians and the international community.652  
 Most of the legal procedures of the re-implementation of sharīʿa in the northern 
states took place during the years 2000 in Zamfara, Kano, Niger State, Kebbi, and 
Jigawa and 2001 in Sokoto and Yobe.653 Although the northern states are 
predominantly Muslim, they are different in matters of laws, ethnic groups, political 
settings and presence of non-Muslims. If the re-implementation in Zamfara State 
occurred quickly because the majority of the population are Muslims, then the 
situation in other states was much more complicated. In Kaduna for instance the 
situation was much more complicated since there is a large Christian population in 
that state and they felt threatened by the sharīʿa-re-implementation in one way or 
another. Here we should mention that there are no reliable statistics about affiliation 
to any religion. This question was (and still is) a “taboo” even as recently as the 2006 
population census.654 The state of Kaduna witnessed one of the first sharīʿa related 
                                                 
652 Weimann, Gunnar J. (2010): Islamic Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria. Politics, religion, judicial 
practice; PhD-thesis at the University of Amsterdam, p. 16; the governors of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) acting in the northern states were Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (Katsina State), Rabi’u Musa 
Kwankwaso (Kano State), Abdulkadir Kure (Niger State), Ahmed Makarfi (Kaduna State), and Ahmadu 
Adamu Mu’azu (Bauchi State). 
653 For more details see Peters (2003), p 14.  
654 Statistics about religious affiliation is a political question in the country and can be misinterpreted. 
During the last census of 2006 this question was not raised. The last time the “question about religion” 
was part of the census dates back to 1952. Personally, I prefer not to give statistics about religion. For 
an attempt to give the percentage of Muslims in the twelve Sharīʿa-States see Ostien (2007), Vol. II, p. 
xix.  
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riots between Muslims and Christians with casualties on both sides.655 The riots in 
Kaduna required the intervention of the then President of Nigeria Obasanjo who 
condemned the occurrences and called for the reconciliation of the conflicting parties. 
After he travelled to the region he appealed to the nation on March 2000 to deal with 
sharīʿa democratically and peacefully.656 Sharīʿa law become effective in Kaduna 
state in May 2001.657 
 The late Umaru Yar’Adua, former Katsina State governor and the second 
president of the Forth Republic, implemented Islamic law in his state in August 2000. 
During the same year this law was officially applied.658 The politician addressed the 
people of his state indicating that sharīʿa needed the contribution of all and called on 
them to take responsibility:”...all Muslims now bear a heavy responsibility for the need 
to contribute to the successful implementation of the legal code (...).“659 In addition, 
he ensured that Non-Muslims would not be affected by the new laws: “I assure 
adherents of other faiths that the government will guarantee the security of their lives 
and property. I assure them that none of their rights will be trampled on.”660 
                                                 
655 For a detailed description of the riots in Kaduna see Danfulani, U., Ludwig, F. und P. Ostien. 
(2002), p. 74; the riots seems to have an ethnic aspect between the Muslims (Hausa) and Christians 
(Kajes and Katafs for instance)  
656 See Obasanjo’s speed “President Olusegun Obasanjo’s address to the nation on Sharīʿa Crisis”, 
March 1, 2000, http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/obasanjo_sharīʿa_address.html (2.5.2011) 
657 Peters (2003), p. 55. 
658 Peters (2003) registered cases of application of Islamic law in Katsina in November 2000 (lashes 
for consuming alcohol and unlawful sexual intercourse), see p. 57.  
659 Quoted in Oduyoye (2000), p. 95. 
660 See ‘Nigeria's Katsina state adopts Sharīʿa’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/860660.stm, 
Tuesday, 1 August, 2000. (7.10.2004). 
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 In Kano, the center of Sufism in Nigeria and the commercial metropolis of the 
north, thousands of people celebrated the decision of the governor to implement 
sharīʿa in June 2000.661 A few months later (in November) Islamic law was legally 
approved. In December of the same year, consumption of alcohol in police stations, 
which is a federal institution, was banned. The institution of ḥisba was set up.662 
Among other responsibilities, the ḥisba groups are charged with reminding Muslims 
to fulfill their religious obligations and impose sanctions on those people who ignore 
them.663 In order to fulfill the requirements of the sharīʿa Project Kano state 
established the so-calledSharia Commission, zakāt and Hubusi Commission (in 
Hausa: Islamic endowment).664 
 Since June 2000 Islamic law has been in practice in Sokoto State. The first 
stoning case and three hand-amputation cases according to sharīʿa law took place in 
2001.665 The case of Safiya Hussaini, a Muslim woman of the north, attracted the 
attention of the entire world. She was accused of adultery and sentenced to death by 
stoning by a Sharia Court in Sokoto. This case was extensively discussed nationally 
and even internationally.666  
                                                 
661 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/798630.stm. (07.10.2004).  
662 For details on ḥisba see Fwatshak, Sati U. (2003): Shari‘a Enforcement in Northern Nigeria: The 
Hisba and the Publics. Paper presented at the conference on: ”The Sharīʿa debate and the shaping of 
Muslim and Christian Identities in Northern Nigeria“. Bayreuth, Germany. 11th-12th July, 2003, pp. 1-
23. 
663 Peters (2003), p. 30. 
664 See Yusufari (2004), p. 4. 
665 Peters (2003), p. 58-59. 
666 For an extensive legal analysis of this case see Ostien (2007), Volume V “The Two Famous Cases” 
[Safiya Hussaini and Amina Lawal], the author provides excellent material on these cases including a 
translation of all proceedings of the process as well a statement of the lawyer who defended Hussaini; 
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Although Hussaini was acquitted, a bitter controversy over the compatibility of human 
rights and sharīʿa, and equality between men and women under sharīʿa law arose.  
 The Governor of Niger State Abdul-Kadir Kure announced the implementation 
of a modified form of Islamic law in his state. He announced the re-implementation of 
Islamic law as a remedy for a corrupted political system. As was the case in Katsina, 
he guaranteed Christians that sharīʿa would not affect them.667 Niger state represents 
an exception among the other states of the north since it kept the Penal Code of 
1960 and added Section 68A for Islamic law and so called ḥudūd-penalties.668 
 In Jigawa state, sharīʿa was announced in August 2000 and many people 
travelled to Dutse, the state capital in order to show their support of the re-
implementation of Islamic law. Other inhabitants were sceptical about sharīʿa and 
preferred to stay indoors and kept shops, hotels and bars closed.669 Nevertheless 
cases of burning down churches as well as violent acts between Muslims and 
Christians were documented in the territory of Jigawa State.670 
 In the north-east of the country where Borno State is situated sharīʿa was 
implemented in 2000 and celebrated by the predominantly Muslim population. 
Christians are a minority in that region. The governor addressed the Christians in his 
state insisting that sharīʿa is for the Muslims only. This statement was not 
                                                                                                                                                        
in addition see Kalu, Ogbu (2003): ‘Safiyya and Adamah: punishing adultery with Sharīʿa stones in 
twenty-first-century Nigeria’, in: African Affairs vol. 102, no. 408, pp. 389-408. 
667 Oduyoye (2000), p. 7. 
668 Peters, p. 14.  
669 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/862662.stm. (12.10.2004). 
670 Peters (2003) reports cases of burning of churches in the town of Gwaram related to tension 
between Christians and Muslims, see p. 55. 
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considerated by Christian authorities as a guarantee of their freedom to worship and 
of their safety. They reacted by performing prayers and fasting in protest of the 
planned law.671 sharīʿa was officially introduced on 1st June 2001 although the 
Christians remained suspicious about the project.672 In the neighboring Yobe State 
Islamic law was introduced in August 2000 and legally implemented two months later. 
The Sharia Penal Code became effective in April 2001.673 
 Bauchi state was the tenth state that implemented sharīʿa law on 27 February 
2001. The protest from human rights organizations and Christians in the state failed 
to discourage sharīʿa law in that territory. As sharīʿa became legal in June 2001 
approximately sixty-three judges were appointed to act as Sharia Court Judges. The 
sharīʿa re-implementation caused a wave of riots in Bauchi State. Apart from burning 
places of worship, several people lost their lives, property was destroyed and 
thousands were displaced.674 
 Protests with slogans like “no sharīʿa” related to the sharīʿa re-implementation 
in Gombe states led to violent acts at the end of May 2001 between Muslims and 
Christians in that region.675 Riots were registered in different towns of the state and 
caused rivalry between the two religious communities. The Anglican archbishop of 
Gombe, Henry Ndukuba, described the sharīʿa re-implementation as “a lie, a ploy and 
                                                 
671 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/887355.stm. (12.10.2004) 
672 Peters (2003), p. 54. 
673 Peters (2003), p. 58. 
674 Peters (2003), p. 54.  
675 Peters (2003), pp. 54-55. 
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the greatest deceit.”676 He doubted that sharīʿa would be able to guarantee equality 
among people in his state.  
 In Kebbi State, sharīʿa was introduced in July 2000 and was implemented by 
1st December 2000. In January 2001 Muslim women in that state were asked to 
dress according to sharīʿa law. In July of the same year a young boy was accused of 
stealing money and was punished by amputating his hand. In September of that year 
a man was sentenced to death by stoning over the sexual abuse of a seven-year -old 
child.677 
 The re-implementation process of Islamic law differed from state to state. In 
most cases it happened under the pressure of the Muslim population. Thus, most of 
the governors of the northern states re-implemented sharīʿa as an answer to mass 
protest. Zamfara State was a pioneer in implementing sharīʿa and its Penal Code was 
adapted by some states, while others used it as a template to develop their own 
codes. Seven states introduced Sharia Penal Codes (Bauchi, Kebbi, Jigawa, Kano, 
Zamfara, Yobe, and Sokoto) and Niger State preferred to keep the 1960 Penal Code 
with a particular section related to sharīʿa.  
 The northern Muslim states of Nigeria were not ready to re-implement Islamic 
law: they were largely surprised by the events which followed. The Penal Code varied 
from one state to the other. Islamic judges were not prepared to handle cases 
according to these recently implemented laws. There were no support-institutions in 
place to facilitate the re-implementation process. Even the drafting of the Penal Code 
                                                 
676 Compass Direct, December 14th, 2001. 
677 These sentences were never enforced. 
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needed revision. In Zamfara State for instance, Peters speaks of a “hasty drafting” 
with “incorrect cross-references, incorrect and defective wording, omissions and 
contradictions.”678 
The sharīʿa re-implementation raises several questions about its 
constitutionality and conformity with the laws of the federation. Laws in Nigeria like in 
any federal system are complex. The constitution is the most authoritative document 
defining regulations within the territory of the federation. Nevertheless laws may differ 
from one state to the other. In Nigeria Islamic law was controversial during and after 
the colonial era. Islamic Law was reduced for personal and family matters. The 
reintroduction of criminal law implicates its codification and integration of the law of 
the federal state in a written form as fixed in the 1999-constitution:  
“Subject as otherwise provided by this constitution, a person shall not 
be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and 
the penalty therefore prescribed in a written law; and in this 
subsection, a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or 
a law of a State, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under the 
provisions of a law.”679  
 
 According to Rudolph Peters the notion of “codification” in an Islamic context 
goes back to the early 19th century. He understands it as a measure of fixing that 
“(…) only the state determines what law is and that the state law is the highest form 
of law.”680 Nadjma Yassari, a jurist, observes that Islamic law was uncodified for more 
                                                 
678 Peters (2003), p. 45.  
679 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Lagos: Federal Government Press, p. 22. 
680 Peters, Rudolph (2002): From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What happens when the Shari’a is 
codified, in: Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, 3, p. 88.  
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than a thousand years, although it was based on a collection of textbooks, 
annotations, and fatwās (legal opinions). The process of codification took place 
through contact between Muslim societies and colonial powers. It was a sort of 
adaptation to the exigency of that period of time.681 Codification of Islamic law first 
took place in the Ottoman Empire before it moved to other North African countries. 
The codification process varied from one contry to another. It changed the legal 
framework of sharīʿa from being “jurist law” to become “statuary law” - as Aharon 
Layish formulates it.682 
 Apart from the codification of Islamic Law several questions were raised, 
especially as to whether this law violates the constitution of Nigeria. One of the 
controversies has to do with Section 10 of the 1999-constitution stating that “The 
government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as state 
religion”. This section was interpreted by many opponents of sharīʿa in Nigeria as a 
confirmation that the form of the state is “secular”. This means that none of the 36 
Nigerian states can adopt a religiously inspired law (like sharīʿa) as a state law. On 
the contrary supporters of the sharīʿa-project argue that the term “secular” was not 
mentioned in the constitution and the re-implementation was by no means a violation 
of it. Furthermore Muslims mention that the constitution guarantees the right of 
religion and reinstituting Islamic law was part of that right defined in Section 38 (1):  
                                                 
681 Yassari, Nadjma (2004): Islamisches Recht oder Recht der Muslime- Gedanken zu Recht und 
Religion im Islam, in: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaften, 103, p. 112. 
682 Aharon Layish (2004): The Transformation of the Sharī’a from Jurists' Law to Statutory Law in the 
Contemporary Muslim World, In: Welt Des Islam 44 (1), pp. 85-113; the author provides a good 
historical overview on Sharīʿa codification and how it took place and what kind of methods were 
applied. Furthermore he gives an overview of the perception of codification by the Ulama.  
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“Every Person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or 
private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.”683 
 
 There was an attempt to unify the Sharia Penal Code initiated by the Institute 
of Islamic Legal Studies (CILS) at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. This was a project 
of “harmonization” of all Codes.684 Furthermore its aim was to develop a judicial 
backdrop for the re-implementation in all Muslim states and at the same time the 
project was meant to “ (…) enhance legal certainty and facilitate the training of 
judicial staff and police personnel.“685 
 One of the biggest issues of the re-implementation was the legislative power 
between the states and the federation. According to Section 4 of the 1999 
constitution, this legislative power is divided between both the state and the 
federation. Peters clarifies that “matters mentioned in the Exclusive Legislative List 
(…) are exclusively federal matters, while matters mentioned in the Concurrent 
Legislative List can come under both the legislative power of the Federation and the 
legislative power of the states.” Other matters not mentioned in both lists are part of 
                                                 
683 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). 
684 Ostien (2007), Volume IV “The Sharīʿa Penal and Criminal and Procedure Codes” provides a good 
comparison of the “harmonized” Codes projects and the Penal Code of 1960. In fact, views on the 
CILS suggested Penal Codes are divided between “sceptics” (as Ostien calls them) who asked for 
reasons for such a project that may restrict Sharīʿa to what is written and those who perceive it as a 
chance to redraft and correct the introduced Penal Codes; see pp. 20-21. The same volume provides 
a copy of this “harmonized Sharīʿa Penal Code” with annotations; see pp. 33-139. 
685 Peters, p. 45.  
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the state’s legislation. This was exactly what happened with the introduction of 
Islamic Criminal Law. Peters indicates that the Penal Code itself is unproblematic, but 
introducing sharīʿa as a religiously-inspired law was challenging.686  
 
2 Proponents and opponents of the Sharīʿa-project 
 One may get the impression that all Muslims advocated the re-implementation 
of sharīʿa and that all Christians opposed it. This claim is not true. There were also 
Muslims who did not agree with the re-implementation but at the same time could not 
oppose it. This was the case among Muslim politicians, intellectuals, scholars and 
even among ordinary people.  
 Allen Christelow observes a loophole in the constitution of 1999 that led the 
twelve northern states to implement Islamic criminal law in addition to the existing 
personal and family law.687 Christelow speaks of several other secondary factors that 
generated the Nigerian sharīʿa-crisis. According to him, the feeling of insecurity 
amongst the population, social inequality, violence, and the absence of a well-
structured state system are other factors behind the call for sharīʿa.688 
Tabiu Muhammed summarizes views of the opponents of sharīʿa and their 
argument for a possible violation of the constitution of 1999 in the following points:  
                                                 
686 Peters (2003), p. 34. 
687 Christelow, Allen (2002): Persistence and transformation in the politics of Sharīʿa-Nigeria, 1958-
2002, in: search of an explanatory framework. Paper presented at the Conference on Muslim Law in 
Post-Colonial Africa, Centre for Contemporary Islam, University of Cape Town, 11-14 March 2002, p. 
16. 
688 Ibid., p. 18. 
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1. sharīʿa opponents questioned the legislative power of Zamafara as well 
of the other northern states to reimplement Islamic criminal law;  
2. for these opponents sharīʿa is reduced to personal matters and its use 
in criminal law is nothing but a violation of the constitution;  
3. finally they consider Nigeria to be a secular state according to Section 
10 of the constitution.689 
The jurist Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim analyzes the conformity of sharīʿa with the 
constitution. He mentions the establishment of the National Assembly and the State 
Houses of Assembly. Both have different fields of legislation fixed in the Exclusive 
Concurrent Legislative Lists mentioned above. The fact that Islamic Criminal Law 
was not mentioned in one of these lists became a matter for the states. This means 
that any state in the federation can introduce its own legislation or its own criminal 
law independently whether this law is inspired by a particular religion or not.690 When 
it comes to the question of sharīʿa and human rights, Ibrahim understands penalties 
like death by stoning or the amputation of limbs and legs as a way to fight and reduce 
criminality in the society and keep secure the life, property and dignity of people. In 
                                                 
689 Tabiu, Muhammed (2001): Sharīʿa, Federalism and Nigerian Constitution. Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Sharīʿa 14th April, organized by the Nigerian Muslim Forum, London, 
United Kingdom, pp. 6-7. 
690 Ibrahim, B. Yusuf (2003): Application of the Shari’a Penal Law and Justice System in Northern 
Nigeria: Constitutional issues and implications, in: Ezeilo, J. Ngosi; Ladan, M. Tawfiq and A. Afolabi-
Akiyode (Eds): Shari’a Implementation in Nigeria: Isssues and challenges on Women’s Rights and 
Acces to Justice. Enugu/Port Hartcourt/Abuja: (WACOL); Lagos: (WARDC); Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
p. 133. 
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addition, he reminds us that there is no paragraph in the constitution forbidding the 
death penalty.691 
Frieder Ludwig, a scholar of religion and an expert on Christian-Muslim 
relations in Nigeria, clarifies that the majority of Muslims (proponents) understand the 
sharīʿa re-implementation as “restitution of their rights” while on the contrary, many 
Christians (opponents) consider Islamic law as “a step to Islamize Nigeria”.692 This 
opposition within the two camps is motivated by events like the two famous stoning 
cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini as well by discussions about the 
presidency of 2007 and whether the president should be a Muslim or a Christian. 
Ludwig quotes the reaction of the Anglican Archbishop Peter Akinalo when President 
Umaru Yar’Ardua, a Muslim and PDP (People’s Democratic Party) candidate was 
elected as successor of Obasanjo as head of the state: “Oh! My God, a Sharia 
governor”.693 In the same vein, the reaction of the governor of Kano State, Ibrahim 
Shekarau, who showed his disappointment in 1999 when sharīʿa was introduced not 
introduced sooner.694 These two examples illustrate stereotypes of divided views on 
sharīʿa re-implementation.  
                                                 
691 Ibid., p. 135.  
692 Frieder Ludwig (2008): Christian–Muslim Relations in Northern Nigeria since the Introduction of 
Shari’ah in 1999, in: Journal of the academy of Religion, Vol. 76 (3), pp. 603. 
693 Ibid., p. 604. 
694 Ibid., p. 607. 
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2.1 Proponents of Sharīʿa 
 Danladi A. Mohammed695, from the Centre of Journalism Studies in Wales, 
seems to be among those who defended sharīʿa. His article is an answer to the 
prominent Islamic scholar and sharīʿa critic, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi (whose views are 
reflected in the next chapter). Danladi A. Mohammad considers Sanusi to be one of 
those modernist scholars who is influenced by “orientalists”. For him, Sanusi is a 
Marxist who developed personal views on sharīʿa that are far from reality. In addition, 
Danladi Mohammad goes further in reproaching Sanusi for being attracted to the 
views of the controversial Sudanese founder of the Republican Brothers, Maḥmūd 
Muḥammad Ṭaha.696  
 As part of his protection of sharīʿa, Mohammad goes even further when he 
categorizes Sanusi among secularist scholars (in the same category with Abdullahi 
Aḥmad An-Na’im, a prominent Sudanese law expert living in the USA) who oppose 
ʿulamā' and blame them of corruption and incompetence.  
According to Danladi A. Muhammed, Sanusi and the modernists want to 
reform Islam and change its rules. This step could be a danger to Islam since it leads 
                                                 
695 Mohammed, Danladi A. (2002): Muslim Intellectuals and the Sharīʿa debate in Nigeria, aus: 
www.nigeriadelta congress.com/marticles/muslim_intellectuals_and_the_Sha.htm. (22.05.2011). 
696 Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṭaha was executed in 1985 during the time of President Numeiri because of 
his controversial views on Islamic Qur’ān revelation. He made a differentiation between two types of 
revelations: one that happened before the hijra of the Prophet to Medina in 622 and one after that 
event. Taha believes that the Medinian-revealed Quranic text should be understood in its historical 
context. This point of views was heavily criticized by Muslim scholars of that time; Danladi reproaches 
Sanusi for being influenced by such views.  
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to total secularization and abolition of the religion, which was the case in much of 
Christianity:  
“The problem is that Sanusi and other modernists before him wanted 
to change the rules so that Islam would be totally reformed like 
Christianity, leading to complete secularisation and the abolishing of 
Islam just as Christianity was abolished. This is clear from the writings 
of Mahmud Taha and his followers.”697  
 
The author concludes by attacking Sanusi Lamidu Sanusi and reproaches him 
for practicing propaganda, manipulating Islam, and even for selecting particular 
chapters from the Qur’ān and the sunna in order to confirm his point of view on the 
rejection of sharīʿa laws.  
Danladi Mohammed judges most secular reforms in the Islamic world as failed 
reforms. He cites the example of Turkey and the program of laicism imposed by 
Atatürk that failed to replace the long-lasting hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. This 
attempt, like many others, led to a westernization of Islamic societies and the 
adaptation of western norms.698  
 Along the same lines of defending sharīʿa re-implementation, the prominent 
Kaduna-based Islamic scholar, Muhammed Sanusi Gombi, argued that compared to 
other religious communities in Nigeria, Muslims have been disadvantaged for many 
years. The Islamic scholar raises the points that for a long time Muslims tolerated 
non-Muslim norms like accepting Saturday as a public holiday instead of Friday. He 
even advocates extending sharīʿa to the entire federation, not only in the north. The 
                                                 
697 Mohammed, Danladi A. (2002). 
698 Ibid. 
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Islamic scholar Ali A. Mazrui also legitimizes the re-implementation of Islamic Law in 
Nigeria. According to him, this law questions western model(s) of law. Mazrui 
considers Nigeria a unique African state which offers an alternative to western law 
traditions. He adds that sharīʿa was a result of a critical reflection on existing western 
norms. Furthermore, sharīʿa led, according to Mazrui, to a pluralistic society and in no 
way to a repressed one. 699 
The current Izala leader in Jos, Sheikh Sani Yahya Jingir, fully supports the 
sharīʿa-project of 1999 and considers it an “embryo” which is in the process of 
growth. He expects this “embryo” to fully mature one day. He formulates it in the 
following:  
“Yes indeed! We also support that. We wanted sharīʿa and consider it 
a janān (in Arabic: embryo) that will not be old in only one day, but will 
mature gradually. As westerners [the British] came to us and criticized 
the sharīʿa and reduced it until we couldn’t do anything. Now we want 
to react to them. We have to react gradually and when sharīʿa 
becomes strong enough, then we will correct what we failed to correct 
before…”700 
 
This statement reflected the views of many Muslims in northern Nigeria who 
viewed Islamic law as a chance to unite Muslims. This unity was deeply affected by 
the colonial policy of reducing Islamic law to personal and family matters. The 
journalist Suleiman Shehu who covered the sharīʿa-related event for Radio Kaduna in 
1999 speaks about the feelings of Muslims at the gathering of Gusau, in the capital of 
Zamfara State when the announcement to reinstate Islamic law was made. During 
                                                 
699 Danfulani, U., Ludwig, F. und P. Ostien (2002), p. 89. 
700 Interview with the Izala-leader in Jos in his office, 28th February 2007. 
313 
 
the re-implementation ceremonies, Shehu who was deeply moved and he confessed 
that he has never seen a comparable crowd of people before. For him, the project 
unified Islamic groups in spite of doctrinal differences:  
“(…) the implementation of sharīʿa involves the religion of Islam, you 
have all the groups, I mean the sects, the groups under Islamic 
organisations coming together to give their input. They were called by 
the state government to come and give their input because you have 
the ʿulamā' of the Sufis, you have ʿulamā' in the Izala, you have 
ʿulamā' in the other groups. So they called for unity. For the 
implementation of sharīʿa is basically teaching of the Prophet 
Muhammad – peace be upon him. That was, I think, the basis under 
which the groups were unified.”701 
 
The acceptance and support of sharīʿa happened at the level of the ʿulamā' as 
well as at the grassroots level where expectation were enormous. Ordinary Muslims 
were enthusiastic and interpreted sharīʿa as a solution to their problems in the 
country. Suleiman Shehu added that in most cases, people at the grassroots level 
are “guided by the ʿulamā'” and consider them their “mentors”. Although many 
Muslims at the grassroots level are ignorant about what sharīʿa really means and 
what kinds of challenges and changes can occur because of it, they trusted their 
religious leaders who supported sharīʿa. Apart from this support, ordinary Muslims 
also expected sharīʿa to improve their economic and social conditions: 
“Yes, sharīʿa is the way. It will work for us. (…), maybe it is the cradle of 
the years: years of campaign, years of call, years of…, you know; people, 
                                                 
701 Interview with Suleiman Shehu in Arewa House, Kaduna, 16th January 2007. 
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you know, aspiration towards having a sharīʿa government. So whatever 
that will entail, they will say rudely, ’oh yes, we are ok.’”702  
 
2.2 Opponents of the re-implementation of Islamic Law 
  It seems that most Muslim groups, except the Shiʿites under the leadership of 
Ibraheem Zakzaky,703 welcomed the sharīʿa reimplementation without reservation. 
Zakzaky and his group – known as the Muslim Brothers and labelled as Shiʿites by 
the majority of Muslims – opposed the reimplementation. In a lecture given at Bayero 
University in Kano in December, 1999, Zakzaky tried to clarify his position towards 
sharī‛a. After defining the word sharī‛a he classified Islamic countries practicing 
sharī‛a into three major categories:  
1. traditional ones that have applied the sharī‛a for a long time and that were 
hardly colonized by western colonialists;  
2. countries that applied sharī‛a only partially: these countries have been 
colonized and after independence they started practicing a ‘post colonial 
system of democracy’;  
3. Finally countries where the sharī‛a is absolute and where an Islamic revolution 
may have taken place.704  
                                                 
702 Ibid.; Suleiman Shehu mentions that these expectations were demonstrated by the masses that 
came to Gussau to support Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru in his undertaking of instituting of Islamic 
law. While many people estimate the number of people would reach one million, the journalist speaks 
of approximately 800,000.  
703 See Suleiman, G. Ibrahim (2005): Mallam Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and the Question of Shi’ism, B.A.-
Dissertation in Islamic Studies, University of Jos.  
704 Az-Zakzaky, Ibraheem (1999): Application of Shari’ah in the contemporary world: Lessons from 
some Muslim countries; a Paper presented to the national Conference on the Application of sharī‛a 
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After discussing the examples of Pakistan, Sudan and finally Iran, Zakzaky came to 
the conclusion that sharī‛a was successful only in Iran because it is part and parcel of 
an Islamic state. He concludes that the success of a full sharī‛a implementation is 
only guaranteed within a system of government which is ‘purely Islamic’. Concerning 
Nigeria, Zakzaky predicted two conflicts that would coincide with implementation of 
the sharī‛a: One conflict would be with the constitution which would claim superiority 
over the sharī‛a and would, therefore, place the sharī‛a under its control and 
regulations. The other conflict would be with sharī‛a itself which, as the Law of 
Almighty God, claims superiority over all laws and therefore cannot accept the 
supremacy of the Nigerian constitution.705 Zakzaky concludes by saying that the 
application of sharī‛a under a government system which is not Islamic will subject it 
(sharī‛a) to ‘restrictions, manipulations and possible abuses.’706 
 One of the most prominent independent Islamic scholars in northern Nigeria is 
Sanusi Lamidu Sanusi. He is an economist by profession and since 2009, the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. He is also an expert on Islam in northern 
Nigeria and has published extensively in that field.707  
                                                                                                                                                        
organized by the Department of Islamic Law, Faculty of law, Bayero University and RAMNAN Law 
Consult, Kano, Bayero University, 1st to 3rd December 1999, p. 8.  
705 Az-Zakzaky 1999, p. 13.  
706 al-Zakzaky  1999, p. 15. 
707 Most of Sanusi Lamido Sanusi’s articles and views were published on the Internet platform 
www.gamji.com /sanusi/htm. According to personal observation he published extensively until the year 
2005 on that platform. After that period he seems to have been more engaged in Economics as Risk 
Manager at the United Bank of Africa before he was appointed as governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria in June 2009. Also Barbara Taschner (2006): Die Scharia in Nigeria anhand der Texte von 
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 Sanusi criticizes aspects of the application of ḥudūd in general and aspects of 
particular questions related to the law as it is practiced in Nigeria. In the case of 
Amina Lawal, a women accused of unlawful sexual intercourse (Arabic: zinā) and 
sentenced to death by a Sharia Court in Katsina, Sanusi questioned the background 
of Islamic Law in Nigeria, its relevance in the sources (Mukhtaṣar Sīdī Khalīl) and 
how Islamic judges dealt with the adultery case of Amina Lawal.708 Sanusi 
emphasizes that the rights given to Safiya Hussaini – another prominent zinā case in 
Nigeria – to revoke her confession of committing zinā and who was initially sentenced 
to death in Sokoto State and then released were not given to Amina Lawal by the 
Upper Sharia Court in Futuna, in Katsina. 709 According to the Sanusi, the standard 
book of Islamic Mālikī law used in Nigeria, Mukhtaṣar Sīdī Khalīl, considers personal 
confession evidence for a ḥadd-penalty “unless it was withdrawn in any manner 
whatsoever.”710 This means that the accused has the right to annul his or her 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sanusi Lamidu Sanusi, BA-Thesis, Religious Studies, University of Bayreuth, Germany, makes that 
same observation that Sanusi published a lot in the field of Islam in Nigeria until 2005. She counted 
eighty publications of his accessible on www.Gamji.com as well as on www.nigerdeltacongress.com 
708 Sanusi L. Sanusi (2002): “The Hudood punishment in the Northern Nigeria: A Muslim criticism.”, 
October 1st. Prepared for a publication in ISIM NEWS, the quarterly publication of the Institute for the 
study of Islam in Modernity, Leiden, Holland, pp. 4-7, www.gamji.com/sanusi30htm. (19.10.2004) 
709 Sanusi (2002), October 1st. p. 4. 
710 Ibid., p. 5. 
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statement.711 Amina’s lawyers appealed her penalty since her rights were not 
considered by the judges who sentenced her to death.712 
 Sanusi goes further by explaining the issue of pregnancy if the woman is 
divorced or widowed and how the different Islamic schools of law deal with such a 
situation. In Mukhtaṣar Sīdī Khalīl the waiting period called ‘idda of a widow or a 
divorced woman lasts between two and five years although in the different schools of 
law it is debatable how long it should last.713 If a woman gives birth to a child outside 
that period of time, then it is a case of zinā (adultery) confirmed through pregnancy. 
According to Sanusi, the situation under the Mālikiyya is much more complicated. A 
woman risks a ḥadd-penalty under the Mālikī School of Law when she falls pregnant 
in the fifth month of the fifth year after the death of her husband or the divorce (in 
case she did not marry again).714 Many Islamic scholars deal with this regulation 
sceptically since neither Allah nor his Prophet fixed a waiting period of five years, as 
Sanusi points out. Even Imam Mālik did not release a clear statement on the waiting 
                                                 
711 In some Islamic schools of law it is required that the accused person confess/repent committing 
adultery in front of four different judges. In the Maliki and Shafi Schools, a single confession is 
required; for more details see Baradie (1983), p. 105. 
712 Amina’s lawyers presented twelve points against the judgement. Among others the court did not 
explain to Amina what Zinā is and which implications she faced in the case of adultery; see more 
details in Babaji and Dankofa (2003), p. 123. 
713 On this problem in Islamic law see Bossaller, Anke, ‘Schlafende Schwangerschaft’ in islamischen 
Gesellschaften. Entstehung und soziale Implikationen einer weiblichen Fiktion, Würzburg: Ergon 
Verlag, 2004. 
714 All Islamic Schools of Law fixed the period “six lunar months” for the birth of a baby within the 
institution of wedlock. In the case of a divorced or widowed woman falling pregnant before these six 
months, then it can be interpreted as a case of Zinâ; for more details see Sanusi (2002), October 1st, 
p. 5. 
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period.715 In the case of Amina Lawal, she gave birth two years after her divorce. 
Sanusi reminds us that she should not be condemned to death because of 
pregnancy or giving birth as long as there is no consensus on the waiting period or 
on pregnancy as evidence for zinā.716 Sanusi formulates it clearly that “Adultery is 
committed every day, but only those against whom admissible proof is established 
are punished by law.“717 
 This viewpoint shows that sharī‛a is an ideal project for equality and justice 
among Muslims. In fact, such promises in a country like Nigeria in which political and 
ethnic tensions are high are far from becoming reality. Sanusi looks at the sharī‛a 
reimplementation from a social perspective rather than strictly within a religious and 
legal discourse. Sanusi perceives the sharī‛a-debate in his country to be a political 
issue in which religion is ideologically misused. He speaks of a “political violence” 
leading to a split in the society. The recently implemented law cannot guarantee 
justice among Muslims. Women especially are disadvantaged in the project:  
 
“…at the level of ideology it holds that the discourse exhibits 
tendencies of political violence toward the weaker segments of 
society. Slicing through the opacy or religious jargon and propaganda, 
social critics highlight the reality that the poor and the women seem to 
be on the receiving end of harsh punishments, and that the 
                                                 
715 Mālik spoke of 4, 5, 6 and even 7 years, see Ibid., p. 6.  
716 Ibid., p. 7. 
717 Sanusi, L. Sanusi (2002): Amina Lawal: Sex, Pregnancy and Muslim Law, September 2002. 
www.nigeriadeltacongress.com/articles/amina_lawal.htm. (6.12.2004) 
717 Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi (2004): The West and the Rest: Reflections on the Intercultural Dialogue 
about Shari‘ah. Paper presented in the Conference on „Comparative Perspectives on Shari‘ah in 
Nigeria“, Bauchi Road campus, University of Jos, January 15-17, 2004, p. 216. 
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intensification of the process of religious revival is accompanied by a 
deepening of contradictions in the social formation.”718 
 
In most cases Islamic law has been applied only to the poor. Politicians and 
the wealthy enjoy the possibility of escaping such a law. The ideal of social justice 
under sharī‛a was thus far from being realized. Sanusi observes that implementation 
of Islamic law provokes a clash of law, i.e. a clash between Islamic traditional norms 
and western laws. Many Muslims do not agree with western concepts of equality in 
the society if they do not conform to Islamic norms.  
 
“A slave is not the equal of a free born, a woman is not equal to a man 
and a non-Muslim is not equal to a Muslim, even though clear 
guidelines are given for compassionate treatment of women and 
slaves, and the protection of certain non-Muslims (who pay the 
special poll-tax, the jizya).”719 
 
 Sanusi argues that sharī‛a understood as a way of life is unproblematic for 
Nigerian Muslims. The situation became more critical when it came to the application 
of certain aspects of Islamic law. Sharī‛a was criticized because religious discourse 
was used to achieve ideological and political goals (amongst others) through the 
state in order to legitimize an existing economical, political, and social system of 
inequality.720 
                                                 
 
 
719 Ibid, S. 220. 
720 Ibid., p. 224. 
320 
 
 Sanusi considers the issue of justice to be a central aspect of sharī‛a. He asks 
how amputation can be applied to those who steal a goat and not for corrupt civil 
servants of the state. He questions how justice can be proven in the case of adultery, 
especially when “different standards” are applied to men and women? Is that religion 
or ideology? Sanusi sees more ideology behind sharī‛a than religion.721 Furthermore 
he draws attention to other Islamic countries that have implemented reforms in their 
law tradition and accommodated legislation to the needs of people without deviating 
from the tradition. He insists that such a step in Nigeria is more than needed – 
especially a critical approach towards religion. There is a need to differentiate 
between those who consciously manipulate religion for ideological objectives and 
those who tend to establish the law of God. 722 
 In a paper on the relationship between politics and Islam, Sanusi warns those 
politicians who use Islam in northern Nigeria to achieve political goals. He defines the 
duty of all Muslims is to oppose such “spoiled” politics. 723 For such politicians, sharī‛a 
should not only be a sign of harsh sentences and sanctions, but also a way to 
establish social justice and improve the economic situation of Nigerians. Politicians 
should not use sharī‛a to conceal their own corruption, abuse of office, and 
nepotism.724  
                                                 
721 Ibid., p. 226. 
722 Ibid, pp. 227-230. 
723 Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi (n.d.): On the Islamization of politics and the Politicization of Islam, 
www.gamji.com/sanusi14.htm. (22.12.2004) 
724 Sanusi, Lamido Sanusi (1999): Issues in constructing corporate Nigeria. Paper presented at the 
“National Conference on the 1999 Constitution”, organized by the Network For Justice and The Vision 
Trust Foundation, Arewa House, Kaduna from 11th – 12th September, p. 8. 
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Lamidu Sanusi was not the only Nigerian scholar who maintained a critical 
view of sharī‛a; there are other critical voices of the sharī‛a project. This category of 
scholars stresses that there is no enforcement in Islamic faith (lā ikrāha fī’d-dīn 
Qur’ān 2:256) and that the newly implemented Islamic criminal law cannot favour 
favor Muslims or protect them: “(...) sharīʿa rule leaves Muslims helpless before it.“725 
A Muslim lawyer from Kano, Suleman Kumo, observes that Islamic judges of sharī‛a 
courts are incompetent and corrupt, and abuse of office is common in such courts. 
These judges, argues Kumo, would even “fail a simple character test”.726 
 Lamin Saneh mentions a Muslim from the north named Mohammed Sani who 
in front of other Muslims in August 2000 openly criticized Zamfara’s Governor and his 
campaign to re-implement sharī‛a law. These critics were based on the argument that 
the implementation had more to do with politics than with religion. According to Sani, 
sharī‛a comes from Allah and not from the governor.727 
On 21st February, 2000, anti-sharī‛a demonstrations took place in protest 
against the introduction of sharī‛a. Several other riots between Muslims and 
Christians resulting in loss of properties and lives on both sides happened in the 
following days. Several mosques and churches were destroyed. Sharī‛a appears to 
                                                 
725 Saneh, Lamin (2003): Shari’ah Sanctions as Secular Grace? A Nigerian Islamic debate and an 
intellectual response, in: Transformation, 20/4 October, p. 240. 
726 As quoted in Saneh (2003), p. 240 from Maier (2000), p. 178. 
727 Saneh (2003), p. 240; based on his statement and criticism towards the Governor of Zamfara, 
Mohammed Sani was arrested and jailed for four months. He accused of violating the loyalty of 
Zamfara State. 
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be a violent dispute between Christians and Muslims in the federation, to say the 
least.728 
 Christians and human rights organizations in Nigeria interpret sharī‛a as a 
violation of the constitution and of human rights and see in it a danger for the 
peaceful coexistence in a multiethnic and multi-religious state like Nigeria. Frieder 
Ludwig speaks of a sort of “Fundamentalism-thesis” developed and introduced to the 
debates by sharīʿa opponents. As an example, Ludwig mentions the chairman of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in Edo State, Archbishop Patrick Ekpu, who 
points to the OIC controversy and warns against Islamic Fundamentalism in northern 
Nigeria sponsored by Arabic countries.729 There are some other opponents of sharī‛a 
who consider it a “second Jihad” comparing it to the successful movements of Usman 
Dan Fodio and the Islamization of northern Nigeria during the 19th century.730 
 In an International Religious Freedom Report, the US Department of State 
judges the re-implementation of Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria as an abuse of 
religious freedom and a cause for interreligious violence. The report states that 
although Christians in the north were not affected by sharī‛a, especially in Zamfara 
State where Christian minorities were only minimally influenced in one way or 
                                                 
728 For more details on the Sharīʿa related riots, see Ibrahim, Jibrin (2002): Democracy and minority 
Rights in Nigeria: Religion, Shari‘a and the 1999 Constitution. Paper for the Conference on: 
”Globalisation, State capacity and self-Determination in Muslim Contexts“. Center for Global, 
International and Regional Studies, University of California-Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, 7th to 10th March 
2002; also Danfulani, Umar H. D. (2005): The Sharīʿa Issue and Christian-Muslim relations in 
contemporary Nigeria. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, esp. pp. 13-38 reflect on what 
happened in Kaduna from different perspectives. 
729  For details see Ludwig (2001), p. 266.  
730 Ibid., p. 267. 
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another. Segregation of both sexes in public transport, ban of alcohol, dress codes, 
closing shops on Fridays, and banning cinema can be considered aspects of such an 
impact of sharī‛a on Christians. The US Department of State report points out that the 
law of the federation does not allow any religious discrimination, but the Nothern 
States of Nigeria violated that law and discriminated against religious minorities.731 
 
2.3 The Federal Government, the States, the ʿulamā', and grassroots’ 
positions on sharī‛a re-implementation 
 
For the Federal Government of 1999732 under president Obasanjo the sharī‛a 
re-implementation was a precarious matter. The democratic process of Nigeria and 
the transition to democracy was positively appreciated on the national as well as on 
the international level. The debates related to Islamic Law seemed to divide the 
country on a religious basis. The president, a born again Yoruba Christian from the 
south, had no choice but to reduce the tension in the country. At a very early stage of 
the re-implementation there was no official statement from the government for 
supporting or opposing sharī‛a. This is understandable since religion in Nigeria is a 
complicated issue. The intervention of President Obasanjo was related to the riots of 
Kaduna in 2000 and the heavy tension between Muslims and Christians in that state. 
Travelling in person to that area, President Obasanjo was shocked by the 
                                                 
731 US Department of State (2001): International Religious Freedom Report, Nigeria.  Released by the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 
732 For an overview on the transition to democracy in Nigeria see Fatunde, Tunde (2000): Nigerias 
Rückkehr zur Demokratie. Eine Bewertung, in: KAS-AI/00, S. 74-91. 
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consequences arising from clashes related to the sharīʿa controversy. He expressed 
his deep disappointment and wondered during his visit on 27th February, 2000, if it 
was really the same Kaduna that he knew from earlier times:  
“Are you people sure this is Kaduna? Can this be Nigeria? Are we 
still in Nigeria at all? I don’t think people who did this could have 
done it for any religion. I don’t think they did this for any 
religion.”733 
 
He indicated that such acts cannot be grounded in religion and in an official 
address to the nation on 1st March, 2000; he described the Kaduna events as 
“barbarism”. Obasanjo spoke of a “the worst incident of blood-letting” since the Civil 
War in Nigeria. He all parties involved in the conflicts to engage in dialogue, 
reconciliation and to respect the federal constitution that guarantees freedom of 
religion. Furthermore he added that the National Council of States would hold a 
meeting to discuss the security situation as well the re-implementation of sharī‛a in 
the northern states and its constitutionality:  
“The Council also reviewed the remote and immediate causes of 
the disturbances, and noted that the Penal Code currently in force 
in the northern States is substantially based on Sharia Law, with 
the modifications that imprisonment is substituted in place of 
amputation of limbs, as punishment for stealing, and also as 
punishment for adultery, instead of stoning to death. The Council 
noted that these modifications are consistent with the human 
rights principles enshrined in our Constitution, and considered the 
punishments adequate in the circumstances. 
The Council unanimously agreed that all States that have recently 
adopted Sharia Law should in the meantime revert to the status 
                                                 
733 Quoted in Danfulani (2005), p. 24. 
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quo ante. That is, Sharia, as practiced in Penal Code, continues to 
be practiced by all States concerned. The Council urges all 
Nigerians to remain calm and law-abiding. Provocative and inciting 
utterances will not be tolerated. This position by the Council is a 
triumph of love of fatherland, triumph of maturity and sustenance 
of security of the nation and preservation of our corporate 
existence. There can be no winners in the destructions, all 
Nigerians are losers. And in peace and cessation of destructions 
of life and property, all Nigerians are winners. But to respect the 
feeling of one another and to hasten the process of reconciliation, 
there is no victory to be celebrated and no loss to be mourned.”734 
 
The official position of the then president and his government was moderate in 
order not to divide the country into pro- and anti-sharī‛a people – unlike Obasanjo’s 
opinion on sharī‛a few months ago before the Kaduna riot.735 The Nigerian Inter-
Religious Council (NIREC)736 established in September, 1999, received the support 
of the president to work for more peaceful coexistence between Muslims and 
Christians in the country. NIREC recommended that leaders from both religions 
should take on the duty of quelling tensions, and members of the two different 
religious communities should converge. 
 The federal government in Nigeria has no choice but to reconcile conflicting 
parties over sharī‛a. At the state level the situation was different. In the southern part 
                                                 
734 President Olusegun Obasanjo's address to the nation on Sharīʿa crisis, March 1, 2000; see the 
entire speech at (http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/speech/obasanjo_sharia_address.html, accessed 
29/05/2011).  
735 During a visit to the USA, when he was asked about the issue of Sharīʿa, President Obasanjo 
answered; “The government simply wished the Sharīʿa cancer would disappear into thin air.”; quoted in 
Danfulani (2005), p. 23; when the Zamfara governor called for the inauguration of Sharīʿa, Obasanjo 
called on the Vice-president, ministers, governors and emirs to boycott the event, see ibid. p. 52. 
736 For history and information on this institution see its homepage http://www.nirecng.org  
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of Nigeria sharīʿa was present in the media but was not problematic since Muslims 
are in the minority there. Nevertheless, Muslims among the Yoruba for instance find 
other ways to practice sharī‛a and have established Independent sharī‛a Panels as 
shown by Abdulfattah Makinde.737 In the northern part of the country the governors 
were influenced by the masses; public pressure seemed to be higher than they 
realized. Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru was elected in 1999 and re-elected in 2003 
because he implemented Islamic Law. The sharīʿa factor was also used in Kano by 
the former governor Ibrahim Shekarau who achieved two mandates (2003 and 2007) 
before he became one of the leading candidates for the Nigerian presidential 
elections of 2011. In Kaduna the situation was more complicated and the House of 
Assembly was divided among Christians who opposed the re-implementation and 
Muslims who favored it. Governor Makarfi (PDP) seemed to have won the elections 
of 2003 because of his moderate view on sharīʿa re-implementation, unlike his rival 
candidate (ANPP) who played the sharīʿa card and advocated full implementation.738 
Ludwig also shows how Gombe State chose the way of dialogue between Muslims 
and Christians in order to reduce tensions and religious clashes (like the riots of 2000 
and 2001). This was achieved by establishing a legal system made of Sharia Courts, 
Customary Courts, and a Magistrate Court:739 Even though Ahmadu Mu’azu, 
governor of Bauchi State (1999-2007), was among the first governors who started to 
implement sharī‛a in the North, he insisted on patience especially in stoning cases 
                                                 
737 See Makinde, A. (2007). The Institution of Sharīʿah in Oyo and Osun States, Nigeria, 1890–2005. 
PhD-Thesis in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria.  
738 See Ludwig (2008), p. 626. 
739 Ludwig (2008), p 627.  
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and admonished sharī‛a judges in adultery cases who sentenced pregnant divorced 
women to death by stoning.740 Concerning the home state of late President of Nigeria 
(2007-2010) and former governor of the state (1999-2007) Umaru Yar‘Adua, Katsina, 
Christians seem to have ongoing problems with education within the state and their 
children face difficulties at the secondary school level in finding a school. In addition, 
Christian TV-programs and the building of churches seemed to be among the 
difficulties expressed by representatives of the Christian Association of Nigeria in that 
state. The re-implementation in Katsina happened under pressure and the governor 
practiced a moderate policy which in part assisted with pilgrimages of Muslims and 
Christians to Mecca and Jerusalem, respectively. Also the dialogue between both 
religious communities was supported by the state.741 
 The ʿulamā' are important actors in the sharī‛a -project. In Northern Nigeria 
Islamic scholars are well-established and highly respected in the society. They have 
the duty of guiding the Umma (Muslim community) when it comes to religious 
matters. ʿulamā' are those who have access to the “sources”. The Nigerian Historian 
Haruna Wakili considers the role of ʿulamā' during the period immediately before the 
re-implementation of the sharī‛a in 1999 as “neutral”.742 After that event they became 
                                                 
740 Ibid, p. 629, this happened in 2002 and quoted by Ludwig from Vanguard of 19th December 2002 
“Mu’azu Cautions Sharīʿa judges”.  
741 Ludwig (2008) mentions the establishment of a “Christian Pilgrims Welfare Board” in the State as 
well a Muslim-Christian Forum in order to promote peace and dialogue among Muslims and 
Christians; see pp. 630-1. 
742 Wakili, Haruna (2009): Islam and the Political Arena in Nigeria: The Ulama and the 2007 Elections. 
ISITA Working Paper No. 09-004, p. 3. 
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more involved in politics. They insisted on more “sanitization” of the society and 
politics in the north in order to achieve the goals of sharīʿa re-implementation. 743 
 Wakili shows how ʿulamā' have the power to influence politics in the north. 
During the elections of 2007, Islamic scholars were fully involved in calling Muslims to 
register in the elections and vote for leaders who were “credible, honest and God-
fearing.” Although sharīʿa did not play an important role during the election of 2007 
(as it was the case during the elections of 2003)744, Haruna Wakili states that 
“anyone who campaigned against the sharī‛a in the states surely would not be voted 
for.” 745 He confirms that the ʿulamā' are not a homogeneous group in the north and 
their political orientation was not uniform. Wakili cites the example of Kano, when 
ʿulamā' were divided between those who supported governor Shekarau and 
campaigned for him and those who opposed him. Many Islamic scholars used 
mosques, seminars and public lectures to mobilize Muslims to vote for him. Other 
ʿulamā', like the Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya leaders (Sheikh Qaribullah Kabara and 
Sheikh Kalifa Rabi’u, respectively) as well as Salafiyya leaders campaigned against 
Shekarau.746 
 Ordinary Muslims consider ʿulamā' to be their spiritual guides. Apart from the 
political campaign related to sharīʿa at the grassroots level, the expectations were 
high. Sharīʿa was for Muslims a chance for changes in many aspects of life. Most 
                                                 
743 Ibid., p. 7. 
744 Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The “Sharīʿa Factor” in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, in: Muslim-Christian 
Encounters in Africa. Benjamin F. Soares (ed.), pp. 256-274, Islam in Africa series 6. Leiden, Boston: 
Brill. 
745 Wakili (2009), p. 8. 
746 See Wakili (2009), p. 9. 
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ordinary Muslims do not really know much about the implication of sharīʿa, and what it 
really means. If you ask about sharī‛a and how people understand it, in many cases 
you may get answers like:  
 
”Wonderful! Great achievement and we love it! (…) the 
implementation was a great achievement for a country like Nigeria. 
We never dreamed of having sharīʿa so soon, so even if it is not fully 
implemented, it has made a great impact in our hearts and those of 
our children. For the younger ones to know about the presence of 
sharīʿa is a great thing.”747 
 
Or statements such as: 
“I so much loved it. It is a great achievement, though there are certain 
restrictions but I am happy about it and I hope that in the future we will 
be able to have a caliphate that rules according to Islamic law.”748 
 
 The sharī‛a application appealed to the feelings of Muslims. Sharī‛a was 
introduced as a solution to their problems and was expected to bring change in many 
directions, especially economically and socially. Many see in sharī‛a an answer to 
corruption, political mismanagement, and social injustice. The re-implementation of 
Islamic Law was valued as an alternative and option for a better life. This may or may 
notbe true, but Muslims generally follow their ʿulamā' in matters concerning the re-
implementation of Islamic law: 
                                                 
747 Interview with J. M. on 15th March 2008 in Jos; J.M. is one among six women interviewed in Jos by 
R.M., by a female research assistant. For the reason of protecting the interviewees as well the name 
of the assistant I prefer not to write the full names.  
748 Interview in Jos with H.H. on 5th march 2008. 
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“The grassroots! You know, the grassroots normally have been 
guided by these: the ʿulamā' and others because the basis of the 
followers is the grassroots. And some of them see the ʿulamā' as their 
mentors who tell them what is supposed to be even when they don’t 
have knowledge. There is a lot of ignorance, of course in the 
grassroots, but then when something appeals their social condition, 
their economical condition, they welcome it. For instance they 
welcome a situation by which you will say: “Ok!” There is no more 
selling alcohol in the entire society; because it is their children, it is 
their people and brothers and sisters that … or you say that have a 
situation where you can abolish prostitution, I mean brothels and other 
places where you find this, or gambling; all these social vices. Of 
course the grassroots will proudly welcome that because most of the 
crimes are related to these people. So this is the base for that, there 
was a massive support for sharīʿa implementation.”749 
 
This statement is confirmed by several ordinary Nigerian Muslims interviewed 
throughout my fieldwork in 2007 and 2008. Neither their social status nor their sex 
played a substantial role in their opinions. The re-implementation was positively 
perceived at the grassroots level. Was the re-implementation really a challenge for 
Nigerian Muslims or not? It is impossible to confirm or disconfirm this statement. Did 
alcohol outlets, brothels and places of gambling really disappear completely from 
northern Nigeria? Or did they only disappear from the public sphere? To what extent 
was the success of sharī‛a so clear that even Islamic organizations claim to have 
been behind the re-implementation project? In the following chapter, the Izala 
contribution and perception of sharī‛a are introduced. 
 
                                                 
749 Interview with Suleiman Shehu, Journalist, 16th January 2007, Kaduna.  
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3 Izala’s contribution to the re-implementation: initiators?  
The re-implementation of sharī‛a turned out to be a very successful initiative at 
least in the beginning. Thus, many different groups claimed to be the initiator of the 
re-implementation of Islamic law in northern Nigeria. But there are different voices 
and opinions on this issue. One main and highly powerful opponent seemed to be the 
Federal Government as the statement of Sheikh Jingir, leader of the Izala Council of 
ʿulamā' in Jos shows:  
 
“As Ahmad Sani Bakura introduced his project to implement sharīʿa, 
he asked all people to come to Gusau. We accepted his invitation 
because at that time it was a problem between him and the 
government. Some Islamic organizations refused to go because they 
feared the government. We went there and so did the other faction of 
our Society [Kaduna branch] as well as the Sufis. All supported the 
program. We saw what the issue was: who accepted what is called 
Islam and who refused it. We came together because of politics. In 
the matter of politics we came together, but concerning fatwās and 
theological questions we are like before: different.”750 
 
According to Sheikh Jingir, only the two Izala branches and the Sufi 
brotherhoods answered the call of the Governor of Zamfara State. But this shows 
that the most powerful Islamic groups and organizations of northern Nigeria 
supported the sharī‛a project from the very beginning. The doctrinal and ideological 
differences became less important; politics dominated the support of Ahmad Sani’s 
project. Sheikh Jingir did not talk about the initiator of the re-implementation. One 
                                                 
750 Interview with the Izala-leader in Jos in his office, 28th February 2007. 
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gets the impression that it was Ahmad Sani himself, but according to Ustadh Nasir 
Abdulmuhy, a prominent representative of the Izala Jos-faction, it was his 
organization who initiated the entire project: 
 
“The Society was among the first who called for the implementation of 
sharīʿa and thank God, the Governor of Zamfara, was the first who 
listened to the call of Izala and practiced sharīʿa. This is one of the 
good things done by the jamāʿa.”751 
 
This statement gives the impression that the main actor of the sharīʿa project was the 
Jos-faction of Izala. The future governor of Zamfara State only reacted “to the call of 
Izala”. The leader of Izala in Lagos, Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, affiliated with the Jos 
branch, went even further:  
“As we launched into our preaching, he [Ahmad Sani] came to the 
lecture and spoke of his wish to become a governor: ‘I promise you – 
my Society; our Society – that if you elect me as governor, then I will 
implement the Islamic sharīʿa. I will do it because this Society [Izala] 
taught and linked us to what is useful for us and through it we 
understood that the religion is Islam, and sharīʿa is the best thing in 
life that a human being can reach. Sharīʿa is the way of satisfaction of 
Allah. If you elect me now as Zamfara’s Governor, I will apply sharīʿa!’ 
(…) After that he became governor of Zamfara. The late Sheikh Idris 
sent him a letter saying: ‘I thank Allah for you, but I want to remind 
you that you promised Allah to apply his sharīʿa and since you have 
the opportunity to do it, then hurry up. It is a treasure that should not 
be delayed.’”752 
 
                                                 
751 Interview with Ustaz Nasir Abdulmuhyi, Jos, 5th December 2006 in his office 
752 Interview with Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, Lagos, 18th February 2007. 
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According to Dalha Abubakar Abdallah, Ahmed Sani looked actively for the 
support of Izala during his political campaign. He promised Izala to re-implement 
Islamic law if he was successful and became governor. That means it was a political 
deal between the politician Ahmed Sani and the religious organization Izala. Implicitly 
Izala supported him during the election campaign. This becomes clear when the 
leader of Izala Jos reminded him to fulfill his promise after he was elected governor of 
Zamfara State. Finally Ahmed Sani delivered and implemented full sharī‛a. Some 
leading personalities of Izala even claim him as a member of the movement. Nuhu 
Tahiru Tajuddeen, head of the administrative council in Kaduna State (Jos branch), 
said that Ahmed Sani “confessed in front of the Izala, but before that we didn’t know 
him. As he confessed then we considered him an Izala man. He confessed 
himself.”753 This view is also shared by Abdurrahman Lawal Adoro, a former Izala 
leader from Katsina. When questioned whether Izala was the first organization to call 
for sharī‛a, the scholar attested that Ahmad Sani Yeriman Bakuru was an “Izala 
man”.754 
These statements show that a number of leaders in the Jos-faction claim that 
their organization was the initiator of the sharī‛a-project. It is impossible to prove such 
statements because many Muslims in Nigeria identified themselves with sharī‛a, not 
just the Izala. The leader of Jamāʿat Tajdīd al-Islām (in Arabic: Society of Revival of 
Islam - JTI), Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid, pointed out that the re-implementation of 
                                                 
753 Interview with Nuhu Tahiru Tajuddeen, 10th January 2007 in his office, the centre of Islamic 
Development, Imam Road, Tudun Wada, Zaria.  
754 Interview in Katsina with Abdurrahman Lawal Adoro, 12th March 2008, his Office at the University of 
Katsina, dept of Arabic Studies. 
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sharī‛a in Nigeria was achieved through the contributions of many groups: Izala, 
Sufis, JTI and others:  
“(…) the ṭarīqa and Izala played the role of sensitizing people. People 
of the Umma took care of the legal aspect, and JTI tried to find 
answers to the issues like corruption; the zakāt of course it was in our 
(task) and we looked how to collect zakāt.”755   
 
Sani Modibbo, former Izala national secretary, confirms that implementing 
sharīʿa or transforming Nigeria into an Islamic state was not the initial agenda of the 
Izala. Instead, the movement was determined to fight bid‛a and Sufism more than any 
other thing.756 This point of view is backed up by O’Brien in her article on sharīʿa in 
Nigeria. She writes that the Izala was neither the first group that called people to 
apply Islamic Law nor the one that monopolized its application:  
“Les réformistes d’inspiration Wahhābite connu sous le nom d’Izala et 
leurs nombreuses branches, dont certaines reçoivent des 
financements Saoudien, n’ont pas été les premiers à réclamer la 
charia, pas plus qu’ils n’ont monopolisé son application, au profit des 
principales confréries soufis, la Qādiriyya et la Tijāniyya.”757 
 
The leader of the Qādiriyya brotherhood in Kano, Sheikh Qaribullah Kabara, confirms 
that the sharīʿa project was the product of many different initiatives:  
“Nobody can come out and say that he is going to apply Islamic 
sharīʿa and could not find help. When they came with that, the 
Qādiriyya was one among many Islamic groups that promoted the 
                                                 
755 Interview with Sheikh Abubakar Mujahid, Zaria, 5th January 2007. 
756 Interview in Jos, 28th February 2007.  
757 O’Brien, Susan M. (2007): La Charia contestée: Démocratie, débat et diversité musulmane dans 
les ‘état Charia’ du Nigeria, in: Politique Africaine 106, p. 48 
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project and helped in its establishment. We had a meeting at that 
time. I think the government started calling for sharīʿa only after we 
called for it here, in this house.”758 
 
The Maiduguri based scholar and member of Borno’s ʿulamā' Council, Sheikh 
Muhammad Ali Gobshiya, observes that if the Izala was the leading organization 
behind the sharīʿa re-implementation then Sufis would not have compromised. The 
scholar points to a statement of Sheikh Tahiru Bauchi, the prominent Tijāniyya 
leader, who once said that voting for a Christian is better than to vote for an Izala 
man. That is why Sheikh Muhammad Ali Gobshiya cannot imagine that Izala was the 
initiator of sharī‛a in the north.759 
 From the Tijāniyya point of view, it is also unimaginable that Izala was the 
driving force responsible for the re-implementation. Alhaji Abubakar Imam, a Tijānī 
and registrar of the sharī‛a Court of Appeal in Maiduguri, points out that Sheikh 
Ibrahim Saleh and Tijāniyya leaders started very early on to write about the necessity 
to re-implement Islamic law. Apart from the several lectures he gave on that matter 
Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh published a book on the ḥudūd-punishments. Alhaji Imam 
confirms that the Tijāniyya were the first ones who called for sharī‛a. He confesses 
that this call may have been misunderstood and confused with criminal law. He 
clarifies that sharī‛a cannot be limited to corporal punishment for certain offences. It is 
                                                 
758 Interview with the leader of the Qādiriyya Sufi brotherhood in Kano, House of the Qādiriyya, 2nd 
January 2007. 
759 Interview with Sheikh Muhammad Adam Gashua,  
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more than that and has to do with education, economy, and civil service. Sharī‛a is 
according to him is to be found everywhere.760 
 The re-implementation of sharī‛a appears to be a concretization of Izala’s 
world view of an Islamic society based on the Qur’ān and the tradition of the Prophet. 
The daʿwa of Izala consists of educating people about their religion and guiding them 
to follow the right way to become good Muslims. Izala insists on education at every 
stage of life and establishes schools and mosques to provide its adherents with 
education. Izala calls on women to wear ḥijāb. It stands for separation of the sexes in 
the society in all aspects of life. Izala propagates an ideal society without alcohol, 
gambling, and prostitution. It encourages knowledge about Islam and the Arabic 
language. It gives an important status to religious scholars. The organization 
demands for the application of Islamic law in all its aspects and according to the 
elementary sources of the Islamic religion. Izala regards itself as protector of Islam 
and Muslims. The organization makes efforts to defend Islamic interests. In Plateau 
State, which is not a sharīʿa state, Izala for instance succeeded in changing the times 
of public administration and schools on Fridays in order to allow Muslims to go 
perform their prayers. Since colonial times only Sunday is a work-free day in 
Nigeria.761 At the beginning of 2007 the design of Nigerian currency was changed. 
The Jos-faction of Izala realized that the new Naira bills are without Arabic scripture, 
                                                 
760 Interview with Alhaji Abubakar Imām on 5th March 2008 in his office, Sharīʿa Court of Appeal, 
Maiduguri.  
761 In an informal discussion on 13th December 2006 with Prof. Muslih T. Yahya in Jos, from the 
department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, the scholar mentions that Izala in Jos  makes efforts that 
Muslims can stop working by 12.30 in order to go for Friday prayers and come back by 2.30 p.m.  
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so they sent letter to the President of the Federation, Obasanjo, on 27th February 
2007, expressing their “(…) displeasure and total rejection of the removal of Arabic 
inscription”. Izala indicates that removing Arabic, as an identity marker of Muslims, 
may be against human rights and “endangers the interest of some Nigerians on the 
basis of their religion.”762 
 After Islamic law was introduced Izala was adamant that all aspects of it 
should be applied in the northern states. Weimann mentions the example of Bauchi 
State and its governor Mu’azu who was visited by a delegation from Izala urging him 
to rush in applying Islamic criminal judgements. Aware of the implications of the law 
in a mixed state like Bauchi, the governor responded that it is the sharī‛a 
commission’s duty to deal with that.763 Also in Jigawa State the Izala warned Ibrahim 
Turaki, governor of the state from 1999 until 2007, that he should not stop the 
“divine” law of sharī‛a from being enforced in a stoning case from the year 2002.764 
Weimann’s explanation of the enthusiasm of Izala in the sharīʿa-project sounds very 
plausible: “Yan Izala (…) were quick to espouse the project on the basis of common 
                                                 
762 This open letter entitled “Memo to Mr. President Chief Olesegun Obasanjo G.C.F.R. on the recent 
removal of Arabic inscription from the Nigerian currency notes”, published in the Daily Trust of 27th 
February 2007; a copy of this letter was send to the Senate President, The Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the Deputy Senate President, The Central Bank Governor, The Sultan of Sokoto, the 
Emirs (Kano, Borno, Zazzau, Katsina, and Ilorin), the Etsu Nupe, and the AARE Musulmi of 
Yorubaland. 
763 Weimann (2010), pp. 49-50. 
764 This was a case of rape in 2002 in the state when the accused was found guilty and put to death by 
stoning after his confession. In 2003 he revealed his confession and appealed the judgment at the 
Sharīʿa Court of Appeal. The accused was then freed from charges and sent to psychiatry; see ibid., p. 
68.  
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interests.”765 The author emphasizes that this interest does not mean an effort for an 
Islamic state, but rather a kind of establishment of a particular vision of an Islamic 
“way of life” according to sharīʿa.766 
 Historically Izala was founded to fight un-Islamic innovations (bida’a) in 
Nigeria. There were social, political, and economic changes that occurred in the 
federation during the last years that brought Muslims to reflect on their relationship 
and doctrinal differences in the entire country. Events like ethno-religious clashes in 
several parts of the north, debates related to the constitution, and the elections in the 
federation (the leader should be a Christian or Muslim) are just a few examples. In 
times of clashes the borders between religious groups within the same community all 
but disappear. For Christians in Nigeria, all Muslims re-implemented sharīʿa law and 
there is no difference between Izala, Sufis or Shīʿa-groups. The sharīʿa-project was 
an opportunity for Muslims to think about common objectives and leave internal 
debates aside. The re-implementation of Islamic law was an opportunity for Izala to 
“conquer” more space in a religious field dominated by the Sufi brotherhoods. The 
sharīʿa-project was also a chance for Izala to gain recognition of its ideology based 
on the Qur’ān and the sunna. Izala and sharīʿa can be placed side by side since both 
are calling for the “sanitization” of Islam and offer a solution to Muslims in all aspects 
of life. If Izala perceived sharīʿa positively and of its many leaders claim that the 
organization was directly and indirectly behind the re-implementation, then what 
                                                 
765 Ibid., p. 57. 
766 Ibid.; in a discussion on Sharīʿa-debates  in Jos with Prof. Musa Gaiya, a church historian and 
religion expert in Nigeria, the scholar spoke of “Islamization of the socitey” rather than an Islamic state; 
18th December 2006.  
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about the Izala-Sufi-brotherhood relationship? Did sharī‛a law put an end to the long 
struggle between Izala and the two major Sufi brotherhoods in northern Nigeria? Did 
sharīʿa re-implementation really bring change with it? Did it unify the Muslim Umma? 
 
4 Izala, Sufis, and Sharī‛a-law: a chance for reconciliation? 
 After the long-lasting conflict between Sheikh Gumi and the Nigerian Sufi 
Brotherhoods which eventually developed into clashes between Sufis and the Izala, 
internal issues had been increasingly weakening the organization since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The division of the organization between Jos and Kaduna affected the 
image of the movement and especially its credibility amongst Muslims in matters of 
leadership. Most (if not all) Izala leaders confess that the division of the movement 
has nothing to do with ʿaqīda but rather with orientation within the organization: are 
ʿulamā' at the top of Izala or not?  
In dealing with internal problems Izala was concerned with education, 
preaching, and especially with convincing Muslims in northern Nigeria of being the 
authentic “Izala” founded by Sheikh I. Idris. This new orientation in Izala allowed 
Muslims to speak of different groups in Izala: that of Jos connected with the founder 
and known for its strictness compared to other Islamic groups, and that of Kaduna 
which is more compromising when it comes Sufis and other Muslims, and even 
another group of Izala members who did not belong to either of these two 
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branches.767 The concentration on their own problems led to a reduction of the 
tension between Izala and Sufi. Violent clashes that were the case in the 1970s and 
1980s were reduced. Clashes over religious space in mosques and in the public 
sphere were reduced to verbal struggles. Nevertheless, differences still existed and 
borders became more visible (different schools, mosques, activities, interests).  
 The re-implementation of sharī‛a was neither planned nor prepared. It was 
motivated by politics and part of an electoral campaign of one single governor with 
the intention “to gain popular support and to secure his own political survival 
developed into a chain reaction throughout the predominantly Muslim-inhabited 
northern states of Nigeria.”768 Sufis, Izala, and many other Islamic groups had no 
choice but to cooperate. The northern governors called all Muslims to contribute to 
the sharī‛a project and asked the ʿulamā' to set up the outlines of such an 
undertaking. No religious leader should be excluded except if he/she is against 
sharī‛a. Opposing sharī‛a means opposing Islam and that can be related to social 
isolation. sharī‛a – as shown above – is an identity marker for Muslims in northern 
Nigeria. It was seen as a chance for Islamic law after years of oppression. Sharī‛a 
was related to change and reform of the society. Sharī‛a became a unifying issue 
                                                 
767 Prof. Musa Gaiya speaks of an Izala A, B, and even C. Under the third group he categorizes those 
Izala members who studied abroad and adapted a modern model for society, 18th December 2006. 
Under this third wing of Izala I consider those members who are still related to both groups without 
taking part to in group or the other. Among them is Alhaji Abba Damburno, from Jos, who considered 
himself a father to both the Jos and Kaduna factions; interview on 24 December 2006. 
768 Kogelmann, Franz (2006): The ‘Sharīʿa factor’ in Nigeria’s 2003 Elections, in: Soares, Benjamin F. 
(ed.): Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa, pp. 257-8.  
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despite the heterogeneity of the Nigerian society and existence of other religious 
groups in the sharī‛a states.  
 The publications of Philip Ostien769 show that most (if not all) of the northern 
states were not ready to reinstate Islamic Law. This was confirmed by the difference 
between the Penal Codes and Penal Codes Procedures in the twelve sharī‛a states. 
Outsiders may get the impression that sharī‛a was easily implemented and consider 
the northern region as religiously unified. Problems emerged later with the first 
stoning cases that demonstrated the complexity of the sharī‛a issue.770 
 The re-implementation processes of sharī‛a was initiated by establishing 
sharī‛a Implementation committees in each state with the duty to advise and prepare 
a report with the recommendation of the best way to implement Islamic law and how 
to codify it in conformity with the federal constitution. In these committees we find 
Sufis (Qādiriyya, Tijāniyya, etc.), Emirs, Salafis, Izala, independent scholars, Izala, 
JTI, Islamic judges, professors, and other experts.771 At a later stage the different 
institutions that emerged from sharīʿa re-implementation like the zakāt-board, Council 
of ʿulamā', or ḥisba-board were comprised of representatives from different religious 
groups.  
                                                 
769 Ostien (2007). 
770 As an example see Ostien, Philip (ed.) (2007): “Sharīʿa implementation in….”, Vol. V, Two Famous 
Cases; this volume deals with the cases of Amina Lawal and Safiya Hussaini who were put by Sharīʿa 
Courts to death. The book provides all documents related to the two cases and shows that the 
reimplementation of Sharīʿa was far from being “properly” applied. 
771 For more details on the structures of these committees and their reports  in Bauchi, Zamfara, and 
Kebbi states as well for all memoranda related to the reimplementation-process see Ostien, Philip 
(ed.) (2007): “Sharīʿa implementation in….”, Vol. II, Sharīʿa Implementation Committees reports and 
related white papers.  
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 For some scholars the re-implementation was more of a political than a 
religious project. Sheikh Khaled Aliyu, an independent scholar based in Jos observes 
that the re-implementation was politically colored. He speaks of a “marriage” (Arabic: 
zawāj) between Izala and politicians. Izala was looking for higher influence and 
politicians for more voters. That is why Izala was ready to compromise.772 This is 
almost congruent with Sheikh Muhammad Haris, an established Tijāniyya leader in 
Jos who saw a lot of fitna behind the sharīʿa re-implementation. The leader confirms 
that verbal attacks between Sufis and Izala are still going on.773 Some other scholars 
are more optimistic, like Sheikh Alhassan Said who sees an advantage in the re-
implementation, mainly; the possibility of a dialogue among the different Islamic 
groups: “those who implemented sharī‛a brought all of us together. We meet, speak 
and negotiate.”774  
 A few scholars have indicated mixed feelings towards sharī‛a and reunification 
of Muslims including Izala and Sufis. Ustaz Ibrahim Ahmad Makari, a Tijānī scholar 
based in Zaria, indicates that there was great hope linked to the sharī‛a project. 
According to him, hundreds of gatherings (Arabic: majālis) were set up as a result of 
the re-implementation. He expected that the project could result in reforms within the 
Muslim society in the north, but there were a lot of politics behind sharī‛a. Intafā al-
ḥamās (in Arabic: enthusiasm is over) – this is how he phrased it. He mentioned that 
self-interest hindered the project from achieving its goals. In Kano for e.g. he views 
                                                 
772 Interview in Jos on 14th December 2006.  
773 Interview Jos, 3 December 2006. 
774 Interview in with the Izala Sheikh who is affiliated to the Kaduna branch, 12th December 2006. 
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those who implemented Islamic law as selective and did it for their own advantage. In 
addition, in the Council of ʿulamā' in Nigeria, although Tijāniyya, Qādiriyya, and 
Salafiyya are represented, the representatives of these groups were far from solving 
problems of ordinary people – as Ustaz Makari points out. In Zamfara State identity 
was defined through a long beard and a particular type of dress. Makari concludes 
that maybe five percent of sharīʿa was realistically achieved because politicians 
mainly appealed to the emotions of the people. Makari ensured that the future would 
be more promising since there is an agenda to unify all Muslims in northern Nigeria.  
Regardless whether the Izala initiated the sharī‛a project or another Islamic 
group was responsible for the most dramatic change in the judicial system of Nigeria 
since independence, in the aftermath of the re-implementation the conflict between 
Izala and the Sufi brotherhoods seemed to have been relegated to the background. 
Whether this challenge can be understood as reconciliation between Izala and Sufi 
cannot be easily answered.  
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Conclusion 
 The major objective of this study was to look at the sharī‛a re-implementation 
in Nigeria from the perspective of an Islamic organization like Izala. The application of 
Islamic law is an integral part of the movement’s ideology. According to my 
knowledge, this aspect has not been studied before, since the re-implementation of 
Islamic law is a very recent development in the history of northern Nigeria. Izala has 
been studied in the context of its relationship to Sufis.775 
 The Izala-Sufi controversy seems to take on another dimension. The violent 
clashes between Izala and Sufis that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s were 
reduced during the 1990s and from the beginning of the new millennium. This can be 
explained by the fact that the Izala movement was concentrated on its own internal 
problems (division, struggle for leadership, financial issues) on the one hand and on 
the other it underwent a process of institutionalization and became a well established 
and recognized Islamic organization in northern Nigeria. However, it is debatable as 
to whether the series of violent clashes between Christians and Muslims since the re-
implementation of Islamic law in 1999 led to a reduction of tensions within the Muslim 
community or not i.e. intra-religious conflicts were replaced by inter-religious ones. 
 In order to understand the current religious situation it is necessary to go back 
to the history of Islam and Christianity in Nigeria. A historical overview on Islam 
serves as a back-ground for what is going on today. This can be simplified in the 
following picture: Nigeria with its current borders did not exist until the coming of the 
                                                 
775 Loimeier 1997, Kane 2003, Umar 1983 and 1983. 
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British. In the 19th century the Sokoto Caliphate dominated the Muslim north with its 
emirates, and in the southern region African Traditional Religions as well as 
Christianity dominated the religious landscape. For many Muslims of the north the 
colonial domination, despite indirect rule, was a period of massive intervention in 
Islamic affairs. The fact that the highly developed and in Muslim eyes holy Islamic law 
enjoyed only the same status as other “native laws and customs” was regarded as a 
devaluation of sharīʿa. In addition, the reform of certain aspects of the Islamic legal 
tradition according to western norms and values was also an important event. This 
led to a conflict of laws that continued until the re-implementation of sharī‛a in 1999. 
Izala emerged from an intra-Islamic conflict between Sheikh Gumi and the Sufis. The 
organization became the major actor amongst reform-oriented Nigerian Muslims 
since it attacked the well-established tradition of Sufis in the country. Sufism in the 
Nigerian context also means that certain religious traditions were affiliated with 
political and economic power. The Qādiriyya Sufi brotherhood is traditionally linked to 
the house of Usman dan Fodio whereas the Tijāniyya Sufi-brotherhood challenged 
this position for a long time. 
 The ostensible reason for the establishment of Izala was to purify Islam from 
all innovations. For several years Izala attacked Sufism on this matter, but it was also 
a struggle over the interpretative authority in Islamic issues which is directly linked to 
questions of power. After the division of the movement discourse on bidʿa became 
part of the internal struggle of the movement. One interesting finding of this study is 
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that the organization that was established to fight innovations found itself within the 
same discourse fighting an “internal bidʿa” (see chapter on bidʿa).  
 The re-implementation of sharī‛a was a project for all Muslims and all Islamic 
groups were invited to take part in it. Izala has had to cooperate with other Muslim 
organizations despite their religious orientation - even with Sufis. Sharī‛a re-
implementation was positively perceived by Izala, furthermore many Izala leaders 
claim to have been the driving force behind the project. This could be interpreted as a 
new orientation of the organization from attacking Sufis to cooperating with them as 
part of the whole sharīʿa-project. This was necessary for the movement to overcome 
its own problems and regain more space and prestige among Muslims.  
The field of sharī‛a generally and that of Izala specifically is complex and 
multifaceted. If we go back to history (see the introductory chapter) this was always 
the case in the region that constitutes Nigeria today. In fact the religious field cannot 
be separated from the political one. The motivation of Nigerian politicians to re-
implement Islamic law could be manifold: it could be part of a political campaign to 
collect as many votes as possible; it might even be out of religious zeal or simply 
because the masses are demanded it. However, those politicians need religious 
actors to achieve their goals. These major actors or “mobilizers” as Bourdieu calls 
them are the most important category in this study: Islamic scholars.  
 The Muslim community of Nigeria holds Islamic scholars in very high esteem. 
They enjoy a high social prestige and have influence over the society.  To become an 
Islamic scholar is a great deal of work, and necessitates particular skills and intensive 
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knowledge. Apart from memorizing the Qur’ān, studying the tradition of the Prophet, 
knowing Arabic (as a holy langue) and mastering the most important sources of the 
Islamic tradition, Islamic scholars must also attend a university and obtain an 
academic degree and travel abroad to seek knowledge. Along the way, they 
generally build useful personal networks. Preaching, writings books, participating in 
on-going discourses and providing access to the sources are the ways to achieve 
social recognition. 
 The struggle for “symbolic power” among Islamic scholars in Nigerian religious 
and political fields is stronger now than it ever has been before. Izala did not ‘miss 
the boat’ because they were able to read the writing on the wall and learned to 
understand the ’rules of the game‘. As a result of this learning process Izala changed 
its former strategy of direct confrontation. The new “religious field” in which Izala is 
operating necessitates adjustment to the new dynamics of the field(s). This 
adjustment was prescribed by an intensive competition with other groups. Izala 
accommodated itself to the necessity of the time: it is a protector of the sunna at the 
local level and for those who follow its doctrine. At the same time it is part of the 
Muslim Umma and the sharī‛a project. By being part of these, Izala moves within the 
religious field but can also shift to the political field in the north, which is characterized 
by an on-going struggle for space, power, and acknowledgement. Through “invading” 
the religious and political field Izala has to make an offer in the “religious market” of 
Nigeria.  
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In discussing the history of the Izala, most of its leaders narrate a victorious 
event that depicts the triumph of the founder, Sheikh Ismaila Idris (1937-2000) over 
the Sufis and even over the Nigerian state. Being an individual aware of the situation 
of Muslims in his country, Sheikh Idris started his daʿwa by preaching the oneness of 
God. Before he restricted his activities to preaching he was an Imam in the Army.  
The growth of a movement around Sheikh Idris at its initial stage influenced him to 
think of an official organization that protects him and his followers from Sufi attacks 
and state confrontation. The registration of Izala in 1978 was not possible due to 
vigorous opposition. It took place only in 1985. Until that time, Izala acted under the 
umbrella of a different Islamic organization which is Jamāʿat Naṣr al-Islām  (in Arabic: 
Society for the Victory of Islam; JNI). 
 Izala is autonomous when it comes to financial resources. The leader(s) of 
Izala developed a three-tiered structure for the organization starting from the local, to 
the state, and then national level. At every stage, there is a council of ʿulamā', an 
administrative unit, and First Aid Groups. To sponsor its projects, Izala relies mainly 
on donations from its members and supporters at all levels. This is a strategy initiated 
by the founder. 
 To show the effectiveness of Izala in collecting donations, the Jos branch of 
Izala collected 10,924,296 Naira (approximately 50,000 Euro) and 665 bags of grain 
in 2009 through the newly-established zakāt-board.776 The philosophy of Izala is to 
take the initiative itself before waiting for any other assistance.  
                                                 
776 Interview with Sheikh Jingir published at www.peoplesdaily-online.com of 3/12/09 
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When it comes to education, Izala leadership is proud to mention its 
achievements in that sector. The organization realized that educating people is an 
effective way to propogate its doctrine. The Izala initiated nursery, primary, and 
secondary schools. Izala also maintains Saturday and Sunday schools. According to 
their own sources the number of schools is 5,191 with more than 3.4 Million students. 
They also have a diploma section with three branches in Jos, Bauchi and Gombe777 
Most (if not all) schools are registered and programs and examinations are under the 
supervision of the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.  
The education of women is an important part of the Izala educational-project. 
Members of the Society are invited to permit their wives to go to schools. Educated 
women are asked to teach their relatives and neighbors. This strategy succeeded in 
such a way that many Izala schools today are attended by small girls and married 
women. One of my interviewees says proudly: “we even pushed traditional Sufis to 
send their wives to schools.” 
 The last aspect of the “offer” of Izala introduced by the leaders is the fact that 
they attracted many Sufi followers who left their ṭarīqa and joined the movement. 
Izala stands for tawḥīd, and for combating witchcraft and innovation. Their 
organization has branches in all thirty-six Nigerian states. They even propagate their 
doctrines in neighboring countries (Republic of Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and even 
Sudan).778 
                                                 
777 Interview with Sheikh Jingir published at www.peoplesdaily-online.com of 3/12/09 
778 In several Interviews, the leaders of the Jos faction confirmed having branches in all Nigerian 
states. As part of that, Izala is also active in neighboring countries (Republic of Niger, Chad, 
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The Izala also identifies both Jos and Kaduna as main headquarters. Why?  
In the mid 1980s, the Izala suffered from an internal crisis on the level of leadership. 
The issue can be summarized by problems associated with guiding the society as 
well as monetary matters. Through this division the attitude towards Sufism changed. 
When asked about the reasons for the division, the Jos and Kaduna-factions will give 
different answers. Sheikh Ali Abdallah, member of the Council of ʿulamā', in the 
Kaduna-faction explains that money and struggle for leadership divided the 
movement. 
 In summary, the Izala succeeded in establishing itself as an organization 
propagating the oneness of God and inviting people to come back to the religion of 
Islam on the basis of the  Qur’ān, sunna and the tradition of the pious predecessors. 
Izala leaders themselves claim the failure of the movement to unify all Muslims. It 
fails because of its style of leadership and harsh attitude towards others. Money 
issues and theological differences led to the division of the movement.  
 In absence of any reliable statistics on the approximate number of Izala 
followers, the number of members of the movement is not known. To become a 
member of Izala or leave the organization is possible at any time. Registration is not 
required but loyalty plays a crucial rule. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cameroon, Ghana, and even Sudan; see Umar, Muhammad S. (2001): Education and Islamic Trends 
in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s In: Africa Today, Vol. 48 (2), pp. 127-150. 
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 If we come back to the definition of religious organizations offered by Stark 
and Bainbridge,779 we read: “religious organisations are social enterprises whose 
primary purpose is to create, maintain, and exchange supernaturally-based general 
compensators”. In this context Izala as a religious “firm” offers a way of achieving the 
reward of Allah and as a means of reaching al-janna (paradise). The organization 
claims to have the best access to Islamic sources and invites adherents to follow its 
path. Izala is also aware of the “religious market” in Nigeria. As an organization, it 
struggles not only inside the Muslim community but also outside. Competition against 
other Islamic organizations is required. What Izala is offering is their brand of Islam; 
i.e. authenticity and purity of religion. The organization is exclusive to those who 
accept its offer. What makes it attractive to people is its efficiency and its obvious 
credibility in establishing schools, mosques and hospitals. Also the strictness of Izala 
in defining religion played a crucial role in giving it an identity among Muslims. Izala 
(especially in Jos) are known as hardliners and if we apply the model suggested by 
Introvigne780 for Turkey, the Izala belongs to the category “strict”. Of course, this 
emphasis can be discussed and may be revised in the Izala context.  
 The strictness of the founder of Izala and the ʿulamā' surrounding him made 
the organization attractive to people. As proof of success the actual leader of the Jos-
faction says: “Our records speak for us”. But that same strictness and attachment to 
                                                 
779 Stark, R. and W. S. Brainbridge (1980): Towards a Theory of Religion: Religious Commitment, in: 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 114-128. 
780 The Model developed for Turkey by Introvigne (2005) includes five different ”niches“ (ultra-strict, 
strict, moderate-conservative, liberal and ultra-liberal). This is problematic for the Izala context 
although the organization aligns with his category “strict”. Surprisingly in the same category we find 
Sufis as well as Wahhabis.  
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a particular doctrine led to the division of the movement. Even the several attempts to 
unify the different factions failed. As we have seen the same Izala is divided into two 
“firms”: one in Jos, related to the founder and his doctrine. To attract more followers 
this firm developed the strategy claiming that they are more authentic. The other 
group is established in Kaduna and is convinced that the division was necessary to 
save the organization’s initial and authentic goals. The level of success of Izala can 
be measured in accordance with the model suggested by Stark. In this context he 
proposed ten necessary points for a religious movement to be successful.  
First, Izala seems to be successful in retaining “cultural continuity with the 
conventional faith”. Izala is a continuation of the project of purification of Islam 
initiated by Sheikh Gumi and Sheikh Idris. Izala sees itself as the ideal protector of 
the sunna. It places itself within the tradition of pious predecessors that goes back to 
the first centuries of Islam. 
Second, Rodney stark assumes that new religious movements can be 
successful to the extent that their doctrines are non-empirical. Stark gave the 
example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses who ”suffered very marked decline in 
missionary activity” after their expectation of the end of the world did not take place. 
The point here is that a successful religious movement has a non-empirical doctrine. 
In fact, this can also be proved for the Izala case. I showed earlier that bidʿa or 
innovation is an “open system of meanings”. Fighting innovation in Islam and 
establishing the sunna are the two elements of Izala doctrine. Izala offers a unique 
way to achieve reward in the afterlife. This dogma cannot be proven empirically. 
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Third, religious movements succeed if they maintain a medium level of tension 
with their surrounding environment- they are strict but not too strict. Indeed Izala 
maintained a medium level of tension with its surrounding environment. There are 
several markers of Izala. These vary from the way of praying to dress code of the 
movement. The movement opposes for e.g. wearing of amulets and justifies this by 
the fact that such a practice does not exist in the fundamental sources of Islam on 
one hand. On the other hand, Izala does not oppose non-Izala attending their 
schools at different levels of education. This illustrates a ‘medium’ aspect of 
strictness of the movement. 
Fourth, legitimate leaders of religious movements have adequate authority. 
This requires clear doctrinal justification and participants recognize themselves as 
members of this system of authority. In the case of Izala this assumption can be 
opposed by the fact that the movement was divided into two factions. The leadership 
of Sheikh Idris seems not to have been effective enough so that it could be 
recognized by all Izala members. In fact, many Izala people questioned the 
legitimacy of his leadership and formed another group with a new authority and more 
“legitimate” leaders.  
Fifth, religious movements can generate a highly motivated, volunteer religious 
force willing to proselytize. This is absolutely applicable to Izala. Members of the 
movement are highly motivated. Their activities and contributions within the 
movement are not paid. Each member considers himself an Izala-representative who 
can transmit its message and propagate its doctrine.  
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Sixth, the level of fertility that offset the level of mortality required for any 
religious movement to survive. This point can also be identified in Izala since it 
produced and still produces leaders and members able to guarantee the continuation 
of the movement’s doctrine.  
Seventh, Rodney Stark assumes that religious movements prosper so that 
they compete against weak, local religious organizations within a relatively 
unregulated religious market. This can be empirically proved with Izala. Since its 
establishment in 1978 Izala has been competing with other Muslim groups in 
northern Nigeria. This competition has led to the recognition of Izala as part of the 
religious landscape. Izala rejects ignorance about Islam and asks Muslims to 
intensify their knowledge in this field. Izala invites people to reject any affiliation with 
Sufism and join the movement’s struggle for a “purified” Islam. By doing that, Izala is 
in a continuous competition for legitimacy with other Muslim groups. 
Eighth, new religious movements will succeed to the extent that they sustain 
strong attachments, while remaining an open social network which is able to maintain 
and form ties to outsiders. This proposition can also be affirmed in the Izala context. 
Izala offers a religious and social service to its followers. At the same time Izala is an 
open social network. Its goal is to bring newcomers and “converts” non-Muslims and 
integrate them into its doctrine. Izala maintains “bonds” of networks to non-Izala. This 
happens either through education (at schools receiving pupils from different groups 
and orientations) or through social interaction with other Muslims/non-Muslims. This 
openness is necessary for the movement to be attractive to outsiders. 
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Ninth, a religious movement continues to grow so that it can maintain sufficient 
tension with its environment. This is applicable to Izala, since the movement 
maintains a certain level of strictness towards other groups. The level of strictness 
has decreased since the first years of the establishment until today. The movement 
still defines its own identity and religious orientation, but seems to be more 
accomodating to others. This can be a seen as a way of adaptation to the necessities 
of the religious environment in northern Nigeria. 
Tenth, a religious movement has to socialize with the young sufficiently, well 
as to minimize both defection and the appeal of reduced strictness. In fact, youth are 
the target of Izala. The movement is integrated in a particular type of education at 
Izala schools. These schools and institutions are known for high levels of 
competition. Graduates especially recognize the Izala strictness of achieving its goal 
of establishing an Islamic education based on the Qur’ān and sunna and far away for 
any innovation. Izala is known - even by outsiders of the movement – by its strictness 
in achieving goals.  
Rodney Stark listed these ten points for any religious movement willing to 
achieve a certain level of success. At the same time, he expects failure of any 
religious movement for varying reasons, like division or the appearance of new 
leadership with new ideas or approaches related to authenticity. Stark argues that 
most religious movements share one aspect which he called “eventual failure”. In 
fact, Izala faced this failure when it was divided into two major groups during the life 
time of its founder, Sheikh Idris. For many years the conflicting Izala parties 
356 
 
struggeled over legitimacy and authenticity. Both sides kept the same name and the 
same structure and continued preaching to people in the name of the “authentic” 
Izala that calls Muslims to the right path of Islam. Surprisingly, Izala found its way to 
reunification in 2011.781 This may confirm Stark’s theory that failure remains 
“eventual”.  
 Several aspects of the “modes of religiosity theory” (see introductory chapter) 
introduced by Whitehouse can be proven in the Izala context. The two basic 
elements of his theory (remembering and motivation) are part of Izala’s doctrine. 
Izala insists on revivalism of the sunna of the Prophet. This revival should happen via 
studying this tradition and making it an indispensable part of the daily religious 
routine. The organization offers an easy access to this tradition: it proposes the 
relevant Quranic verses and ḥadīth quotations. It produces books and preaches to 
the adherents. Izala develops its educational curricula according to its needs. Having 
this ideology repeated to adherents in schools, mosques, in media, in writings, CDs 
and in audio-cassettes, the doctrine can be preserved indefinitely. The motivation of 
Izala members (like any Muslims) is to achieve the reward of Allah. These elements 
can also be found in the context of Sufi brotherhoods insisting on the survival of their 
sheiks and their ṭarīqa. Memorization is part of their doctrine and daily repetition of 
litanies keeps this doctrine alive. Members of Sufi groups have the same motivation 
(reward, paradise) as Izala, but differ in their methods for reaching such a goal. 
                                                 
781 I did not conduct research on the reunification of the movement. I accomplished my PhD project 
before that event took place. The reunification after many years of division may be an interesting topic 
for future research on Izala. 
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 Whitehouse gives two types of religious modes: a doctrinal and an imagistic 
one. All aspects of the doctrinal mode of religiosity are identifiable in Izala as well as 
among Sufi-groups (rituals, long-term-episodic memory, religious leaders, hierarchy 
and orthodoxy). The initial assumption that Sufism may be categorized under the 
imagistic mode of religiosity can be disproved. Sufi brotherhoods like any other 
Islamic groups experienced reform(s). Among the practices in Sufism that were rarely 
performed (imagistic modes of religiosity) became part of the doctrine itself. The use 
of drums (bandiri) was introduced by late Sheikh Nasiru Kabara, the Qādiriyya leader 
in Kano, and became a crucial element in the Qādiriyya-doctrine.782 Two crucial 
aspects proposed by Whitehouse when it comes to imagistic modes of religiosity are: 
low frequency and high emotional arousal. This assumption can be rightfully 
observed during celebrations like the birthday of the Prophet or that of the ṭarīqa 
founder Sheikh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī. These celebrations take place once a year and 
are widely distinguished with a lot of emotions. Nevertheless, the theory can be 
contradicted by the fact that the daily and weekly practices of Sufis are performed 
frequently with high emotional arousal. Tijānī‘s recite their litanies (Arabic: awrād) 
twice a day. They participate daily in so-called waẓīfa, or congregational recitation of 
a Tijānī formula. Also the Qādiriyya followers organize the so called ḥaḍra (in Arabic: 
congregational ritual) and dhikr either on Thursdays or Fridays. The use of drums 
and the repetition of religious songs either in the zāwiya or in the mosque go together 
                                                 
782 For the bandiri performance in mosques by the Qādiriyya, see Larkin, Brian (2004): Bandiri Music, 
Globalization, and Urban Experience in Nigeria, in: Social Text 81, Vol. 22(4), pp. 91-112; also Buba, 
Malami and Graham Furniss (1999): Youth Culture, bandiri, and the Continuing Legitimacy Debate in 
Sokoto Town, In: Journal of African Cultural Studies, Vol. 12 (1), pp. 27-46. 
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with a very high level of emotion. Whitehouse identifies “emotional bonds between 
participants”783 resulted from the high emotional arousal in the context of the 
imagistic mode. In fact, these “emotional bonds” can be observed on a daily basis 
during the congregational meetings of Sufis. I would argue that these emotions are 
related to the doctrinal conflict between Sufis and Izala. Any religious practice 
performed can be a place for showing emotions and distancing from other groups. 
During my field work I observed that Sufis organize from time to time walīma (in 
Arabic: gatherings like marriage or birth). In many cases, it is accompanied with food 
and celebrations. The Izala group also initiated such a walīma as an answer to the 
Sufi brotherhoods. Izala makes a point to only recite the Qur’ān. This is also a way to 
show high emotions and distance from Sufi practices. 
                                                 
783 Whitehouse (2002), p. 307.  
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Abstract (English) 
 
The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of 
Sharia Re-Implementation 
 
Ramzi Ben Amara 
 
Abstract 
The religious landscape of Northern Nigeria is very heterogeneous. Nevertheless two 
Sufi Brotherhoods, the Tijāniyya and the Qādiriyya dominated the religious field until 
the 1970s. This situation changed in 1978 with the appearance of Jama’atul Izalatzul 
Bid’a wa Ikamatis Sunna (Society for Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of 
the Sunna). This reform movement was established to fight the so called bidac (in 
Arabic: non-Islamic innovations) on the basis of the tradition of the Prophet. The long 
Islam tradition in Nigeria has to be “purified” and the model of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (in 
Arabic: the pious predecessors) should be followed. This created numerous tensions 
between Izala and Sufi Brotherhoods. 
In 1999 and during the process of transition to the Fourth Republic Nigeria, Islamic 
Penal Law was re-implemented by the Governor of Zamfara State Ahmad Sani 
Yeriman Bakuru. This step was followed by eleven northern states. This meant 
amongst others the introduction of ḥudūd-punishments – corporal punishments like 
lashing, hand amputation, or stoning to death. The re-implementation provoked a 
debate in and outside Nigeria. Many observers raised questions related to the 
constitutionality of Sharia-laws, human rights, religious freedom and to the 
democratic process. Opinions on this process were divided. 
Almost all Islamic organizations of Nigeria stood for the re-implementation of Islamic 
Law. Izala was among those who supported that project. Sharia goes side by side 
with Izala doctrine of “islamizing the society”. Izala was ready to compromise within 
the Sharia context and a kind of “domestication” of the long-going Izala-Sufi struggle 
seems to have taken place. During the Sharia-reimplementation, no Islamic 
organization (except of Shiite movement) risked opposing Sharia. Islamic Law was 
started by a single politician within a political campaign and after him the masses 
pushed in eleven states to have Sharia re-implemented.  
378 
 
Izala claimed being behind the Sharia re-implementation. One could ask if this was a 
re-orientation strategy of the movement especially after the end of its conflict with 
Sufi. Do Izala really contributed to the re-implementation of Sharia law?  
On the basis on solid fieldwork in Northern Nigeria including participant observation, 
interviews with Izala, Sufis, and religion experts, and collection of unpublished 
material related to Izala, three aspect of the development of Izala past and present 
are analysed: its split, its relationship to Sufis, and its perception of Sharia re-
implementation. “Field theory” of Pierre Bourdieu, “Religious Market theory” of 
Rodney Start, and “Modes of Religiosity theory” of Harvey Whitehouse are theoretical 
tools of understanding the religious landscape of northern Nigeria and the dynamics 
of Islamic movements and groups. 
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Abstract (German) 
 
 
Die Izala Bewegung in Nigeria: Ihre Spaltung, Beziehung zu Sufis und Sichtweise der 
Reimplementierung der Scharia 
 
Ramzi Ben Amara 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Die religiöse Landschaft Nordnigerias ist sehr vielfältig. Dennoch war bis in die 
1970er Jahre die islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft Nordnigerias durch die beiden 
großen Sufi-Bruderschaften, Qādiriyya und Tijāniyya, geprägt. Diese Situation 
änderte sich 1978 grundlegend mit der Gründung der Jama’atul Izalatzul Bid’a wa 
Ikamatis Sunna (Gesellschaft zur Beseitigung der unzulässigen Innovationen und der 
Errichtung der Sunna). Hierbei handelte es sich um eine islamische 
Reformbewegung deren Ziel die Bekämpfung unislamischer Neuerungen (Arab.: 
bidca / bidac) sowie die Errichtung einer islamischen Gesellschaft auf Grundlage der 
Tradition des Propheten war. Diese religiös legitimierten Ansprüche wandten sich 
direkt gegen die Glaubenspraxis der Sufi-Bruderschaften. Die in Nordnigeria 
etablierte Glaubenspraxis sollte gereinigt und eine Gesellschaft nach Vorbild der 
urislamischen Gemeinde errichtet werden. Die Sufi-Bruderschaften befanden sich in 
der Defensive und versuchten geeint, die von der Izala Reformbewegung initiierte 
Debatte über islamische Werte und Normen abzuwehren.  
Mit der Wiedereinführung des islamischen Strafrechts im Jahr 1999 kam es zum 
weitreichendsten Eingriff in das nigerianische Rechtssystem Nigerias seit 
Wiedererlangung der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit. Sämtliche zwölf Staaten 
Nordnigerias führten sukzessive das islamische Strafrecht ein. Hierbei handelte es 
sich um eine vollständige Einführung des islamischen Strafrechts d.h. auch die 
bereits unter den Briten abgeschafften koranischen Körperstrafen waren wieder Teil 
des Strafrechts auf bundesstaatlicher Ebene. Diese Entwicklung führte zu 
Verwerfungen mit der nicht-muslimischen Bevölkerung der betroffenen 
Bundesstaaten. Aber auch unter muslimischen Intellektuellen stieß die 
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Wiedereinführung von Teilen der Scharia nicht immer auf ungeteilte Zustimmung. Zu 
überstürzt, zu sehr vom politischen Ränkespiel beeinflusst oder einfach als Angriff 
auf internationale Menschenrechte lauteten einige der Argumente der Gegner der 
Einführung des islamischen Strafrechts.  
Nahezu alle islamischen Organisationen Nigerias standen hinter dieser Entwicklung. 
So auch die Izala Bewegung, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt zwar immer noch die 
mächtigste islamische Reformbewegung war, doch durch eine Aufspaltung in zwei 
Fraktionen geschwächt war. Diese Aufspaltung hatte eine Reihe von Gründen. 
Vordergründig ging es um gegen Mitglieder der Führungsebene gerichtete Vorwürfe, 
sie würden unislamischen Neuerungen Vorschub leisten. Letztendlich handelte es 
sich jedoch offensichtlich um einen Machtkampf innerhalb der Führung dieser 
Reformbewegung.  
Die Tatsache, dass sich im Grunde kaum eine islamische Bewegung der Welle der 
Scharia Wiedereinführung widersetzen konnte, mündete zumindest vorübergehend 
in eine Beilegung des Konflikts zwischen den Sufi-Bruderschaften und der Izala. Mit 
wenigen Ausnahmen beteiligten sich die islamischen Organisationen an einer mit der 
Wiedereinführung des islamischen Rechts einhergehenden Islamisierung des 
öffentlichen Lebens von Nordnigeria. Unklar ist jedoch welche Gruppe diese für viele 
überraschende Entwicklung initiiert hatte bzw. wessen Verdienst die 
Wiedereinführung der Scharia war.  
Letztendlich entwickelte das Scharia Projekt eine enorme Eigendynamik, die den 
gesamten Norden Nigeria überrollte. Die Gouverneure waren durch öffentlichen 
Druck gezwungen, ebenfalls die Scharia in ihrer Gänze einzuführen. Die gesetzlichen 
Rahmenbedingungen wurden zwar geschaffen, doch die eigentliche Umsetzung ging 
in den einzelnen Bundesstaaten sehr unterschiedlich vonstatten und war vom Willen 
der politischen Entscheidungsträger abhängig.  
Ihrem Selbstverständnis nach würde die Izala Reformbewegung die 
Wiedereinführung des islamischen Rechts gerne für sich reklamieren. Sicherlich hat 
sie einen Einfluss auf diese Entwicklung nehmen können, doch ob sie nun 
entscheidend war oder gar die Fäden im Hintergrund gezogen hat und das Scharia 
Projekt orchestriert hat, bleibt fraglich. Zu viele Akteure waren und sind daran 
beteiligt. 
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Die methodischen Grundlagen dieser Arbeit sind historisch-philologischer sowie 
sozialwissenschaftlicher Natur. Neben der Auswertung von Medienprodukten, 
unveröffentlichter akademischer und grauer Literatur, waren das Rückgrat dieser 
Dissertation zwei intensive Feldforschungen. Mit einer Reihe von religiösen Führern 
unterschiedlicher Provenienz, wie Izala Mitglieder, Mitgliedern von Sufi 
Bruderschaften oder unabhängige muslimische Intellektuelle wurden 
Leitfadeninterviews geführt. Den theoretischen Rahmen bildeten insbesondere die 
Feldtheorie von Pierre Bourdieu, die Theorie zu religiösen Märkten von Rodney 
Starks sowie Harvey Whitehouses Theorie zu „Modes of Religiosity“. 
